Professor of political science P. Terrence Hopmann (below) was asked to shed some light on the collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet and the responses of the two governments. Hopmann, an expert in international negotiation and research director of the Global Security Program at the Watson Institute for International Studies, spoke with Janet Kerlin on April 5.
Why didn't the United States apologize as soon as China asked? At this point we have very different accounts of the basic facts about what happened. The United States contends that its aircraft was conducting a routine operation off the Chinese coast outside Chinese airspace, and that the Chinese fighter buzzed it, coming too close so that a collision resulted. The Chinese contend that the U.S. plane violated Chinese airspace, that Chinese planes were trying to divert it, and that the U.S. plane veered sharply off course causing the collision. If the U.S. statement of facts is true — which we should not take for granted — then an apology would not be in order, and the expression of regret about the loss of life by a Chinese pilot issued by Secretary of State Powell would appear to be an appropriate and sufficient response. However, U.S. spy planes often have strayed over the territory of other countries in the past, followed by denials that were later proven to be untrue. Furthermore, since the territorial waters in the South China Sea are disputed due to conflicting claims by China, Vietnam and other countries over the same small islands scattered throughout the region, it is also possible that the plane was flying in airspace claimed by China but not recognized as such by others in the international community. Until these disputed facts are clarified, the issue of who should apologize to whom remains unclear. What is clear is that procedures to avoid future incidents are essential. And the U.S. call for a joint U.S.-Chinese panel to investigate the facts of the incident is also quite appropriate. What is motivating the Chinese government to take its course of action? The Chinese government has been concerned that the Bush administration has taken a somewhat harder line toward China than its predecessor, to say nothing of the previous Bush administration which was viewed in Beijing as quite sympathetic toward Chinese interests. The Chinese are especially concerned about issues such as George W. Bush's strong commitment to a national missile defense that the Chinese perceive to be directed against them and by planned military sales to Taiwan and growing sympathy in Washington for an independent Taiwan. Their decision to try to divert the spy plane, even if it was flying a routine course, might have been a way of signaling the new administration that its policies risk damaging U.S.-Chinese relations. Similarly, their attacks on "U.S. arrogance" may reflect their desire to cut the Bush administration down to size right at the outset. Indeed, this seems to have worked, as the administration has taken a quite measured response so far; had Clinton done the same, he almost certainly would have been roundly attacked by Republicans for being "soft on China." What could be done to prevent this from happening again? This is really the key issue. After the specifics of this incident have been clarified and resolved by the parties, our attention must turn to negotiating specific agreements with China similar to those we negotiated over the past 15 years with the Soviets/Russians on how to handle military incidents at sea and in the air. The sinking of a Japanese fishing vessel by a U.S. Navy submarine off Hawaii recently reminds us that a similar incident involving Chinese naval forces could also occur with far more serious consequences. Whenever military forces are operating in close proximity to one another and surveying each other's activities, incidents are possible. What we need is a series of agreements negotiated in advance about how to deal with incidents such as these, so that each incident does not create a new crisis that has to be negotiated and resolved ad hoc under the pressure and tension of the moment. At times of crisis, cooler heads often lose out to those advocating escalation in order to "save face" or "stand up" to the enemy. Such agreements, negotiated in times of peace and not under the pressure of a crisis, are already in place with the Russians and need to be negotiated with the Chinese as well.