Working Papers


Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Asymmetric Information

Coauthored with Geoffroy de Clippel and Jack Fanning

coming soon

The Silent Treatment revised

Coauthored with Geoffroy de Clippel and Kfir Eliaz


In an organization, the attention of an executive decision-maker (principal) is sought by multiple subordinates (agents) eager to have their ideas implemented. Such attention-seeking imposes an externality on the principal, who can only implement one idea per period and may overlook valuable proposals. Her only means of providing incentives is her rule for selecting among proposals, which must be rational for her to follow. Can she design an idea-selection mechanism that circumvents this problem? 

Bounded Rationality and Limited Datasets
Coauthored with Geoffroy de Clippel

Peer-reviewed at NAJ Economics

Revise and resubmit at Econometrica

[download the online appendix] 


Theories of bounded rationality are typically characterized over an exhaustive data set. How does one tell whether observed choices are consistent with a theory if the data is incomplete? How can out-of-sample predictions be made? What can be identified about preferences? This paper aims to operationalize some leading bounded rationality theories when the available data is limited, as is the case in most practical settings. 



Fairness Through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach

Coauthored with Geoffroy de Clippel


This paper experimentally investigates cooperative game theory from a normative perspective. Subjects designated as Decision Makers decide on payoff allocations for three subjects (Recipients) whose substitutabilities and complementarities are captured by a characteristic function. Axioms and solution concepts from cooperative game theory provide valuable insights into the data.


A `Dual' Improved Shortcut to the Long Run


This paper provides a duality-based improvement upon Ellison’s radius-coradius for evolutionary games.