Mr. BELNICK: And did Mr. McFarlane tell you that it was then
proposed that Israel would send an air shipment-through a European
city- of some 100 HAWKs to Iran?
Secretary SHULTZ: Yes. That was- he described the structure of a
deal in which a plane would go from I think someplace in Portugal,
as I remember, and it would be contingent on release of the hostages,
a rather complex arrangement.
Mr. BELNICK: But the burden of it was that if the hostages came
out, the weapons would go to Iran; if they didn't, the weapons
Secretary SHULTZ: Exactly. It was a straight out arms-for-hostages
Mr. BELNICK: What did you tell Mr. McFarlane?
Secretary SHULTZ: I told him I hoped that the hostages would get
out, but I was against it, and I was upset that he was telling me
about it as I was just about to start so there was no way I could do
anything about it.
But anyway, if it was happening, I hoped the hostages would get
Mr. BELNICK: After you objected, though, you learned within the
next several days that no hostages had been released and your information
was that the deal had, therefore, collapsed?
Secretary SHULTZ: Exactly.
Mr. BELNICK: Your notes indicate-in the chronology-that you
told your executive assistant on November 23, 1985, it is over?
Secretary SHULTZ: That was what I understood.