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cc: VP, Meese, Baker, Deaver, Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ___________________________ (Date/Time)

Partially Declassified/Released on 092987 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by 2. Reger, National Security Council
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD

September 2, 1984
N 4464

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: OLIVER NORTH

SUBJECT: FDN Air Attack of 1 September (U)

Shortly after noon on 1 September, three FDN Cessna O-2 (push-pull) aircraft, launched from the FDN Resistance Base, attacked the Sandinista Military School at Santa Clara, Nicaragua with 2.75in. rockets (see map at Tab A). Accompanying the strike aircraft, for command and control, was a Hughes 500-D helicopter. Abroad the helicopter was a U.S. private citizen who apparently was killed when the helicopter was downed by Sandinista small arms/AI fire. We have no evidence that SA-7 missiles were fired at any aircraft. [TS]

This operation was not sponsored/directed by or briefed to any of our CIA personnel. In discussions with Adolfo Calero both last night and this morning, it is evident that the Resistance Forces launched the attack after being goaded by the non-official Americans on-scene at the FDN Headquarters Calero, when he left on Friday, 11 August left instructions that this operation should not be conducted until he had talked to us. At our meetings with Calero on 1 September, both Clark and North urged that the operation be postponed because the rockets necessary for the attack had to be saved for potential use against the next arms delivery. Calero agreed, and in discussions with him this morning, indicated that the attack was undertaken without his permission. He has further expressed concerns that the growing presence of "non-official assistants" will increase the likelihood of similar incidents. From a military perspective the loss of the only operating FDN helicopter on the Northern Front is a serious blow. The only remaining helicopter available to the Resistance Forces is located at a small private field. It may therefore be necessary to ask a private donor to donate a helicopter to the FDN for use in any upcoming operation against an arms delivery. We are knowledgeable that FDN resources are not adequate to purchase a helicopter at this time. [TS]

DECLASSIFICATION: OADR
Calero has information from his sources on the ground that there were no civilians casualties and that other foreign Sandinista advisors (Monteneros [Argentine terrorists] and Chilinos) may also have been killed when rockets struck the instructors' barracks. This information is at variance with the Sandinista press reporting we have already seen (Tab C). (TS)

This afternoon the FDN will announce from the attack was indeed undertaken and that Cubans were killed. A summary of the FDN press statement is at Tab D. (S)

Given the President's trip this afternoon, there will undoubtedly be numerous questions by the media traveling with the party. We should have no official statement on the event, but a properly worded and used backgrounder could be helpful in emphasizing our need to re-involve the USG in the Resistance effort. Since our briefings to the SSCI and the HPSCI, we have emphasized to members of Congress that the lack of funding creates a situation in which the USG has very little, if any, control over the FDN. A carefully worded press backgrounder could help reap some small benefit from this unfortunate event. Proposed press guidance is attached Tab I. (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you brief the President on this action using the points above.

   Approve [X]   Disapprove [ ]

2. That you approve the use of the press statement and guidance at Tab I and pass to Bob Sims.

   Approve [ ]   Disapprove [ ]

3. That you approve my approaching a private donor for the provision of a replacement civilian helicopter for use on the Northern Front.

   Approve [ ]   Disapprove [X]

Attachments:
Tab I USG Press Guidance
Tab A Map
Tab B [ ]
Tab C Sandinista Press Releases
Tab D FDN Press Statement (Summary)

TOP SECRET

May 1987