

LATE KANT

Towards another law of the earth

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Peter Fenves

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UNDER THE SIGN OF FAILURE

Toward Eternal Peace

Projectiles of peace

Toward Eternal Peace is written under the sign of failure.

The slogan "eternal peace" can be announced only under the sign of failure because the term *eternity* does not belong either to the vocabulary of politics or to the lexicon of the "critical enterprise" (5: 170). Speaking of anything as "eternal," including peace, demands that the speaker take leave of both politics and critical self-reflection, both of which take their point of departure from an abandonment of eternity in favor of time, timing, temporality, and temporizing – so much so that the "critical enterprise" presents time as the single, absolutely universal condition of human experience. No use of the term *eternity* henceforth goes without saying, and as long as the success of words is measured by their ability to express univocal concepts, the phrase "eternal peace," if not eternal peace itself, is doomed to failure. One of the expressions of this failure is the customary translation of *ewig* by "perpetual," but this – almost inevitable – failure of translation is already prepared in the German word *ewig*, for, as Kant writes in the opening article of the treatise, the qualification of the term "peace" by this adjective is "suspicious" (8: 345).¹ Those who qualify the term *peace* arouse the suspicion that they speak of peace only in order to prepare for war. The word *eternal* cannot say what it means, and neither can the announcement of "eternal peace."

Toward Eternal Peace is, for these reasons – and more to come – written under the sign of its own failure. Images gather around the word *eternal* because it cannot be properly grasped, and the specific image by which Kant first illuminates the title of his little treatise – that of a graveyard – is an emblem of human fallibility. But Kant goes even further in the direction of failure: not only does he place an insignia of lost life at the beginning of his treatise, he also sets a condition on the interpretation of his "philosophical project" that guarantees its failure. *Toward Eternal Peace*, in other words, is written not only under the sign of failure but under the *protection* of failure as well. Such is the double function of the *Schild* (sign, shield) with which

Kant begins the only one of his texts that he describes in its title as *philosophical*. By professing to fail, the treatise guards itself against those in power who might fear its success. As long as the project Kant proposes in *Toward Eternal Peace* is understood as nothing more than a "sweet dream,"² as long as it is understood as a failure from the start, there can be no reasonable objection to its publication. According to the interpretative premises of those who review the publication of philosophical treatises, *Toward Eternal Peace* does not apply to "the real world." There is, for this reason, only one condition imposed on its readers: they must understand that the treatise only *appears* to be a treaty and that it, therefore, cannot be taken seriously.

At the inception, therefore, Kant must lay down an interpretative condition. To the extent that the prologue sets out the terms by which the text can be read as it is intended, it cannot be read in the same way as the rest of the treatise: it must remain silent about its own intentions. Whereas the body of the treatise is directed toward the conditions under which eternal peace can be achieved, the prologue directs its attention toward this "toward."³ Far from granting access to "eternal peace," however, the opening words articulate the impasse on the way toward this long-sought destination, and it does so by showing the difficulty of reading the sign of failure after which the treatise is named:

Toward Eternal Peace

Whether this satirical superscript on that Dutch innkeeper's sign [*Schild*] upon which a graveyard was painted is valid [*gelte*] for human beings in general, or especially for heads of state, who can never get enough of war, or perhaps only for philosophers who dream that sweet dream, may be set aside. But the author of the present [treatise] conditions himself in this way: since the practical politician places the theoretical one at his feet, looking down with great self-satisfaction and regarding him as an academic, who, with his ideas devoid of reality, brings no danger to the State (which must proceed from principles of experience), and whom one can always allow to fire his eleven projectiles all at once without the world-wise statesman having to turn around; in case of a conflict with the theoretical politician, the practical one must proceed in a consistent manner and not suspect a danger to the state behind the opinions that the latter openly expresses, and ventures in the hope that they would meet with good luck. – By this *clausula salvatoria*, the author will herewith know himself expressly guarded in the best form against all malicious interpretation.

(8: 343)

Only because the innkeeper brings the phrase "toward eternal peace" into relation with an emblem does there arise a question concerning its validity.

The emblem alone may give rise to questions of accuracy, even truth, but not of validity; and the prepositional phrase cannot by itself be considered either valid or invalid. The emblem of the graveyard does not so much turn the prepositional phrase into a definite judgment – which in this case would be a last judgment – as give some directions for the interpretation of “toward,” and by doing so, it poses the question “to whom do these directions apply?” Those to whom they apply are the ones for whom they are “valid.” The directions could then be interpreted in the following ways: if the sign applies to human beings in general, they should seek peace in the grave, “for the dead do not fight any longer” (Leibniz); if it applies to heads of state, they should see the grave as the outcome of their insatiable desire for war; if it applies to philosophers, they should rouse themselves from their dreams and awaken to the sober reality of inter-state conflict. By superimposing directions over an emblem, the innkeeper produces something like a signpost for those who seek the road to peace; but insofar as this sign says to those for whom it is valid that there is no peace in this life – or on this road – it is a self-negating sign. If, however, a sign does not give directions, then it is not simply a sign but the replacement for an absent sign and, in the case of the sign posted by the innkeeper, the absence of a directional sign presents itself in an image of irreparable loss: the gravestones through which a graveyard is recognizable are themselves signs by which the end of life’s road is marked and shields in which the loss of life is protected in perpetuity. The innkeeper’s sign thus indicates that the “toward” of “toward eternal peace” is uninterpretable. By showing sign-posts of a passage for which we have no valid concepts and about which we can therefore make no valid judgment – the passage “from time into eternity”⁴ – the sign says “no passage,” or in Greek, *aporia*: there is no path to peace; this, the gravestone, marks the end of the road.⁵

If there is no path to peace, there can be no method by which this goal can be secured, and if it is understood in advance that no method is valid, then no proposal for peace poses any danger: each one is null and void from the start. Kant may therefore put aside the question concerning the validity of the sign posted by the innkeeper by answering this question in advance: the sign is a sign of the absence of any sign giving directions to the place called “Eternal Peace.” Once *Toward Eternal Peace* has been placed under this sign, Kant can raise a general question of validity: under what conditions does any genuine peace treaty apply? And this is precisely the question to which he responds in the first article of the treatise: “1. ‘No conclusion of peace [*Friedensschluß*] shall be valid [*gelten*] if it is made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war’” (8: 343). A question concerning the validity of a local sign gives way to a question concerning the validity of peace treaties in general; but this question itself is a generalization of the *aporia* to which the local sign points, and this *aporia* is inscribed in the very term for

peace: *Friedensschluß*, “conclusion of peace.” Kant doubtless means by this word a treaty by which war comes to a conclusion, but it could also mean the exact opposite: peace’s conclusion, an end to peace and, thus, the inception of war. The decision to use this duplicitous word is, moreover, anything but arbitrary, for, as Kant indicates in the second “definitive article,” seemingly more exact terms like “peace contract” or “peace treaty” (*Friedensvertrag*) are even more inadequate: “without a contract [*Vertrag*] among peoples under itself [the throne of reason], peace cannot be founded or secured. There must therefore be a league [*Bund*] of a peculiar kind, which one could call a league of peace (*foedus pacificum*) and which would be distinguished from a peace contract [*Friedensvertrag*] (*pactum pacis*), since the latter seeks to end *one* war, whereas the former seeks to end *all* wars forever” (8: 356). A “conclusion of peace” would be the name for this non-contractual contract: a “contract among peoples” that does without contractual obligations; a contract without contract. No wonder the term *Friedensschluß* succumbs to ambiguity. Yet, even if another word were chosen to replace it, the *aporia* would not be avoided, for the article in question would still say: peace is concluded only among those for whom war has come to a conclusion – which is tautological and, for this reason, less a preliminary article than the articulation of the *impasse*.

Just as Kant is allowed to leave aside the question for whom the superscript is valid, the “practical politician” is under an obligation to grant Kant’s treatise a certain leeway: the “pins” or “projectiles” (*Kegel*) of this “project” are “Ideas” which, according to the self-defining policy of the “practical politician,” are “devoid of reality” (*sachleer*). The treatise entitled *Toward Eternal Peace* occupies precisely the position with respect to anonymous “practical politicians” that the sign entitled “toward eternal peace” occupies with respect to Kant, the “theoretical politician.” Since Kant will conclude the “definite articles” for eternal peace by proposing a certain right to “hospitality [*Wirtbarkeit*]” (8: 358), he associates himself even more closely with the *Gastwirt* (innkeeper) under whose sign he presents his treatise. Just as the innkeeper poses no threat to his guests – or else he would not be a *Gastwirt* – Kant’s treatise poses no danger to the state. Only an innkeeper who is known to be harmless could place the emblem of a graveyard at his door; otherwise, as a sign of a more permanent inn, it would be a threat, and the Dutchman would have to be associated not with Kant but with those Barbary pirates and European states – especially the Dutch one⁶ – that violate the international right to hospitality. The same can be said of Kant’s treatise, for it, too, having been immediately translated into French,⁷ relies on the hospitality of an international readership. *Toward Eternal Peace* may leave the innkeeper’s sign aside, but it never departs from the *place* of this sign. Within the economy of the treatise as a whole, the place occupied by this sign is the polemical site of “satire.”

Satire

In the last – and oddly unnumbered – “Remark” of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant seeks to understand the “affect” of laughter by proposing that it “arises when a tense expectation is suddenly transformed into nothing” (5: 332). The wit of the Dutch innkeeper can be explained accordingly: wayward travelers expect to receive directions to a hoped-for place called “Eternal Peace” but are, instead, directed nowhere – or better yet, directed downward. The innkeeper’s sign can thus be considered a joke to the second power. Not only does it transform a tense expectation into nothing, it does so by way of a reference to nothingness. If, as Kant suggests in the same “Remark,” bursts of laughter are monuments to cognitive failure, then the painted gravestones can even be read as the illustration of their origin in a radical failure of our cognitive capacities: their inability to grasp the sudden transformation of life into death. And this lamentable transformation is never far from the jokes Kant tells for the purpose of illustration:

[I]f the heir of a rich relative wants to arrange a solemn funeral for him but laments that he cannot quite succeed in doing so, because (he says), “The more money I give to the mourners to look sorrowful [*berriübt*], the happier they look,” then we laugh out loud, and the reason is that an expectation is suddenly transformed into nothing. One should note that it must not be transformed into the positive opposite of an expected object – for that is always something and can often cause sorrow [*betriüben*] – but into nothing. For if in telling us a story someone arouses a great expectation, and at its conclusion we immediately see its untruth, that displeases us, as in, for example, the story of people whose hair is supposed to have turned gray in a single night because of a great grief. By contrast, if in response to such a story another jokester [*Schalk*] tells in a very round-about manner a story of the grief that a merchant who, while returning from India to Europe with all his fortune in merchandise, was forced to throw everything overboard in a terrible storm, and was so upset that on that very night his *wig* turned white, then we laugh, and it gives us satisfaction, because, for a time, we throw back and forth like a ball our failure to grasp [*Mißgriff*] some object that is otherwise indifferent to us, or rather the idea we have been pursuing, while we merely intended to grab it and hold onto it. It is not the dismissal of someone as a liar or an idiot that awakens our satisfaction here, for the latter story, even by itself, told with the appearance of seriousness, would make a group of people laugh heartily, whereas the former story would not even be worthy of attention.

(5: 333–34)

The author of *Toward Eternal Peace* occupies the same position as the jokester who makes fun of a failed colonialist enterprise – only inverted: whereas the latter assumes a serious demeanor in order to keep his listeners interested in his long-winded story, the former begins by declaring that his short treatise is nothing more than a game. The ball that eludes our grasp in the joke about the white wig turns into the projectiles Kant tosses out in his “game of ideas [*Spiel der Ideen*]” (23: 155). That Kant erases the phrase “game of ideas” in the published version of the Preface indicates that he does not want to give away the whole thing by simply saying “this is a joke,” but the effect of the published preface is precisely the same: even without saying “don’t take me seriously,” it makes sure that those who play serious roles in the regime of Friedrich Wilhelm II will know that the objects with which he plays are only parts of an elaborate game. The treatise, therefore, has little chance of eliciting laughter: there is no tense expectation that anything will come of it, least of all “eternal peace.” When Kant takes over the story of the Dutch innkeeper, however, he adds one telling detail: the inscription “toward eternal peace” is described as “satirical.” The same can be said, up to a point, of the like-named treatise as well. The point where its satirical intention fails is at the beginning, for – unlike, say, Swift’s *Tale of the Tub*, which Kant must have re-read shortly before writing *Toward Eternal Peace*⁸ – it undermines its comic potential by declaring its status as a game.

Toward Eternal Peace can, however, retain the satirical character of the innkeeper’s sign on the condition that its eleven projectiles hit a target – only not the target toward which they, in unison, are said to aim, namely “eternal peace.” Satire is successful only if it strikes something, and it must strike its target with enough force to deflate its pretensions. Taking the air out of those who give themselves airs is the principal aim of satire. In the case of *A Tale of the Tub*, priests who claim divine afflatus are under attack; and Kant’s only attempt at Swift-like satire, *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (1766), takes aim at a mining engineer who extensively records his visits to other worlds. At the end of a section entitled “Anti-Kabbalah” Kant even borrows Swift’s preferred explanation for the puffed-up character of enthusiastic priests: “whenever a hypochondriacal wind blows in the guts, it is a question of which direction it takes: if it goes downwards, it comes out a f—; but if it goes upwards, it is an apparition or sacred inspiration” (2: 348).⁹ By saying that claims to divine afflatus are the result of flatulence, the satirist promptly deflates those who mistake their gassiness for greatness. A line from *A Tale of the Tub* that makes its way into *Toward Eternal Peace* captures satire *in nuce*: what Swift says of wisdom in general – “’tis a *Nut*, which unless you chuse with Judgment, may cost you a Tooth, and pay you with nothing but a *Worm*”¹⁰ – Kant applies to Jacques Mallet du Pan’s counter-revolutionary wisdom, which is supposedly drawn from long years of political experience: “What forms of government let fools contest;/Whate’r is best administered

is best.' [Pope] If that means the best administered government is the best administered, then he has, in Swift's expression, 'cracked a nut and been rewarded with a worm'" (8: 353). Those who are proud of their ability to crack nuts discover to their dismay that they are no better off than anyone else. Kant's claim that the success of a joke does not depend on its capacity to dismiss its subject as a "liar or idiot" is dubious in its own right and untenable with respect to satire, which aims to show that its targets are either liars, idiots, or a combination of the two: idiots who lie to themselves in order to make themselves seem wiser, grander, or closer to God.

Toward Eternal Peace may not be as intricately structured as *A Tale of the Tub* – few texts are – but Swift can be taken for its guiding spirit. In the coda to "On the Common Saying: That May Work in Theory But Not in Practice" (1793) Kant explicitly discusses the threat of ridicule to which the opening of *Toward Eternal Peace* responds:

[A]n enduring universal peace brought about by the so-called *balance of powers in Europe* is a mere figment of the imagination, like *Swift's house*, whose architect built it so perfectly in accordance with the laws of equilibrium that as soon as a sparrow lit on it, it collapsed. – "But that states," one will say, "will never subject themselves to coercive laws, and the proposal for a cosmopolitan nation, to whose power all individual states should voluntarily accustom themselves in order to obey its laws, may sound ever so nice in the theory of an Abbé St Pierre or of a Rousseau, yet it does not work in practice. For this proposal has at all times been ridiculed [*jederzeit verlachen*] by great statesmen and even more by heads of state as a pedantic-childish idea that comes out of the academy."

(8: 312–13)

And one can say the same about Dutch innkeepers: statesmen, heads of state, and innkeepers all laugh at immodest philosophers making great plans for "an enduring universal peace," which, regardless of their dazzling complexity, are in effect nothing. To this laughter Kant responds by way of Swift – first in the final paragraphs of "On the Common Saying" and then more extensively in *Toward Eternal Peace*. First, he answers the accusation of ineffectualness by acknowledging its truth: he will not puff himself up. Kant's apologetic response to Mendelssohn, who apparently complained about the satirical character of *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, is valid for *Toward Eternal Peace* as well: "It seemed to me wisest to forestall other people's mockery by first of all mocking myself" (11: 70). Indemnified in this way, Kant then reverses the direction of the accusation and throws out a series of projectiles against "practical politicians" who seek to secure an enduring peace by balancing power. Far from being wise architects, they are liars and idiots, for they forget to include the nuts and bolts that bind the parts of

their intricately designed construction together – without informing anyone who has to inhabit their house of its structural failure.

Toward Eternal Peace goes even further, moreover, in the direction of satire. Not only are the rare politicians who devise plans for enduring peace consigned to the category of stupidity, so, too, are the statesmen and heads of state who are as scornful of such plans as they are contemptuous of philosophical projects. Putting on airs is, of course, an integral feature of both statesmen and heads of state. Without distinguishing themselves from those over whom they rule, they could not maintain their positions. One can always say, as Kant does in his response to Hobbes's assertion that the head of state can never be in the wrong, that rulers have not been "blessed with divine inspiration and elevated above the rest of humanity" (8: 304); but this is not satire – and it is not particularly effective critique either. Few, if any, statesmen or heads of state are vulnerable to the accusation that they, like Swedenborg, think that they can communicate with another world; on the contrary, a resolute this-worldliness is a badge of honor. What they believe about themselves is not that they are recipients of divine afflatus, even if they claim for themselves "divine right." Rather, they are convinced that they are fundamentally different from those over whom they rule. The more powerful they are, the more exalted they believe themselves to be. And of all those who are subject to the whims of European princes and privy consuls, none are in a weaker position than the so-called "savages" who live on territories that they seek to make into their own. Their claim to these places rests, in part, on this belief in the superiority of their supposedly civilized condition. Even if they do not present themselves as the leaders of the "civilized world," they regard themselves as eminent representations of a higher degree of humanity. *Toward Eternal Peace* takes aim at this pretension. Swift, once again, can be seen as the guiding spirit. Whereas "A Modest Proposal" casts the rulers of England as cannibals, who are prepared to eat Irish children, if only the price is low enough, Kant's treatise calls the rulers of European states something even worse: "The difference between European and American savages consists precisely in this, that while many of the latter tribes have been entirely eaten by their enemies, the former know how to make better use of those they have conquered than to consume them and would rather increase the number of their subjects and thus also the quantity of instruments they have to wage even more extensive wars" (8: 354–55).

European rulers may present themselves as the representatives of civilization, but they are more "savage" than those whom they treat as such. With only a slight alteration in tone – which would bring it in the vicinity of satire, properly speaking – *Toward Eternal Peace* could present itself as another "modest proposal": that the rulers of Europe put an end to the haphazard method in which their subjects are born by establishing breeding facilities for the production of good physical specimens of the human species, so that they can conduct even more entertaining spectacles of warfare. And as Kant

knows well, having duly weighed – and ultimately rejected – Maupertius’s proposal for the establishment of state-controlled, human breeding farms (2: 241), such proposals are not limited to philosophers inspired by Plato’s *Republic*.¹¹ The modesty of Maupertius’s proposal stands in stark contrast to the immodesty of the various proposals for perpetual peace that philosophers like Abbé St Pierre and Rousseau have drawn up. The slight trace of another “modest proposal” may even be perceptible in one of the opening words of *Toward Eternal Peace*: the statesman can find no reason to disallow Kant from firing “his eleven projectiles [*elf Kegel*]” (8: 343), which is to say, the treatise as a whole, with its six “preliminary articles,” three “definitive articles,” and two appendices. *Kegel* not only means “pins” in particular and “projectiles” in general; it also means “bones,” especially those of human beings. The new game of throwing out projectiles of peace, in other words, is reminiscent of the apparently long-forgotten practice of casting human bones for the sake of fateful gods and cannibalistic kings.¹²

All of these “modest proposals” have one thing in common: the satirist presents himself as a remnant from the state of nature – not, however, a state of nature that is imagined to be paradisaic or innocent. Whereas the naïf, according to the same unnumbered “Remark” of the third *Critique* that contains Kant’s explanation of laughter, inadvertently reminds the members of civilized society that they have regrettably distanced themselves from “the simplicity of nature” (5: 335), the satirist willfully makes the same audience aware of the fact that they only *pretend* to have departed from the state of nature, that they have puffed themselves up into thinking that they are superior to those who live far from the *civitas*.¹³ The premise of satire is that natural life is not only *not* paradisaic; it is – to use the term Kant invokes in “On the Radical Evil in Human Nature” – fundamentally “perverse” (6: 30). The naïf only needs to learn the principal lesson of Kant’s recent contributions to the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* to turn into a satirist. And nothing shows this transformation better than *Toward Eternal Peace*: from the perspective of statesmen, heads of state, and Dutch innkeepers, Kant would be judged utterly naïve, since he shows no evidence of having engaged with the real world; knowing that human beings are by nature perverse, however, his naïveté presents itself as the “modest proposal” that he simply be allowed to throw out a few *Kegel* – which, as insiders would know, both commemorate and prognosticate cannibalistic festivals.

Natural life is mired in evil – not because those who are “uncivilized” necessarily want to harm anyone else but, rather, because they think nothing of using others of their kind as means toward their own particular ends. Satire is oriented toward the meanness of human beings. According to the etymology of the term, satirists are “saturated” (*satir*). The word does not indicate what satisfies the satirist, however. Walter Benjamin proposes an answer: “The satirist is the figure in which the cannibal was received by civilization.”¹⁴ Cannibalism, however, is only one form of satisfaction – and

not even the most extreme. Creating breeding farms for human beings holds out the prospects of even greater satisfaction. Just as the naïf innocently discloses the “jokester in ourselves” (5: 335), the satirist does the same – but with a perverse twist: the inner jokester, who, upon encountering a naïf, regrets having fallen away from “the simplicity of nature,” learns that he has only fooled himself into believing that he has distanced himself from his original condition. With the emergence of the satirist, not only is the joke on the jokester – this is already true with the appearance of the naïf – but the jokester can no longer pass off the joke by laughing at someone else. Kant’s dubious conclusion to his abbreviated analytic of wit does not therefore apply to satire: “It is not the dismissal [*Abfertigung*] of someone as a liar or an idiot that awakens our satisfaction here” (5: 334). On the contrary, the aggressive character of satire, which wants to “finish off” (*abfertigen*) its targets, confirms its premise: that human beings are evil by nature; that creaturely life is perverse; that, from the perspective of a civilized race, the human species looks like a bunch of Yahoos. Satire is palpable only because its targets do not recognize themselves as such. No one is clearer about the irony of satire – it succeeds only by failing – than Swift himself: “Satyr is a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do generally discover every bodys’ Face but their Own.”¹⁵

Erasing race

There is, however, an utterly obvious way to put an end to warfare among sovereign states: grant one of these states dominion over the entire surface of the earth. This is not a far-fetched plan, reserved for medieval treatises like Dante’s *De Monarchia*. According to Kant, every ruler of Europe wants to fulfill Dante’s end by machiavellian means. Nature, however, thwarts this desire and thus condemns European rulers to continual failure. Frustration is a constitutive feature of sovereignty – so much so that an alternative title for *Toward Eternal Peace* could be *On the Failure of All Political Attempts at Global Domination*: “the desire of every state (or its ruler) is to establish an enduring peace, hoping, if possible to dominate the entire world. But nature *wills otherwise*. It uses two means to prevent peoples from intermingling and to separate them: the difference of *languages* and of *religions*” (8: 367). After the word *religions* Kant immediately adds a footnote that contradicts the body of the text: “*Differences in religion*: a wonderful expression! Precisely as if one spoke of different *moralities*. No doubt there can be different kinds of historical *faiths*. . . . But there is only a single religion, valid for all men in all times” (8: 367). This inconsistency is remarkable. At no other place does Kant write a word only to undermine its value in an accompanying footnote: it is a technique more appropriate to the author of *Gulliver’s Travels* or *Tristram Shandy* than the philosopher who wrote the *Critique of Practical Reason*. An earlier draft of *Toward Eternal Peace* gives an

indication of what might have contributed to this strange inconsistency, for Kant had originally identified three differences among peoples – “races, languages, and religions” (23: 170). In the final version he erases *races* in fact and *religions* in effect. The retraction of the latter term by means of a sarcastic footnote can even be read as the last trace of the technical term *race* not only in this passage from *Toward Eternal Peace* but in all of Kant’s publications of the 1790s. Even in the *Anthropology*, which, given the series of lectures from which it is largely drawn, should devote a major section to the “character of the races” (7: 182), Kant cuts short his discussion and simply refers interested readers to J. C. Girtanner’s work.¹⁶ With very few exceptions – almost all of which will be examined in subsequent chapters of this study – the word never appears again in late Kant.¹⁷

No one can know why Kant decided to do away with *race* from *Toward Eternal Peace*; Kant himself may not have known. Perhaps he did not want to enter again into the controversies around the term that had been spawned by his three essays on race: “On the Different Human Races” (1775), “The Determination of the Concept of Race” (1785), and “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” (1788). Perhaps, for the same reason, he did not want to add yet another footnote to a battle of the books that, in his estimation, he had already won. Yet, this reluctance to enter into a new debate or add another footnote would be surprising, since the treatise nowhere else spurns controversies and welcomes digressive footnotes, including a long digression on the non-European etymology of the word *pax* (8: 359–60). And in any case, if only Kant had erased the term *religions* and replaced it by “historical creeds,” he could have saved himself the trouble of adding a footnote in which he makes fun of his own terminology. More importantly, however, race, for Kant, is a thoroughly natural phenomenon, unlike religion and even language, which is supposed to be a vehicle of reason.¹⁸ Discussion of racial differences, for Kant, may only be appropriate for “natural history,” in contrast to “natural description” (2: 443; 8: 100; 8: 161), since the validity of racial categories is based on teleological judgment; nevertheless, these categories, unlike those of religion and language, can be considered entirely natural.¹⁹ To say that nature, by establishing racial differences, thwarts the ultimate intention of European rulers would not only be completely unobjectionable from the perspective of Kant’s theory of race; it might even disclose a daring new dimension. The erasure of *race* is therefore a puzzling act. The oddity of Kant’s giddy self-sarcasm – “Differences of religion: a wonderful expression!” – is compounded by the fact that, less than a decade earlier, he had strenuously argued for a concept of natural differences among members of the species that, in his opinion, could be of inestimable value for future anthropological research.²⁰

The erasure of the term *race* is as enigmatic as any of Kant’s self-corrections. Just as the retention of *religions* in the plural can be understood in two divergent ways, so, too, can the erasure of *race* in the singular. *On the one hand*,

the statement that nature does not wish that human beings speak only one language and profess only one religion means that French will never be the world tongue, regardless of how well post-Revolutionary France may fare, and that Christianity will never be the world religion, regardless of what priests, missionaries, enthusiasts, and Friedrich Wilhelm II may dream. That the multiplicity of races cannot be reduced to one means, in turn, that all non-white races will not, as he claims in a notorious note, be wiped away.²¹ In other words, Kant may have struck out the word *race* because he still holds the conviction in 1795 that the white race is destined, after all, to dominate the planet, as the other races succumb to their supposedly “inferior” nature. *On the other hand*, saying something to this effect would destroy the very basis on which he launches his “philosophical project,” for even a slight suggestion that the race of Europeans is destined to dominate the earth immediately plays into the hands of the European rulers from whom he sharply distinguishes himself. Their inhospitality may be morally unjustifiable; but it would still be justified from the perspective of nature. A kind of “natural right” would support their claims to every part of the globe. And Kant, who in the *Anthropology* refuses to count the Germans among the “civilized nations of the earth” (7: 312) for fear that readers might judge him arrogant, would be saying, in effect, “I am superior to those who inhabit the other continents – not because of anything I have accomplished, still less because of my moral comportment, but because of the race to which I belong.” These two divergent explanations for the erasure of *race* from *Toward Eternal Peace* reinforce each other, moreover. Kant may still believe that all non-European races are destined to extinction, but he has good reason to keep this opinion to himself. In the second edition of *Toward Eternal Peace* Kant adds a “Secret Article” in which it is tacitly agreed that philosophers should have the right to make public their views. An even more secret article might also be at work – an article that forbids European philosophers from publishing their views on race.

The silence of the late Kant in matters of race cannot simply be attributed to his preoccupation with other issues. He fails to make good his promise in the Preface to the last *Critique* to proceed “without fail” (5: 170) to the “doctrinal” dimension of the critical system and, instead, concentrates on a variety of miscellany, including some reflections on the influence of the moon on the weather, an analysis of a minor conflict in mathematics, and an extended debate with the likes of Johann Schlosser and Count Leopold zu Stolberg. By contrast, during his so-called “silent decade” of the 1770s, when he was working assiduously on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he had enough time to write and significantly revise “On the Different Human Races.” With respect to race, the 1770s is no decade of “silence.” And during the 1780s, when all of the *Critiques* were written – and much more besides – Kant found enough time to write two substantial essays that clarify and defend his concept of race. That he should allow a concept of such potential

magnitude for the “human sciences” to disappear entirely from his public persona is of some significance, especially since it could be considered among Kant’s most influential contribution to the natural sciences of the next century. The *Universal Natural History*, after all, was unknown to Laplace who, in any case, proposed a much more rigorous version of the same general conception of solar evolution. When Eric Voegelin defends the Critique of Teleological Judgment as the most viable account of the systematic organization of nature in his *Idea of Race*, he does not bother to ask himself why Kant decided to drop his defense of the concept of race by the time he writes the third *Critique* – and thereafter as well.²²

One more element of this question makes it even more puzzling and the late Kant’s erasure of race from his writing even more enigmatic: the thesis of radical evil could be understood to make the use of racial categories all the more appealing – and for reasons other than those of natural-scientific systematicity. That human beings have a “perverse” character means that they have no character, which is to say: none of their words can be trusted, not even the words they speak to themselves in the privacy of their hearts. As Kant notes in the “Concluding Remark” to “On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at Theodicy,” “the human being knows how to falsify even inner assertions before his own conscience” (8: 270). From a “pragmatic point of view,” it is therefore necessary to divine their intentions by non-linguistic means. And here the concept of race would be of some help: racial characteristics can reveal what people without character cannot – the desires and aversions that they hide even from themselves. Because the natural marks of race are not subject to the faculty of choice, they cannot be corrupted. These marks, so the argument runs, betray the intentions and motivations of those who are naturally corrupt better than their words. In this respect, the thesis of radical evil supports the kind of racialism that would rapidly develop in nineteenth-century Germany: since it is impossible for anyone to trust what anyone says, social distinctions require a system of characterological signs.

The radicality of the thesis of radical evil, however, thwarts this program from the start – and sends it into a different direction altogether: toward the thought of another possible kind of human being whom future anthropologists may eventually encounter. In the meantime, the words of Paul are valid: “There is no distinction here” (6: 38–39). Regardless of the linguistic, religious and “racial” distinctions among peoples, every member of the human species subordinates the absolute commands of practical reason to the pragmatic calculations of potential gains and losses. All human beings can thus be seen to belong to a single race, whose specifying feature consists in a “foul spot,” as Kant emphasizes in the concluding paragraph of the “Announcement of the Near Conclusion of a Treaty for Eternal Peace in Philosophy” (1797):

Lying (“from the father of lies, through which all evil has come into the world”) is the actual foul spot on human nature, however much the tone of *truthfulness* (according to the example of many Chinese grocers, who place above their shops an inscription in golden letters that reads “here one is never deceived”) is the usual tone, above all, in matters that concern the supersensible. – The command *you ought not lie* (even if it were done with the most pious intentions), inwardly incorporated as a principle into philosophy conceived as a doctrine of wisdom, would alone be able not only to bring about eternal peace in philosophy but also to secure it for all time to come.

Königsberg

I. Kant

(8: 422)

Unless the “foul spot” is eradicated, the treaty for eternal peace in philosophy can always only be announced as near, for, even if peace were announced, the announcement could not be believed – and would not therefore be an announcement of peace but only a vociferous prolongation of war. But no announcement to the effect that the “foul spot” has been eradicated can be believed until it has indeed been eradicated. Chinese merchants thus occupy the same position as European philosophers: all place themselves under shields that affirm their truthfulness, but since their signs are credible only insofar as they are indeed truthful, these signs say, in effect, nothing. And the same is true of all “natural” characteristics: none can be believed, not even the characterological system of tones, since the “foul spot” marks “human nature.” Drawing attention to the differences among human races is therefore a distraction – or worse: it plays into the hands of European statesmen who mendaciously present themselves as superior to those over whom they exercise arbitrary power.

“The Antichrist”

From the perspective of “The End of All Things” (1794), which Kant had published shortly before *Toward Eternal Peace*, the retention of *religions* is as curious as the erasure of *race*. For, according to the last sentence of this essay in rational eschatology, Christianity is destined to become the world religion:

Should it ever come about that Christianity ceases to be worthy of love (which could certainly happen if, instead of its gentle spirit, it were armed with dictatorial authority), then disinclination toward, and resistance against it would have to become the dominant mode of thought for human beings, because in matters of morality there is no neutrality (nor even a coalition of opposing principles); and the *Antichrist*, who is taken as the harbinger of the last day, would begin his doubtless short regime (presumably based on fear

and self-interest); then, however, because Christianity would indeed be *destined* [bestimmt] to be a universal world religion but would not be *favoured* by fate {vom Schicksal begünstigt} to become so, *the* (perverted) *end of all things*, with respect to morality, would make its entrance.

Königsberg

I. Kant

(8: 339)

By the time Kant publishes *Toward Eternal Peace* a few months after this sentence appears in print, fate must have intervened, for the treatise unambiguously asserts that no religion is destined to become a “universal world religion.” Nature not only does not favor any religion; it is positively disinclined toward all of their global aspirations. And a fateful event did occur on October 1, 1794: King Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia, while exercising his magisterial right to issue “sovereign sentences” (*Machtsprüche*), reprimands Kant for his “abstinence” and therefore commands that his subject conform to “our sovereign will” (11: 525). Recognizing that Christianity had finally become unworthy of love, Kant responds, as predicted, with resistance – not open revolt, to be sure, but subtle sabotage. Solemnly promising the king that he would cease altogether from lecturing or publishing anything “touching on religion [*die Religion betreffend*]” (11: 530), he contradicts his own conviction that there is only one religion, properly speaking, and publishes a sentence touching on *religions*. By retaining and yet instantaneously repudiating this inconsistent pluralization of *religion*, he keeps his word, while at the same time breaking its spirit. However nonsensical *religions* may be, it says something very specific in its context: there will never be a “universal world religion.” Which is to say: “the Antichrist” has arrived in the person of Friedrich Wilhelm II. As a result, “*the* (perverse) *end of the world*” has begun to make its entrance. Given the last sentence of “The End of All Things” and the subversive use of the term *religions* in Kant’s next publication, there can be no other reasonable conclusion.²³ Christianity, for Kant, is destined to leave its destiny unfulfilled. “With respect to morality” – and without any angelic fanfare – all things are approaching their end.

Chance

By retaining the inconsistent plural of *religion* Kant subtly rebels against a king whom he obviously despised. In this regard, the word *race* would have led in the wrong direction entirely: toward a consideration of natural differences among races rather than the political equality of all those who are subject to arbitrary executive decrees. The structural position of an “academic” like Kant and that of the “savage” is the same. Both are subordinate to those whose feeling of superiority expresses itself in extra-legal actions: “one part of the world that feels itself to be superior [*überlegen fühlt*] to

another, which does not even stand in its way, will not fail to exercise the means of increasing its power by plundering or even conquering this other part of the world” (8: 371). Even if rulers need no rationale for this feeling of superiority – for they are, after all, in positions of unchallenged power – the same cannot be said of their apologists, against whose opinions *Toward Eternal Peace* is principally aimed. The rationale of these “practical politicians” is succinctly formulated in the Preface to the treatise: “practical politicians” are intimately familiar with the ways of the world, and their familiarity makes them into masters of chance. Counting on this rationale, Kant emphasizes that the statesmen who censor philosophical manuscripts cannot deny his treatise its chance for success, for, as they must admit for the sake of consistency, the chance that the “eleven projectiles” of the project will eventually hit something is zero: success, in other words, is “impossible” (23: 155). *Toward Eternal Peace* must therefore be allowed to “venture” out into the world. If, however, the venture fails to fail as expected, this impossibility cannot be attributed to anyone’s intention – not even to that of the author, who, after all, is only playing a game that he concedes in advance. The only agent that can be held accountable for such impossible success is, therefore, “luck” (*Glück*). In other words, nothing is accountable for this event, should it ever, *per impossibile*, come to pass. Kant therefore places the sole valid clause of the counterfeit treaty he publishes under the title *Toward Eternal Peace* at the end of the Preface – a clause that absolves him of any responsibility for the consequences of his pin toss. This “little saving clause” responds in advance to the possibility that, by publishing his reflections on another dimension of practical philosophy, Kant will, once again, be censured by the king for failing to bend his public opinions to “our sovereign will”: “the practical [politician] must proceed in a consistent manner and not suspect a danger to the state behind the opinions that the latter openly expresses and ventures in the hope that they would meet with good luck [*gut Glück*]. – By this *clausula salvatoria*, the author will herewith know himself expressly guarded in the best form against all malicious interpretation.”

The *clausula salvatoria* saves the author from accusations that his treatise intends any heresy, which, in his case, is heresy with regard to the doctrine of unchallenged sovereign power. The term *clausula salvatoria* does not belong to the terminology of classical Roman law.²⁴ As one might expect, the concept of a “saving clause” gains currency only when “salvation” from the law is of the utmost concern, on the one hand, and beliefs are legal matters, on the other. From a certain perspective, Pauline doctrine in its entirety can be comprehended as a “small saving clause”: outside the letter of the law a clause – or a closing word – abrogates the law in favor of grace. Whenever this happens, someone is “saved.” If the luck to which Kant appeals can be distinguished from grace – and it is the point of a lengthy footnote in the section on the “Guarantee of Eternal Peace” to lay out the terms for this

distinction (8: 361–62) – the clause by which the opening of the treatise closes should be understood less as a “saving provision” than as an *exit sign*, for it provides a way out of the impasse expressed in the Dutch innkeeper’s sign. According to the *clausula salvatoria*, the author cannot be held responsible for the effects of his treatise, since the “practical politician” admits that it can have none; its effectiveness can therefore be ascribed to “good luck” alone. If, however, its effectiveness can be ascribed *only* to luck – and not to agents who carefully devise stratagems through which they can increase the likelihood of successfully accomplishing their ends – it outdoes “practical politicians” at their own game. And if *something* or *some word* escapes the calculations of those who seek to master chance, then statesmen can never secure for themselves the final say: it will always have been possible that certain words they deem “impractical” – philosophical projects, dreams, even jokes – will have been effective, “real,” and therefore, in their terms, “practical” after all.

Kant thus abandons *Toward Eternal Peace* to the domain in which practical politicians operate. Outside of a few remarks in the *Critique of Pure Reason* – which drew Goethe’s attention²⁵ – Kant says little about chance within the parameters of the “critical enterprise”: it belongs to the domain of “pragmatics” rather than “practice” in the rigorous sense. And the “pragmatism” of “practical politicians” consists in their ability to gain control over circumstances, while making the most of every opportunity. Outdoing politicians at their own game, Kant makes his treatise into a sheer “venture.” The treatise is so completely abandoned to chance that it cannot be brought under the control of a pragmatic rule derived from observation of political expedience. If, however, chance cannot be mastered, then there may also be a chance for something other than chance. And this aporetic chance is not only what Kant contemplates in those sections of *Toward Eternal Peace* where he investigates the possibility of founding a world-federation of republican states; the treatise is *itself* a chance of this kind. If it is lucky, the world of political reality will no longer be based on luck. But this does not mean that politicians, having perfected the state to the point where it operates either as a frictionless machine or a well-formed organism, will have finally mastered chance; on the contrary, the world of political bodies, like Epicurus’ cosmos,²⁶ will have been paradoxically “founded” on chance – “paradoxical” because the chance on which it will have been founded is groundless; it is only a chance for something other than chance, a chance that cannot be seized as such.

Only the chance for something other than chance – not the chance statesmen wish to master or the goddess Fortuna whom princes woo – points a way out of the exigent contingencies to which these politicians appeal whenever they justify otherwise unjustifiable measures, clauses, or decrees. “Something other than chance” can, of course, be described in eminently critical terms: it is the non-contingent principle of right. But the very

immunity of what Kant calls “practical principles” from contingency means that the long-promised but long-delayed *Doctrine of Right* cannot account for the chance on which *Toward Eternal Peace* stakes its venture. Not only does this chance escape political mastery, it escapes a properly criticized philosophical vocabulary. Yet this chance cannot simply go without a name, for, as a “contract of peoples,” it is, in every sense of the word, a “public” matter. There is no chance for this impossible chance unless it is named, and so Kant goes in search of one in the first appendix to the treatise, “On the Guarantee of Eternal Peace.” To speak of a guarantee is to acknowledge certain risks; but the point of a guarantee is, of course, to reduce these risks by devising some form of compensation for any failure that might perchance occur. Kant has no trouble naming the guarantor of eternal peace. Taking his vocabulary from Lucretius, from whom he had early learned how to write a *Universal Natural History*, he calls it “the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*).” Speaking of Daedalus in this context is a mark of modesty; an immodest proposal, by contrast, would use the term *providence* and be exposed, in turn, to the unhappy fate of the artisan’s son:

When, as here, it is a matter merely of theory (not of religion), the use of the word “nature” is more appropriate for the limits of human reason . . . and more *modest* than an expression for a providence of which can have no cognitive knowledge, and on which we, in a fit of hubris [*vermessenerweise*], take flight as on Icarus’s wings in order more closely to approach the secrets of some unfathomable intention.
(8: 362)²⁷

Like Daedalus, however, *natura daedala rerum* guarantees its artifacts only up to a point. For Daedalus, the guarantee extends to the edge of the lower atmosphere; for Kant, to the lineaments of the heart: wherever there are secrets, the guarantee is invalidated. And when Kant discusses a “people of devils” who “possess understanding” (8: 366), the limits of the Daedalean guarantee come to light. Just as the term *nature* comes to Kant’s aid in the appendix to the treatise, *natura daedala rerum* “comes to the aid” of that which “practical politicians” know to be wholly impractical: “the honored but practically impotent general will, grounded in reason” (8: 366). As a result of nature’s assistance, an otherwise intractable problem becomes “solvable”:

So order and establish a constitution for a group of rational beings who require universal laws for their preservation, although each is secretly [*insgeheim*] inclined to exempt himself from such laws, that, while their private attitudes conflict, these nonetheless so cancel one another that their public comportment succeeds in the same way as if they had no evil attitudes.

(8: 366)

Since a solution to this problem can be calculated, it is *only* a problem, not an aporia, and the calculability of the problem is precisely what the artisan of nature guarantees. *Natura daedala rerum* has only a single complex function here: to make up for the tendency of human beings to exempt themselves in secret from the principle they publicly profess. This is, as it were, the “secret” intention of *natura daedala rerum*: to replace trust, which cannot in principle be guaranteed, by calculation, which can. As long as secret intentions are calculable – everyone can be expected to want what makes himself or herself happy – the problem remains solvable. But as the first “preliminary article” makes clear and the rest of the treatise corroborates, secrecy is anything but unproblematic when it comes to a proposal for *eternal peace*.²⁸ The problem posed by a treaty of this sort – which is less a closed contract than an open forum – is unsolvable; but its very insolvability is paradoxically its salvation: it escapes the “principles of experience” on the basis of which statesmen, heads of state, and “practical politicians” stake their claim to superiority.

The remnant race

A peace treaty can be guaranteed but not its eternity. Unless a peace treaty is “eternal,” however, it not only does not establish peace; on the contrary, it prolongs the war. Eternity cannot be guaranteed. And the same is true of the term *eternity*: there is no guarantee that it even makes sense. As Kant notes at the beginning of “The End of All Things,” *eternity* would “say nothing” (*nichts sagen*) if it is supposed to designate an “infinite passage of time” (8: 327) – and what else is it supposed to designate in a treatise entitled *Toward Eternal Peace*? For the term to say something, however, the time of “eternal peace” either must be limited or must be something other than time, properly speaking: in Kant’s terms, *duratio noumenon*.²⁹ This time for something other than time can present itself “in” time only as an interruption of the temporal continuum. *Toward Eternal Peace* turns toward an interruption of time that shows the limit of “eternal peace”: it lasts only as long as the human species exercises dominion over the surface of the earth. The contrast to the proposal for “eternal peace” is, then, the program for *eternalization*: “the moralizing politicians, who, on the pretext that human nature is not capable of the good in accordance with the Idea as reason prescribes it, gloss over the principles of the state contrary to right, make improvement *impossible* and eternalize [*verewigen*] the violation of right” (8: 373).

By saying that their subjects are incapable of acting in accordance with the Idea of goodness and cannot therefore regard this Idea as anything but ineffective and unreal, “moralizing politicians” incapacitate the subjects of whom they speak, including themselves. As long as human beings are incapacitated, they cannot do anything about the conditions that occasion their impotence, and these conditions are thereby “eternalized.” Nothing could be

more sharply distinguished from this program of eternalization than the project with which it might be confused: that of projecting eternal peace. Because the program and the project are so different from each other, however, they are easily confused: the project of eternal peace appears to be a program of eternalization, and the program of eternalization can be seen from a certain perspective to be a project of eternal pacification. The projectiles launched by each side thus threaten those who launched them. Practical politicians prove their power to the degree that they are able to make their word come true by saying it: more exactly, by saying that human beings cannot improve themselves and must therefore be suppressed, they make human beings incapable of improvement and in need of constant suppression.³⁰ The impotence of those who speak for “eternal peace” reveals itself in the same way: they are unable – and, according to Kant, should not try³¹ – to make their word come true merely by saying it. The words of “theoretical politicians” do not make anything happen, which means, in sum, that they appear impotent dreamers and are forever exposed to uncontrolled chances.

Toward Eternal Peace can thus be read, in reverse, as *Away from Eternalization*. But the way out of eternalization cannot itself be eternalized: it, too, must be exposed to chance, and the only chance that constantly opens up a way is the inconsistent chance for something other than chance. One name for this chance is already inscribed in the title of Kant’s treatise: *eternity*. For this term designates a time for something other than that of the temporal continuum. If, however, the chance for something other than chance is eternal, it could take place at *any* time – which means that every “philosophy of history,” like every philosophical attempt at theodicy, is condemned to failure. Nowhere is this failure more apparent in *Toward Eternal Peace* than in the sole passage of the treatise in which Kant dons Icarus’s wings and approaches the atmosphere of providence:

When someone transgresses his duties toward another who is just as lawlessly disposed toward him, then whatever *happens* [geschieht] to them as they wipe each other out is entirely right; enough of their race [Race] will always remain so that this game [dieses Spiel] will not cease, even in the remotest times, and late descendants [späte Nachkommenschaft] can thereby take them as a warning example [ein warnendes Beispiel]. In this manner, the course of world events justifies providence.

(8: 380)

Only here does Kant use the term *race* in *Toward Eternal Peace*, and it is one of the few occurrences of the term in his late writings. The race appears to be the human race in general – but not quite. “Late descendants” of the race must outlive its own self-destruction, and these latecomers must be

divided from the race of which they are members. This self-division, which corresponds to self-destruction, depends, however, on a stringent condition: the latecomers must interpret the catastrophic event of self-destruction as a “warning example,” which says, in effect: “do not take your race as an example.” In other words – those of the Hebrew prophets, whom Kant often vilifies, particularly in his late writings, including in a footnote to *Toward Eternal Peace*³² – the race turns into a “remnant.”³³ The remnant “race” exists only as long as it interprets itself as different from its own race. It must be constitutively inconsistent: part of the race and apart from the race at the same – always later – time. And, of course, there have been enough examples of mutually lawless members of the human race for this remnant of the race to arrive at any time. At the end of the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) Kant provides a perspective from which to grasp the unexpected appearance of the term *race* in a treatise that elsewhere avoids it: “If one now asks: whether the human species [*Menschengattung*] (which, if one considers it as a species [*Spezies*] of rational *earthlings* in comparison with rational beings on other planets, as a set of creatures originating from a single demiurge, can also be called a *race* [*Rasse*]) – whether, I say, it should be seen as good or an evil race, I must admit that there’s not much to brag about” (7: 331–32).³⁴ The remnant “race” does not inhabit another planet but, instead, indicates that the character of this one has changed. After all, the angel whom Kant quotes near the beginning of “The End of All Things” – in a gesture worthy of Swift’s “excremental vision”³⁵ – points to this out-of-the-way planet when he is asked for directions to “the toilet for the whole universe” (7: 331). The Dutch innkeeper who begins *Toward Eternal Peace* points in the same direction.

The dismal prospect that the solemn “play of mourning” (*Trauerspiel*) called “history” will be seen as an unendurable “farce” (*Possenspiel*) as soon as its spectators finally realize that “the never ending play is eternally the same [*ein ewiges Einerlei*]” (8: 308) cannot be foreclosed, as Schiller proposes in a contemporaneous series of Open Letters, by the establishment of an “aesthetic state” that gives free reign to the “play drive” (*Spieltrieb*).³⁶ Rather, for Kant, the thought of the eternal return of the same generates both a dream and a nightmare: the dream of a duly constituted federation of independent states, all of which have bid adieu to their former condition of “savage (lawless) freedom” (8: 357); and the nightmare of massive mutual-annihilation. The dream has, of course, generated the greatest interest among Kant’s readers, then and now, doubtless because it can be transformed into a program for international politics. The nightmare, by contrast, has gone largely unnoticed. But the dream may only be a screen for the nightmare, which, as Kant dares to say, alone justifies providence.

The way out of the “game” (*Spiel*) lies in “a warning example” (*ein warnendes Beispiel*). The catastrophic interruption of the *Spiel* appears as a commemorative *Beispiel* that forever warns a late-coming “race” of the catastrophe in

store for anyone who resumes the *Trauerspiel*. Such is Kant’s “play of ideas [*Spiel der Ideen*]” (23: 155).³⁷ By playing out this innocent game to its catastrophic end, Kant enters into close proximity with Hölderlin, who, in an interrupted poem about the conditions of peace, asks of the poet that his own transgression be made into a “warning example”:

das warnende Lied den Gelehrigen singe
[sing the warning song to those able to learn]³⁸

5 UNDER THE SIGN OF FAILURE

1 Throughout this book the title of the text is italicized, since Kant first published it as a self-standing work. Furthermore, I translate *ewig* by “eternal,” although there are also good philological reasons to choose the more traditional translation “perpetual.” Kant’s opening remarks clearly take their point of departure from Leibniz’s *Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus* (1693), Praefatio, III. In the opening paragraph of his introduction to this collection of documents Leibniz makes reference to the image of a graveyard above which is written the words *pax perpetua*, and he subsequently refers to the same image in a letter of 1712 to Jean Leonor le Gallois de Grimarest (translated in Leibniz, *Political Writings*, p. 183). The Latin term gave way to its French equivalent in Fontenelle’s eulogy for Leibniz in 1716, Saint-Pierre’s *Project pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1713), and Rousseau’s “extracts” from the latter “project” (which he published in 1761). Finally, Kant’s own publisher, Nicolovius, printed a French translation of *Zum ewigen Frieden* in 1796 under the title *Projets de paix perpétuelle*. But even in this last and apparently decisive case there are reasons to prefer the less idiomatic translation, *Toward Eternal Peace*. For the French translation was, itself, announced under the telling title “paix éternelle,” and this same phrase, which was used to translate the Dutch innkeeper’s sign, was apparently the one Kant preferred; indeed, he was irritated by the appearance of

“paix perpétuelle” as a translation for “ewigen Frieden” (see Kant, *Über den Gemeinspruch*, p. lvii; see also Volker Gerhardt, *Immanuel Kants Entwurf “Zum Ewigen Frieden,”* p. 42). Furthermore, the phrase *ewigen Frieden* obviously pre-dates Leibniz’s *Codex*. One of the tracts from the Thirty Year’s War proposes the question “under what conditions the Swedish crown could bring about eternal peace?” And in the context of this war – which was precisely the kind of war Leibniz set out to prevent – the eschatological character of the phrase is unmistakable; see the anonymous pamphlet entitled *Politischer, auss göttlicher und erbarn Völkern Rechten kürztlich verfafter Discurs*. The eschatological character of the term *Ewigkeit* is, finally, the point of departure for the essay Kant published only a few months before *Toward Eternal Peace*, namely “The End of All Things.” And within the treatise itself Kant uses *stehende* (standing) to translate the Latin word *perpetuus*. If one of the preconditions of peace is the disbanding of *miles perpetuus* (standing armies), then the peaceful condition toward which Kant aims should not be so quickly assimilated to the balance of forces represented in its ideal form by a *perpetuum mobile*, and the word *ewig*, in turn, should be dissociated from *perpetuus*. But Kant’s peace should not be completely dissociated from the image of the perpetual motion machine (see 8: 367), and so the translation of *ewig* by “eternal” is also wanting. As Hansjürgen Verweyen points out, finally, the preposition “zu” can also function as the shield for a tavern, and the title could thus be rendered: “At the Inn of Eternal (or Perpetual) Peace”; see Verweyen, “Social Contract Among Devils,” p. 201.

- 2 In a letter to Kieseewetter (October 15, 1795) Kant speaks of the treatise as “Meine reveries” (12: 45), and in one of the preliminary drafts to the treatise Kant explicitly states that, for “practical men” (*Praktiker*), metaphysics is “idle theory and empty dreaming [*leere Träumerey*]” (23: 155).
- 3 Of the many studies devoted to *Toward Eternal Peace* very few have, to my knowledge, sufficiently acknowledged the interpretative difficulties posed by the title, although Kant’s opening words are concerned with nothing else. In his extensive and incisive analysis of the treatise Hans Saner, who has done more than anyone else to show the significance of the idea of peace and polemics in Kant, describes the prologue as “ironic” (Saner, “Die Negative Bedingungen des Friedens,” p. 46). Klemme uses the same term (Klemme, *Über den Gemeinspruch*, p. xxvii). Similar terms are often used in discussions of the treatise. Hannah Arendt, for example, opens her lectures on Kant and politics with the following remark: “the ironical tone of Perpetual Peace . . . shows clearly that Kant himself did not take them [his writings on politics] too seriously” (Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, p. 7).

It is by no means obvious that the concept of irony can be so easily mastered, however, especially in the context of Germany in the 1790s. Indeed, the writer who, perhaps more than anyone else, made irony into an indispensable term of criticism – Friedrich Schlegel – has more than an incidental relation to the text under consideration. His extraordinary review of *Toward Eternal Peace* may have played a significant, perhaps even decisive, role in Kant’s “renewal” of the “old question” in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, and this review, in turn, may have played a decisive role in his own recognition of the critical potential of irony. Schlegel’s review appeared in the first volume of *Deutschland* (1796) and has been reprinted, among other places, in the useful collection *Friedensutopien*, eds Z. Batscha and R. Saage, pp. 93–110. To my knowledge, the first one to recognize the relation between *The Conflict of the Faculties* and Schlegel’s review is Klaus Reich; see the introduction to his edition of

Der Streit der Fakultäten, esp. pp. xv–xxiv. Schlegel's review is named in Refl., 6340; immediately below, Kant associates Schlegel's analysis with the thesis of radical evil, understood in terms of insincerity: "Die Unredlichkeit der Menschen als das radikale Böse" – a line, however, which, as Reich notes, appears in Reicke's *Losse Blätter aus Kants Nachlass* (2: 107), but for some strange reason is not reproduced in the Akademie edition.

For an analysis of the process by which *Toward Eternal Peace* came into its final form, see Kant, "Ein neu aufgefundenes Reinschriftfragment Kants mit den Anfangstexten seines Entwurfs 'Zum ewigen Frieden.'" 4

- 4 Kant opens the contemporaneous essay "The End of All Things" (1795) with the following words: "It is a common expression, especially when speaking piously, for a dying man to say he is passing *from time into eternity* [er gehe aus der Zeit in die Ewigkeit]" (8: 327).
- 5 For an examination of the relation between passages across borders, non-passages, and the passage from life to death, see Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, pp. 84–86 (a long footnote concerning *Toward Eternal Peace*); see also the incisive investigation of Geoffrey Bennington, *Frontière kantienne*, esp. pp. 131–63.
- 6 In his powerful condemnation of European imperialism Kant mentions only a single nationality: the Dutch, whom the Chinese and Japanese rulers wisely keep well apart from their own people (8: 359).
- 7 See Emmanuel Kant, *Projet de paix perpétuelle*.
- 8 Kant begins the letter of April 10, 1794, which is addressed to J. E. Biester and includes the fair copy of "Something on the Influence of the Moon on the Wind and the Weather," with a revealing remark: "Here you have, most worthy friend, for your M. S. [*Berlinische Monatsschrift*] something that may serve, like Swift's [*Tale of a Tub*], to create a momentary diversion from the constant noise about the same thing" (11: 495); at the end of the same letter, Kant promises to deliver "The End of All Things." Clearly, he had recently read Swift's work, which he then quotes in a footnote to *Toward Eternal Peace* (8: 353). He also quotes *A Tale of the Tub* in the section of the *Anthropology* devoted to the tricky topic of "Permissible Moral Semblance [*Schein*]" (7: 152–53). Kant probably knew the eight-volume *Satyrische und ernsthafte Schriften von Dr. Jonathan Swift*.
- 9 Kant attributes this insight to Samuel Butler's *Hudabris*, but it is far more powerfully formulated in *A Tale of the Tub*, especially section eight, which discusses "that Renowned Cabalist, Bumbustus" (Swift, *The Writings of Jonathan Swift*, p. 341), and section nine, which is a digression "concerning the Original, the Use and Improvement of Madness in a Commonwealth" (p. 345). Kant, similarly, concludes his "Essay on the Sicknesses of the Head" with Swift's observation that a bad poem is "merely the purification of the brain" (2: 271).
- 10 Swift, "Introduction" to *A Tale of the Tub*, reprinted in *The Writings of Jonathan Swift*, p. 298. Kant truncates the quote: "cracked a nut and was rewarded by a worm" (8: 353).
- 11 Kant considers Maupertius's proposal for creating a stock of intelligent, diligent, and righteous people "feasible" (*tunlich*); but "a wise nature hinders it quite well, for the great driving springs, which set the sleeping powers of humanity into play and compel them to develop all of their talents and to approach the perfection of their determination, lie precisely in the mixing of evil with good" (2: 241). It is worth noting that the passage of *Toward Eternal Peace* where Kant speaks of nature hindering

the plans of princes for world domination repeats the phrasing of this passage from "On the Different Human Races." The erasure of *race* in the former is therefore all the more remarkable.

- 12 Susan Shell has emphasized the close connection between *Toward Eternal Peace* and cannibalism, especially with respect to the term *Kegele*; see "Cannibals All" and "Bowling Alone."
- 13 See the first chapter in this volume for a more extensive discussion of Kant's reflections on naïveté. A contemporaneous – and highly influential – account of satire, which owes its origin to Kantian aesthetics, can be found in Friedrich Schiller's "On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry" (originally published in *Die Horen*, 1795–96). According to Schiller, sentimental poetry is either satirical or elegiac: "The poet is satirical if he makes the distance from nature and the contradiction between actuality and the ideal (in their effect upon the mind both amount to the same) as his subject-matter" (Schiller, *Über das Schöne und die Kunst*, p. 255). Among the satirists Schiller names are Juvenal, Rousseau, Swift, and von Haller. Schiller's extensive analysis of satire can be considered a Kantian-inflected summit of eighteenth-century reflection on this important genre of enlightenment. The *Berlinische Monatsschrift* welcomed satirical works, and the journal was also a forum for the consideration of the question whether satire contributes to the advancement of enlightenment. Just after Moses Mendelssohn proposed an answer to the question "what is enlightenment?" he raised anew the less well-known but equally troubling question: satire or state intervention?; more exactly, mockery of religious fanaticism or coercive control of fanatics? See the brief essay he published in 1785 in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, "Soll man der einreißenden Schwärmerei durch Satyre oder durch äußerliche Verbindung entgegenarbeiten?" (reprinted in Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 12: 137–41). Wieland, whom Kant places in the company of Homer (5: 309), had earlier posed the same question as Mendelssohn, and Lessing proposed a remarkable answer; see his essay, "Über eine zeitige Aufgabe: Wird durch die Bemühung kaltblütiger Philosophen und Lucianischer Geister gegen das, was Enthusiasmus und Schwärmerei nennen, mehr Böses als Gutes gestiftet Und in welchen Schranken müssen die Antiplatoniker halten um nützlich zu sein?" in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Sämtliche Werke*, 16: 297. In the remarks he made in conjunction with his *Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant had responded to the same question with a decisive "no": "Satire never improves anything, so even if I had the talent for it, I would not use it" (Kant, *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und des Erhabenen,"* p. 81). Two recent commentators have tried to discover the reason Kant, having written this remark, went on to write the *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*: see Allison Laywine, *Kant's Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy*, esp. pp. 78–80; and John Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, esp. pp. 208–12. Having recently experienced the sting of royal reproof, which was motivated by religious fanaticism, Kant may have changed his mind about the validity of satire. He writes to Carl Stüdlin on December 4, 1794: "I beg of you most ardently: give my warmest thanks to your excellent Privy Councillor Lichtenberg; his clear head, his righteous mode of thinking, and unsurpassable humor [*Laune*] can perhaps work against the evil of a miserable coercion of faith than others with their demonstrations" (11: 534). In the same letter Kant says that the "approaching peace [of Basel] may also bring with it an increased freedom for innocent judgments" (11: 533–34). Kant dedicates *The Conflict of the Faculties* to Stüdlin.

- 14 Walter Benjamin, "Karl Kraus," reprinted in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 2: 355.
- 15 Swift, "Preface of the Author" to *The Battel of the Books* (1710), reprinted in Swift, *The Writings of Jonathan Swift*, p. 375.
- 16 See Johann Christoph Girtanner, *Über das Kantische Princip für die Naturgeschichte*.
- 17 An important indication of Kant's reticence to use the term *race* in the 1790s can be found near the conclusion of "Something Concerning the Influence of the Moon on the Wind and the Weather" (1794): "Perhaps to this [community of jovial and volcanic air] belongs also the make-up of the air that renders some illnesses in certain countries at a certain time epidemic (actually, ravaging) and that shows its influence not merely on a *people* [Volk] of human beings but also on a people of certain species of animals or plants" (8: 323). Instead of using *Race* or *Rasse*, Kant prefers *Volk*, even though it requires that he describe "a people" of animals and plants. The term *race* does, however, play a function in Kant's description of organic terrestrial species in various versions of *Physische Geographie*, all of which derive from a variety of notebooks from different periods in Kant's academic career.
- 18 Kant refuses to enter into the controversy concerning the origin of language. The closest he comes to making a contribution to this topic is his counter-Herderian "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," where the first human beings could already "talk (Gen. 2: 20), and even converse, that is, speak in coherence concepts (Gen. 2: 23), consequently think" (8: 110). Nevertheless, in footnotes to some of his late writings, especially "The End of All Things" and *Toward Eternal Peace*, he shows an interest in developing a genealogy of moral terms, which would indicate a direction for linguistic-moral research (8: 328, 359–60).
- 19 All of Kant's essays on race seek to show that, although race does not figure into "natural description," it still is valid for "natural history." As a result of Georg Forster's critique of his earlier formulations of his concept of race, Kant unambiguously states in the last of his race-oriented essays, "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy," that differences in race are based on teleological judgment; see John Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's "Critique of Judgment"*, esp. pp. 213–18.
- 20 For analyses of Kant's conceptualization of race, see Erich Adickes, *Kant als Naturforscher*, 2: 406–59; Monika Firla, "Kants Thesen von 'Nationalcharakter' der Afrikaner"; Emmanuel Eze, "The Color of Reason"; Mark Larrimore, "Sublime Waste"; and Robert Bernasconi, "Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant's Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race."
- 21 Among the notes gathered in the section of the anthropology *Reflexionen* is the following: "All races will be wiped away (Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. To serve therefore only as slaves), only not that of the whites [*Alle racen werden ausgeroten werden (Amerikaner und Neger können sich nicht selbst regiren. Dienen also nur zu Slaven), nur nicht die der Weissen*]" (15: 878).
- 22 See Eric Voegelin, *Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus*.
- 23 A recent English translation of "The End of All Things" has sought to remove any trace of this conclusion by translating "*weil Christentum allgemeine Weltreligion zu sein zwar bestimmt . . . sein würde* [because Christianity would indeed be destined to be a universal world religion]" by "because Christianity, though supposedly destined to be the world religion" (translated by Allen Wood, in Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, p. 231); but the word *supposedly* does not capture the positive character of the assertion, which, regardless of the use of a subjunctive, is emphasized by *zwar* (indeed).

- 24 The term *clausula salvatoria* does not appear in Adolf Berger's comprehensive *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*. According to Klenner's informative note, a *clausula salvatoria* was introduced into the Preface of Karl V's penal code (1532): the new legal code did not supercede "old, well adapted, legal, and fair practices." This concept was also used to protect scholars from accusations that they wrote something against Christian doctrine. Grotius concludes the Preface to his *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625) in this manner; see Kant, *Rechtslehre*, p. 510.
- 25 Géza von Molnár has shown that the passage of the first *Critique* devoted to belief and betting (A: 824–25; B: 852–53) decisively shaped Goethe's conception of the pact scene in *Faust*; see von Molnár, "'Die Wette biet' ich.'"
- 26 Although Kant had little interest in the phenomenon of luck (beyond some remarks on gambling and the discussion of wagering in the Canon of Pure Reason), he takes note of the Epicurean concept of the *clinamen* in his exposition of universal natural history in his early writings and universal human history in his later ones: "Should one expect that by virtue of some *Epicurean* confluence of efficient causes, states, like minute particles of matter randomly colliding with one another, should experiment with all sorts of organizations that will be destroyed by new collisions, until they finally succeed *by chance* upon an organization that can maintain itself in its own form (a lucky accident [*Glückzufall*] that is surely very unlikely ever to happen)?" (8: 25).
- 27 Kant may have no trouble naming nature as guarantor of eternal peace; but the same cannot be said of the point of view from which "the great artist nature" is to be regarded: "If we regard this design as a compulsion resulting from one of its [nature's] causes whose laws of operation are unknown to us, we call it fate [*Schicksal*], whereas, if we reflect on nature's purposiveness in the flow of world events, and consider the underlying wisdom of a higher cause that directs the human race toward its objective goal and predetermines the world's cause, we call it providence" (8: 360–61). By the end of the paragraph Kant admits that the word "providence" is too high, and compares those who speak in this way to Icarus. Although the term "nature" is therefore more "appropriate" (*schicklich*) than "providence" – and in this way closer to *Schicksal* – Kant declines to return to the earlier term, except in the often-repeated quotation from Seneca's *Epistles* (8: 365; 8: 313).
- 28 Otherwise, Kant would not have found it necessary to append a "Secret Article to Eternal Peace" to the second edition of the treatise. This article takes up the challenge of the treatise's Preface: philosophers should be allowed to publish treatises on eternal peace precisely because the word of philosophers – or "theoretical politicians" – has no immediate impact. But there is at least one peculiarity of this doubly supplementary article that should be noted. Kant concludes the "secret article" of 1796 with these words: "because this class [i.e. the philosophical] is by nature incapable of sedition and forming clubs, it cannot be suspected of disseminating *propaganda*" (8: 369). In the opening lines of another treatise he published in 1796 he says something quite different. Once again, however, the silence and secrecy of philosophers is under discussion:

Since it relinquished its first meaning, scientific wisdom of life, the name of philosophy has very early on come into demand as a title that would adorn the minds of uncommon thinkers who now imagine it to be a mode whereby secrets are revealed. – To the ascetics in the Marcarian

desert, philosophy means their monasticism. The alchemist called himself *philosophus per ignem*. Tradition has made the Masons of ancient and modern times adepts of a secret about which they jealously want to say nothing (*philosophus per initiationem*). The newest owners of this secret are, finally, those who have in themselves but unfortunately cannot express and universally communicate it through language (*philosophus per inspirationem*).

(8: 389)

Masons, of course, are not only members of a club; they were widely suspected of being members of a revolutionary organization in which sedition was propagated. Kant must therefore deny these club-members the status of philosopher; but he does so in the context of an attack on Schlosser, a rather harmless conservative official whose edition of Plato's letters from Syracuse are a thinly disguised attack on the French Revolution. Nothing more is heard of (leftist) club-members. By the time Kant received Schlosser's reply to his polemic, he must revoke his statement in the closing lines of the "Secret Article": philosophers do, after all, tend to unite "into a huge mass [and] to lead an open war against one another (school against school as army against army)" (8: 414). Only by acknowledging this tendency on the part of philosophers toward forming factions can Kant announce "the Near Conclusion of a Treaty for Eternal Peace in Philosophy."

- 29 In his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), eternity manifests itself at a moment of interruption. When the universe collapses and begins to re-ignite itself, like a Phoenix, eternity is, as it were, brought into view – but only "as it were" or in the "imagination" (1: 321). At these moments of interruption Kant repeatedly returns to Albrecht von Haller's "Unvollkommenes Gedicht über die Ewigkeit" (1736; reprinted in *Die Alpen und andere Gedichte*, pp. 75–79). In "The End of All Things" (8: 327), which Kant writes almost forty years later, the same poem functions in the same way: it shows eternity to be "frightfully-sublime" (8: 327). This presentation of eternity in terms of sublimity associates it once again with an untimely interruption of time. For, according to paragraph 27 of Kant's *Analytic of the Sublime*, the attempt to comprehend "in one instant what is apprehended successively" – which is required for any presentation of eternity – "is a regression that cancels [*aufhebt*] the condition of time in the imagination's progression" (5: 258–59).
- 30 One of the few commentators who has shown the centrality of self-fulfilling prophecy to Kant's reflections on history is Margherita von Brentano, "Kants Theorie der Geschichte und der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft."
- 31 In the "Secret Article for Eternal Peace," Kant insists that the words of the philosopher should not have the kind of authority that accrues to those of the king. Philosophers are, from this perspective, "silent" (8: 369), regardless of how often they speak in the public realm; indeed, their public speech is a form of silence. By appending this "secret article" to the appendix of the treatise "On the Guarantee of Eternal Peace," Kant indicates that this guarantor, *natura daedala rerum*, cannot carry out its assignment: mute nature must be supplemented by "silent" – yet articulate – philosophers.
- 32 In a final footnote to the "Second Definitive Article for Eternal Peace: The Right of States Shall be Based on a Confederation of Free States," Kant suggests that the end

of any conflict should include a day of atonement after the festival of celebration. The Jews in general, and the prophets in particular, go in the opposite direction: "The festivals of thanksgiving for victories during the war, the hymns that are sung (in good Israelite fashion [*auf gut israelitisch*]) to the *Lord of Hosts*, could not stand in greater contrast with the idea of the father of human beings" (8: 375). At the opening of the second section of *The Conflict of the Faculties* Kant explicitly denounces the prophets:

Jewish prophets could well prophesy that sooner or later not merely decadence but complete dissolution awaited their state, for they were themselves the authors of this fate. – As national leaders, they had weighed down their constitution with so many ecclesiastical burdens, along with all the incumbent civil ones, that their state became utterly unfit to subsist of itself and especially so in conjunction with neighboring states, and the jeremiads of their priests therefore were spoken in vain to the winds; because the priest obstinately [*hartnäckicht*] persisted in the untenable constitution that they had themselves created; and thus they could, without fail, foresee the outcome.

(7: 80)

In a draft version of these remarks, Kant discusses Moses Mendelssohn instead of the Jewish prophets, presumably because Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem* does not recommend the "euthanasia of Judaism" (7: 53); see Kant, "Ein Reinschriftsfragment zu Kants 'Streit der Fakultäten.'"

- 33 The concept of "the remnant of Israel" (*she'ar* or *she'erit Yisrael*) is first developed in *Isaiah*: "And it shall come to pass in that day, that the remnant of Israel, and such of the house of Jacob who have escaped, shall no more again rely upon him who struck them; but shall rely upon the Lord, the Holy One of Israel, in truth. The remnant shall return, the remnant of Jacob, to the mighty God" (*Isaiah* 10: 20–21). Jeremiah speaks of the "remnant of Judah" that outlives the Babylonian exile (*Jer.* 40–44). For a short exposition of the phrase, see Nahum Glatzer, "Remnant of Israel"; see also Giorgio Agamben, *Le Temps qui reste*, esp. pp. 90–97.
- 34 Similar considerations are probably at the basis of Kant's use of the term *race* in the second part of the *Conflict of the Faculties*. He parenthetically notes that the question that this section seeks to answer – "whether the human species [*Geschlecht*] is constantly progressing toward the better?" – should not be construed as an inquiry into "whether new races could somehow emerge" (7: 79); and he briefly reflects on this question later in the section (7: 89). For an extensive consideration of these passages and similar ones in the *Opus postumum*, see Chapter 7 and the Conclusion.
- 35 See Norman O. Brown, *Life Against Death*, pp. 179–201.
- 36 See Friedrich Schiller, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen* (1795), reprinted and translated in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Kant makes a promise to Schiller that he will "study and give you my thoughts" about the first of the *Aesthetic Letters* (12: 11); he may have done the former, but there is no evidence that he did the latter.
- 37 Kant thus associates himself with the poet, who, unlike the orator, "announces merely an entertaining play with ideas" (5: 321).
- 38 Hölderlin, "Wie wenn am Feiertage," *Sämtliche Werke*, 2: 120.