Geoffroy de Clippel
Professor of Economics, Brown University
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Working Papers
Relaxed Optimization, with Kareen Rozen Revised: June 2019
Good Enough, with Salvador Barberà, Alejandro Neme, and Kareen Rozen New: July 2018
Testable Implications of Some Classic Assignment Methods, with Kareen Rozen New: July 2018
Bounded Rationality and Limited Datasets, with Kareen Rozen, Peer reviewed by NAJ Economics Revised: December 2018
On Selecting the Right Agent, with Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, and Kareen Rozen New: July 2019
Fairness Through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: an Experimental Approach, with Kareen Rozen Revised : May 2019
Egalitarianism in Mechanism Design
Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin, with Roberto Serrano
Coming Soon
Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes, with Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano
Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Asymmetric Information, with Jack Fanning and Kareen Rozen
Communication, Perception and Strategic Obfuscation, with Kareen Rozen (financial support from the NSF is gratefully acknowledged)
Bad Repetition, with Kareen Rozen
Publications
Level-k Mechanism Design, with Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano, Review of Economic Studies forthcoming
On the Redundancy of the Implicit Welfarist Axiom in Bargaining Theory, Journal of Economic Theory 2015
Premise-Based vs. Outcome-Based Information Aggregation, with Kfir Eliaz, Games and Economic Behavior 2015
Strategic Disclosure of Collective Actions - supplement, with Kfir Eliaz, Games and Economic Behavior 2015
Competing for Consumer Inattention, with Kfir Eliaz and Kareen Rozen, Journal of Political Economy 2014
On the Selection of Abitrators - supplement, with Kfir Eliaz and Brian Knight, American Economic Review 2014
Behavioral Implementation, American Economic Review 2014
Destroy to Save, with Victor Naroditskyi, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald, and Nick Jenning, Games and Economic Behavior 2014 (special issue 10th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce)
Reason-Based Choice - supplement, with Kfir Eliaz, Theoretical Economics, 2012
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information, with D. Perez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012
No Profitable Decompositions in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems, with Camelia Bejan, Journal of Economic Theory, 2011
Cores of Combined Games, with Francis Bloch, Journal of Economic Theory, 2010
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value, with Roberto Serrano, Econometrica, 2008
Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information, Economics Letters, 2008
Impartial Division of a Dollar, with Herve Moulin and Nicolaus Tideman, Journal of Economic Theory, 2008
An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution, Social Choice and Welfare, 2007
The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 2007
The Procedural Value for Cooperative Games with Non-Transferable Utility, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007
Values for Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: an Eloquent Example, Games and Economic Behavior, 2005
Two Remarks on the Inner Core, with Enrico Minelli, Games and Economic Behavior, 2005
Axiomatizing the Harsanyi Solution, the Symmetric Egalitarian Solution and the Consistent Solution for NTU-Games, with Hans Peters and Horst Zank, International Journal of Game Theory, 2004
Two-Person Bargaining with Verifiable Types, with Enrico Minelli, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004
Coming Soon:
Bad Repetition (with K. Rozen)
Coming soon...
Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Asymmetric Information (with J. Fanning and K. Rozen)
Coming soon...
Level-k Mechanism Design with Small Modeling Mistakes (with R. Saran and R. Serrano)
Coming soon...
Communication, Perception, and Strategic Obfuscation (with K. Rozen)
Coming soon... (financial support from the NSF is gratefully acknowledged)
Publications: (Click here for a complete list)
The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies under Asymmetric Information (JET 2008)
Idea: The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.
Impartial Division of a Dollar (with H. Moulin and N. Tideman, JET 2008)
Idea: For impartial division, each participant reports only her opinion about the fair relative shares of the other participants, and this report has no effect on her own share. If a specific division is compatible with all reports, it is implemented. We propose a family of natural methods meeting these requirements, for a division among four or more participants. No such method exists for a division among three participants.
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value (Ecma 2008)
Idea: The paper studies how to extend the theory of the Shapley value to problems involving externalities. Using the standard axiom systems behind the Shapley value leads to the identification of bounds on players’ payoffs around an “externality-free” value. The approach determines the direction and maximum size of Pigouvian-like transfers among players, transfers based on the specific nature of externalities that are compatible with basic normative principles.
Reason-Based Choice (with K. Eliaz, TE 2012)
Idea: Two well-documented violations of rationality (the attraction and compromise effects) can be captured as the cooperative solution to an intrapersonal bargaining problem among two different criteria for choosing. We first axiomatically characterize our solution when the two criteria are known, and then discuss the testable implications of our model when the two criteria are unknown. Alternatively, our analysis may be reinterpreted as a study of (interpersonal) bilateral bargaining over a finite set of options.
On the Selection of Arbitrators (with K. Eliaz and B. Knight, AER 2014)
Idea: The problem of arbitrator selection is studied using implementation theory. Combining theory and experiments, we document some issues with the veto-rank procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties.
Competing for Consumer Inattention (with K. Eliaz and K. Rozen, JPE 2014)
Idea: How do markets respond when consumers are able to examine only a limited number of markets for the best price? A firm’s price can deflect or draw attention to its market, and consequently, limited attention introduces a new dimension of cross-market competition. We characterize the equilibrium of a stylized model capturing these features, and show that having consumers who are only partially attentive increases consumer welfare. With less attention, consumers are more likely to miss the best offers; but enhanced cross-market competition decreases average price paid, as leading firms try to stay under the consumers’ radar.
Behavioral Implementation (AER 2014)
Idea: Implementation theory assumes that participants’ choices are rational, in the sense of being consistent with the maximization of a context-independent preference. The paper investigates implementation under complete information when individuals’ choices need not be rational.
Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options (with K. Eliaz, GEB 2015)
Idea: An important, yet overlooked, step in bargaining is figuring out the set of feasible options. Once options are on the table, different compromise rules can be used to decide on which final option to settle on. These compromise rules impact the willingness to disclose feasible options. Both in a static and in a dynamic setting, we show how the Nash compromise rule is second-best when it comes to disclosing options.
Level-k Mechanism Design (with R. Saran and R. Serrano, ReStud forthcoming)2
Level-k Mechanism Design (with R. Saran and R. Serrano, ReStud forthcoming)
Idea: In my paper on behavioral implementation, bounded rationality was understood as a failure of preference maximization. The assumption of rational expectations was maintained, however. In this paper, agents do maximize a preference ordering, but the notion of Nash equilibrium is replaced by a level-k behavioral model.