Herschel I. Grossman is the Merton P. Stoltz Professor in the Social Sciences and professor of economics
Revolutionary rhetoric and propaganda invariably portray revolutions as struggles for human freedom. But, the romantic notions of idealists notwithstanding, this portrayal is for the most part historically incorrect. In reality, most revolutions are more accurately characterized as manifestations of kleptocratic rivalry.
Historical examples of kleptocratic ruling elites include oligarchic property-owning ruling classes, parasitic aristocracies, indolent royal courts, the leaders of powerful ruling parties, or overprivileged military establishments. In the typical revolution the incumbent ruling elite faces a challenge from an alternative ruling elite for the authority to exploit the productive members of society. A successful revolution results in the establishing of new property rights, the enthroning of a new ruling class, or both.
In the revolutions of the Middle Ages, sometimes the incumbent ruling elite was a parasitic royal court with the landowners being the alternative ruling elite, as in the case of King John and the barons, and sometimes these roles were reversed, as in the case of French kings gaining power relative to the feudal landlords. In any case, the revolutions of the Middle Ages typically involved what the historian E. L. Jones has described as "a struggle between taxes and rents," which were alternative ways of exploiting the peasants.
In the major revolutions of the 20th century, the Russian revolution being the prototype, the incumbent ruling elite typically included both owners of property and a parasitic ruling class, whereas the alternative ruling elite typically was a clique of ambitious intellectuals who, once in power, emulated the incumbent kleptocratic ruling elite. In the Soviet Union the nomenklatura became a new class of aristocrats, and the collectivization of agriculture in effect reestablished serfdom. In post-revolutionary China, as we now know, while millions of Chinese people were starving, Mao and his cronies lived in comfort, behaving like their imperial predecessors.
The characterization of 20th-century revolutions as manifestations of kleptocratic rivalry does not apply only to communist revolutions. The recent Congolese revolution in which the kleptocrat Kabila deposed the kleptocrat Mobutu is an especially stark case. But even less obvious examples are not exceptions. In South Africa the main beneficiaries of "majority rule," at least so far, seem to be the new ruling elite of ANC leaders, who are receiving what they consider to be their just rewards, which one observer summarizes as "good salaries, nice cars, patronage and perks." Astute observers of contemporary China, reacting to the common naive interpretation of the Tiananmen Square uprising as a pro-democracy movement, have pointed out that the dissidents were educated and technically skilled young people whose goal was to wrest political power from the incumbent party ruling elite. It is probably more accurate than not to describe the Tiananmen Square confrontation as a struggle for the right to exploit the Chinese peasants.
This brief historical account of revolutions brings us to the current tragic events in Serbia, especially in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The relevant facts are that several years ago politically ambitious Kosovar Albanians recognized that, with ethnic Albanians now comprising an overwhelming majority of the population of the province of Kosovo, a revolution against the Serbian-dominated elite that rules Kosovo would have a good chance of success. Initially, the rebellious Kosovar Albanian leaders used nonviolent political methods. But one increasingly important faction, known in English as the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA), launched an armed rebellion. Predictably the Serbian rulers responded to violence with violence in attempting to suppress the KLA.
Using effective propaganda about Serbian atrocities, the Kosovar Albanian leaders were able to induce the United States and its NATO allies to intervene militarily. The ostensible purpose of this intervention was to protect the Kosovar Albanian people from the cruelty of their Serbian rulers and to permit the Kosovar Albanian leaders to create a politically autonomous Kosovo. Unfortunately, the NATO air war against Serbia provoked the Serbs to behave even more cruelly toward the Kosovar Albanians.
But what about the long run? Suppose that the KLA and NATO together are successful in forcing the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo. Then, the hundreds of thousands of refugees will be able to return to their homes and their farms, and to rebuild their lives. At the same time the leaders of the Kosovar Albanians, with the armed KLA faction in the vanguard, will establish a de facto independent Kosovar state.
If this scenario comes true, we have to ask the following question: After the foreign peacekeepers have gone home, and after life in Kosovo has returned to "normal," will ordinary Kosovar Albanian people, those who are not part of the new Kosovar ruling elite, be grateful that we intervened on "their" side? Or will the successful war for Kosovar independence, like most revolutions in history, seem to them to have been only a struggle between rival kleptocrats? The new Kosovar ruling elite, if they can avoid destructive infighting, will enjoy their "good salaries, nice cars, patronage and perks." But, based on history, we have no reason to be confident that ordinary Kosovar Albanian people will be much better off in an independent Kosovo.