Looking for a `win-win-win' among U.S., China and Taiwan


Chinese president Jiang Zemin's recent visit to the United States stirred protests on the streets of America and the floor of Congress, with economic interests and human rights concerns in collision. Ying-Mao Kau, professor of political science, an expert on China-Taiwan relations and former president of the Taiwanese think tank the 21st-Century Foundation, recently spoke with Linda J.P. Mahdesian about Zemin and the future prospects of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations



What was your reaction to Jiang Zemin's visit?

Zemin's interest in visiting the United States has been going on for at least a year because his visit would, in some way, consolidate his power and raise his prestige in China and raise his reputation as a world leader.

Was he hand-picked by Deng Xiaoping?

It's very complex. But if I had to point out one reason, he was picked for the way he handled the democracy uprisings in 1989. At that time he was the party boss in Shanghai and the mayor of the city. He maintained law and order in the city without the tremendous violence and massacre in Beijing at Tiannamen Square. He seemed to emerge very quickly after the Tiannamen incident. I also want to emphasize that it was believed that Zemin would represent the new breed of leadership to succeed the revolutionary-era leader like Deng Xiaoping. He would be considered as a prominent technocrat who emerged after the revolution of 1949. Deng was interested in phasing out the revolutionary leaders with a group of competent, well-trained technocrats in the service of power.

What is Zemin's background?

He went to one of the prominent technical science-oriented universities, Qing Hua, in Beijing. It's considered the MIT of China. He has an engineering background. After graduation, he was recruited into the government.

Why was there such an outcry among Chinese people in America?

Zemin is considered to be part of the leadership which suppressed the democracy movement in 1989, even though he was in Shanghai. He seemed to have managed better than the bloody suppression in Beijing, but from the dissidents' point of view, he was part of the leadership which exercised suppression.

How did he avoid a Tiannamen-like massacre?

With some diplomatic skills in communicating with the dissidents. In the north, in Beijing, it was handled more by the military through violence. However, in Shanghai, he was able to handle it with greater restraint and succeeded.

What is your view of Zemin's interests in Taiwan?

[Annexation] would not succeed in the short run, because China tried to use the threat of force through missile testing last year and encountered strong opposition. Clinton responded by sending two aircraft carriers to "observe" the development along the Taiwan Strait and demonstrated his opposition to the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. I think China is very much aware of that.

Zemin has insisted that China is not going to renounce the use of force in Taiwan, but he is quite aware of the complexity of the issue because any use of force or threat of force is going to repeat what happened last year and also alarm Japan and the Southeast Asian countries.

What is your assessment of Clinton's policies on China?

Clinton's policy emphasizes comprehensive engagement. That means not to isolate China and to develop high-level contact, including economic relations. I think the policy of comprehensive engagement is very much supported by various political forces in this country. However, there are worries that engagement would develop into appeasement and that the U.S. would not take a firm stance on some other issues which we feel very strongly about, such as the human rights record of China, religious suppression, the political arena, and the security of China's commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to missile technology control. China's record in these areas is pretty bad; there are indications that China provides nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan in violation of these international agreements.

For example, this time China reiterated, in writing, its commitment to these agreements and tried to [gain] Washington's approval of the sale of nuclear reactors to China, built with American nuclear power plant technology. So the key point of debate in Washington is whether you can trust the Chinese to improve in the domain of the political and nuclear areas or not. Many congressional leaders would argue that even if China gives promises in those areas, their behavior remains to be seen.

What does this mean for Taiwan's future?

As far as Taiwan is concerned, I have a concept that the ideal situation for this summit is to create a triple-win scenario. If the U.S. and China can develop its comprehensive engagement in a healthy and constructive way, presumably China will become more cooperative and responsible in its international behavior - and this would enable the U.S. to maintain a friendly relationship with Taiwan. If the United States can maintain good relations with both China and with Taiwan, then China and Taiwan can also develop more peaceful interactions across the Taiwan Strait. So I hope the U.S. comprehensive engagement policy is achieved and [that it will] create a new era of win-win-win development.