Russell Glen
The light-armed troops are like the hands, the cavalry like the feet, the line of men-at-arms itself like chest and breast-plate, and the general like the head.” —Iphicrates
The Macedonian war machine was like none other before it. Never previously had flexibility and strength been so inventively merged into one symbiotic beast. At the hands of Philip of Macedon and his infamous son Alexander, the Macedonian army thrusted, charged and crushed its way across vast expanses of hostile territory. The success they achieved, combined with the drive and strategic brilliance of its commanders, forged an empire unparalleled in antiquity. Through tactical success after tactical success the army continually adapted and evolved to take advantage of whatever situation was available, defeating vastly superior numbers of enemy troops and overcoming previously insurmountable obstacles. While it is true that the Macedonian army was but one tool used by the Macedonian rulers, its legacy, both in the form of the empire it founded and the new era of military thinking it ushered in, was the greatest advancement in military thinking until the conquests of Napoleon; and even he “perused again and again the campaigns of Alexander . . . and modeled [himself] upon them” (Kiley 2002). What gave this military its fantastic strength? How was it so able to adjust and overcome time and time again, regardless of odds, location or foe? From the sands of Egypt to the river valleys of India, the Macedonian army introduced the world to the advancement of combined-arms tactics.
The army was both created and led by legendary commander-in-chiefs who merged the relative strengths of the ancient militaries of the time and adapted them to work together in one, efficiently deadly war machine. The military became more than just a patchwork of its separate parts. As Iphicrates noted, it became a unified body of military might, ready to react to any situation as quickly and cooperatively as was possible. Philip, and Alexander after him, astutely studied the tactics of the age, analyzing the titanic clashes of the Greek heavy phalanxes and the finessed attacks of the Persian cavalry. From these age-old military institutions they constructed their revolutionary military, constantly disregarding the contemporary thinking. Through continued evolution, and the usage of an aggressive style of battle that deftly took advantage of the newfound force, the Macedonian military proved for all history the necessity of combined-arms tactics.
In order to better understand the way that the combination and deployment of the different forces, it is first necessary to examine each part independently. Only by looking at the origin of each part can one truly appreciate the genius it took to invent a method of combining them. First and foremost in the Macedonian Army was the infantry. This was nothing new, as foot soldiers had formed the backbone of virtually every major army previously. “Taking and holding land. It’s been the job of infantry ever since one caveman took a dislike (and a leg bone) to another; and will remain so. Infantry alone can’t do it; but no force without infantry can either” (Clonfero 2002: online). This maxim has remained true throughout the centuries. Recognizing the crucial importance of the man-at-arms, Macedon’s novel infantry was constructed as a synthesis of the best contemporary forces. Forming the core were the rock-steady heavy infantry. Taking cues from the Greek massed hoplite warfare, and especially the deep formations employed by Thebes, the heavy infantry was formed into phalanxes. These were manned by the peasantry of Macedon. Philip imposed iron discipline upon them, training them to think and act as one unit—making them a block of men that could stand firm against anything thrown at them, but flexible enough to adapt to the changing situations on the battlefield (Connolly 1981: 68).
Beyond the discipline, the phalanxes of Philip were revolutionized by the use of the sarissa, a long, two-handed pike. The length of the spears varied relative to the position of the man within the phalanx; the front rank held the shortest lance, while the men six ranks back held the longest, so that “five of the pikes of the men behind the first rank appeared in front of the first man” (Wintringham 1943: 35). Up to ten ranks of men were pressing behind the first six, meaning that whenever gaps in the line formed, they were instantly closed, keeping the even frontage of six pikes per opposing shield. This system allowed much more power to be projected across the front of the phalanx than ever before, and the length of the spears was such that their range was greater than other, one-handed thrusting javelins of the time.
The organization of these Pezhetairoi (foot companions, a name meant to stress their crucial relationship to the elite heavy cavalry) was just as revolutionary as the weaponry. In total, seven phalanxes of around 2,000 men were fielded at the same time, while another slightly lighter phalanx, the Hypaspists, consisted of 3,000 crack troops. These hand-picked troops arranged into three more mobile phalanxes of 1,000 men occupied the dual role of protecting the phalanx’s vulnerable flanks as well as staying flexible enough to attack the enemy where they seemed weak (Devine 1989: 108). The seemingly insurmountable odds against which these phalanxes triumphed are a little more easy to understand once one thinks of what it must have been like to face a unified front of 15,000 crack Macedonian troops, arranged 16 ranks deep, with a wall of long lances preceding them.
The infantry forces were supplemented by lighter, ranged missile units. These ranged from both archers and slingers, who would frequently deploy in a skirmish cloud before the pezhetairoi, to light javeliners, who ran alongside the cavalry in order to mop up dismounted riders (Devine 1989: 110). These troops too were vital to the army plan, harassing and confusing enemy troops as they advanced, and then shielding the flanks of the battle line from light cavalry and other skirmishing units. They were frequently recruited from the empire. Indeed, as Alexander’s conquests continued, more and more troops were incorporated into the machine; from Cretan archers to Persian horse-archers these units continually evolved the shape of the modern army.
Forming the essential counterpoise to the phalanx was the famous Macedonian heavy cavalry. These companion cavalry were truly revolutionary, and constituted the first true regular cavalry force. The companions were the nobility of the Macedonian military, bound together by blood and honor. This unit was sufficiently well trained and armed so as to be able to decimate any opposing cavalry force opposing it, and then quickly wheel so as to strike the enemy battle line where it was most vulnerable. They were at the time the penultimate shock unit; armed with a 4 meter sarissa of their own they would charge in and deploy the lance (with great skill, seeing as stirrups would not be invented for another 600 years) and then follow with the slashing saber if necessary (Delbruck 1975: 177). Their discipline and mounted skill was unparalleled. Arranged into as many as 15 squadrons of 300 horses they were the armie’s scalpel, charging into battle in wedge formation, slicing through enemy cavalry and auxiliaries with the skill of a surgeon. Alexander, or the squadron commander, would typically ride into battle at the head of the wedge, with the well-trained cavalry mimicking the leaders moves (Connolly 1981: 72). Much as Rommel famously rode into battle in the first tank of the line during the novel blitzkrieg, Alexander too led his companions by example, bringing his shock troops out on to the field to create havoc and isolate the enemy infantry.
Accompanying the heavy horse into battle were assorted light cavalry. These were typical of the cavalry forces that had been fielded in Asia Minor for years. First and foremost among these more conventional mounted soldiers were the Thessalian Cavalry. Long considered the finest horses in Greece, they were molded and perfected by Jason of Pherae, who armed them with javelins and trained them in diamond formation (Devine 1989: 107). In this way they retained the mobility needed of light cavalry, but could also be used as shock troops if necessary. The more historical job of light cavalry skirmishing fell to the Prodromoi, and Paeonian and Thracian horse. The Prodromoi (scouts) were armed with sarissa and were frequently employed as army advance guards, scouting ahead and then harassing the enemy. The Paeonian and Thracian cavalry were also armed with javelin or short lance, and frequently served the role of protecting the Companion or Thessalian cavalry’s flank (Connolly 1981: 72). The flexible nature of the light cavalry made them very well suited to the fluid, aggressive style of the Macedonian tactics. Indeed, as the campaigns of Alexander moved farther east the army gained from the addition of more and more Asiatic light cavalry.
Also of important note in the Macedonian arsenal were mobile artillery units. Light tension-catapults were used for more than just sieges. This artillery could either fire large bolts or bags filled with stones meant to burst apart upon impact, serving as shrapnel (Gerald 2002: online). While the technology behind the catapults was very old, the armies of Macedon were the first to employ them in this tactical way across the battlefield. The manner in which they were deployed and used is reminiscent of the use of “shock” or assault artillery throughout the twentieth century, the aim being the suppression and disruption of the enemy formation.
Each of these branches served a vital part in the Macedonian military process. While each was superior and effective in their own right, the genius of the combined arms tactical system employed them in such a manner that each would support the other’s weaknesses while capitalizing upon the rapid, shock tactics of the cavalry and the superiority of the Macedonian phalanx against all other heavy infantry. The tactics were an evolution of those used by both Greece and Persia. The Persian military had historically been superior to the Greek in horse. However, they did not have the ability or discipline necessary to fashion powerful heavy infantry, and instead relied on extremely effective bowmen and light infantry. A typical Persian set-piece battle consisted of the light cavalry driving off the lighter infantry of the enemy with missile fire, and then engaging the enemy’s infantry in the flanks with missile fire and harassment techniques. This was intended to slow or halt the advance of the slow line while massive amounts of ranged infantry in the center of the Persian line could pour volley after volley into the enemy infantry.(Jones 1987: 21).
From this, Philip saw how powerful the cavalry could be. He then combined the heavy infantry of the Greek hoplites with the tactical flexibility offered by cavalry. By removing both from their previously unassaulted bastion of prominence on the battlefield, this became crucial and interlocking elements of all future battles. The infantry could not survive without the flank protection and mobility offered by the cavalry, while the cavalry could not succeed without the infantry holding down the line-of-battle, anchoring the enemy through engagement. Throughout all of this the crucial auxiliary units harassed and encapsulated the enemy, forcing them to fight as individual units instead of one cohesive body. One way of thinking of this aggressive system is by comparing it to the armoires forge. The rock-steady discipline of the phalanx provides the anvil, enticing the enemy in, forcing them to commit to the center of the field. Light cavalry, ranged units and artillery provide the necessary heat, confusing and isolating enemy units, forcing them into a channel of destruction at the center. Through all of this chaos the heavy cavalry provides the hammer. The shock tactics employed by the cavalry were lightening quick and brutally efficient. As the enemy exhausted itself maneuvering against the machinations of the infantry, the hammer secures the battlefield and delivers the crucial blow against the now malleable metal of the enemy formations. Time and time again, against all odds, the enemy was unable to secure it’s flanks and rear, allowing the companion cavalry to exploit this gap with crushing speed. This, combined with the impossibility of securing a quick victory against the Macedonian army center, led to victory.
Philip and Alexander continually employed these tactics against their foes. One epic example of the potency of combined arms tactics was the Battle of Gaugamala. Alexander faced odds of up to 20:1 arrayed against him on the flat fertile plains of the Euphrates (Fornara 2002: lecture). As this is not the arena to discuss the strategic maneuvering and logistics employed to maneuver the militaries to this position, we begin with the placement of troops on the eve of battle.
The battle begins with Darius ordered the left wing around the Macedonian right “ to prevent them extending their line any further” (Arrian 1981: 40). To counter this, Alexander sent the Greek mercenary heavy cavalry stationed on the right flank out to counter the Persian light cavalry charge. These troops, led by Menidas, were repulsed by superior numbers, at which point the Paeonians and Prodromoi were launched into the fray. Despite the superior numbers and better protective armor of the Scythians, the Macedonian cavalry held firm, breaking the Persian formation (Arrian 1981: 40). It is at this point that the battle gets tactically interesting. Darius now sends his own shock troops, the scythe-chariots against the companions in the right center of the army. However, Alexander had anticipated this, and met the charging chariots with a mosquito swarm of javelin throwers. These light infantry swarmed nimbly between the oncoming tide of chariots and quickly routed them. As the chariots fled the field in disarray a gap formed in the left center of the Persian line due to some light cavalry trying to reinforce the Persian left flank (Devine 1989: 120). With Hypaspists and the righter most Pezhatairoi en echelon. Companions in tow, Alexander quickly “led them at the double, raising his war-cry, straight at Darius himself” through the gap (Arrian 1981: 40). As the Macedonian line began to strain forward against the Persian center a mixed Indian and Persian cavalry force charged through the gap and deep into the rear of the Macedonian Pezhatairoi. Instead of explointing this stroke of battlefield fortune, they headed straight for the baggage train and began looting it. At this point, the second line of heavy infantry formed by Greek mercenaries met the marauding force and quickly dispatched them.
By now the Persian center was disintegrating under the initial shock of the Companion assault, followed by the relentless press of the phalanxes. The Persian right flank at this point was unaware of the disintegrating center, and led by the Median heavy cavalry attempted to press home an attack against the vastly outnumbered left flank of Alexander. At first the light infantry of Crete and Thrace were hard pressed by the Persian cavalry, but the Thessalian cavalry under the command of Parmenion assumed the heavy cavalry role of shock troops and bought time for the left most Phalanxes of the line, which wheeled forward into battle (Arrian 1981: 41). The Persians were bloodily repulsed, and as word of the routed center reached the men the repulse turned into a rout. Darius was pursued and the day was won.
Upon detailed analysis of the engagement, it becomes apparent that Macedonian combined arms tactics, combined with an astute perception of events by Alexander, carried the battle. Keys in this conclusion include the early use of a sustained cavalry screen on the right flank to force the enemy into disarray and cause him to send more troops, the skirmish cloud in front of the Companion cavalry that routed the Persian chariots, and the devastating one-two punch of the Companion cavalry followed by the prickly Pezhatairoi. Also notable was the use of the Greek mercenary infantry as a second line. While it cannot truly be called a tactical reserve due to the fact that Alexander was no longer around to direct them where needed, it does show a recognition on the Macedonian commanders’ part that the ability to hold back part of the force for an unforeseen crucial moment was a critical need.
At the battle of Gaugamala combined arms tactics under Alexander reached their pinnacle. Overcoming a vastly numerically greater foe, the light cavalry tied down the enemy flanking attempts, the screening light infantry turned back the enemy shock troops, the Companion cavalry struck the critical blow that routed the Persian center, and the ordered phalanxes pressed home with relentless pressure. In short, everything worked, symbiotically and instinctively. The military brilliance of Alexander, combined with the masterful discipline of the Macedonian military, successfully merged vastly different units of all backgrounds into one, deathly beautiful war machine.
The combination of different arms so as to achieve cooperation and concentration of forces when necessary is perhaps Alexander’s greatest military legacy. He irrevocably changed the face of ancient warfare, laying the blueprint for those such as Ptolemy, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, who used armies much similar to his all the way into the 2nd century B.C. However, his military legacy extends far beyond that of the ancients. His tactics and conquests inspired even the great military genius Napoleon, who devotedly studied his battles. Even today, when military politicians talk of “more results, fewer casualties” and “the art of using all the different weapons systems with each other in an effective and devastating way” they are following the lead of Philip and Alexander (Combined Arms 2002). The application of combined arms tactics undeniably allow more force to be concentrated accurately and quickly into an enemy’s tactical and strategic weak-spots. The immortal words of Sun-Tzu stress the importance of this: “what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy” (Sun 1963: 77).
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