

Photography After Photography

The Terror of the Body in Digital Space

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The subject under discussion here is neither the end of photography nor a post-photography. In the face of epoch-making technological changes, photography's artistic translation and its social utilisation require that both the medium and the concept be re-considered. The whole thinking behind and the practice of photography ask for other possibilities of translation. A century ago the Secessionists began to seek a new use for the medium of photography, independently of the fine arts. Far from having any canon of its own, photography had already gained access to all social realms where the image held sway.

Photographic pictorialism united the most varied fields of application of the medium, often in a genre-like manner, underlining in particular the subjective gesture - the signature - in the creation of images. But it could only appropriate this subjective gesture through a kind of mimicking of the other arts. Out of this desire for similarity with what already existed, namely the canon of the Nazarenes, the Pre-Raphaelites and Symbolists, up to and including the naturalistically glorified studies of genre painting, what was gained was an insight into the capacity of this new medium for abstraction.

I

When Alfred Stieglitz and Paul Strand undertook a survey into the importance of photography as an aesthetic medium three quarters of a century ago, Marcel Duchamp was not short of a reply:

New York, May 22, 1922 Dear Stieglitz, Just a few words, which I do not really even want to write. You know well what I think of photography. I would like it to make people despise painting, that is, until something else makes photography unbearable. That's how far we have come. (1)

And how far have we come in photography 75 years after Duchamp's almost apodictical attempt to instrumentalise the medium of photography for the artistic armoury of the avant-garde(s)? Have we come that far? Has the growing attention paid by the art market to photography over the past 20 years, the apparently successful inclusion of photography in the canon of museum culture, finally brought its 'unbearableness' to light? Has photographic activity (Douglas Crimp) subjected itself to the bonds of a ruling style from which it can no longer extricate itself? Must it bow down before the splendour of curatorial arbitrariness? Has photography left its privileged place - its true non-place in the configuration of the arts - and allowed its eye to be blurred by what has long since been visible, by what has long since happened to the sound, the colours, the movement of other media? Has the signal been given for it to beat an imitative retreat? Is the yearning of photography now to perish in the dusty archives and air-conditioned rooms of museums?

"After philosophy comes philosophy. But it is altered by the after."
Jean-Francois Lyotard

"After the coveting of an absolute and pure language that speaks of the world comes the deceptive discovery of the plurality of tongues entangled in the world."
Jean-Francois Lyotard

II

Is photography no longer the great occurrence to which painting and sculpture, literature and music are indebted for their exhilarating departure into the modern era? Must photography now sacrifice its allegorical - Hegel would say "frosty" - contour to the desire for a new symbolic unity in the realm of data? Will it be in a position to assert itself at all as different from the other media? And - in the event of Duchamp's prognosis being correct - what is that "Other" that could or ought to take the place of photography today as a 'counter-art', as an alternative draft? What status has authenticity or the presence of the Other in the current artistic practice of photography?

III

The exhibition *Photography after Photography* is devoted to the social and artistic position of photography in our time. From the historical point of view, the exhibition understands the first photograph, the first technically generated image, as being in conflict with the 'new media'. The scene of that conflict takes place in the confrontation between the analogical and the digital, that is, in the analogo-numerical (2) image. The digitisation of the photographic image offered great new possibilities for montage - for "extensions of the momentary", as Eisenstein called his montages - for manipulations such as have been known in the relatively short history of photography since Roger Fenton's photographs of the Crimean War, Henry Peach Robinson's 'naturalistic' negative montages, Francis Galton's composite images, or Alphonse Bertillon's photographic identikit images. The history of photography is the history of forged testimonies. Digital image production invites us to view the history of photography in the light of the here and now. Images are created anew in the surreal simultaneity of the non-simultaneous.

They are not analogical, not after nature, not after painting, not after photography. They are created in accordance with the technical and process possibilities of computability. As once Baudelaire's allegory of the artist - the rag-picker - so too artists such as Victor Burgin or Jochen Gerz make lucky finds, collect them, save them in a storage medium, and merge them into new contextual relationships on screen - released from their spatio-temporal origins. Burgin sees an analogy between the computer screen and psychic space. In the computer, the residues - the precipitate expressions - of daily perception are collected and linked by the individual with the aid of the rhetorical strategies of sublimation or transfer. Thus the shocks of the everyday are absorbed into the medium and their repetition on screen - in Freud's sense the "mystic writing pad" free of any writing - becomes a process of continual analytical transference work. Jochen Gerz, whose art like that of Burgin's has always been able to assert itself against the assumption of a monolithic character and against a mono-media form, uses the computer as he uses photography, in order to atomise and fragment "similarities" and patterns of identity. "The similarity which links me with images which are not images, is the prerequisite for the controversial act of representing them - only to realise yet again that this is not possible." (3)

IV

Confronted with the new digital imaging techniques some people are quite outraged (German:

entrÿstet suggesting disarmed) by the veiled deception which lies concealed in these images. Outraged and thus disarmed, because they have no device at their disposal which might aid them in their observation, help them to trace back the image to a reality that is common to us all and in compliance with our social consensus. This deception cannot be penalised. In our "photological" (Adorno/Horkheimer) credulousness, we are no longer able to even suspect it. Instead we quickly avail ourselves of those handy linguistic scraps, those bits and pieces from a vocabulary nourished on media theory and imbued with the style of the feuilleton, a vocabulary which thinks that by the use of terms such as simulation, simulacrum, virtual reality, cyberspace etc., it is naming something that actually no longer exists, something that requires a new grammar, a new syntax, ultimately, a new logic the elements of which we are only gradually beginning to discern.

The digital imaging techniques have literally put on hold, turned off, eliminated the photographic model of representation - that spatio-temporal link between a light sensitive medium and a spatio-temporal constellation / configuration in front of the camera. The ontology of the photographic image as formulated in the 1920s from Kracauer to Benjamin and later from Bazin to Barthes, has been shaken to its very foundations. Even the index theory based on the writings of Charles S. Peirce now seems obsolete in the face of the binary coding of photographic contingency. (4)

V

The preposition after refers both to the temporal and spatial difference in photographic representation, and thus to the space and time of the referential which is so fundamental to the photographic image. (5) The historically established belief in the authenticity of the photographic image has its roots in the assumption that a physical-chemical apparatus can (re)produce the displaced analogue image of an optically perceivable phenomenon. We believe in photography just as we believe in our shadow. From the inventor of the negative process, William Henry Fox Talbot, to the 'revolution in seeing', an agenda formulated in the first third of this century, the basis for the social, artistic and theoretical treatment of photography has always been an implicit linking of the technically generated photographic image to a referential outside that image.

Whether as a 'faithful imitation', an anamorphous, distorted 're-creation' or as a subjective design, right up until the 70s the photographic image had still to withstand comparison with an 'ideal' (German: vor-bildliche, pre-image) reality of which it was held to be the artistic but binding indexical representation. Photography was understood in its relationship to the coordinates of space and time in which it originated and which left their mark on it. That is to say, it was understood to the extent that it was able to correspond to, or contradict our traditional view of things. Photography is the image of our history. It has been regarded by some as a source of historical records, by others as the ruin of a historical continuum. It took the progressive digitisation of the pictorial and lexical worlds, both grounded in analogy, to show us just how far we had evolved down the road towards becoming 'homo photographicus'. (6)

"The good photographer is the one who offers the de-fi-ni-ti-ve image. Perfect."
Jean Genet

VI

In the 1930s Walter Benjamin lamented that photography was emancipating itself more and more from any "physiognomic, political, scientific interest" and was now aspiring to be "creative". According to Benjamin, this aspiration to creativity betrays a photographic attitude "which can mount any tin can in space but cannot grasp a human context". How does today's artistic practice react to the almost unlimited digital possibilities for "montage"? Are we to expect - in a historical return - a post-aestheticisation of photography determined by soft- and hardware? Or will it be possible not just to continue the history of representation in the analogo-numerical translation but also to actually think it anew?

Once atomised into pixels (picture elements), digital imaging techniques are able to modify each and every pictorial representation of reality at will, to erase it or to supplement it. Politically and aesthetically different from the classical montage techniques of the 'historical' avant-garde (from Dadaism to Fluxus), digital imaging techniques are clearly involved in the work of arbitrating between differences (binary substitutes are only discernible arithmetically, not visually). Digital pictorial montage may be compared to a puzzle: its individual parts are now being allocated to each 'player' to be formed as he or she wishes, whereby the target image too is affected by a technical process determinism.

VII

Photography after Photography sees the traditional light-image in a critical relationship with the new image potential which has been given to photography through the algorithm. Whereas digital image processing has dominated professional image processing in telecommunications and press agencies since the beginning of the 1980s and at the moment these latter have at their disposal worldwide the most advanced electronic "dark rooms" (a nice contradiction) in the public, that is to say, non-military, domain, the art world could only begin to come to terms with digital image processing with the advent of personal computers (one exception being Nancy Burson's early composite images). There is no doubt that digital image processing is as unlikely to replace traditional photography as the latter was able to replace painting, or film replace photography, or video replace the film etc.

The digitisation of photography simply means its translation into a numerically coded - and therefore non-visual - legibility, a translation which it shares with the other media of sound, writing or film. It can now join these media in the digital pool. An appropriately equipped computer encodes writing, sound, photograph or film, irrespective of the medium, and burdens the user with the semantic differentiation of a basic algorithm. Multimedia designates not a wealth of different media but the media correspondences implicit in the computer. Thus digitisation offers us new kinds of image spaces in which the possibilities of modulation are limited by arithmetic alone and in which the links with reality can be shifted arbitrarily. Image and space, representation, the historical archive and the human archive (memory with its elementary contiguity) are destined to be subjected to an as yet inconceivable "revision".

The exhibition Photography after Photography shows the challenges to which the psychic apparatus is to be exposed. If, as Derrida writes in his book *Mal d'Archive*, these technological changes should also intervene in the structures of the psychic apparatus, "for example, in its spatial architecture and its economy of speed, in its arrangement of space and time, then what we are dealing with is no longer a simple linear advance within representation, within the representative value of the model, but with a whole new logic". (7)

VIII

How will western culture, whose pictorial tradition is essentially based on analogue / analogical pictorial worlds, be able to refer in future to a primarily numerical presence set down in images and writing, in sounds and forms? One of the myths of the origins of painting contains the idea of a technically analogical image. According to Pliny the Elder, Dibutades, daughter of the potter of the same name, draws the outline of the shadow of her departing lover which had been cast onto the wall by the candlelight. This act of turning to the future memory is undertaken at the price of a turning away from the sight of the present: Dibutades turns her gaze away from her lover and bends over to draw the outline of his shadow on the wall. Sciagraphy, a form of drawing based on the negative, divides the moment up into the moment of its loss and the moment projected into the future when it will be recalled.

Sciagraphy turns the vision of light into the fixing emanation of darkness, "this shadow writing introduces an art of blinding" (8). In the blackening of the silver bromide (as an impression of the present, the present time) light become the shadow of time. The shadow writing signifies a turning away from the light in favour of the recollection of its appearances: "une ombre est une mŕmoire simultanŕe" (9) - it is in the shadow that what is past achieves the simultaneity of its original image. Thus darkness is not just a turning away from a presence but also the 'simultaneous' recollection of the light.

The myth of the origin of painting was also drawn on when naming the invention of reproducible photographs. William Henry Fox Talbot used this term already in 1834 to name the process of transforming his photographic process from the positive to the negative. Photography is the first medium to raise the subsequence of the immediate to the status of an image by means of a technical, i.e. physical-chemical process. Photographs administer estates. Their historicity lies in the spaces they have left. And today, every gaze at the photographs undeniably inherits what is past. In this translation, which goes far beyond a mere iconography, lies the time-bound artistic potential of the photographic: there is always an ancestor involved, there is always a demand for a translation. Herein too lies the allegorical wealth of photography. In the temporal completeness of the exposition, in its finitude, it literally ruins all thought of a present, establishes each moment in its difference. Derrida speaks of a "memory of the present " which inscribes the difference into the "presence of the present": "and thus by the same token the possibility of being repeated in representation". (10)

IX

Talbot wrote a text announcing the publication of his *Pencil of Nature* (1844-1846), his "philosophy of photography" published on subscription in six instalments and the first book to contain photographic illustrations. In that text he writes: "Needless to say, the plates in the book ... are themselves the photographs as produced by the effect of the light, and not engravings after their model" (11) (*italics H. v. A.*). With this remark Talbot distanced himself from Lerebours' work *Excursions Daguerriennes* which appeared in 1841 and in which there were, as Talbot put it, "carefully executed engraving after photographic models" (*italics H. v. A.*). This temporal and modal preposition after is important. It signifies not only the temporal but also the local, spatial difference in the photographic representation, i.e. the dislocation of the referential, fundamental to photography, accompanied by the difference (Derrida), the temporal deferring of a moment which has occurred, that is to say, the division of the moment into the mindfulness of what it left behind, its estate.

"One ought to destroy the lens, smash the gramophone, and ask oneself whether this worldly space is really available to us free of charge, and who is paying for the light in it? In other words, who advances us the costs for this badly constructed space in which the old puzzles get the best of us, in which we find all that silly nonsense about time and space, which is so worn out, so patched, and in which no one believes anymore!"

Villiers de l'Isle-Adam

X

Photograph after nature is how it is always put in historical lists of plates so as to underline the unquestionable character of the authenticity of the image. But there is also the photograph after nature in the non-mimetic sense, as the construction of a simulacrum. Works of arts, argues Plato in his *Politeia*, are "the third kind of bringing-forth reckoned in terms of the pure emergence of the idea which is first" (the god, the craftsman, the copier). (12) The gradations from the original to the mimetic imitation descend from the idea (eidos) to the copy (eidolon) and finally to the copy of the copy (phantasma).

Later in his *Sophist* Plato distinguishes between two kinds of imitation within mimesis: Firstly, the image (eikon) or "likeness-making" ... "when an artist produces a copy that follows the proportions of the original in length, breadth and depth and gives each part of it its proper colour". (13) Secondly, the semblance, which is illusory because "it is viewed at a deceptive angle, but which to a man whose vision was fully adapted to so large an object would not even resemble the original of which it claims to be a copy". Whereas the eikon allows at least a truthful copy to appear, the simulacrum is an illusion which deforms and distorts the perspective. The latter does not stand up to close examination. Were there an appropriate place from which to observe it, the simulacrum would betray itself as dissimilar in relation to its model.

"So all we have to do is wait for those 'seeing machines' which can see and perceive in our stead."

Paul Virilio

XI

The concept of the simulacrum derived from the Platonic theory of ideas differs from that frequently used by Jean Baudrillard. In his book *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Baudrillard, whose concept of simulation has been much quoted over the past two decades even in the theory of art, conceives the simulacrum(s) of the third order as different both from imitation of the original and from the serial reproduction of advanced capitalism. In the third order the simulacrum is defined in relation to models "from which all forms emerge through a slight modulation of differences". This means that "the only thing that confers meaning is belonging to the model, nothing proceeds anymore in accordance with a goal, everything emerges from the model, the referent-signified to which everything is referred, which has a kind of anticipated finality and the only probability." (14) Thus the copy (German: *Nachbild*, *afterimage*) would seem to be caught up in a circular movement within which the model is both the original and final image. In this sense the after is also thebefore.

In the early 1980s Baudrillard's thesis was that the aesthetic could not have a place in

hyperreality anymore because it can no longer have a differential relationship to reality "which is merged with its own image". The artificial is at the centre of reality. Reality is "a schizophrenic intoxication of serial signs which know no imitation, no sublimation, which are locked up in their repetition - who could say where the reality of that which they simulate is?" (15) In Baudrillard's "schizophrenic intoxication" the artist becomes a psychotic who tries to compensate for his loss by making a fetish of the Other. Baudrillard's simulation theory means the obliteration of the difference between the copy (German: Nachbild) and the original model (German: Vorbild), between a trace preceding the representation, and the referential restoration of the reproduction to a world outside the image.

XII

In his books *Difference and repetition* (Engl. 1969) and *The Logic of Sense* (Engl. 1969), Gilles Deleuze presents a reading of Plato in which simulation and difference are grasped as difference. Deleuze writes: "When we say of the illusion (i.e. simulacrum) that it is a copy of a copy, an eternally graduated icon, an eternally shattered similarity, we miss the most essential thing: the essential difference between illusion and copy, the aspect through which they form the two halves of a division. The copy is an image equipped with similarity, the illusion an image without similarity." (italics H. v. A.) (16) Although the simulacrum possesses a general "similarity effect" it is still essentially constructed on difference. "It interiorises a dissimilarity" which results in us being unable to find in it either a trace of the presence of an original or of a copy. What we can trace is, so to speak, its radical separateness from both.

It is in this very difference that the simulacrum finds its shape. The "similarity effect" - not to be confused with Barthes' "effet du réel" - is based on stereotype givens against which the simulacrum stands out, while at the same time citing them. The simulacrum as a phantasm cannot be traced back to something original or to a referential contained within it. Thus it represents nothing which could substantiate a temporal after. Pierre Klossowski writes: "In the imitative sense, the simulacrum is the actualisation of something which in itself cannot be communicated or represented: the phantasm in its obsessive compulsion." (17) Accordingly, for us the simulacrum would be the phantasmical construction of the real.

"If we set ourselves down on the bank of the moments so as to observe them as they flow by, all we are able to recognise in them in the end is a meaningless succession, time which has lost its substance, abstract time, a transformation of our inner void. One step further, and from abstraction to abstraction it becomes more and more threadbare through our fault, it dissolves into temporality, it become a shadow of itself. Our task now is to give it back life, and to adopt a clear and unambiguous attitude towards it."
E. M. Cioran

XIII

Analogo-numerical photography imposes a new grammatical direction on our seeing. Our habitualised power of visual perception is destined to be directly effected not only by the manipulation of the image, which cannot be traced back to a material origin, but above all by the general availability of images as sets of data capable of being managed and interchanged endlessly. Even if the analogo-numerical image can still be recognised via its representative values, the photographic image will no longer be able to qualify as a translation of a spatio-

temporal moment. The analogo-numerical image is separated from its origin, its negative. It is without a shadow. Seeing is impeded in its elementary process of recognition and is unable to achieve a translation of what it recognises into memory, which is grounded in representation.

For photography after photography, therefore, one central issue is: how are we to look upon the photographic image, once historically established as a medium of traces, in its separateness from the world? The works on show in this exhibition all take into account this rift which is of fundamental importance for the history of representation in the west. The image may be able to draft alternative worlds, but these are grounded in a concept of similarity which has been decisively influenced by photography itself since the middle of the last century. Walter Benjamin once described the atmosphere in a photographer's studio at the turn of the century; he found himself "distorted through a similarity with everything that is here around me". A human being becomes a prop which like any other object can be moulded and technically generated. The design Human being will be circulated around the schools as a new draft.

The shaping of the human being, the intervention into the anthropological constants of the sexual difference, the composition of the body from heterogeneous sources, the deformation of corporeal integrity - these are elementary interventions into the very fabric of the subject's similarity and identity. Organic medicine designates these procedures as transplants. Neurobiology, neurophysiology and research into artificial intelligence have long since been preoccupied with this organ-related or genetic bricolage - in LŽvy-Strauss' anthropological sense of the term. The human being becomes a project, drawn in, as it were, like a plaything into the projection of alternative worlds.

XIV

A few years ago VilŽm Flusser wrote: "'digital' appearance is the light which illuminates for us the night of the gaping void around us and in us. We ourselves are then the floodlights which beam the alternative worlds against the nothing and into the nothing." (18) Flusser recommends relativising the term 'real' in accordance with its resolution into dot elements: 'thus something is more real according as the dot distribution is denser, and more potential the more sparse this is'. This digital view of the world could be summarised as follows: Identity is in the process of dissolution.

The artists Aziz and Cucher, both living in California, allow the people in their portraits to become submerged in sense-lessness. Keith Cottingham generates twins by creating in the computer a confluence of classical drawing techniques, a moulded mask and photographs. Nancy Burson's composite works atomise individuals so as to visualise their percentage share of power as a calculable entity or to present them proportional to the familiarity of the general public with their image. Alba D'Urbano allows the computer to design sewing-patterns of her body and makes a suit of her skin to clothe the emptiness. All these works - however much their aesthetic character may differ - achieve a joint translation: they lead the image of the human being out of an iconographic tradition and into the uncertainty of its presentability.

XV

The bodies are distorted and terrified; if the shadow was once the guarantor of human historicity - the shadow bearing witness to the presence of the person, placing him in the light

of time - it is now being digitally deranged and relieved of its capacity to be handed down. The handling of digital media technology is accompanied not only by an often astonishing euphoria, a technophilia, an intoxication on the part of the net surfers, but also and ultimately by a fear intensified to the point of paroxysm, the fear of not being able to find a way back to a place anymore, once that place has been abandoned, that is to say, the fear of not being able to be present in any place anymore at a distance from the here and now. And just as photography removes the moment from its time, gives it a "posthumous chock" (Benjamin), so too analogo-numerical photography frees that moment from its essential link with the temporal before and after.

XVI

But of course we continue to make an indexical link between the image and the real, the actual 'has been there' of the body in front of the camera. But a doubt, a concern, a fear has crept into our understanding of these images. And this fear intrudes on our self-evident notion of representation and recollection. According to Barthes, this 'has been there' constitutes the noema of the photograph. Therein lies the fascination of the photographic medium, that which is so captivating about it, which distinguishes it from all other reproduction media. The suspicion that 'perhaps it was not there', that there could be parts on the pictorial surface - the material medium - that were never blackened by photons, this existential doubt leads on to an impression of terror. It is not what is represented that gives rise to that terror but the possibility of the presentation, the potentiality of a digital world which would no longer permit a distinction - if ever one actually existed - between the real impression (how the light 'impresses' itself into the surface and also marks the mental image in the translation) and a 'representation' generated in the darkness of the computer.

"Perhaps numerical thinking is not concerned with knowledge of the world but with projecting the numerical code outwards and finally recuperating what was projected. Numerical knowledge, therefore, is a theoretical problem."

Vilém Flusser

XVII

"The terrifying," writes Heidegger, "is unsettling; it places everything outside its own nature. What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies? It shows itself and hides itself in the way in which everything presences, namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distances, the nearness of things remains absent." (19) This unsettled state signifies the human condition of fear, of disarming distress, even about an encounter: when un-settled or dis-armed we are exposed, dislocated. "All distances in time and space are shrinking ... Everything gets lumped together into uniform distancelessness." But terror also means that something is removed from the "trough of its disposition" and is concealed without trace. In the realm of digital data on the other hand, concealedness is a purely calculable entity which is neither 'close to the skin' nor perceptible. Perhaps in future, analogo-numerical photography will turn physical space into psychic space and transform our locally fixed body into the non-local, the uncanny (German: Unheimliche, suggesting homeless) - a-topic.

XVIII

After photography comes photography, but it is altered by the after.

Notes

1. Part of this survey is reproduced in: Wolfgang Kemp (ed.) *Theorie der Fotografie II, 1912-1945*, Munich 1979, pp. 39-44. (Back)
2. In order to avoid the ambiguous formulation "digital photography" I have opted for Bernard Stiegler's term analogo-numerical, "RŽmanence et discrŽtion des images", in: *Art/Photographie numŽrique. L'Image rŽinventŽe*, CYPRES, fcole d'Art d'Aix-en-Provence, Aix-en-Provence 1995, pp. 220-252. (Back)
3. "Die kŸnsterliche Produktion von Bildern in einer Gesellschaft des Spektakels. Ein GesprŸch von Sarah Rogenhofer und Florian RŸtzer mit Jochen Gerz", in: Florian RŸtzer (ed.), *Digitaler Schein. Œsthetik der elektronischen Medien*, Frankfurt/Main, 1991, p. 535. (Back)
4. Cf. Jean Marie Schaeffer, *L'Image prŽcaire. Du dispositif photographique*, Paris 1987, pp. 32. (Back)
5. It is one of the characteristics of contemporary art that it scarcely allows a differentiation between reference and referential. Whereas reference, as a process, is left to observation, the referential is inherent in the work. I use the word "referential" in Derrida's sense (le rŽferentiel). German translations use "das Referentielle" which, however, ignores the link with the "diffŽrentiel", the differential, although, as in the realm of mechanics, it concerns the transmission of what is different but yet geared to each other. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *The Deaths of Roland Barthes in: Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Merleau-Ponty*, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman, Routledge, London & New York 1988. (Back)
6. Cf. Abraham M. Moles, 'Alors ... mais pourquoi photographier?', in: *Les Cahiers de la Photographie*, no. 8, Paris 1982, pp. 151-160. (Back)
7. Jacques Derrida, *Mal d'Archive. Une impression freudienne*, Paris 1995, p. 32. (Back)
8. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind*, University of Chicago Press 1993. The original calls it "un art d'aveuglement" suggesting an art of blindness or blinding. (Back)
9. *Ibid.* (Back)
10. Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs for Paul de Man*, Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 60. (Back)
11. Cf. Hubertus v. Amelunxen, *Die aufgehobene Zeit. Die Erfindung der Photographie durch William Henry Fox Talbot*, Berlin 1987, pp. 42 and H. v. Amelunxen "Nach der Fotografie", lecture held in Braunschweig 1992, published in: *ZugŸnge zu einer OberflŸche. VortrŸge zur Fotografie an der HBK Braunschweig*, Braunschweig 1995, pp. 60-71. (Back)
12. Plato (515 c) quoted in Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1, Engl. transl. David Farrell Krell, Harper & Row, New York 1979, pp. 184. (Back)
13. The quotation here is from Plato, *Parmenides, Theaitetos, Sophist, Statesman*, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London 1961, folio number 236, p. 180. (Back)
14. Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Sage Publications, London 1993. (Back)
15. *Ibid.* (Back)
16. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, Columbia University Press, 1993; cf. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, The Athlone Press, London 1994. (Back)
17. Pierre Klossowski, *La Ressemblance*, Marseilles 1984, p. 76. (Back)
18. VilŸm Flusser, "Der digitale Schein" in: Florian RŸtzer (ed.), *Digitaler Schein. Œsthetik der elektronischen Medien*, Frankfurt/Main, 1991, p. 159. (Back)
19. Martin Heidegger, "The Thing", in: *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Engl. transl Albert Hofstadter, Harper & Row, London, 1971, pp. 166. (Back)

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