

Comparative Policies: Analyzing Policy Making Around the Globe
PPAI 1500

Professor Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro

Fall 2008

Course: Tues/Thurs, 2:30-3:50 pm; Sayles Hall 005

Office Hours: Wed, 10am-12pm

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Course Description

This course examines public policy from the perspective of comparative politics. Over the course of the semester, we will examine the politics of policy-making from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Among the questions we will ask are the following: What determines how policy is made? Whose interests are represented in policy-making? When and why do policies get changed or stay the same across time and space? In general, our focus will be not on technical policy design, but on the political variables that affect policymaking.

Although many of the semester's readings are theoretically driven, almost all have an empirical component. Substantively, we'll pay particular attention to how the pressures of changing demographics and economic globalization affect policymaking in democratic settings. Geographically, the readings pay particular attention to Latin America and Southeast Asia, though we will also draw on examples from other parts of the developing world and developed countries. In addition, at the end of the course, we will spend a few weeks looking at a few policy areas in more depth, seeing how and if the theories we have studied can help us to understand them.

Course Requirements

* In-class midterm on Tuesday, October 21st (25%)

* Take-home final. You will receive the final on Thursday, December 11th, and it is due on Wednesday, December 17th. Over that period, you will be asked to write two essays in response to questions that I will provide on December 11th. The exam will not require outside research. (35%)

* Thought papers. You must choose two weeks in which you will write a 3-5 page (double spaced) critical review of the week's readings. These should not summarize the week's readings, but they should instead critically engage with some or all of them, presenting an argument about their strengths, weaknesses, or connections to theory or empirics introduced in other weeks. Each of these is due at the *beginning of class* the *first day* a topic is introduced. (Week 2 is an exception- if you write a thought paper for this week, you may hand it in on Thursday.) You must submit one of these thought papers before the midterm and one of them after the midterm. (20%)

*Class participation + presentation (20%)

Presentation: In each of the weeks listed below, a small group of students is responsible for presenting a current policy issue from anywhere in the world, culled from newspaper articles, news magazines, or other similar sources from the past six months. The goal of the presentation is to describe the policy issue at stake and examine possible explanations of why that policy has been adopted or not (or why advocates and opponents of a proposed policy are taking certain positions). You are expected to pay particular attention to that week's "variable"/explanation of interest, but you should not feel limited to only discuss that week's topic. The presentation should be approximately 10-15 minutes, and it will be followed by 5-10 minutes of questions from the rest of the class. Each student will participate in one presentation.

After your presentation, you need to hand in a list of references your group used to prepare the presentation (1 copy per group, with all names on it). Two citations should be sufficient, and if you find a very in-depth article, even one may be ok. You shouldn't need to draw on more than four to five newspaper or magazine articles to plan your presentation. Questions on these presentations may be included on the midterm and/or final, although not in the same detail as material from readings and lectures.

Weeks with presentations: 3, 4, 5/6, 7, 8, 10, 12

Participation: In addition, I expect you to attend lectures and to actively participate in them by asking and answering questions (in addition to your participation in a presentation). You will best be able to do this if you have done the week's reading before the lectures. The readings and lectures are complements, not substitutes. (Additional readings are optional.) I also encourage you to make a habit of reading the news, paying particular attention to the domestic politics and public policies of foreign countries. Good sources include the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Financial Times*, and the *Economist*.

Note that some readings include technical material that, depending on your quantitative background, may be difficult to understand. Students will *not* be responsible for understanding the details of game-theoretic techniques or statistical procedures. Regardless of the method, it is important to understand the basic arguments made in each piece. What question is being asked or what puzzle is being presented? Why is this an important or difficult question or puzzle? What theoretical explanation is being proposed, if any? How is this explanation being tested? Is the empirical evidence presented appropriate for the question and convincing?

Academic Honesty: You are expected to follow Brown's academic code. According to the code, "Students who submit academic work that uses others' ideas, words, research, or images without proper attribution and documentation are in violation of the academic code. Infringement of the academic code entails penalties ranging from reprimand to suspension, dismissal, or expulsion from the University."

(http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Dean_of_the_College/curriculum/academic_code.php) You can and should read the code in its entirety here:

http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Dean_of_the_College/curriculum/documents/principles.pdf

Course Materials

The following books are available for purchase at the Brown bookstore and are on reserve at the Rockefeller library.

-Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds. 2001. *Presidents, parliaments, and policy* New York: Cambridge University Press.

-Robert E. Klitgaard. 1990. *Tropical gangsters* New York: Basic Books.

-Mancur Olson. 1965. *The logic of collective action* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

I have provided links to some of the articles below; these should work if you are connected to the Brown network. In any case, *all* materials are available on-line via the library's course reserve system. The class password to access the reserves via the library system is: reserves. (All lower case) You are responsible for finding and reading these articles each week—please tell me if you have any difficulty finding them, and I will address this problem as quickly as possible.

Finally, note that some readings might change. This is especially true of the later weeks, and I will let you know as soon as possible if any changes occur.

Week 1: Introduction to the course

(September 4)

Week 2: Institutions

(September 9 and 11)

-Haggard and McCubbins, eds. *Presidents, parliaments, and policy*. Chapters 1-3.

-Scott Mainwaring and David Samuels. "Federalism, constraints on the central government and economic reform in democratic Brazil," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #271. November 1999.

<http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/271.pdf>

Additional readings:

-McCubbins and Rosenbluth, "Party provision for personal politics: dividing the vote in Japan" in Cowhey and McCubbins, eds., *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*. Cambridge University Press, 1995.

-Gary Miller and Thomas Hammond. "Why politics is more fundamental than economics," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6(1), 5-26 (1994).

Week 3: Voters

(September 16 and 18)

-Susan Stokes. 2001. *Mandates and democracy: Neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Preface, Chapter 1, and Chapter 5. A hard copy of the book is on reserve at the library. In addition, the book is available on ebooks through the library website, which allows you to read the book online. If you are using Firefox and have trouble getting ebooks to work, see the instructions on how to install the plug-ins here:

<http://www.ebrary.com/kb/users/ff3install.jsp;jsessionid=BBAHIBIJCJOI>

-Paul Pierson. "The new politics of the welfare state" *World Politics* 48.2 (1996): 143-179. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v048/48.2pierson.html

-Fernandez and Rodrik 1991 "Resistance to reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty" *American Economic Review* 81, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1146-1155. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006910> *Don't worry too much about following the technical details of this article if this is difficult for you; instead, focus on the main substantive points.*

Additional Readings:

-Michael Hiscox. 2001. "Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade," *International Organization* 55: 1-46.

<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=164715>

-Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," *The Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): October 1981: 914-927.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830813>

Week 4: Interest groups

(September 23 and 25)

-Mancur Olson, *The logic of collective action*. Chapters 1, 2, and 6.

-J. Unger and A. Chan. "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model," in *The China Journal*, No. 33, January 1995: 29-53. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950087>

-"Lobbying Boom," *CQ Researcher* 15(26): 613-636.

<https://faculty.washington.edu/bdjones/policyclass/Lobbying%20Boom.pdf>

Additional readings:

-Hector Schamis. 1999 "Distributional coalitions and politics of economic reform in Latin America," *World Politics* 51.2 (1999): 236-268.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v051/51.2schamis.html

-A. Lijphart, "Interest Groups: Pluralism versus Corporatism," in *Patterns of Democracy and Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 171-84.

-Robert A. Dahl, "Pluralism revisited," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jan., 1978), pp. 191-203. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421645>

Weeks 5 and 6: Political competition and partisanship

(October 2 and 7)

Note that there will not be class on September 30 and October 9, due to the Jewish holidays.

-Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2006. "From Crisis to Reform: Partisan Responses to Economic Crises in Latin America and Eastern Europe." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. Note: you will read the most recent version of this paper, which is forthcoming in *Comparative Political Studies*.

-María Victoria Murillo. 2008. *Voice and Light* (Unpublished manuscript). Chapters to be announced and circulated.

-Herbert Kitschelt, 2001. "Partisan competitions and welfare state retrenchment: when do politicians choose unpopular policies" (Chapter 9) in Paul Pierson (ed), *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford University Press and Oxford Scholarship Online).

<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/9780198297567/to.c.html>

Additional readings:

-Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2004. "Do Party Systems Matter? The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States," *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(2): 152-187.

<http://www.polisci.osu.edu/faculty/nooruddi/research/chhibber&nooruddin2004.pdf>

Week 7: Bureaucrats

(October 7 and 9)

-Joseph Stiglitz. 2008. "Principal-agent" In *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*.

<http://cms.dictionaryofeconomics.com/Articles.aspx>

-Charles E. Lindblom. "The science of "muddling through," *Public Administration Review* 19, No. 2 (Spring 1959), pp.79-88. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/973677>

-Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 165-179. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110792>

- Kent Eaton. 2003. "Can Politicians Control Bureaucrats? Applying Theories of Political Control to Argentina's Democracy," *Latin American Politics and Society* 45 (4): 33-62.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3177130>

Additional readings:

- Ben Ross Schneider. 1993. "The Career Connection: A Comparative Analysis of Bureaucratic Preferences and Insulation," *Comparative Politics* 25 (3): 331-350.
- Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. 1981. *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Chapter 5.

Week 8: Time and path dependence
(October 14 and 16)

-Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 251-267.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586011>

-Elisa Mariscal and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Schooling Suffrage, and Inequality in the Americas, 1800-1940," in *Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America*, S. Haber, ed., (Stanford, 2000): 159-217.

-Hacker, Jacob. 1998. "The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy." *Studies in American Political Development* 12 (Spring): 57-130.
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=38749>

Additional readings:

- Peter A. Hall. "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), pp. 275-296
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/422246>
- James Mahoney. "Path dependence in historical sociology," *Theory and Society* 29 (4), (August 2000), 507-548.

Week 9: Corruption
(October 21 and 23)

OCTOBER 21st: MIDTERM IN CLASS

-Miriam A. Golden and Eric C.C. Chang. "Competitive corruption. Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy," *World Politics* 53 (July 2001) 588-622. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v053/53.4golden.pdf

-Moisés Naim, "Corruption eruption," *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Summer 1995.
<http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=648>

-Benjamin Olken, "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia" *Journal of Political Economy* 115 (2), pp. 200-249, April 2007.
<http://www.nber.org/~bolken/corruptionexperiments.pdf>

***During weeks 9 through 11, you are also expected to read Robert Klitgaard's *Tropical Gangsters*. It's a relatively quick, very enjoyable read that will give you a sense of how international influence can play out on the ground. It is also useful for thinking about how corruption and regime type affect public policy.

Week 10: International diffusion—ideas

(October 28 and 30)

- David Collier and Richard E. Messick, "Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), pp. 1299-1315. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955290>

-Wendy Hunter and David S. Brown, "World Bank Directives, Domestic Interests, and the Politics of Human Capital Investment in Latin America," *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 33, No. 1, 113-143 (2000)
<http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/1/113>

-Kurt Weyland, "Theories of Policy Diffusion. Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform," *World Politics* 57.2 (2005) 262-295.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v057/57.2weyland.html

-Patricio Silva "Technocrats and politics in Chile: From the Chicago boys to the CIEPLAN monks" *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1991), pp. 385-410.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/157030>

Week 11: International diffusion—economics

(November 4 and 6)

-Suzanne Berger. 2000. "Globalization and politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*. 3:43-62. <http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/berger/globalizationandpolitics.pdf>

-Geoffrey Garrett. 2001. "Globalization and government spending around the world," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, No. 4.
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/1vmg1c7dtw60kh0/>

-Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins (2004). "The globalization of liberalization: policy diffusion in the international political economy," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 1.
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=205177>

- Robert R Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. "Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America," *World Politics*, 53.4 (2001) 553-587
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v053/53.4kaufman.html

Note: There will be a group discussion of Klitgaard's "Tropical Gangsters" at the end of Thursday's class. Here is a comment on the book from Chris Blattman's blog to think about as you prepare for the discussion: "One of things I like most about Klitgaard's book: you're never quite sure who the tropical gangsters really are. Obiang and his cronies? American business execs? Or the whirlwind of World Bank and IMF consultants themselves?"

Week 12: Regime type and public policy
(November 11 and 13)

-Casey B. Mulligan, Xavier Sala-I-Martin, and Ricard Gil. 2003. "Do Democracies have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?" NBER Working Paper No. W10040
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=459411

-Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman. 2008. *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*. Chapters 1 and 3. (This book is not published yet; I will circulate copies of the chapters.)

-James McGuire. 2002. "Democracy, Social Provisioning, and Under-5 Mortality: A Cross-National Analysis"
<http://condor.wesleyan.edu/jmcguire/Research/McGuireAPSA02.pdf>

Week 13: Anti-poverty policies and social safety nets
(November 18 and 20)

-Carol Graham. "From Safety nets to social sector reform: lessons from the developing countries for the transition economies," in *Social development in Latin America*, Joseph S. Tulchin and Allison M. Garland, eds. This is also available here:
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1997/02globaleconomics_graham.aspx

- Bénédicte de la Brière and Laura B. Rawlings. 2006. "Examining Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: A Role for Increased Social Inclusion?" World Bank SP Discussion Paper 0603.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Safety-Nets-DP/0603.pdf>

-Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet. "Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Are They Really Magic Bullets?" University of California, Berkeley. 2004.
<http://are.berkeley.edu/~sadoulet/papers/ARE-CCTPrograms.pdf>

- Natasha Borges Sugiyama. "Theories of Policy Diffusion. Social Sector Reform in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 193-216 (2008)
<http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/41/2/193>

Additional readings:

-“Social Safety Nets in Response to Crisis: Lessons and Guidelines from Asia and Latin America” <http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/APECreport.pdf>

Week 14/15: Decentralization and federalism

(November 25/December 2)

NO CLASS NOVEMBER 27 FOR THANKSGIVING

-Eliza Willis, Christopher da C. B. Garman and Stephan Haggard, “The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America,” *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1999), pp. 7-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2503925>

- Kent Eaton (2001) “Political Obstacles to Decentralization: Evidence from Argentina and the Philippines,” *Development and Change* 32 (1) , 101–127. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-7660.00198>

-Kathleen O’Neill, “Decentralization as an electoral strategy,” *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 36, No. 9, 1068-1091 (2003).
<http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/9/1068>

-Tyler Dickovick, “Municipalization as central government strategy: Central-Regional-Local Politics in Peru, Brazil, and South Africa,” *Publius* 2006.
<http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/pjl012v1>

Week 15: December 4: Wrap up, catch-up, and normative discussion

Week 16

December 9: Review before final exam

FINAL EXAM: It will be distributed Thursday, December 11th, and you will have until Wednesday, December 17th to turn it in.

December 11: Make up class (if necessary)