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Cases from Legal Proceedings
back to Crook vs. Murphy
In the Superior Court of the State of Washington In and
for the County of Benton
LYNN CROOK, Plaintiff, vs. BRUCE MURPHY and LUCILLE MURPHY,
and the marital community composed thereof, Defendants
No. 91-2-0011-2-5 VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
Proceedings had before the HONORABLE DENNIS D. YULE, Superior
Court Judge, in and for the County of Benton, on the 4th day
of March, 1994, at Kennewick, Washington.
RICHARD SINDELL
BARBARA JO LEVY
Attorneys at Law
614 First Avenue, Suite 300
Seattle, WA 98104
Appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff;
FLOYD E. IVEY
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 6125
Kennewick, Washington 99336
Appearing on behalf of the Defendant
March 4, 1994
Kennewick, Washington
(The following proceedings were had in open court, to wit:)
THE COURT: Good afternoon.
Well, Counsel, this I think represents almost a complete tour
of the courtrooms in Benton and Franklin Counties now.
We only do that because Seattle lawyers are here so we can
kind of keep you off balance. Any post-trial motions will
be heard in Prosser.
Counsel, I want to reiterate again what I said when we were
together Tuesday, convey to you, once again, my profound appreciation
for your excellent work in this case.
I have worked hard on this case myself as well, and in the
course of rereading the testimony it reminded me again of
your excellent work, and I really comment you for your professionalism
in this case, through a long trial with a number of moves,
your good humor and patience and courtesy, both to the Court
and to each other. That has made an extraordinarily difficult
trial much easier, I think, for all of us.
This is a difficult trial, and it is a trial in which we
have spoken the unspeakable, not only incest but incest in
its most egregious conceivable form.
When I became a judge, I was given some advice by one of
the justices of the Supreme Court. He told me that there would
be occasions as a judge when I would be hearing a matter and
it would cause me to ask myself, what am I doing here? Who
am I to be deciding this case? Who am I to be deciding this
issue?
I know that this has been a terribly difficult case for all
of you and your families. And I want you to know that I have
shared at least some of your discomfort. While I am certainly
accustomed as a judge to hearing some rather intimate details
in the lives of stranger, I have not had any trials comparable
to this one.
And there have been points throughout this trial where I
have really felt like I was an intruder, like I was listening
to things and hearing things and you were saying things in
court that I really didn't have any right to hear.
Let me remind you that the standard in this case, the standard
by which the Court has decided each of the issues is what
is known as the preponderance of the evidence. What that means
in simple terms is the greater weight of the evidence. As
I generally explain that standard to jurors, it is whether
any given proposition is more likely to be true than not true.
That is the standard in this case.
Several witnesses in this trial have had the luxury of indicating
to the Court that a decision, the ultimate issue here, whether
there has been — whether it is more probably than not
that there has been sexual abuse, is an issue which they cannot
and need not decide. That is not a luxury that the court has.
But I want you to bear in mind that each of the issues decided
by the Court are decided on that standard, whether it is more
probable, considering all of the evidence, than not that the
proposition is true. And I want also to tell you that there
are doubts in my mind. There will always be doubts in my mind.
This is a case in which I left the courtroom after the very
able closing arguments of counsel without any clear feeling
of the ultimate decision that I would come to. And that is
frequently not the case. Frequently by the time Court has
heard all of the evidence, it has a pretty good mind for what
the final outcome will be. That has not been the case in this
trial.
I have found that the decision has required very, very careful
and thorough deliberation of all the evidence that was presented.
Perhaps the first question that the Court should address
is whether there is any evidence that the plaintiff, Lynn
Crook, is intentionally fabricating her memories. Although
that would seem to be a fundamental question in this case,
it is one as to which there is really little or no dispute.
Certainly none of the expert witnesses in this case suggested
or expressed the opinion that the plaintiff had intentionally
and willfully created false memories.
Dr. Loftus indicated that she had no evidence of intentional
fabrication and noted that in a majority of such cases the
memories are sincerely held. Dr. Ofshe indicated that he thought
that the plaintiff was sincere in her belief, in her memories,
and that he had no reason to think otherwise.
Dr. Harris said that he was not suggesting that the plaintiff
intentionally fabricated her memories.
Although there was some discussion in the course of this trial
about possible secondary gain, Dr. Harris alluded to that,
for example, neither Dr. Harris nor any of the other witnesses
in this trial presented any evidence to indicate a secondary
gain.
Let me just briefly comment on the two categories that were
mentioned in the course of the trial. One was monetary award,
a potential monetary award in this suit. That does not appear
to the Court to be consistent with the evidence as to the
kind of person that the plaintiff is, the kind of relationship
that she has had with her family, her personal history. It
is not consistent, given that information, to conclude that
she would bring to this public forum knowingly false allegation
of such egregious sexual abuse for the uncertain opportunity
to obtain a judgment in any amount.
The other secondary gain that was referenced in the course
of the trial was revenge or exposure of the defendants. And,
again, the picture that the evidence paints of the plaintiff,
her background, personality, her history, her family, and
her relationship to it, does not lead the Court to conclude
that a motivation of revenge exists here.
I don't see what the revenge would be for. It would seem
more probably that revenge, were it a motivation for the plaintiff's
bringing this action, would be the consequence of plaintiff's
having been abused than the cause of plaintiff's willfully
fabricating accounts of such abuse.
So I conclude that there is no evidence that the plaintiff
intentionally or willfully has created false or fabricated
memories.
The Court's inquiry then must be directed to whether the
plaintiff's memories, although genuinely believed by her to
be true, are sufficiently reliable mental records of actual
past occurrences to warrant the conclusion that it is more
probably than not that the plaintiff was sexually abused by
the defendants.
The first part of that inquiry goes to the capacity of the
human mind. A lot of this trial has been about looking into
the impenetrable regions of the human mind. Is the human mind
capable in some way of storing data relating to a childhood
of sexual abuse that is not accessible to conscious memory
for a period of many years and then releasing that data in
a reliable form to the conscious memory?
To some extent, the legislator — legislature, I should
say, has already given a partial answer to that question implicit
in its enactment of the statute of limitations applicable
to actions such as this. That represents at least some indication
by the legislature of its acceptance of the notion of recovery
of repressed memories.
The testimony of the experts in this case reflect the debate
that rages among mental health professionals, therapists,
and academics.
The empirical experience of all of the therapists or clinical
witnesses supports the possibility, at least, of the recovery
of repressed memories. Dr. Conte, a part-time therapist and
teacher of psychotherapy, focuses on research, focuses his
research on the sexual abuse of children. And it was his testimony
that many mental processes become better with practice and
experience.
Dr. Feldmann-Summers, a therapist, a past teacher, indicates
that based upon the scientific literature and her clinical
experience, a series of traumatic events over time can be
locked away.
Dr. Harris, a therapist, 20 percent of whose time is devoted
to issues relating to child sexual abuse, refers to an emerging
clinical entity of the recovery of repressed memories and
acknowledges a broadly held view that trauma can result in
the destruction of memory.
He also noted that though amnesia is more often associated
with sudden singular trauma, he could not make a blanket statement
that it cannot exist for long periods of trauma. And in his
testimony, Dr. Harris implicitly recognizes the possibility
when he addressed two possibilities to the Court: either that
this was a case of what he referred to as therapy gone wild
or it was a case in which the plaintiff in fact has been sexually
abused by her father and that he could not conclude which
was the case.
Dr. Loftus, a psychologist of some considerable experience
in memory and memory distortion, is cautious in her testimony.
She testified that there is no cogent expression, there is
no cogent scientific evidence that long term repression of
a series of traumas and retrieval years later in any reliable
form is possible. And she points to the diminishing reliability
of memory with the passage of time.
Dr. Ofshe, a social psychologist and an expert on influence
on memory and beliefs, testified that no scientific basis
or substantiation existed for the phenomenon of repressed
memories and characterized it as being used torationalize
what were products of influence.
Although there may indeed by no studies of trauma that conclusively
demonstrate such a psychological phenomenon, the Court cannot
so easily dismiss the numerous reports of its occurrence in
the clinical experience.
Dr. Feldmann-Summers testified that scientific literature
and the experience she has a clinician indicates a substantial
body of information that supports such forgetting, as she
terms it.
The Court finds persuasive the explanation for the hypotheses
of repressed memory provided in the testimony of both Dr.
Feldmann-Summers and Dr. Conte. As they cogently testified,
the trauma, particularly to a defenseless young child from
sexual abuse, particularly by that child's parent, is so confusing,
so threatening, that the instinct for survival requires an
extraordinary psychological defense.
Just as the body's physiological systems seek to protect
it from infection by encapsulating invading bacteria, so does
the mind seek to protect itself from the unthinkable, the
unbearable, by forgetting it.
It is, incidentally, a phenomenon which Justice Pierson discussed
in some detail and with considerable eloquence in his dissent,
his rather lengthy dissent in the Tyson case.
I conclude from the evidence that there is a substantial
basis for finding that it is possible for memories of a series
of traumatic events to be removed from the conscious memory
and retrieved years later.
The second part of the Court's inquiry was to the reliability
of the plaintiff's memories goes to the nature of her memories
and to the process by which they were revealed.
With respect to application of the statute of limitations,
let me address that as a preliminary matter. It is clear from
the evidence that the first memories of sexual abuse as a
child were revealed to the plaintiff in February of 1989,
within the timeframe of the statute of limitations applicable
to this action.
The Court can certainly identify with the response of Dr.
Morton to the plaintiff's memories as absolutely unbelievable.
I would expect that most people, and certainly most parents,
would find the events that the plaintiff remembers so ut6terly
contrary to the norms of human behavior and propriety as to
defy their belief.
But the very notion of incestual abuse would, I assume, be
difficult for most of us to believe. Tragically, however,
most would also recognize that it indeed exists.
Although I found rather astounding Dr. Harris' suggestion
that child sex abuse may not represent an event not in the
normal course of human experience for purposes of post-traumatic
stress disorder diagnosis under DSM III criteria, I noted
his reason for that suggestion, that 20 to 30 percent of the
population is in some way involved in child sex abuse. Dr.
Harris also agreed that perhaps one in every four females
experienced some sex abuse as they are growing up.
So while the acts which the plaintiff recalls may be repugnant,
incest is a fact of life in our society, and the Court must
very carefully consider the reasons that the plaintiff sincerely
believes those memories, abhorrent though they may be, to
have actually occurred. The evidence in this case presents
two alternative reasons as Dr. Harris testified for those
memories. The plaintiff is the victim of therapy gone wild,
to use his term, that accompanied by influences exerted by
the environment in which the plaintiff found herself caused
the distortion of mental processes that subconsciously implanted
so deeply in her mind wholly fabricated thoughts that she
came to see them as true memories or the plaintiff was the
victim of the unspeakable acts she now remembers and survived
the trauma of those acts by repressing them from her conscious
memory until, from the distance of more than 40 years, her
mind permitted those buried memories to begin to be resurrected
into consciousness.
That has been the Court's agonizing quandary throughout this
trial. What could cause the plaintiff, such an apparently
bright, successful, high achieving, resourceful, caring woman
to attribute such reprehensible, devastating actions to her
parents, such apparently bright, successful, respected people?
Four of the five therapists testifying in this case, two
of whom treated the plaintiff for a substantial period of
time and two of whom personally interviews her, concluded
that at least some of her memories, more probably than not,
represent long repressed memories of acts of sexual abuse
of the plaintiff by her parents.
Their conclusions are based upon their acceptance of the
psychological phenomenon of repression of memory of a protracted
series of traumas, and their evaluation of —to borrow
a legal term — the totality of the circumstances of the
plaintiff, included her array of psychological symptoms, which
lead them to diagnose her as suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder and which are consistent with the course of
childhood sexual abuse, lack of other causative factors to
account for the collection of symptoms, and in direct corroboration,
memories of two of the plaintiff's sisters of Dr. Murphy's
sexual abuse of them as children, by improprieties as they
refer to them, boundary violations by Dr. Murphy, and by the
responses by the defendants to the plaintiff's claims. The
fifth therapist, Dr. Harris, who also interviewed the plaintiff,
concluded that a mental health professional could not say
on a more-probable-than-not basis that plaintiff's memories
are historically true memories of actual sexual abuse of the
plaintiff by her parents. Although Dr. Harris recognizes the
existence of repressed memories and said he could not make
a blanket statement that amnesia cannot exist for long periods
of traumatic events, he concluded that the symptoms the plaintiff
presented could result from any number of causes, including
anxiety and depression and do not support a diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder. He also agreed with Drs. Loftus and Ofshe
that there was a substantial possibility of influence and
suggestion from the plaintiff's therapy and from her contacts
with the sexual assault center. Finally Dr. Harris found no
significant corroboration of sexual abuse. Two non-therapists,
Dr. Loftus and Dr. Ofshe, reject the concept of repression
of memory of a protracted period of traumatic events and their
recovery years later. And these two doctors conclude it is
probably that suggestion and influence are responsible for
the creation of the plaintiff's memories and that the memories
are, therefore, false.
As I have already indicated, the Court concludes that the
concept of repression of child sex abuse memories and retrieval
years later of memories is a valid hypothesis accepted by
a substantial segment of the mental health community.
The focus then of the Court's inquiry is directed at whether
the plaintiff's memories are factually real or the result
of some other cause, namely influence and suggestion.
Dr. Feldman-Summers rather summarily concludes that there
is absolutely no evidence by anybody that Eric Harting or
Deena Evans-Smith engaged in suggestion. Dr. Ofshe, on the
other hand, sees both therapists as driven by incompetence
and aberrance, who apply unrelenting pressure on the plaintiff
to have memories of six abuse.
The Court, probably not surprisingly, finds that the truth
is somewhere between those two positions. Dr. Feldman-Summers
does not afford due consideration, it seems to the Court,
to both Mr. Harting's and Ms. Evans-Smith's connections to
the sexual assault center in which the plaintiff was deeply
involved to their regular treatment of clients who have recovered
memories of past sex abuse to their general orientation toward
childhood experiences a influencing adult symptoms to the
rather rapid progression in four sessions with Mr. Harting
to the first memory of sexual abuse.
The evidence suggests the potential for at least subtle influence
by the two treating therapists. Dr. Ofshe, however, sees a
sinister symbioses at work between the plaintiff and Eric
Harting that leads inexorably to fabricated memories. While
Dr. Ofshe was clearly established during this trial as an
expert of considerable renown and productivity in the area
of influenced or false memories, the Court, frankly, found
his credibility to be limited by his stridency.
The evidence in this case indicates that substantial segment
of practicing clinicians in mental health subscribe to the
theory of repressed memories of sexual assault trauma.
Dr. Ofshe denigrates that segment by repeatedly in his testimony
referring to them as part of a "subculture" and as "pop psychologists."
Dr. Loftus was quite right, it seems to me, in her observation
that Dr. Ofshe is not afraid of being rude in expressing his
opinions. Unfortunately, in a court of law, it is my experience
that heat tends to diminish light. Well, as the finder of
fact, I have endeavored to ignore the heat in his testimony
that Dr. Feldmann-Summers has "virtually no understanding
of what is written in English" in his paper on the Ingram
case or in his comment that Mr. Harting, asking the plaintiff
how her boss reminded her of her father was "a strategy for
lengthening therapy," or that Harting had turned the plaintiff
into a "cash cow," unavoidably detracts from his credibility
as a thoughtful and reasoned expert. Dr. Ofshe describes the
plaintiff as having been immersed in the subculture of the
sexual assault center which primed her to find sexual abuse.
He testified that she selected Mr. Harting as a known sex
abuse counselor who saw her desire to recover memories of
her childhood as a sign of past sexual abuse. He describes
the plaintiff's narrative, Life with Father, as a knowing
invitation to Mr. Harting that she knows will provoke him
to suspect sexual abuse.
I do not find that the evidence supports such a cynical characterization.
While the evidence does suggest openness, if not predilection
by both Mr. Harting and Ms. Evans-Smith toward the recovery
of repressed memories of sex abuse, it does not suggest to
the Court anything in their therapy of sufficient potency
to cause the plaintiff to fabricate the memories she began
having in February of 1989 involving her own parents.
I find persuasive Dr. Conte's assertion that psychotherapy,
at least in this case, is not powerful enough to manufacture
out of nothing the sort of memories which came to the plaintiff.
The evidence does not show a highly suggestive therapy run
wile, as Dr. Harris put it. The plaintiff initiated therapy
with Harting for the limited and immediate purpose of resolving
a conflict with her supervisor at work. The evidence indicates
that it was the plaintiff, not Mr. Harting, who drew the parallel
between her relationship with her employer and her relationship
with her father.
Dr. Harris testified that Harting's suggestion that the plaintiff
write about her childhood in the second or third session was
not inappropriate. While the reference in the plaintiff's
narrative, Life with Father, to being in the shower with her
father raised a suspicion in Harting's mind of possible sexual
abuse, he did not express that to the plaintiff. Both the
plaintiff and Mr. Harting initially expected that there would
only be one or two sessions of therapy.
Although there is some confusing use in the testimony of
several of the witnesses of the word hypnosis, the only technique
which either therapist introduced the plaintiff to was a relaxation
technique, one attempt by Mr. Harting to recover positive
childhood memories by hypnosis and one guided visualization
by Ms. Evans-Smith.
There is no evidence that any of those procedures elicited
any memories. Drs. Harris, Loftus, and Ofshe also point to
what I would term environmental influences from Lynn Crook's
involvement in the sexual assault center and victim advocacy
and from her exposure to various reading materials. Dr. Ofshe's
rhetoric notwithstanding, the evidence demonstrates a possibility
of influence from the plaintiff's work with the sexual assault
center. Plaintiff testified that she took 40 hours of training
as a volunteer advocate in the fall of 1988 and met with clients
for a four-month period before becoming an education coordinator.
As educational coordinator, she gave numerous presentations
on abuse, including child sex abuse. She testified that during
those presentations he had thoughts about whether she had
been sexually abused. Clearly her association with the sexual
assault center sensitized her to the existence of sexual abuse
and the plight of its victims. The potential for influence
is manifest. Although there was little specific evidence about
the reading materials available at the sexual assault center,
there was evidence that some materials were available. Such
general information is not sufficient, however, to support
the conclusion that it represented a source of any significant
influence.
There is also evidence that plaintiff's periodic — that
plaintiff periodically read erotic literature during sexual
relations with her husband. There was indication, at least
by Dr. Loftus, that sexual fantasies described such erotica
could influence at least some of the plaintiff's memories
or visualizations.
I am not persuaded, however, that such environmental influences
would be sufficient to prompt a woman of the plaintiff's intelligence,
education, and personality to fashion out of whole cloth the
memories that have come to her.
I have also considered the cumulative or compounding effect
of both therapeutic suggestion or influences and environmental
influences as I have just described, but I am led to the same
conclusion. There is simply not sufficient evidence before
the Court to find an atmosphere of suggestion, influence,
or pressure surrounding the plaintiff that would explain her
formulation of false memories.
Drs. Harris, Loftus, and Ofshe also point to what might be
described, I suppose, as victims movement books that the plaintiff
reviewed in the Tri-City Herald and to the plaintiff' participation
in group therapy. Assuming thebooks to be as inflammatory
as the defense suggests, however, the evidence is that the
plaintiff did not read any of the books until after she had
the dozen or so memories which she reported at the June, 1989
meeting with her sisters.
Similarly, the plaintiff's participation in a therapy group
of female adult survivors of child sexual abuse began in early
1990, at least ten months subsequent to the time that her
memories began. The defendants, primarily through the testimony
of Dr. Ofshe, have raised some troubling questions about several
of the plaintiff's specificmemories.
Some of those memories, the one involving her mother changing
her diaper in particular, the plaintiff insists occurred when
she was about two years old, an age at which the experts all
agree a child is not generally capable of cognitive memory.
Dr. Feldmann-Summers' explanation is that it represents a
memory that is metaphorical and/or not fully explored. A considerable
amount of attention has focused on the plaintiff's memory
of an event in Dr. Murphy's office involving a bright light
and a shiny instrument which the plaintiff thought involved
his cutting of her hymen.
Other evidence, including Dr. Morton's examination of the
plaintiff when she was 17 years old and her own recollection
that she bled when she first had intercourse establish that
her hymen was in fact intact throughout her childhood. The
defendants also point out several other memories that involve
activities which would arguably have ruptured her hymen.
The plaintiff's testimony about the memory of her father
doing something to her in his office is contradictory. She
testified that her father told her he had cut the hymen of
an eight year old and she connected that statement to her
memory, yet she also testified that she had always remembered
Dr. Morton's exam and his report that her hymen was intact
and also recalled that she bled when she first had intercourse.
The plaintiff frankly admits that she cannot explain the contradiction.
At the least, it casts some doubt on the accuracy of her other
memories. Although other memories involve activity which could
have resulted in rupture of her hymen, it is conceivable they
could have occurred without sufficient penetration to tear
the hymen.
Dr. Ofshe notes memories that indicate an awareness by Lynn
Crook, the child — Lynn Murphy, the child — that
abuse is occurring and argues that such awareness is not compatible
with the concept of repression of memory. However, there is
a dearth of evidence in the record in this case as to how
and when memories in a series of traumatic memories are repressed.
Dr. Ofshe also addresses other challenges to the manner in
which the plaintiff visualizes the memories by seeing herself,
and he points to the absence of any memories by the plaintiff's
sisters of those events which the plaintiff remembers them
as being a part of. The Court finds Dr. Feldmann-Summers response
in the balance to be more persuasive.
The defense argues that the plaintiff's vision of a co-worker's
exposed penis draws in question the reliability of her memories.
In other words, if current stimuli can cause her to visualize
a co-worker's penis, why can't they cause her to visualize
an event 40 years ago that is equally untrue.
That seems to the Court to be a valid point that I am not
satisfied that either Dr. Conte of Dr. Feldmann-Summers fully
answered. Both characterize the vision of the exposed penis
as a momentary dissociative experience. Dr. Conte dismisses
it as a visual symptom of anxiety. Finally, Dr. Ofshe characterizes
the plaintiff's memories as a progress toward ritual, satanic
cult images, which he states fits a pattern he has observed
of false memories.
It appears to the Court, however, that in this regard, he
is engaging in the same exercise for which he criticizes therapists
dealing with repressed memory. Just as he accuses them of
resolving at the outset defining repressed memories of abuse
and then constructing them, he has resolved at the outset
to find a macabre scheme of memories progressing toward satanic
cult ritual and then creates them. He testified that he began
his work in this case by "trying to get an idea of the progression
of interest and then the initial visualizations and then the
development and elaboration of the visualization."
Dr. Ofshe equates recovery of memories of early childhood
sexual abuse with the recovery of past life traumas as memories
of abduction of space aliens. He explains that he is the only
one who has seen such progression to satanic cults because
he is perhaps "the only one who studied the record to the
depth that I have studied it."
In my review of the plaintiff's collection of memories, the
progression is not so apparent. Although I do not conclude
from the evidence that the totality of the plaintiff's memories
have been fabricated by the suggestion and influence of her
therapists and her environment, as I have just discussed,
the evidence does raise some questions as the reliability
of those memories as proof of the acts which they involve.
Those questions require a discussion of corroborative evidence.
The Court ruled at the beginning of this trial that the highly
aberrational nature of incest, the problems of proof peculiar
to recovered memories, and the circumstance of secrecy and
intimidation that surround child abuse, as the Alaska Supreme
Court discussed, render evidence of the sisters' memories
of childhood abuse by their father admissible and relevant.
First I will address the testimony of Joan Bringham. Her testimony
reflected an intelligent, articulate, purposeful, and sincere
woman. I found her testimony to be credible. I am satisfied
from her testimony that she has always had a memory of being
in bed with her father and of him telling her to play with
his dolly, referring to his penis.
There is no evidence to suggest that she has knowingly fabricated
that memory. While the fact that she had never told anyone
of the memory until after the plaintiff revealed her memories
to her and had discussed some of those memories with her and
after she had read at least portions of Courage to Heal, although
those factors raise the issue of influence or contamination,
I find it certainly improbably that either factor would cause
her memory to be falsely implanted in her mind. Nor do I find
it probably that either would prompt her to jump to the conclusion
that a previously unidentified male was her father.
Her testimony that she had always known the memory was of
her and her father but that she had put the memory aside and
revisited it only infrequently and had not labeled it as sex
abuse, seems to the Court to be credible. As she explained,
she processed that peculiar memory involving her own father
not as an experienced nurse and mother but as a daughter.
Maggie Murphy can be described much as Joan was. She appeared
to the Court to be an intelligent, sensitive, sincere, and
anguished woman. Her testimony also appeared credible. Again,
I see no evidence that would lead the Court to believe that
she knowingly fabricated her memories. There is however, a
greater possibility of influence of contradiction or contamination
of her memories. Her memory of her legs, the wooden spoon,
and her father's hand came to her while she was alone for
a weekend at a friend's cabin, while she was talking on the
phone to the plaintiff, several months after having heard
and discussed the plaintiff's memories, and apparently at
a time when she had been reading Courage to Heal.
Dr. Feldmann-Summers recognized the potential for contamination.
Maggie did not indicate when she had the memories of her father
exposing himself to her in his office and of having a stain
on her panties. However, the same concerns of contamination
would apply to those memories as well.
Maggie testified with considerable and genuine emotion. Both
her testimony and the plaintiff's testimony indicate she has
given plaintiff a lot of empathy and support. She referred
to having previously been in therapy. I cannot conclude, considering
all of those factors, that it is more probably than not that
Maggie's memories were not so contaminated by both the plaintiff's
experiences and her own that they are not reliable reflections
of historic fact. In addition to the foregoing memories of
sexual abuse, the plaintiff and her sisters Joan, Maggie,
and Kate testified about instances behaviors by Dr. Murphy
that are probative of an insensitivity to normal boundaries
of sexual propriety. For the reasons given for admitting evidence
of the sisters' memories of sexual abuse, I conclude that
this evidence is relevant and admissible. Joan testified to
Dr. Murphy's patting her buttock as an adult in a manner that
made her distinctly uncomfortable. Bob Crook testified to
observing Dr. Murphy pat the plaintiff on her buttock in a
manner that he characterized as more like fondling and which
he observed caused a physical stiffening by the plaintiff.
Joan remembers Dr. Murphy urinating in the bathroom while
the girls were present taking a bath and testified that she
knows how her father holds his penis when he urinates. Joan
also recalls changing clothes in her bedroom closet out of
concern that her father would walk in on her.
Maggie recalls Dr. Murphy treating her for genital warts
at the age of 22 and at the time telling her that her mother
only did the missionary position. The conversation, I believe,
needs no further comment. However, with respect to the treatment
which Dr. Murphy testified was appropriate and which Dr. Morton
testified was within the standard of care, I must frankly
say that I find it remarkable that a physician practicing
in the Tri-Cities in the 1970's would not recognize that as
a clear breach of the boundaries of privacy and propriety.
Kate recalls that when she was approximately in her early
teens Dr. Murphy told her to hold her knees together as she
was sitting across the room from him and explained to her
that otherwise it meant she wanted him. >From the Court's
review of the testimony of Lucille Murphy, Maggie Murphy,
Joan Bringham, Lynn Crook, and Robert Crook, I find that Lucille
Murphy's initial response to the plaintiff's memories and
Maggie's memories — memory was one of support and acknowledgment
of their truth.
I have given considerable thought to the reaction of a parent
to such allegations from a child. And I appreciate the enormous
confusion, conflict of loyalties, and emotion with which any
parent would respond. However, the testimony of Lucille, of
the plaintiff, of Robert Crook, and of Maggie is that Lucille
Murphy also indicated to them that she knew the memories were
true and knew some of the events described in them.
Although the evidence indicates that Lucille Murphy went
to an attorney and to counseling with Michael Henry at the
suggestion of her daughters, the fact that she did so and
that she continued counseling with Mr. Henry for seven months
suggests that she support the plaintiff and believed her memories
for a protracted period of time. It is the Court's conclusion
that it is further evidenced by her letter to Maggie of April
26th, 1990. I have read and reread her testimony that gives
her interpretation of that letter, and it simply does not
sound credible. I have heard no explanation why if Lucille
Murphy meant in her letter that her husband denied everything
she chose to express that sentiment by writing "he" —
referring to therapist Mike Henry — "said dad is in total
denial, and will never change."
The final paragraph of that letter is equally puzzling. Although
Lucille Murphy explained that the comment "it's why I stayed
here. Hope you can understand," is a reference to her duty
to bring her husband to the Lord, that does not explain why
she felt the need to explain why she remained with him if
she did not put any stock in the plaintiff's memories. The
tenor of the letter in its entirety does not seem to me to
be consistent with a firm belief in Dr. Murphy's innocence.
Finally, a brief comment on Dr. Murphy's response to the allegations
by the plaintiff in his deposition, in the meeting at Mr.
Harting's office, and in his testimony in this trial.
Again, it is hard to imagine the anguish that would be suffered
by a parent falsely accused by a daughter of sexually molesting
her. However, Dr. Murphy's responses seem strangely ambiguous
and coolly clinical. Although I recognize that the plaintiff's
evidence has painted a picture of a man who is authoritarian,
highly controlled and controlling, not emotionally demonstrative
and scientific, a response that "I don't remember any of that"
or "I don't remember doing this" seems to me to be oddly detached
for such an egregious accusation. His testimony as to Maggie's
memory of the wooden spoon, a horrible abominable scene, seems
to me to be equally puzzling. I don't think that it is appropriate
for the Court to make too much of that. Perhaps it is just
a peculiarity of Dr. Murphy's personality, but it would seem
to me that a father, any father, whether a physician or not,
would respond to such an accusation in far more vehement,
far less clinical terms. My God, this is my daughter. This
is my beloved daughter. I can't even conceive of doing such
a thing. A response along those lines seems to me to be more
consistent with not having committed any of the acts.
But, as I said and will reiterate, while I think that it
is somewhat corroborative, it may indeed be Dr. Murphy's way
of communicating, and I does not ascribe a great deal of probative
value to it.
My consideration of all of the evidence in this case as I
have reviewed it with you this afternoon leads me to conclude
that it is more probably than not that the plaintiff was sexually
abused by her father and her mother while she was a child.
I find further that as a proximate consequence of such abuse,
the plaintiff has suffered injuries reflected in symptoms
associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, including
specifically episodic anxiety, recurrent depression, poor
self image, sexual dysfunction, limited range of emotional
affect, and hypervigilance.
The Court also finds that the other circumstances of stress
in the plaintiff's life about which there has been evidence
in this trial as to moves, as to job changes, as to two miscarriages,
as to other experience in her life donot adequately account
for such symptoms. As a proximate result of such injuries
I find that the plaintiff has suffered past economic losses
in the amount of $12,080, future economic losses of $17,500,
past non-economic damages for pain and suffering of $90,000,
and future non-economic damages for pain and suffering of
$30,000.
Accordingly, in this case the plaintiff is granted judgment
in the amount of $149,580. That is the Court's decision, Counsel.
I will sign the appropriate judgment upon presentation. Court
will be in recess.
(The proceedings having concluded, the Court stood in recess.)
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