

# From Kreuzberg to Marzahn

New Migrant Communities in Berlin<sup>1</sup>

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Berlin is transforming from the “special zone” of the Cold War that it once was into a multicultural metropolis more typical of the twenty-first century. The city’s social diversity already began increasing before the fall of the Wall, but greatly increased after unification in 1990. Today, the 13.3 percent foreign-born population share of Berlin is among the highest of all European capitals.<sup>2</sup>

Yet, immigrants in the city suffer from social exclusion. The gap between the unemployment rates of Germans and non-Germans in Berlin remains on the order of two to one. In 2003, 18.4 percent of Germans on average were unemployed compared to 38.8 percent of non-Germans (up from 33.5 percent in 1998). Consequently, in every age group but especially among older people, foreigners today are twice or more as likely as Germans to be social assistance recipients. In 2003, 12.6 percent of working-age non-Germans living in Berlin received social assistance, compared to 5 percent of German residents twenty-five to sixty-four years old.<sup>3</sup>

The city-state long has attempted to accommodate its newcomers and fight social exclusion.<sup>4</sup> As early as 1981, the (West) Berlin Senate instituted Germany’s first Commission for Foreign Affairs (now the Commission for Migration and Integration), spending some EURO 500,000 a year on integration projects during the 1980s. This *Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats* coordinates a wide range of policies targeted at disadvantaged populations and mediates between the local government and ethnic organizations. It provides important

information on the city's ethnic groups and promotes intercultural coexistence through billboard campaigns and other programs. In contrast, it was not until 1 January 2005 that the federal government passed a new national immigration law that included explicit integration measures. An "Integration Summit" held in July 2006 launched a national discussion about the issue for the first time.<sup>5</sup>

What does successful incorporation of migrants entail? In Berlin, it is possible to look to the examples of Kreuzberg, Neukölln, and Wedding where migrants have lived for decades. Despite continuing ethnic inequalities and tensions, old West Berlin had many positive experiences with its earlier immigrant communities, especially the Turks, Kurds, Poles and Southern Europeans. There are signs that these groups are slowly incorporating into the larger city. Since unification, Berlin now faces an additional challenge of integrating its newest immigrants, particularly those from Russia, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Africa, and the Arab world. Can one draw any lessons from the experience of West Berlin immigrants for those in the east of the city?

To be sure, federal social measures helped the Jews and ethnic German *Spätaussiedler* (late ethnic German settlers) from Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to organize their communities. However, there was far less social support for the Vietnamese, Africans, and other former contract workers in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) who must largely fend for themselves.<sup>6</sup> Will official neglect and self-help as a last resort largely shape the experience of these groups? Or will Berlin develop a new multiculturalism that can offer a positive signal about Germany's ability to integrate newcomers? This article aims to assess this question.

## Kreuzberg

In earlier decades, multiculturalism seemed to flourish precisely in those parts of town most excluded from local mainstream society. This was the fate of Kreuzberg, which became the legendary island of the foreign, the "Other," and the poor. Turkish "guestworkers" settled in the area's Old Berlin *Hinterhäuser*—rental buildings with inner courtyards dating from the *Gründerzeit* of the late 19th century— and the modernist high-rise social housing estates around Kottbusser Tor.

This neighborhood came to symbolize "the ghetto" of West Berlin and still dominates popular thinking about ethnic spaces and cultural difference in Germany.<sup>7</sup>

Kreuzberg has always been a working-class migrant area, even since the 17th century arrival of the Protestant Huguenot refugees from France and East European immigrants laboring in its workshops and factories since the 19th century. After the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, the city faced severe labor shortages,<sup>8</sup> so the German government recruited guestworkers from Southern Europe and Turkey to West Berlin. In 1962, about two-thirds of the new guestworkers resided in municipal or privately owned hostels.<sup>9</sup> Because Kreuzberg was adjacent to the Berlin Wall and much of the housing was dilapidated and lacked modern conveniences, rent was cheap. There was less competition from Germans and less discrimination by landlords. All this attracted many of the city's 180,000 Turks (as of 2003) and other immigrant workers to make their home there.<sup>10</sup>

In the mid 1970s, urban renewal and housing rehabilitation caused rents to rise. Some Turkish tenants were displaced to other neighborhoods, while more affluent "alternative" Germans were attracted to the area. Some older housing was cleared to make way for a new public housing project at Kottbusser Tor. But, after a large scale urban renewal and highway plan that would have rid the area of densely populated nineteenth-century housing was ultimately abandoned, the "alternative scene" of activists, students and artists formed a squatter movement that took over the vacant buildings in the area. By the late 1970s, these countercultural youth who had occupied and restored the older houses protested large-scale renewal plans, resulting in a new policy of "careful renovation."<sup>11</sup> This policy established neighborhood planning committees, but few immigrants participated and the authorities rejected the committees' recommendations in any case. After five years of conflict, the city legalized the squats and encouraged self-help and sweat equity to restore the older buildings. During the next decade, the orientation of the Berlin state government shifted from new construction to renovation and preservation, and from top-down to participatory planning. The draft-dodgers and other nonconformists who settled in the area helped to gentrify parts of Kreuzberg, making the neighborhood a world-renowned hot spot of sub-cultural innovation and multicultural

success. While some of the alternative scene moved to central eastern districts after unification, the “music scene” has recently returned to the neighborhood.

In the meantime, with continuing immigration, Berlin became the largest Turkish city outside Turkey. In the Kottbusser Tor area of Kreuzberg, non-German citizens comprise 55.2 percent of the population.<sup>12</sup> Turkish residents of Kreuzberg, even second and third generation Germans of Turkish background, feel comfortable and secure in their neighborhood—some even feel anxious when they leave it for other areas of Berlin. At the same time, they maintain transnational identities, creatively blending the cultures of Berlin and their imaginary homelands. This has made Kreuzberg into a “diasporic space” with its own web of social institutions, norms, values, and even language.<sup>13</sup> Turkish internet cafes, television stations, newspapers, travel agencies, and other “transnational intermediaries” are among the flourishing ethnic businesses in the neighborhood, helping to knit dense social ties across space.<sup>14</sup> Political organizations, social service agencies, mosques, and other institutions round out the community. Even Turkish women have organized. For example, one citizens initiative, “Mothers without Borders,” founded by a Turkish-German social worker frustrated by police inaction, campaigns against drug dealing in Kreuzberg. AKARSU, founded in 1984, provides job preparation and training for migrant women in medical care and health advising for migrants. In fact, Berlin has some 121 Turkish organizations<sup>15</sup> and over forty organizations serving immigrants in Kreuzberg alone.<sup>16</sup>

Diversity in Kreuzberg is not limited to Germans and Turks. There are differences among foreigners of various nationalities, and among Turks themselves. Individuals from the same villages in Turkey cluster spatially. The Turkish population is also divided by sect (Sunni-Alevi), ethnicity (Turk-Kurd), politics (secular-religious), and other cleavages which are reflected in the community’s internal organizational diversity.<sup>17</sup> Some argue that these ethnic organizations hinder migrant integration and constitute the rise of a “parallel society,” but this misses the evidence of successful incorporation.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, whether ethnic organizations impede or promote immigrant integration depends upon the organization’s orientation toward the host country.<sup>19</sup> For example, outsiders meet the ethnics of

Kreuzberg through “multicultural intermediaries.” There are restaurants, cafes, markets, museums, festivals, the Werkstatt der Kulturen (a public social and artistic venue) in neighboring Neukölln and even a Radio Multikulti where Germans and Turks exchange and meld their cultural values and practices. There are also bars and clubs in the center of town, rather than in Kreuzberg, that appeal to middle-class Turkish youth in Berlin who identify with the city as a whole more than with their neighborhoods.<sup>20</sup>

There are other indicators of integration. Politically speaking, over 50,000 Turks and Kurds have naturalized (4,000 to 5,000 a year since 1990),<sup>21</sup> and a dozen have been elected to the Berlin Senate. Socially, the most frequent form of interethnic marriage in Berlin is between Germans and Turks (477 in 2004), followed by Germans and Poles (320).<sup>22</sup> Turkish household size began to decline in the 1990s, and like consumption habits, has shifted towards German standards.<sup>23</sup> Since 2000, special adult German language programs targeted at migrant mothers were established in Mitte, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, and Neukölln and demand now exceeds supply. Economically, Kreuzberg is also benefiting from new investment in ethnic businesses. There were about 5,000 to 6,000 Turkish enterprises in Berlin in 1998, employing some 20,000 people, out of 22,000 to 24,000 non-German enterprises in the city.<sup>24</sup> Self-employment among Turks burgeoned, converging on the German rate, before recently leveling off.<sup>25</sup> In Kreuzberg, one-third of the local enterprises were run by people of Turkish background, many employing family members, and serving both Germans and Turks.<sup>26</sup> The Soziale Stadt program has established a business association, IG Kottbusser Tor, to provide advice and services to start-up firms and local entrepreneurs.

It is becoming harder to talk about a Turkish economic “enclave.” To be sure, a majority of Turkish entrepreneurs in Berlin still work in food (24 percent) and groceries (36 percent). But Döner Kebap snack (imbiss) stands are being sold to the next generation of immigrants’ fast food cuisine.<sup>27</sup> Ethnic business people are moving out of traditional businesses catering to migrants’ specific needs and into services and other sectors.<sup>28</sup> Turkish businesses are exporting as well as importing, and few rely solely on Turkish customers. There is a great deal of mobility out of the informal ethnic economy, with female Turkish entrepreneurs especially moving away from the

Turkish community, hiring fewer ethnic family members, using fewer ethnic suppliers, serving fewer ethnic customers, and becoming German citizens.<sup>29</sup> The Turkish business elite has organized to represent its interests to the government. Thus, to some extent, integration into the primary or formal segments of the market is gradually occurring.

To be sure, one should not exaggerate these signs of integration. Turks founded most ethnic businesses after unemployment spiked. For many, self-employment was a response to joblessness, discrimination, and government neglect, a reflection of social exclusion rather than a vehicle of integration. Nor are things necessarily improving for the next generation. The local schools have few immigrant teachers, and many Turkish-origin students drop out. In Berlin, 26.9 percent of foreigners leave school without a certificate, compared to 12.4 percent overall, and the trend among younger-generation migrants is worsening. There was even a May Day riot in 1987 in which youth of diverse backgrounds looted stores and smashed cars in Kreuzberg. Most Turks in Berlin do not participate in the celebrated multicultural events and may even distrust them. As Germans have moved increasingly to the Brandenburg suburbs in the 1990s, migrants have replaced them in the public housing estates on the western periphery so that segregation persists.<sup>30</sup> Turkish and other immigrant households are largely not participating in the Quartiersmanagement (QM) of the area and when Turkish organizations have sought public funds, the QM has rejected them.<sup>31</sup> There continue to be disputes over the construction of new mosques and their architecture.<sup>32</sup> Racist incidents and everyday discrimination add to Turkish resentment and suspicion of Germans. After unification, many Germans left Kreuzberg and those Germans who remain often complain that they feel like a minority.<sup>33</sup> The neighborhood remains a zone of concentrated ethnic poverty.

## Marzahn

Not unlike the social exclusion of Kreuzberg and its Turkish population twenty years ago, the northeastern outskirts of the city—Marzahn and Hohenschönhausen—became the object of contempt

after unification. More than half East Berlin's population had lived in the belt of Plattenbauten, the prefabricated high-rise apartment blocks assembled from precast concrete slabs or "panels." For many years, East Berliners preferred these new buildings over the decaying, unmodernized worker housing in older central neighborhoods like Prenzlauer Berg. During the lifetime of the GDR, favored residents received spaces in high-quality high-rises towards the center, rather than in distant Marzahn (current population 150,000) and Hellersdorf (population 100,000) where there was more of a socio-economic mix. Some of these vast expanses of Plattenbauten were not even completed when the Wall fell, making it possible for residents with means to move to single family houses in the suburbs of Brandenburg or to older historical neighborhoods.<sup>34</sup> In the last half of the 1990s, as housing vouchers were introduced and private construction was favored over social housing, the social mix of older eastern neighborhoods declined.

Marzahn Northwest has lost one-fifth of its population since 1995. The area consists of 140 six- and ten-story buildings with 13,200 units and 25,000 inhabitants. Almost half of the units are currently owned by a public housing company, 30 percent by a housing cooperative and the rest by private housing companies. These companies face falling revenues, given vacancy rates of 15 percent on average. In Marzahn Northwest, however, some buildings have vacancies of 60 percent or more.<sup>35</sup> Newcomers tended to be disadvantaged and those with little choice in the housing market. Social problems and unemployment abound—especially among youth. Thus, Marzahn Northwest is participating in both the Socially Integrative City program (see Peter Marcuse, Hartmut Häußermann, and Janice Bockmeyer in this issue) and since 2003 the Urban Regeneration East program. To attract a younger, more affluent population, the poorly constructed, uniform housing was rehabilitated and given a face lift. Land uses were diversified, and landscaping and communal facilities provided. Some buildings were selectively demolished, while others were upgraded, so that today, there is much demand for the converted small-scale blocks in the neighborhood. A recent survey found that about one-third of the residents are satisfied with their housing, while another third hopes to move. As in Kreuzberg, most residents do not participate in housing or neighborhood management.<sup>36</sup>

Despite the population loss in peripheral eastern housing estates, the new vacancies opened up opportunities for those in search of cheap rent. Like Kreuzberg in the 1960s, Marzahn and Hohenschönhausen became ports of entry to the city for the newest wave of immigrants. Despite their high unemployment rates and bad reputation as high-rise “Plattenbau Ghettos,” there is the hope that these neighborhoods will have a career similar to Kreuzberg’s, becoming ethnic economic enclaves, encouraging new multicultural forms and signifying the potential for social integration in the new Berlin.

For a glimpse of this new Berlin multicultural society, take the S-Bahn train northeast to Ahrensfelde.<sup>37</sup> Do not leave the train until you reach the final stations. On the way, you will see giant modern shopping malls bathed in neon at night. When you arrive at the end of the line, there will be row upon row of high-rise apartment houses, six to ten stories in the air, forming a contemporary variant on an ancient city wall separating Berlin—more than twenty miles from Alexanderplatz or the Brandenburg Gate—from the endless fields and meadows of Brandenburg. Some of the buildings are now fields of rubble, having been demolished. But, others have been refurbished and individually decorated. The public spaces are now filled with diverse activities and gardens.

As you leave the Marzahn line at its final station and cross the broad avenue via the pedestrian bridge, you enter the Havemann-Passagen, a small shopping arcade. It was built in the early nineties just after unification and therefore, helpfully prepared by the architects of the last housing projects. It contains smaller shops and individual enterprises that moved right in during the mid 1990s. Very suddenly, these tiny business facilities were occupied by Vietnamese and Russian shopkeepers, who were prepared to take the risks of a start-up enterprise. Despite public Neighborhood Management efforts at promoting sustainable economic development, neighborhood retail centers like these have suffered from competition with the large commercial centers nearby.


From the start, the new immigrants lived disproportionately in the Eastern outskirts of Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen, and Marzahn-Hellersdorf. The newcomers themselves differ in several ways. The “Russians” are composed of two groups—either Jews, whom the last GDR government invited to immigrate, or families of

the *Spätaussiedler*, i.e., very late descendants of German settlers in the Tsarist Russian Empire that German law allowed to “come home” as “Germans” by blood, under the citizenship rule of *jus sanguinis*.<sup>38</sup> The 1.5 million *Spätaussiedler* from the ex-USSR, Poland, and Romania who migrated to Germany from 1950 to 1987 were joined by another 2 million who arrived from 1990 to 1999.<sup>39</sup> It has been estimated that between 25,000 and 35,000 thousand *Aussiedler*, composing 10 to 14 percent of all residents, live in Marzahn-Hellersdorf.<sup>40</sup> With special immigration rights, both groups from the former Soviet Union received apartments in the large housing estates of the eastern outskirts.<sup>41</sup> Unfortunately, no one knows precisely how many such “Russians” live in Berlin (or even in Germany) for a strange, but typically “German” reason: from the very moment that they receive a German passport, they are no longer counted as a special category in official statistics.

Yet, only a short time later, another wave of “German Russian” newcomers settled in the same area completely on their own. These voluntary migrants preferred living among their compatriots in Marzahn and Hellersdorf more than in the anonymous central parts of town. They did not move to these peripheral estates for economic reasons. Although these areas had high vacancy rates and lower rents, there is not much difference in rents city-wide, and vacancies are rising all over Berlin. In 2005, the vacancy rate reached 8 percent (152,000 units), but was highest in Mitte (11.6 percent) and Marzahn-Hellersdorf (10.2 percent).<sup>42</sup> These settlement patterns produced what might be called vertical villages, high-rise buildings completely settled by immigrants of one national origin.

The eastern newcomers have German names on their doors and their papers. In school or at work, however, the cultural differences between native-born Germans and *Aussiedler* are obvious and commonplace. The “Russian” kids use their native language. Like the transnational Turks, they maintain relationships and cultivate familiar connections back home, often during summer vacation. And they have recently created their own Russian youth culture, drawing upon music from Moscow or Petersburg bands. Like many of the Turkish youth, the Russian-born youth are not culturally German. Nevertheless, the Russian immigrants, both parents and children, Jews and Gentiles, enjoy the security of the German social welfare state. In this

sense, they share the fortunes of most Germans in the struggle for education or jobs, or the boredom and frustration of joblessness.



In 2003, excluding the German-Russian migrants in these neighborhoods who are already counted as Germans and the estimated 100,000 undocumented immigrants in Berlin, the non-German-citizen population of the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg Bezirk (borough) reached 23 percent (just after Mitte with 27 percent), while that in Lichtenberg was only 7.3 percent and in Marzahn-Hellersdorf, a mere 3 percent.<sup>43</sup> Of the 57,600 foreigners in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, 23,500 were Turkish, by far the largest nationality group, as noted above. In contrast, of the 18,400 foreigners in Lichtenberg, the largest group were Vietnamese (3,200), followed by ex-Yugoslavians, Russians, and Poles (each around 2,000). Vietnamese were also the largest single nationality group in Marzahn-Hellersdorf (1,600 of 7,800 foreigners).<sup>44</sup>



The Vietnamese way of life looks quite different from that of the *Aussiedler*. As early as the 1960s, some Vietnamese came temporarily to both the Federal Republic (FRG) and the GDR for education and training, but after the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was established in 1976, the numbers shot up. The FRG agreed to accept up to 40,000 refugees (“boat people”) and in 1980, the GDR signed a bilateral agreement with Vietnam to train Vietnamese workers in East German enterprises, as it had done with Angola, Cuba, and Mozambique.<sup>45</sup> In 1987, the program was stepped up and another 10,000 to 30,000 Vietnamese a year arrived in the GDR as cheap contract labor.

The workers lived in large groups in communal residences or dormitories (Wohnheim) near the textile and metal factories and construction sites in East Berlin as well as other cities (e.g., Rostock, Dresden). Immigrants recall how immediately after arriving in Germany, they received several months of German classes (insufficient to master the language) and vocational training, but afterwards, did little else but work. They were totally segregated from the German population, and were required to receive permission for and provide details of any travel outside the communal residence. Festivals and

other leisure activities were celebrated among the Vietnamese workers themselves. East Germans had very little contact with the contract workers until after 1990.

Following the unification process, labor contracts between the GDR and Vietnam were voided, and for a few terrible years, some 59,000 Vietnamese lived in limbo, without residence permits or means to a livelihood. By 1991, East German enterprises fired and deported two-thirds of the Vietnamese in training and work programs.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, Vietnamese from all over Eastern Europe and from Vietnam directly, migrated to Germany. From 1990 to 1993, 10,000 Vietnamese a year entered Germany and applied for asylum. In 1993, the law was reformed to return asylum seekers to secure third countries through which they traveled, putting an end to this means of entry. Initially, the German government repatriated many of the contract workers, enticing them with a bonus,<sup>47</sup> but from 1993 to 1995, Vietnam sought to prevent them from returning home until economic pressure was used to reach a repatriation agreement.

Ultimately, about 15,000 Vietnamese former GDR contract workers won the right to stay, including 5,500 in Berlin. A new bilateral agreement permitted them to reside and work in Germany until the end of their original contracts. Those who had lived in the GDR for over eight years received long-term visas. These permanent residency permits, established in a 1989 reform of the Foreigners' Law, required proof of adequate earnings, social security contributions, a place to live, German language competence and no record of arrest. In 1993, right-to-stay regulations allowed former GDR contract workers to extend their stay beyond the original term and to receive special work permits that also required a long-term employment record and proof of adequate earnings, living space and clean criminal record. By 1995, about 40,000 Vietnamese citizens in Germany could not become permanent residents and were repatriated.

It was difficult to obtain these permits. Finding a steady job to qualify for a work permit in an area of the city with very high unemployment was a major obstacle. Some former contract workers were lucky, because they found employment in the west or because the socialist firms they worked in survived after reunification, but most lost their jobs and returned home. Even today, in the Bezirk

Marzahn-Hellersdorf, the unemployment rate is 19.6 percent, but among the small group without German nationality, it is a whopping 46.8 percent (versus 38.8 percent Berlin-wide). Lichtenberg is similar. Unlike the "Russians," however, the Vietnamese did not become clients of the welfare state. Even in a city with high unemployment, by necessity many turned to entrepreneurship both informal and formal, since a condition of their residency was self-sufficiency

Thus, in the early-to-mid 1990s, with their status unresolved and squatting without formal leases in the former dormitories, some engaged in black market and informal businesses, and some were inevitably caught, leading to deportation. One major scandal involved illegal cigarette smuggling, and the press stigmatized the Vietnamese as a "*Zigarettenmafia*."<sup>48</sup> In the mid 1990s, gangland murders took place in the high-rises of Marzahn, justifying surprise police raids and closing of the buildings where so many Vietnamese resided. At the same time, the Vietnamese faced discrimination, attacks from rightwing extremists, and even violence on the part of the police, giving rise to Vietnamese civil rights associations.<sup>49</sup> In 1992 and 1993, a wave of antiforeigner violence erupted in Rostock, Mölln, and Solingen, both in the former east and west. During those years, fifty to 100 racist incidents a day were reported in Germany, and at least ten racist attacks a day took place in Marzahn. Massive antiracist demonstrations by Germans and migrants followed, and Amnesty International documented the police abuses.

Most Vietnamese in Berlin still live in the eastern precincts. In 1998, after the repatriations, there were about 1,000 Vietnamese living in each of the districts of Marzahn, Hohenschönhausen, and Lichtenberg, respectively. In 2005, after borough consolidation, there were still about 3,500 registered in Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen and 1,600 in Marzahn-Hellersdorf; both areas have about 250,000 inhabitants. This spatial concentration reflects not only historical factors, but also restrictions on the work permits issued in the 1990s. Vietnamese laid off from GDR enterprises were not supposed to work or set up shop in western Berlin. Thus, clothing, produce, and flower stands sprung up in eastern Berlin, filling a niche in a sector of the city where commercial activities were relatively undeveloped. At many transportation hubs in the east, where wide empty plazas front supermarkets and large buildings, impromptu markets

have sprung up with Vietnamese and other immigrant vendors selling clothing, housewares, and “Chinapfanne.” The Vietnamese took over formerly Turkish kebab inbisses, adding Chinapfanne noodles to the menu.

Eventually, as the more precarious of these entrepreneurs returned to Vietnam, the legally secure immigrants moved into more respectable businesses and into western precincts of the city. In 2000, the Vietnamese ran approximately 600 Asian eating-and-drinking places in Berlin.<sup>50</sup> In the vacant office buildings and storehouses between Lichtenberg and Marzahn left empty by post 1990 deindustrialization, the Vietnamese established import, wholesale, transport, repair service, and other businesses. Of course, just as the Turks have moved out of their enclaves, there are Russian and Vietnamese shops in other parts of town, too. For example, in central but still eastern Berlin quarters like Prenzlauer Berg or Friedrichshain, Vietnamese grocers have also succeeded the old Berlin “Tante Emma” shops.<sup>51</sup> They function like “normal” shops without any Asian character. Russians and Vietnamese working in the inner city target the tourist market, offering mostly folklore goods or trinkets. Vietnamese names have appeared on well-situated fashion stores in shopping malls and in downtown districts. Thus, a rapidly growing shadow economy very soon became legal. Indeed, while self-employment among Berlin residents in general has been rising, it rose from 12 to 14 percent among non-German nationality groups, compared to 10 to 11 percent among German Berlin residents, between 1999 and 2003.<sup>52</sup> In sum, Berlin can now point to the emergence of a well-organized, ethnic economy among the Vietnamese.

Like the Turks, the Vietnamese are internally heterogeneous. The South Vietnamese refugee community consists of middle-class “boat people” who made it to West Berlin in the 1970s and 1980s, integrating quickly into skilled occupations.<sup>53</sup> Many are practicing Buddhists and established a temple, the Pagoda or Sociocultural Center Vietnam, and tend to hold events at the Vietnam Haus in West Berlin. They have little contact with the East Berlin Vietnamese, mainly from the North of Vietnam, who came to the German Democratic Republic. There is a persisting cultural equation of East Berlin with foreign workers from communist countries versus West Berlin with foreign workers from democratic countries that is reinforced by the

Ossi-Wessi social boundary, historical memory and contemporary politics in Vietnam. Yet, even this classification misses, for example, a residential enclave of former GDR Vietnamese contract workers who now live in public housing in Kreuzberg and socialize together.<sup>54</sup> Given these internal community differences, no umbrella organization for all the Vietnamese yet exists in Berlin.

In the city’s outskirts like Marzahn where ethnic residential concentration is evident, both Russian and Vietnamese businesses not only serve the majority German customers or tourists, but also their ethnic fellows. Therefore, in the Russian shops, one finds not only those familiar wooden dolls called “Matrjoshkas” and bottles of vodka, but also wares that appeal to native Russians: dried fish, Shiguli-beer, the latest video tapes from Moscow studios, or music from Siberian underground bands. As in immigrant enclaves around the world, “transnational intermediaries” offer ways to stay in touch with the homeland: cheap phone calls to Chisinau, Almaty or Chabarowsk; eastbound travel offers; the program of the Russian speaking Čechow theatre. Countless handwritten advertisements on pieces of paper in shop windows and on walls offer private lessons in everything from German to violin playing.

The evolving multicultural reality can be found right in the middle of Havemann Passages. There is a twenty-four-hour restaurant and bar called *Truce* where you can meet people of all classes and generations. On Friday and Saturday nights, young Marzahners meet there for drink and dance. Reflecting the great number of Russian youth among the clientele, heavy spirits can be ordered not only in small glasses (as the Germans do), but in whole bottles (as Russians like it). But in a gesture towards the capitalist West, people accompany the purchase of a liter of vodka or brandy with a can of *Coca-Cola*. There, at the northern edge of Berlin, was a facsimile of the Brighton Beach scene in Brooklyn, New York. But sharing this observation with the locals was not a good idea. The Marzahn dwellers were angered, mistaking *Brooklyn* for *Bronx*. They do not want their home to be labeled as the “Bronx of Berlin.” They are defensive, constantly fearing the stigmatization of their neighborhood. They do not want Marzahn to become the next “Kreuzberg.”

The residents of Marzahn and Hohenschönhausen share a pride in their neighborhood, but they differ in many other respects. Even

today, it is not surprising to hear about occasional hate crimes in East Berlin. Indeed, several Berlin Bezirke, including Marzahn-Hellersdorf, have elected members of the NPD neo-Nazi party or the Republikaner. Despite antiracist demonstrations protesting the extreme Right, many people of color now consider these places “no-go zones,”<sup>55</sup> avoiding them for fear of racist violence at the hand of German youths. Field studies by the Zentrums Demokratische Kultur in Marzahn-Hellersdorf identified the connection between oppositional youth culture, the extreme Right, and antiglobalization sentiment in fostering racist and antforeigner conduct, ethnicizing social conflicts in the neighborhood.<sup>56</sup> The Russian-origin *Aussiedler* identify as Germans, not migrants. Their children fear an uncertain economic future and have few opportunities to participate in positive activities to build self-esteem. Thus, they turn on their racially dissimilar immigrant neighbors, even those who have been living in Germany longer than they have, demanding preference over them for jobs and benefits on nationalist grounds and labeling them as criminals and inassimilable. Yet, social exclusion need not turn violent to make newcomers feel unwelcome. In 2006, the first attempt to build a mosque with a minaret in the former East Berlin was met by protests from the residents who suggested that mosques belong in Kreuzberg and Wedding.<sup>57</sup>

In spite of interethnic conflicts, East Berlin neighborhoods have launched numerous multicultural initiatives aimed at fostering understanding across nationalities. For example, Jennifer Jordan’s article in this issue discusses how new markers in the Marzahn cemetery commemorate the area’s past forced laborers, “Gypsy Camp,” and Roma/Sinti deportees, implying a connection to present-day racism. A local citizens’ initiative initially founded to protest violence against the Vietnamese now holds multicultural events in which Africans, Vietnamese, Kazaks, and Germans all contribute music and stories. Its German language classes combine Russians, Bosnians, and Vietnamese, each getting used to the other’s accents. Although the older generation of Vietnamese has poor language skills, the new generation seems to have fewer difficulties in school than the Turkish second and third generations. Instead, the Vietnamese Embassy is supporting a language school in Lichtenberg for children to learn Vietnamese.

Similarly, in Hohenschönhausen, an intercultural garden was planted as an integration project.<sup>58</sup> In Marzahn’s intercultural garden, however, the Vietnamese, fearful of being in the minority, have only three of twenty plots and accuse the *Aussiedler* of “taking over.”<sup>59</sup> The Vereinigung der Vietnamese in Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. in Lichtenberg translates government documents into Vietnamese, helps migrants with legal matters, including informing them that tax on cigarettes is required, and organizes sports tournaments in the “Culture School” gym where the association is based. In Marzahn, just a few blocks from the Havemann Passages, is a multi-purpose association called “Kiek-In” that sponsors an annual “Mondfest,” part of Lichtenberg’s Intercultural Week. At dusk, blond-haired, blue-eyed German children join their Vietnamese classmates in a parade behind the dragons, holding aloft their bright, colorful lanterns and marching through what outsiders might imagine is a drab, monotonous housing project.

There are other signs of gradual integration. Statistics on naturalization and intermarriage are unreliable because, unlike for the larger Turkish community, there are only 11,000 to 15,000 Vietnamese foreigners living in Berlin today. Yet, the community has organized itself institutionally. Ethnic associations such as Vereinigung der Vietnamesen in Berlin und Brandenburg, Club Asiaticus, Reistrommel, Bürgerinitiative-Hoehschoenhausen, Keik-In and Vietnam Haus offer both social and cultural support while fostering integration through language, legal, and related instruction. There is also an intercultural friendship society, the Deutsche-Vietnamien Gesellschaft, where native Germans meet with Vietnamese migrants.

To be sure, Marzahn is not Kreuzberg. But to explain the astonishing emergence of an ethnically diverse neighborhood so far from the city center in a zone of the city not known for its multiculturalism, one should recall the public image of the “socialist” housing estates. Since 1990, expert and public opinion unanimously and repeatedly spoke of the Plattenbau in a disparaging manner. These developments supposedly represented inhuman modernism, concretized collectivism, and the ghettos of tomorrow. With aid from the state, there was an exodus out of these buildings, an increasing number of apartments became vacant, their valuation declined, and some of the least desirable were knocked down. In this manner, the history of old-

fashioned housing in inner cities repeated itself in the periphery. Yet cheap housing, whether in the center city or the outskirts, provides an opportunity for the migrant poor to better their lives.

## Discussion

“Every town that does not have room and work enough for everyone needs a place to get rid of the redundant. Every town concerned about its noble image needs a dump for the intruders, for dysfunctional and inadaptible folks.”

This is how Karl Schlögel so frankly described old Kreuzberg, the previously neglected West Berlin neighborhood symbolizing a dreadful place where you should not allow your children to go. But Schlögel also praised this “dump” as “the first anchor-place for countless immigrants.”<sup>60</sup> Such praise could equally apply to East Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg. In the 1970s, this neighborhood, like Kreuzberg, was officially condemned as a “slum.” Both areas soon became favorite refuges for “new” Berliners: foreign immigrants to be sure, but also young men evading West German army service or dissidents from East German small towns. On both sides of the Berlin Wall, these nonconformist elements created new ways of life, new urban trends, new ideas of individuality and happiness. They squatted in older houses that they found valuable. The squatters prevented the condemnation of historic, architecturally notable older houses, and planners started to rethink urban renewal policies in residential working-class neighborhoods. And in both inner-city neighborhoods—Kreuzberg in the West as well as Prenzlauer Berg in the East—the “New Berliners” ultimately established the trends for the city’s future. The cycle then turned towards revaluation and gentrification.

Not only older central city housing, but also modernist—i.e., master-planned—townscapes have adapted to new social circumstances quietly and without fanfare before local government intervened. Why are the ill-famed zones on the urban outskirts so surprisingly “elastic”? How did they become the “anchor-places” for immigrants left to their own devices? The reason is, ironically, the general contempt with which they are regarded and their subsequent public

neglect. It is precisely the local disorder and loss of cultural valuation that are creating the conditions for revival. Such disregard opened up spaces and, as Karl Marx said in *The German Ideology*, the “circumstances would come up to dance.” Neomarxist geographers, like David Harvey and Neil Smith, argue that the ever-changing relocation of capitalist production gives rise to corresponding cycles of real estate valuation. The location of land and the built environment is spatially fixed, while financial capital circulates. When industrial capital has a falling rate of return, capital may shift into a “second circuit” of investment in fixed capital like buildings, speculating that their value will rise, but also disinvesting from places where rents are too low. Gentrification is likely where a “rent gap” opens up, i.e., “a disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use.”<sup>61</sup> Thus, the devaluation of real estate in one place ultimately makes it attractive and, often with state help, prepares the ground for its revaluation. However, this traditional gentrification process, we assert, is helped along by the “multicultural” renaissance of devalued districts. What we find in Kreuzberg and nowadays in Marzahn is a fundamental change of urban image that may lead to a new style of life and cultural forms in Berlin. Whether this image gives rise to a rent gap and thus, increasing property values and displacement remains to be seen.

Urban neighborhoods passing through crises and decline are the very places where a city faces its next set of challenges. In the 1980s, Kreuzberg was the locale where Berlin learned to survive the disappearance of industrial work, the beginning of worldwide migrations, and the decline of social welfare systems. In the 1990s, the eastern Bezirke like Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf underwent the transition from socialism to capitalism, a traumatic deindustrialization, and the influx of newcomers. Today, in Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf, one can assess the fundamental changes in Berlin after the fall of the Wall. These quarters indicate a new source of diversity and vitality far from the central city and its traditional immigrant neighborhoods. In these districts, we see Berlin as a “frontier town” on the doorstep of the East. Berlin will not be able to avoid most of the transformation problems that the other East European metropolises have to manage. Although the local government

does not like to be compared in this way, there are many ways in which Berlin's problems are closer to those of Warsaw, Vienna or Budapest than to those of Milan, Brussels or London. Just listen to the people on the tram or the S-Bahn traveling with you out to the eastern periphery.

Berlin's town planners have focused on redeveloping the central city. The massive construction in the corridor where the Berlin Wall stood, stretching from Potsdamer Platz to the new government center and main train station, has overshadowed the improvements in the social housing projects on the periphery. Similarly, the movement of the global elite to the new capital has received more attention than the important role that migrant newcomers play in urban development. Their communities are, in fact, growing economically. From this point of view, Berlin is experiencing deep changes in the outskirts as well as downtown.

This is not to neglect the many ways that Marzahn differs from Kreuzberg, or that Turkish origin migrants differ from the Russians or Vietnamese. For the present, West and East Berliners continue to inhabit separate worlds.<sup>62</sup> Kreuzberg is still a left-wing activist district, whereas Marzahn supports the former communist party and is poorly organized internally, with only a few associations by comparison. Furthermore, social integration takes time. Turkish Germans arrived in Berlin en masse before the Vietnamese, and are a much larger minority. Though both groups face racial discrimination, German hostility towards practicing Muslims has grown while that towards Asians has declined. Nor should the specific histories of each neighborhood be forgotten. The high-rises of Kottbusser Tor were constructed under different conditions than those in Hohen-schönhausen or Marzahn Northwest. "Each age has its own biography," says Schlögel. "Periods do not repeat themselves."<sup>63</sup>

Given these differences, can one draw any lessons from the experience of West Berlin immigrants for those living in the East of the city? As we have argued, Berlin's new multiculturalism has its limits. Migrants still suffer from social exclusion. But the comparison of Kreuzberg and Marzahn demonstrates how poor, disfavored areas—whether in the urban center or periphery—can attract ambitious, creative, and industrious residents. Neither neighborhood is socially or economically untroubled, but in each place, a distinctive multicult-

tural stew is brewing, making for vibrant, interesting, and hopeful places. If Berlin and indeed Germany can successfully integrate foreigners, the essential test will be precisely in these neighborhoods.

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## Notes

1. Parts of this research were funded by the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD).
2. The International Organization for Migration, "The Challenge of Integrating Migrants into Host Societies—A Case Study from Berlin," in *World Migration 2003: Managing Migration—Challenges and Responses for People on the Move*, Chapter 4 (Geneva, 2003), 72. Berlin's total foreign population at the end of 2005 was 460, 555 according to the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. If Berlin has a rela-

- tively large population share for a capital, the foreign born population share is much higher in other (western) German cities, such as Munich (21%), Stuttgart (24%) and Frankfurt (28%).
3. Rainer Ohliger and Ulrich Raiser, *Integration und Migration in Berlin: Zahlen-Daten-Fakten* (Berlin, 2005).
  4. Some might say the city also aims to control the foreign population as well. Even multiculturalist policies essentialize and pigeon-hole minority group members into bounded cultural entities.
  5. For the national integration plan, see <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/Beauftragte fuer Integration/Nationaler Integrationsplan/nationaler-integrationsplan.html>.
  6. In 1989, there were 90,000 foreign contract workers, about 60,000 of whom were Vietnamese, in the GDR as a whole. In 1992, there were some 20,000 former contract workers from Vietnam, 3,000 from Mozambique, 1,000 from Cuba, and 250 from China. Pipo Bui, *Envisioning Vietnamese Migrants in Germany: Ethnic Stigma, Immigrant Origin Narratives, and Partial Masking* (Münster and Piscataway, 2003), 116-17. Between 15,000 and 18,000 Vietnamese now remain.
  7. Günter Grass idealized Kreuzberg as a multicultural "utopia." Günter Grass, "Kreuzberg fehlt ein Minarett," in *Berlin, Ach Berlin*, ed. H.W. Richter (Berlin, 1984). See also, Ulrich Bahr, "Moscheebau in Kreuzberg," in *Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Berlin*, ed. Riem Spielhaus and Alexa Farber (Berlin, 2006), 80-84. He argues that "'Kreuzberg' steht auch für die Sichtbarkeit und Repräsentation von Zuwanderern, für einen 'multikulturellen' Stadtteil—und das ist nicht unbedingt negative konnotiert."
  8. West Berlin lost some 60,000 skilled workers from East Berlin who could not commute to jobs in the west. Carol Aisha Blackshire-Blay, "Berlin: A New Kaleidoscope of Cultures," in *Berlin in Focus: Cultural Transformations in Germany*, ed. Barbara Becker-Cantarino (Westport, 1996), 75.
  9. *Ibid.*, 79.
  10. International Organization for Migration (see note 1), 75. Of the 180,000 people of Turkish origin in Berlin, 128,000 of them hold a Turkish passport as "registered foreigners."
  11. Michael Kraus and Carola Wunderlich, *Step by Step: Careful Urban Renewal in Kreuzberg, Berlin* (Berlin, 1987).
  12. Ingeborg Beer and Reinfried Musch, "Berlin-Kreuzberg—Kottbusser Tor," in *Socially Integrative City: An initial appraisal of the federal/Länder programme 'Districts with Special Development Needs—The Socially Integrative City,'* ed., German Institute of Urban Affairs (Berlin, 2002). The area's public housing now includes other Muslims from Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon and other Arab countries.
  13. Ayse Caglar, "Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalisation of Spaces in Berlin," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001): 601-13; Ayhan Kaya, "Sicher in Kreuzberg: Constructing Diasporas: Turkish Hip-Hop Youth in Berlin." (New Brunswick, 2001). In Berlin, Turkish-origin youth speak a creole language called "Kanak Sprak," often denigrated as bad German and evidence of poor integration.
  14. Hilary Silver, "Dominicans in Providence: Transnational Intermediaries and Community Institution Building," *Focaal/European Journal of Anthropology* 38 (2001): 103-123.
  15. Data from Europaisches Migrationszentrum Berlin in Matthias vom Hau, "Constructing Ethnic Cohesion: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish and Polish Immigrants in Berlin," paper presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, 2003, 30. This number of associations far surpasses that of the Polish community in Berlin.
  16. Janice Bockmeyer, "Social Cities and Social Inclusion: Assessing the Role of Turkish Residents in Building the New Berlin" in this issue.
  17. Gerdien Jonker, "The Mevlana Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg: An Unsolved Conflict," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 6 (2005): 1067-81. In addition to the four Muslim umbrella organizations, there are two secular umbrella associations in the city, Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. and the Turkishcer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. Although Turks may share a sense of exclusion, they have not united to respond to it.
  18. Bockmeyer (see note 15). She argues that the QM staff regards pre-existing ethnic and religious organizations in the neighborhood with suspicion. On the "parallel society" claim, see Caglar (see note 12); Jonker (see note 16); Peter Schneider, "The New Berlin Wall," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 December 2005.
  19. Ulrike Schoeneberg. "Participation in Ethnic Associations: The Case of Immigrants in West Germany," *International Migration Review* 19, no. 3 (1985): 416-35. See also vom Hau (see note 14).
  20. Caglar (see note 12).
  21. Between passage of the 1 January 2000 Nationality Act and 2003, 600,000 foreigners naturalized in Germany, compared to less than 100,000 a year in the 1990s. In Berlin, naturalizations of all nationalities doubled in 1990 to over 7,000, and then peaked at 12,278 at the end of the decade. Since 2000, there have been about 6,500 naturalizations a year in the city. Turks, who have lived in Berlin for decades, comprise the majority of these naturalizations because of residency requirements. See <http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/statistik/integration/einbuengerungen.html>.
  22. Beauftragte für Integration und Migration in Berlin: <http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/statistik/integration/ehesdiessungen.html>. Obviously, the frequency reflects the larger population of Turks, but also the decline in social distance with length of residence in Germany. Nevertheless, there is also some older evidence that Turkish migrants have fewer interethnic friendships than Greek and Italian immigrants to Germany. Schoeneberg (see note 18).
  23. Vom Hau (see note 14), 18. Second generation Turks have significantly higher education levels than their parents from Turkey, although compared to ethnic Germans, few have a high school diploma.
  24. Doris Nahawandi, "Diversity-Leitlinien für eine neue Kultur der Vielfalt im Einwanderungsbezirk Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin," Thesepapier der Beauftragten für Integration und Migration des Bezirksamtes Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, December 2004.
  25. A study of 2,010 immigrants of Turkish, Greek, and Italian origin by the Institute for Research on Mid-sized Companies at the University of Mannheim for the German Economics Ministry found that 3 to 4 percent of all jobs in the country are created by self-employed non-Germans. Between 1990 and 1995, self-employment by immigrants rose 60 percent. Foreigners started 182 businesses per 10,000 workers versus 122 among Germans. However, foreigners encounter

- difficulty getting bank loans. Deutsche Welle, "Immigrants Show More Entrepreneurial Spirit Than Germans," DW-World.de, 2005.
26. Figures cited in Felicitas Hillmann, "A Look at the 'Hidden Side:' Turkish Women in Berlin's Labour Market," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (1999): 271-2.
  27. Ayse Caglar, "McKebab: Döner Kebap and the Social Positioning Struggle of German Turks," in *Marketing in a Multicultural World: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Cultural Identity*, eds. G. J. Bamossy and J. A. Costa (Thousand Oaks, 1995). On Chinapfanne, see Bui (see note 5), 178-219.
  28. Antoine Pécoud, "'Weltoffenheit schafft Jobs' Turkish Entrepreneurship and Multiculturalism in Berlin," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 26, 3 (2002): 494-507.
  29. Hillmann (see note 25), 267-82.
  30. Hartmut Häußermann, Andrea Kapphan, and Julia Gerometta, "Berlin, Germany: Integration through Multicultural Empowerment and Representation," in *International Migrants in the City*, ed. Marcello Balbo (Venice, 2005).
  31. Bockmeyer (see note 15). In the case of the Kreuzberg Mevlana mosque and social service center, Muslim leaders concluded that they were rejected because of Islamophobic discrimination. The district government felt the group was not trying to integrate into the majority society and may be using foreign or illegal funds to purchase real estate. Gerdien Jonker, "The Mevlana Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg: An Unsolved Conflict." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, 6 (November 2005): pp. 1067-81. The QM in Kottbusser Tor assesses itself well, as having stopped the „spiral of decline“ but recognizing that it is „premature to regard these processes and changes as signs of a perceptible ‚upward spiral.‘“ Beer and Musch, (see note 11), 13.
  32. Bahr (see note 6), 80-84; Jonker (see note 16). Minarets are particularly resisted by the Christian majority.
  33. Beer and Musch (see note 11), 3.
  34. By 2000, 380,000 prefabricated housing units were vacant in all of the former GDR, causing some cities to demolish them.
  35. Thomas Knorr-Siedow and Christiane Droste, *Large Housing Estates in Berlin, Germany: Opinions of Residents on Recent Developments* (Utrecht, 2005), 14.
  36. Knorr-Siedow and Droste (see note 34); Christiane Droste and Thomas Knorr-Siedow, "The German Housing and Urban Policy Environment for Local Initiatives," in *Housing Policy and Social Exclusion*, ed. Z. Kovacs (Bergen 2001), 162-74. Available at [http://www.nhh.no/geo/NEHOM/publications/NEHOM\\_D2.pdf#search=percent22social percent20exclusion percent22](http://www.nhh.no/geo/NEHOM/publications/NEHOM_D2.pdf#search=percent22social percent20exclusion percent22).
  37. This account is based upon field work in these neighborhoods in the mid-2000s by both authors.
  38. On the history of these notions of citizenship, see Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992). The 1999 naturalization reform moved the basis for German citizenship away from *jus sanguinis* towards *jus soli*, as noted by, for example, Pécoud (see note 27) and Caglar (see note 12). Blackshire-Belay refers to Germany's system as *ius parentum* in that children of foreigners born in the FRG assumed the parents' citizenship (see note 7), 85.
  39. Migrationsbericht 1999, Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, Berlin 1999.
  40. Ohliger and Raiser (see note 2), 49. Knorr-Siedow and Droste estimated that only 3-4000 German-Russian migrants live in the Marzahn NorthWest project (see note 34), 14.
  41. In 1991, Germany enacted special legislation to facilitate the immigration of Jews from the former USSR. During the 1990s, some 100,000 Jews arrived. The Basic Law restored the rights of "former German citizens" upon their application. The ethnic Germans were housed and received some cash while they learned German in short courses. Since 1993, the number of *Aussiedler* recognized as ethnic Germans and allowed entry was limited to 220,000 a year. Philip Martin, "Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration," <http://martin.ucdavis.edu/aredepart/facultydocs/Martin/Germany.php>.
  42. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, *The Berlin Housing Market: Summary, Report 2005* (Berlin, 2005), 5. The estimate of illegal migrants, most from Russia, Ukraine, and Poland, is from Häußermann, Kapphan, and Gerometta (see note 29).
  43. Statistisches Landesamt Berlin.
  44. Ohliger and Raiser (see note 2).
  45. Prior to these agreements, the GDR had recruited foreign workers from Hungary, Poland, and later, Algeria. However, the foreigners did not get along and the contract with Algeria ended at the end of 1970. Blackshire-Belay (see note 7), 73. Early Vietnamese visitors—about 10,000 students and teachers—returned home too.
  46. This account is based upon Hilary Silver's oral history interviews with Vietnamese immigrants and Professor Wilfried Lulei; and on Bui (see note 5), 11-12, 16-18.
  47. Employers often reneged on paying these DM 3,000 bonuses. However, currency restrictions encouraged workers to spend their earnings on German goods and export them to Vietnam. Therefore, the contract workers began buying up scarce goods like bicycles. The GDR placed limits on the goods that could be shipped home to Vietnam (e.g., five bicycles, two motorbikes, two sewing machines, medicines, and so on).
  48. Russians are similarly labeled as gangsters. In general, West Berliners still stigmatize East Berliners and the immigrants to the GDR or from communist countries as lawless. For the parallels between the once-divided city of Berlin (and German nation) and the once-divided country of Vietnam, see Bui (see note 5), chapter 4. She also juxtaposes other dualisms of the former boat people and former contract workers, such as difficult versus easy migration, humanitarian versus exploitative relations with government, and integrated versus isolated migrant experiences in the two sides of town.
  49. Hugh Williamson, "Tobacco Road," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 18 July 1996, 21; Hugh Williamson, "Unwelcome Guests," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 September 1994, 30.
  50. Bui (see note 5), 183. Bui makes much of the "partial masking" of Vietnamese identity in the entrepreneurs' decision to call their snack bars "Asian" or "Chinese," as well as the marketing flexibility of such nomenclature. For a few years, authentic Vietnamese cuisine was found only in eateries located near the dormitories on the eastern periphery. More recently, after the success of the chic restaurant "Monsieur Vuong" in the trendiest Mitte-region, original Vietnamese

- high cuisine, perhaps mixed with Japanese sushi, rather than the usual Thai dishes, can be found all over Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg.
51. This is a nonspatial ethnic niche in the market, not unlike the Korean groceries opened in African-American neighborhoods in the United States. See Roger Waldinger and Claudia Der-Martirosian, *The Immigrant Niche: Pervasive, Persistent, Diverse* (Berkeley, 2001), 228-71.
  52. Ohliger and Raiser (see note 2). The first generation is not interested in having their children take over their shops; they would prefer them to move into stable skilled employment, but the labor market is unobliging.
  53. As refugees, the boat people received special settlement assistance, unlike the GDR contract workers.
  54. Kristof Gosztonyi, *Glücksspiele und Generalisierte Reziprozität: Über den Alltag Junger Vietnamiern in Berlin* (Berlin, 1993).
  55. Hellersdorf is especially known as a neo-Nazi area, where an intercultural youth club was the target of arson. The Berlin Afrika-Rat threatened to list the district as a no-go area in its advisory material because of racist attacks.
  56. Simone Rafael, *Demokratie—Im Berlin Alltag ein Auslaufmodell?* (2004), available at <http://mut-gegen-rechte-gewalt.de/artikel.php?id=10&kat=10&artikelid=1094>.
  57. The Pakistani-origin Ahmadiyya Muslim Association won approval in December 2006 to build a new mosque in Heinersdorf, an eastern neighborhood of Berlin where very few Muslims live. The 70-member strong Pankow-Heinersdorf Citizens' Interest Group demonstrated against the decision. One information session in March 2006 had to be cancelled when members of the far Right showed up. The citizens' group managed to gather 6,000 signatures on a petition, close to 90 percent of the residents, but their attempt to ban the mosque formally failed. Their typical "NIMBY" objections included traffic, falling property prices, and concern about "an Islamic-Ahmadiyya parallel society, which would have the goal of overturning our liberal-democratic order." The congregation chose the site, which was once a sauerkraut factory, simply because it was inexpensive. See Michael Scott Moore and Jochen-Martin Gutsch, "East Berlin's First Mosque: The Muslims are Coming!" *Spiegel Online*, 28 December 2006, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,456751,00.html>.
  58. Frederik Bombosch, "Ideologische Baustelle," *Zitty 20* (2006): 34-6. Every third Vietnamese of the 11,000 in Berlin lives in the district of Lichtenberg.
  59. Interview with Reistrommel e.V.
  60. Karl Schlögel, "Kreuzberg porta orientis," *Die Zeit*, 20 September 1985. See also his "Der Schritt der Landesknechte und die Sehnsucht nach Normalität: Nachdenken über Kreuzberg," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1989; and his collection of essays *Die Mitte liegt ostwärts. Europa im Übergang* (Munich 2002). Karl Schlögel is best known for his work on Moscow, *Das Laboratorium der Moderne* (Berlin, 1989).
  61. David Harvey, "The Urban Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 2 (1978): 101-31; and Neil Smith, "Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to City Movement by Capital, not People," *Journal of the American Planners Association* 45 (1979): 538-48, quotation from 545.
  62. "Jeder dritte West-Berliner ohne Kontakt in den Osten," *Berliner Morgenpost*, 1 October 2006. More generally, almost half of West Germans, and especially younger people, have not visited the east in the sixteen years since unification, according to a TNS-EMNIDpoll, but only 12 percent of East Germans have not visited the West. See "Half of West Germans Haven't Visited East: Divided Germany," *Spiegel Online*, 28 December 2006, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,456865,00.html>.
  63. See Karl Schlögel, *Im Räume lesen wir die Zeit* (Berlin, 2003).