Isagoras, Cleomenes, and the
Peisistratid Kidnapping

Aaron Sokoloff

Herodotus’ account of the events in Attica from the fall of the Peisistratidai through Cleomenes’ Athenian invasions is rife with anomalies that mystify the historian. This paper will suggest a framework by which a (hopefully) plausible solution will be proposed for one of these problems, from which explanations of the other problems will be inferred. First, the kidnapping of the Peistratidai’s children (causing the tyrants to capitulate) is unexplained; we are not told who did it or why (5.65). Second, immediately following the fall of the Peisistratidai, “the chief authority was lodged with two persons, Cleisthenes and Isagoras” (5.66). This is anomalous as well, as standard forms of government at this point include autocracy and oligarchy, but not duocracy. While this situation may reflect that they are leaders of opposing factions, Herodotus does not invoke that until they are both in power, when Cleisthenes garners support of the “common people” (5.66). Third, while Cleisthenes is an Alcmaeonid and thus of one of the truly illustrious families in Attica (as well as a former eponymous archon [Sealey 1976: 136]), Herodotus says of Isagoras only that he is “the son of Tisander, who belonged to a noble house, but whose pedigree I cannot trace further” (5.62 and 5.66). Again, we are not told how a relatively obscure noble comes to rival an Alcmaeonid.

Fourth, King Cleomenes of Sparta undergoes a reversal of attitudes toward Cleisthenes. While Cleomenes helped to reinstate Cleisthenes to power in Attica in his first expedition, only a few years later he comes to banish Cleisthenes and transfer power to Isagoras (5.64-6 and 5.70). Fifth, the nature of Cleomenes’ second Attican expedition is strange. Cleomenes takes the mission seriously enough to lead the force himself (and to engage the Athenians in combat), yet he only brings “a small band of followers” and is quickly turned back (5.72). Sixth, Cleomenes’ invasions seem to reveal an attempt to establish an Athenian tyranny under Isagoras, as he commands the Athenians to dispel their council (5.72). Herodotus does not specify which one and he soon after seeks to establish Isagoras “as despot in Athens” (5.74). This is surprising, as the Spartan foreign policy at this time consisted of “extirpating tyranny wherever opportunity allowed” (Fornara and Samos 1991: 114).

Clearly these are a lot of problems to sort out and with our many gaps in knowledge, any attempt to explain them together is tentative at best. Nonetheless, this paper will suggest a model that constructs explanation of these anomalies by starting with the kidnapping of the Peistratid children. It is plausible that Isagoras, working from inside Attica, masterminded this kidnapping to facilitate the success of the Spartan siege. In this way, he established himself as Cleomenes’ most dynamic supporter in Attica, and thus it was in Sparta’s best interest to use their military force to keep him in power. This hypothesis not only offers a solution for the famous kidnapping, but also implies solutions to the other problems of Herodotus’ account; it will be explained by first establishing the plausibility of Isagoras’ masterminding the kidnapping, and then applying this model to the related problems.

The role of Isagoras in the kidnappings will be examined in three steps. First, it will be seen that this kidnapping was not a random event, but must have been done to aid Sparta in the siege of Athens. Second, it will be seen that someone close to Hippias must have planned this operation, and third, that Isagoras was in an excellent position to do it.

Regarding the establishing of this kidnapping as a strategic pro-Spartan maneuver, one must consider that the children were kidnapped “as they were being removed out of the country” (Hdt. 5.65). If they were being removed out of the country during a siege, one may assume that it was done out of their parents’ concern for their presence in such a dangerous place, since they knew their children were targets. Hence, moving them out of the country was a risky maneuver, considering the state of siege, and must have been done in utmost secrecy. Thus, if the removal was carried out with any degree of competence, it is unlikely that a random potential kidnapper would be able to happen upon them and seize the opportunity. Further, strategic treachery was a major part of ancient warfare, as explained in Pierre Ducrey’s studies on ancient Greek siege-craft:

Treachery continued to play a decisive role in the attack and defense of towns… The presence of aliens and mercenaries, or even of allies [italics mine], within the city walls, might entail an upset in the balance of power. (1985: 174)

Considering the effect of this kidnapping in breaking the Peistratid defense, successful up until this point, and the unlikelihood of a random kidnapping in this situation, it is reasonable to conclude that the kidnapping was a strategic operation (Hdt. 5.65).

The secrecy of the removal of the children has another implication: whoever planned it must have been close to Hippias immediately prior to the event. It is highly unlikely that someone such as a Spartan simply spotted the children (with whatever escort they had), recognized them, and abducted them. This is because few random passers-by would have been likely to recognize them. Not only were they probably in disguise (assuming Hippias was making some effort to get them out safely, a safe assumption, considering the effect of the kidnapping on him), but their faces were probably largely unknown anyway. Aristotle’s anecdote, true or not, in which a peasant does not recognize Peisistratus presupposes that most not living in Athens would not generally recognize the tyrant himself, let alone his children (Ath. Pol. 16.6).

One counter to this claim is that the Spartans used military scouts (perhaps Krypteia [Chrimes 1949, 374]), who may have gotten chances to see the faces of their opponents’ families, and thus the kidnapping could have been an entirely Spartan operation. However, it seems far simpler for Hippias to have been betrayed by someone he knew than that a Spartan scout infiltrated the tyrant’s house, heard of the plan to escape and intercepted them, or that one of the scouts who knew the children’s appearance happened to find them while they were escaping. While it is possible that some of the Athenian exiles in the Spartan camp may have also happened upon the escaping children, recognized them and kidnapped them, this explanation requires too much coincidence to favor it over the hypothesis of an internal conspiracy (Hdt. 5.64).

The third question is why Isagoras himself was in a good position to commit the kidnapping. The answer lies largely in the work of P. J. Bicknell, who places him in the family of Kimon. This family was prominent in sixth-century Athens, and “the Peisistratidai and the Kimoneioi were once close, even if Isagoras let them down when it came to the crunch in 511/10” (1972: 86-7). Thus, Isagoras was in Attica at the time of Cleomenes’ first Attican expedition, and was part of a family that was trusted by the Peistratidae. Hence, Isagoras was in a perfect position to learn Hippias’ plans for his children, execute the kidnapping and use this treachery to become Cleomenes’ man in Athens, so to speak. Also, Bicknell’s statement that Isagoras “let them down,” with its connotation of inaction or negligence, seems to attribute too passive a role to the man who came out of such a tumultuous situation as one of the two most powerful people in Attica. Rather, a definitive action is needed to break the pattern of Kimonian allegiance to the tyrants, and considering that the kidnapping is the action that breaks the tyranny at this point, it seems logical that Isagoras could have planned it. While this evidence is circumstantial, this model of the kidnapping provides consistent explanations for the historical problems presented earlier.

The first problem is the concentration of power in two individuals. The solution implied by the kidnapping is that, following the ousting of the Peistratidai, each of these individuals was powerful for mutually independent reasons. Cleisthenes’ power seems to come from his pre-eminent position among the Athenian exiles under the Peistratidai, which was tied to his Alcmaeonid heritage and indicated by his aforementioned archonship (Hdt. 5.62). Isagoras’ power, meanwhile, is explained by his essentially becoming the vehicle of Spartan interests. It is worth noting that Herodotus does attribute some of Cleomenes’ actions on Isagoras’ behalf to their ”contact of friendship” made during the siege, adding that Cleomenes was allegedly “a lover of Isagoras’ wife” as if that would enhance their friendship (5.70). While (as is seen later) the two cannot share power for very long, it seems that Isagoras’ role in the kidnapping provides a better explanation for the sharing of power than Herodotus’ vague and unconvincing friendship-contract, or rather provides a more plausible explanation for their friendship than either chance meeting (especially if, as Bicknell claims, Isagoras was living in Attica at the time) or Isagoras’ wife’s infidelity. Indeed, the tensions and fluctuations that characterize their dual power implies that their powers were derived from different sources, since it is unlikely that a single source of support would lead to such an unstable structure.

Addressing the problem of why Cleomenes would help install Cleisthenes once and attempt to oust him soon after, this model claims that Isagoras owed Cleomenes not only the freedom of his city from tyranny, but also (unlike Cleisthenes) his personal power within the city. Thus, it is not surprising that Cleomenes would want to, at some point, oust Cleisthenes, getting rid of someone who may have likely felt entitled to prominence in Attica independent of Spartan support, and who may have thus even resented his debt to the Spartan military (although such psychology is, of course, pure speculation). While one may consider Cleomenes’ ousting of Cleisthenes a result of the possible demagogic or tyrannical implications of his reforms, this attribution does not square with other aspects of Cleomenes’ invasions, as shall be examined later (5.66-7).

Why, then, did the Spartans allow Cleisthenes to share power in the first place? Most likely, it was allowed by default; Cleisthenes’ (or at least the Alcmaeonids’) early preeminence among the exiles implies that most of the powerful families in Attica looked to him for leadership (5.62). Thus, he had power naturally and his participation in fighting the tyrants -whatever it actually was - means he was, at the very least, not overtly hostile to Spartan interests. Since taking on the Alcmaeonids and their following was a formidable task, it is not surprising that Cleomenes would have given Isagoras a chance to win the power struggle without Spartan military support. Therefore, leaving Isagoras to his own devices in the beginning was an acceptable risk for the Spartans. It is worth noting that Isagoras was actually above Cleisthenes before the Alcmaeonid pulled ahead by “call[ing] to his aid the common people” with his reforms (5.62). Only when Isagoras thus “lost ground” did he appeal for outright Spartan intervention (5.69).

The next anomaly—the question of how Isagoras could have rivaled Cleisthenes despite his inferior background—is not worth much time, because it has been more or less stated already, that Isagoras was a minor noble who was trusted by Hippias. By betraying this trust and thus allowing the Spartan expedition to succeed, he established himself as Cleomenes’ loyal pawn, and gained great power in Attica due to Spartan backing. Given Sparta’s military strength and willingness to intervene in other states, it is little wonder that Cleomenes’ support was an effective substitute for glorious heritage, personal following and other conventional sources of political power. It might have even been advantageous for the Spartans to install a lower noble, as he would rely more on Sparta in absence of a strong and independent source of power, but his nobility would give him at least some legitimacy in the eyes of his native state.

Regarding the anomaly of Cleomenes’ expedition—the paradox of royal leadership of a minor force, and its quick failure in combat—it seems likely that they were never planning on battle. Rather, the expedition may be viewed as a psychological device, a symbolic display of support for Isagoras. Showing a small force is only effective if the opposition regards it as a harbinger of a larger force, and in such a mission the presence of a king may count for more than a whole army division. Hence, the Spartans must have been aiming only to show the Athenians that they were willing to conduct a real military operation to establish Isagoras over Cleisthenes, and expecting that to be enough to get obedience. Therefore, the force of the mission strong enough to lead the king to Athens must be explained in terms of a strong tie between Spartan interests and Isagoras’ power. The Peistratid kidnapping seems a plausible origin of such a tie and, as mentioned before, appears to make more sense than the vague and adultery-tinged ‘contract of friendship,’ which Herodotus describes.

The pro-tyranny implications of Cleomenes’ installing Isagoras as despot and dissolving the council—shown by Sealey to have been the Council of the Areopagus, a highly aristocratic body—the ideological discord with typical Spartan policy is resolved if it is superseded by Isagoras’ personal loyalty to Spartan interests (1976: 149). Perhaps Cleomenes concluded from Cleisthenes’ appeal to the common people that Spartan-style aristocratic rule was not the trend of things in Attica, and thus settled on the next best thing: a pro-Spartan tyrant. The invocation of Spartan power also helps resolve one of the problems that Sealey acknowledges as being raised by his explanation: the fact that the Areopagus “was the body with which Isagoras could expect valuable support” (1976, 150). Perhaps Spartan military presence (and the threat of its implied willingness to return) would have made the support of an official council unnecessary.

Naturally, the model argued in this paper raises some problems of its own. For example, if the kidnapping was the reason for Isagoras’ rise to power, why did Herodotus not just say so? I suspect the answer is that he did not know, and that virtually nobody knew. Naturally, the kidnapping operation itself would have had to been highly secretive, and perhaps it was advantageous for Isagoras (and thus for Cleomenes) to keep it that way, as it is hardly a noble way of attaining power, with Isagoras short on nobility, as it was. Perhaps Herodotus’ bizarre account of Cleomenes’ and Isagoras’ basis of friendship reflects an attempt on his or someone else’s part to otherwise explain their connection; it may even have actually happened, but does not tell the full story.

A second issue is raised by David J. McCargar, who theorizes that there were two individuals named Isagoras, as the one who was archon in 508/7 would have been too young to lead an aristocratic faction just three years earlier (1974: 280). The response to this problem is the same as the response to the problem of his obscure origin: the shortcoming is made up for by the investment of Spartan power following the loyalty to Sparta manifested in Isagoras’ masterminding the kidnapping. Indeed, there is nothing inherently unlikely about an ambitious young aristocrat abandoning his family tradition to seize a truly rare opportunity for power.

What is to be made of G. H. R. Horsely’s theory that Herodotus is purposely hiding Isagoras’ origins, as to make him less legitimate in comparison with Cleisthenes (1986, 96)? First, this presupposes that Herodotus is actively biased in favor of the Cleisthenes, which is disputed (1986, 95). Second, considering the importance of Herodotus’ account to the understanding of anything from this period, it seems that dismissing specific passages as outright lies is a last resort if there is no other plausible explanation which, I argue, the kidnapping model provides.

Finally, what of the conflicting views among modern scholars on the Isagoras-Cleomenes relationship? Bicknell refers to Cleomenes as Isagoras’ “puppet master,” and this view is consistent with the theory described in this paper (1972, 19). However, Fornara and Samos take the opposite tack, stating that Isagoras “put Cleomenes up to [his 508/7 intervention in Athens]” (1991, 12). This implication of Isagoras being the dominant one seems to me to be at odds with the nature of the expedition. Given its regal pomp but absence of military might or strategizing (as evidenced by its quick failure), it seems that Cleomenes was expecting an Athenian kowtow to Spartan military might. This makes it unlikely that an Athenian noble could manipulate a Spartan king, especially the stronger of the two Spartan kings (Hdt. 6.51). Even a friendship between the two is not enough to explain events satisfactorily; while one may write off the first 508/7 expedition as a friendly favor gone bad, the subsequent invasion seems too large a move by Sparta to be attributed to personal friendship, and the political motive of Sparta trying to maintain its control over Athens, in my view, fits best.

This view seems based on placing Isagoras at the head of a faction of émigrès in Athens that opposed Cleisthenes (Fornara and Samos 1991: 36). While Isagoras certainly came to represent certain interests in Athens, the fact that he specifically became the preeminent among this group seems to be best explained by Spartan support, in light of both his obscure origins, his position in the tyranny-undertoned invasions of 508/7, and (hopefully) their consistence with the kidnapping mechanism of placing him as the most actively pro-Spartan noble.

Sealey also places Isagoras and Cleisthenes at the head of opposing factions, theorizing that they were leaders of two opposing regions of Attica (1976: 149). However, he offers no reason as to why Isagoras of all people was the leader of this faction. Further, he does not explain how regional interests caused the Spartans to favor Isagoras over Cleisthenes, relying again on their friendship which, I have argued, does not seem to account adequately for repeated military expeditions (1976: 147). Nor does it account for the tyrannical implications of Cleomenes’ attempts to reinstate Isagoras, forcing Sealey either to explain his attempt to dissolve the Council as “a major blunder” and admittedly “a strange mistake for Cleomenes to make, since he had Isagoras to advise him,” or to claim that the story was exaggerated and that “perhaps he attempted, not to dissolve it, but merely to modify its composition” (1976: 150). Sealey himself seems unsatisfied with the first explanation, and the second, because it requires us to assume invention of fact in Herodotus’ text, seems a last resort.

Thus, an examination of the kidnapping hypothesis in relation to the problems of Herodotus’ account of 511/10 to 508/7 has great implications for Athenian-Spartan relations at this juncture. Although much of it is based on Isagoras’ personal ambitions, much is revealed in how he exercised his ambition. For example, the hypothesis suggests (as stated earlier) a Spartan willingness to impose dependable leaders in other city-states, with the need for pro-Spartan rulers trumping the aversion to tyranny. Also, that Isagoras became a leader despite his obscure origins seems a testament to Sparta’s aggressive foreign policy, especially considering that there was no reason to assign particular importance to Athens in this period (Hdt. 5.78).

More pointedly, there seems to be a fundamental difference in how the Athenian populace viewed Isagoras’ Spartan loyalty in 511/10 versus in 508/7. The first time, it did not keep him out of power. Perhaps it was because the Athenians respected the Spartans as their deliverers from tyranny, or maybe it was out of fear of taking on the Spartan military. Either way, Cleomenes assumed in 508/7 that Athenian awe of Sparta’s power would be enough to get the Athenians to remake their government to Sparta’s liking. The warring that ensued shows a new relationship between these two city-states, as Athens was now both willing and able to assert its sovereignty. The Spartan connection that was all-important in 511/10 had become an affront in 508/7, and this must have represented a crucial change in dynamics as they approached the fifth century.

References

Aristotle. Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Knapp. New York: Hafner Press, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.

Bicknell, P.J. Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1972.

Chrimes, K. M. T. Ancient Sparta, A Re-Examination of the Evidence. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1949.

Ducrey, Pierre. Warfare in Ancient Greece. Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: Shocken Books, 1985.

Fornara, Charles W., and Loren J Samos II. Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Herodotus, The Persian Wars. Translated by George Rawlinson. New York: The Modern Library, Random House, 1942.

Horsley, G. H. R. Herodotos, Isagoras, and Karian Zeus Ancient Society. In Resources for Teachers 16 (1986): 95-9.

McCargar, David J. Isagoras Son of Teisandros, and Isagoras, Eponymous Archon of 508/7: A Case of Mistaken Identity. Phoneix 28 (1974): 275-81.

Sealey, Raphael. A History of the Greek City-States, 700-338 B.C. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Fragments at the Roman Theatre in Arles.

Photograph by Susanna Ciotti. Used by permission.

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