Was Alcibiades a Good General?

Sharon Press
Brown University

and though in public he managed the affairs of the war best, in private, everyone, resenting his practices and turning to others, soon brought the city to ruin.[1]

Alcibiades captured the interest of the Athenians in a way unlike that of any of his contemporaries. We know he was a great personality, a great seducer, but was he a good general? Throughout his lifetime, opinions on him were mixed: some considered him a danger to the state and the cause of its downfall; others believed that he could lead Athens to a position of ascendancy and, later, that he might still save her from ruin. Thucydides suggests that Alcibiades did have the potential to lead Athens to great heights. Despite his condemnation of Alcibiades, private excesses, he praises his abilities in conducting the war. He suggests that if Alcibiades had not transgressed behavioral norms in the way that he did, then the Athenians might not have been lead by their fear and distrust to overlook his abilities and dismiss the man who promised them victory. Plutarch follows Thucydides' lead in his portrayal of Alcibiades. Likewise critical of the self-indulgent and self-aggrandizing aspects of his character, Plutarch is unambiguous in his regard for Alcibiades' abilities as a general. Diodorus, too, records Alcibiades' skill as a commander and leader, and Xenophon emphasizes Alcibiades' service to the state, rather than the harm he was charged with causing it.[2] Did Alcibiades' skill in magnifying his powers, combined with the turn of events, seduce the historians into singing his praises, or did he prove himself a good general through his actions on the field?

To evaluate Alcibiades' performance we first need some criteria: what is a good general? Xenophon, in a series of conversations recorded between Socrates and several young men aspiring to positions of leadership in the state, gives us some guidelines.[3] Socrates explains to the first of these men that a thorough knowledge of tactics does not in itself make a good general. A good general "must be resourceful, active, careful, hardy, and quick-witted; he must be both gentle and brutal, at once straightforward and designing, capable of both caution and surprise, lavish and rapacious, generous and mean, skillful in defence and attack."[4] At first glance the list seems empty in its inclusiveness, but Socrates does point to a number of qualities that a good general must have. He must combine an enterprising spirit with sufficient caution so that, while he will not be reluctant to risk his life in order to advance the interests of his state, he will also not be so adventurous as to carelessly endanger the lives and the cause of those who elect him. He must be shrewd and capable of designing an intelligent plan of action given particular circumstances, but he must also be resourceful so that he can adjust his plan to changing circumstances. He should be engaging enough to arouse the troops and enlist their support, but also stern enough to ensure discipline and obedience to his commands. Socrates reminds the young man that he must also have technical expertise; a general, after all, must also know how to properly arrange the troops and how to engage the enemy best.

Alcibiades fits this bill. His resourcefulness, intelligence, sense of enterprise, and charisma contributed to his success in the Hellepont from 410 to 407. The record of his activity in these years also suggests that he combined a practical knowledge of strategy with the desirable character traits. Still, this assessment needs to be qualified; indeed, some of Alcibiades' character traits were detrimental to his conduct. In particular, his excessive personal ambition often prevented him from making impartial, well-reasoned policy recommendations. Alcibiades' failure in this respect is significant, but it does not mean he was a bad general, especially if we consider the primary duty of a general to be performance on the field, not the determination of state policy.

Alcibiades' primary failures, then, were his early expeditions of undue boldness. In his general aims, Alcibiades did not balance his daring spirit with a sufficient sense of caution. Both his desire to instigate war with Sparta in 420 and his encouragement of the expedition against Sicily in 415 (along with the unrealistic hope, as recorded by Thucydides, "to reduce Sicily and Carthage"[5]) represent a failure to properly assess the strength of the enemy due to excessive eagerness. As Gomme puts it, in reference to Alcibiades' first actions as general in 420: "it was a grandiose scheme for an Athenian general at the head of a mainly Peloponnesian army to march through the Peloponesse cocking a snook at Sparta when her reputation was at its lowest."[6] The expedition had little practical value, for although Alcibiades was able to persuade the Patrians to carry their Long Walls to the sea, he was prevented by the Corinthians, Sicyonians and others from establishing the fort he sought to build near Rhium.[7] The war policy in general, which Alcibiades took upon himself to initiate through the trick he played on the Spartan envoys earlier in the year, ended in failure at Mantinea in 418. Thucydides indicates that Alcibiades was similarly heedless in his ambition when he encouraged the expedition against Sicily. Thucydides' narrative suggests that Nicias was right in his estimation of the strength of the Sicilian states; and Thucydides comments that his wise advice was ignored because Alcibiades was able to mislead and persuade an "overly-eager multitude."[8] In both cases, Alcibiades' bold but imprudent policy, when adopted by the Athenians, had detrimental consequences.

Given these instances alone we would conclude that Alcibiades failed to balance a sense of enterprise with a due sense of caution. But Alcibiades displayed the same readiness for action characteristic of his general policy more advantageously in his specific pursuits. His arrival at the battle of Abydus in 411, for example, turned an evenly balanced contest into an Athenian victory.[9] Even his departure for Notium to join Thrasybulus in Phocaea in 406 can be viewed as part of his general readiness to come to the aid of his fellow commanders when recognizing that they are in need of assistance. On this occasion, of course, Alcibiades made the mistake of leaving his force in the wrong hands. The orders he left with Antiochus (not to engage the enemy), however, do serve to illustrate that in his individual pursuits, Alcibiades was not so eager for action that he failed to assess the situation properly: presumably, he left Notium to make himself of use elsewhere, recognizing that it was not yet the proper time to engage Lysander. While Alcibiades cannot be absolved of all charges, here, since it is the responsibility of a good general to appoint trustworthy men to position of leadership, his overall activities from 410 to 407 suggest that his kind of poor judgement was the exception rather than the rule.

Alcibiades' victories in the Hellespont seemed to rely more on his particular abilities than on luck, though this is sometimes difficult to determine, given the information we have. In the case of the battle of Cyzicus, for example, the problem lies in the different accounts given by the sources.[10] According the Xenophon, Alcibiades approached Cyzicus during a rainstorm, which, as Plutarch comments, served to conceal his advance ad enabled him to elude the enemy.[11] According to Diodorus, on the other hand, Alcibiades' victory was due, not to the luck of a rainstorm, but to a carefully conceived plan: Alcibiades advanced with a small squadron in order to draw the Spartans out to battle, and, after he successfully deceived Mindarus with this ploy, the squadrons of Thrasybulus and Theramenes came to join him, cutting off the Spartan's retreat. In Diodorus' account, Alcibiades captured and damaged Mindarus' ships in the harbor by throwing out grappling irons, and he pursued Mindarus to Cleri where they engaged in heavy fighting.[12] Alcibiades' victory at Cyzicus was significant because it revitalized the Athenians at this stage in the war. Regardless of which account we accept, the fact that the victory re-established the Athenians' faith in Alcibiades at least suggests that he was instrumental in bringing it about. Even if we do not credit Alcibiades with the particular strategic maneuver attributed to him by Diodorus, we can safely commend his leadership abilities on this occasion.

Xenophon's account of the battle highlights these leadership abilities. Xenophon writes that at Proconesus Alcibiades called an assembly "at which he told the mean that they would have to fight by sea, on land and against the fortifications. 'The fact is,' he said, 'that we have no money at all while they have got plenty which they have got from the king.'"[13] Alcibiades was able to arouse and motivate his troops before the battle. In this regard, his abilities as speaker and his charismatic nature served as assets. Meanwhile, Alcibiades' proclamation that anyone caught informing the enemy of the size of the fleet would be put to death indicates that he possessed the firmness of a good disciplinarian. And Alcibiades' instructions themselves indicate his awareness of the situation at hand. He recognized the need to conceal the size of his fleet in order to deceive Mindarus and lure him into battle. His orders also indicate that he recognized the financial strains which necessitated increased efficiency. Alcibiades was aware of such financial limitations through the period of his activities in the Hellepont, and was instrumental in attaining money for the army. He raised large sums in Cyzicus and Selymbria after capturing Cyzicus;[14] he persuaded many Thracians and the inhabitants of Chersonesus to join his troops after his siege of Chalchedon,[15] and he raised money in Samos and Caria before his return home.[16] The value of this task should not be ignored since a good general, in addition to being technically skilled, must be able to provide for his troops.

The accounts of Alcibiades' capture of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and Byzantium, like that of Cyzicus, reveal a discrepancy among the sources. In general, Plutarch gives Alcibiades a more prominent role in the operations than does Xenophon. For example, in his depiction of the siege of Byzantium, Plutarch credits Alcibiades with a stratagem for capturing the city not recorded by Xenophon: after Alcibiades arranged that Byzantium be betrayed to him, Plutarch writes, he sailed away in broad daylight, and returned at night for a surprise attack. The unexpected attack served to draw the Byzantians out into the harbor and gave the betrayers of the city a chance to admit him.[17] Diodorus records the same ploy and adds, in reference to the battle which ensued, that "the Athenians would not have conquered the city by fighting, had not Alcibiades, perceiving his opportunity, had the announcement made that no wrong should be done to the Byzantines; for at his word the citizens changed sides and turned upon the Peloponnesians."[18] Diodorus and Plutarch, as late accounts, are open to the charge of embellishment, but it should be noted that they both rely on Ephorus for the details not found in Xenophon. And again, even if the details are a rhetorical embellishment on Ephorus' part, they at least reflect the kind of innovation and resourcefulness which the Athenians believed Alcibiades possessed. The magnificent welcome Alcibiades received on his return to Athens in 407, and his subsequent appointment as strategos autokrator, is impressive testimony to the confidence the Athenians had in his abilities.

Looking at this period of activity, it is not surprising that the sources are unanimous in their praise of Alcibiades' abilities. With the exception of his poor judgment in this delegation of authority to Antiochus at Notium, Alcibiades' performance in the Hellepont reveals admirable qualities. Plutarch writes that Alcibiades' enemies were responsible for persuading the Athenians to discharge him after Notium, and he represents their decision as unjustified: "[a]nd it would seem that if ever a man was ruined by his exalted reputation, that man was Alcibiades. His continuous successes gave him such a repute for unbound daring and sagacity, that when he failed in anything, men suspected his inclination; they would not believe in his inability."[19] Diodorus adds that, in addition to his mistake at Notium, Alcibiades was discharged on account of false accusations brought against him by his enemies.[20] Alcibiades' withdrawal to Thrace at this point raises the speculation, which was likely entertained by some Athenians only a few years later, of a possible alternate course of events had Alcibiades retained the command.

Thucydides raises this suggestion when he writes that the Athenians brought the city to ruin through their dismissal of Alcibiades and their entrusting of the city to other hands (assuming, as Gomme argues, that Thucydides refers here to Alcibiades' discharge in 406, rather tan in 415).[21] In a retrospective aside on the Sicilian expedition earlier in his history, Thucydides gives Alcibiades similar credit. He writes that the expedition failed "not so much through a miscalculation of power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons by which they not only paralysed operations on the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home."[22] While Thucyides intends the passage more as an illustration of the consequences of internal discord, and of reliance on the "whims of the multitude," than as an analysis of the expedition itself, he implies that Alcibiades was not so misguided in his estimation in 415 as might be believed. Since, as Gomme points out, this judgement (that the expedition was not ill-conceived) is inconsistent with Thucydides' narrative in Books VI and VII, it is probable that the thought was conceived later than the narrative. According to this interpretation, Thucydides wrote the narrative soon after the Sicilian expedition, while he made the judgement some time after 404.[23] Thucydides, then, would have incorporated his knowledge of Alcibiades' performance in the Hellepont from 411-407 in arriving at this revised judgement. In other words, the abilities exhibited by Alcibiades during this period might have led Thucydides to believe that Alcibiades had the power to accomplish the task he set for himself in 415. This same knowledge would have shaped his judgement that, publicly, Alcibiades conducted the affairs of the war best.

And yet, though Alcibiades can be considered a good general on the basis of his performance in the Hellepont, he would not be considered so on the basis of his performance in Sicily. Thucydides himself implicitly condemns Alcibiades' strategy in Sicily when he writes, in another context, that Nicias "by wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt, and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he had attacked immediately."[24] Alcibiades' plan of attempting to win the support of the Sicilian cities, rather than attacking Syracuse immediately, involved the same kind of delay. While it could be argued that Alcibiades, had he been in Nicias' place, would have changed the plan given the new circumstances, there remains the fact that Alcibiades' original strategy did not meet with any success. When Alcibiades was recalled in 415, he was in the process of attempting to effect the plan and, although he succeeded in securing the alliance of Naxos and Catane, he failed to secure that of Messene and Camarina.[25] Even after Alcibiades' departure, Nicias and Lamachus continued to follow Alcibiades' plan, attempting to obtain the support of Himera and abstaining from an attack on Silenus, but the policy ultimately proved futile.[26] Nevertheless, Alcibaides' failure here does not call for a negative evaluation of his overall abilities. Given Thucydides' account of events in Books VI and VII, it seems that the expedition was too ambitious from the start. It is not clear that Lamachus' plan would have proved any more successful and, given the strength of Sicilian cities, perhaps Alcibiades was right to be apprehensive about an immediate attack on Syracuse. Alcibiades was wrong to advise the expedition in the first place, and even his skills a commander could do little to accomplish it.

At this point it seems appropriate to consider the extent to which a good general should put the concerns of the state before his personal concerns. As Thucydides represents Alcibiades' advocacy of war with Sparta in 420 and of the Sicilian expedition in 415, it seems clear that Alcibiades was motivated more by personal considerations than be a consideration of the correctness f the policy he advised. In 420 Alcibiades opposed peace with Sparta because "he was offended with the Lacedaimonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicia and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as proxeni."[27] In 415, he encouraged the expedition because he "wished to thwart him in his speech," and because he "was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes."[28] Thucydides represents such personal motivations as compatible with the interests of the state, writing, for example, that Alcibiades also "thought the Argive alliance really preferable."[29] While personal considerations inevitably guide decision making, a good general should not allow ambition to blind him in his recommendation of state policy as it did Alcibiades in 420 and 415. As Socrates explains, Agamemnon is dubbed "shepherd of the people" by Homer because one of the features of a good leader is that he care more about the good of the men who have chosen him than he care about his own good.[30] It might further be objected that loyalty to the state is an important mark of good generalship. Alcibiades, of course, displayed little evidence of it when he betrayed information of the Athenian plot to capture Messina to the friends of the Syracusans,[31] and then worked to advance the Spartan cause. But, as Alcibiades points out in the speech Thucydides gives him on his arrival at Sparta in 415, he had good reason to betray a country that sought to deprive him of his rights as a citizen.[32] As long as Alcibiades was assured of his rights, he worked diligently on Athen's behalf. His primary failing was not the self-interest he displayed in attempting to save his life, but the self-interest which guided his decision making in 420 and 415.

The strengths of Alcibiades' performance as a general outweigh his faults. Even his work on behalf of Sparta in 412 attests to his capabilities. In concert with Clearchus, Alcibiades was able to instigate the revolt of Chios, Erythraea, Clazomenae, and Miletus.[33] Both this activity, and the sieges of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and Byzantium, reveal Alcibiades' diplomatic skills. Alcibiades exhibited these diplomatic abilities early in his career when he arranged the Athenian alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis. The same abilities later proved useful in bringing about the revolt of various cities. Such diplomacy is valuable since part of the task of a good general is the gathering of allies. In his activities in the Hellepont, Alcibiades combined his diplomatic abilities with tactical skills, The military insight attributed to him by Diodorus at Cyzicus in 410 is also evident in the advice which he is recorded as offering the generals at Aegospotami in 405. Here, Alcibiades recognized that the Athenians were anchored in a strategically disadvantageous spot and advised them to move to Sestus where they could benefit from a harbor and a city.[34] Diodorus, however, does not mention this advice, writing instead that Alcibiades offered the generals Thracian aid in exchange for a share in the command.[35] Again, divergent accounts often make it difficult to assess the extent of Alcibiades' military acumen and the extent of his particular impact on the outcome of events.

It cannot be denied that Alcibiades' personal behavior was detrimental to his career. That he was said to carry a golden shield with an Eros armed with a thunderbolt on it[36] well captures his renowned inclination toward self-indulgence and luxury. His enemies were able to capitalize on this reputation when they arranged for his discharge in 415 and in 406. But, what is in one context a vice, is an asset in another. The resourcefulness and incisiveness Alcibiades displayed in his various maneuvers to save his life and achieve his personal aims served him well on the battlefield. Similarly, the boldness and daring which lead him to promote bad policy was channeled toward positive end in his individual operations. So the same man who could display many undesirable qualities also possessed the attributes of a good general. Asking the question has itself raised the questions of historical interpretation: how do we distinguish among disparate accounts? How heavily do we weight the judgement of the ancient historians as we formulate our own judgements? How do we explain inconsistencies in these judgements (as in Thucydides' sometimes contradictory assessment of Alcibiades' abilities)? How does our interpretive framework (values, assumptions, criteria . . . ) differ from that of the ancient historian? And in what ways does this framework filter the available evidence as we construct a narrative history and as we evaluate historical figures?

[1] Thucydides vi.15.4.
[2] Diodorus xiii.68.5; Xenophon, Hellenica i.4.13-18.
[3] Xenophon, Memorabilia iii.1-7.
[4] Xen. Mem. iii.1.6-7.
[5] Thuc. vi.15.1.
[6] A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1945-81), p. 70 (=HCT).
[7] Thuc. v.52.2.
[8] Thuc. vi.24.4.
[9] Plutarch, Alcibiades xxvii; Xen. I.1.4-8.
[10] B. Perrin, Plutarch's Nicias and Alcibiades (New York, 1960), pp. 307-8; R. J. Littman, "The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus," Transactions of the Ameriacan Philological Association (1968), pp. 265-72.
[11] Xen. Hell. i.1.16-19; Plut. Alc. xxvii.3.
[12] Diod.xiii.50-1.
[13] Xen. I.1.14.
[14] Xen. I.1.20-1.
[15] Diod. Xiii.66.3.
[16] Xen. I.4.8.
[17] Plut. Alc.xxxv.2.
[18] Diod. xiii.67.5-6.
[19] Plut. Alc. xxxi; Perrin, op. cit., p. 311.
[20] Diod. xiii.73.3-4.
[21] Thuc. vi.15.4; Gomme, op. cit., pp. 243-7.
[22] Thuc. ii.65.2.
[23] Thuc. vi.15; Gomme, op. cit., pp. 295-6; A. W. Gomme, More Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford, 1962), pp. 95-101.
[24] Thuc. vi.42.3; Gomme, HCT, p. 420.
[25] Thuc. vi.50-2; Gomme, op. cit., p. 272.
[26] Gomme, op. cit., p. 339.
[27] Thuc. v.43.1-2.
[28] Thuc. vi.15.1.
[29] Thuc. v.43.1-2.
[30] Xen. Mem. iii.2.1-4.
[31] Thuc. vi.74.
[32] Thuc. vi.92.
[33] Thuc. viii.12-17.
[34] Xen. ii.1.25.
[35] Diod. xiii.105.
[36] Plut. Alc. ii.2.