Mr. LEON: When you arrived in Tehran, were you under an im- pression that there was a specific deal with regard to certain hostages being released right up front?

Mr. McFARLANE: That is what I was told, yes.

Mr. LEON: Are you aware that General Secord testified last week that that was not his understanding of what the status of the ar- rangements was between the parties?

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes. I was surprised to hear that.

Mr. LEON: I believe you testified that Admiral Poindexter had given you the impression that your understanding of the deal was the same as his.

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.

Mr. LEON: Did you learn from Colonel North that he had a differ- ent understanding from either you and Poindexter or Secord?

Mr. McFARLANE: No. This came to, or out of the open-at one of the sessions we had with an Iranian official, where I complained about their not having fulfilled their commitments for release of the hostages, and he looked around the room at his own supporters, and obviously assumed he had been misinformed, because he had quite a different understanding of what the agreement had been. But in talking to my own staff at the time, Colonel North and others, all of them reconfirmed yes, we do expect, and have all along, the complete release of the hostages.

Mr. LEON: You testified that you learned about the diversion for the first time while you were over there.

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.

Mr. LEON: I believe it was in Israel?

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.

Mr. LEON: At Ben Gurion Airport, and you have testified that you were shocked to learn about it initially.

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.

Mr. LEON: But that you assumed that it had been authorized and that North later told you it had been authorized.

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.

Mr. LEON: And when you met with the President, you did not bring it up as a subject at that time?

Mr. McFARLANE: No.

Mr. LEON: Nor did you bring it up with Mr. Poindexter or Donald Regan?

Mr. McFARLANE: No.

Mr. LEON: Have you seen the memorandum with the diversion reference in it?

Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.

Mr. LEON: Were you aware that that was written only a matter of days before you met with Ollie North in his office at the White House, according to his calendar?

Mr. McFARLANE: No.

Mr. LEON: I believe his calendar reflects that you had a meeting with him on October 9 at his office in the White House. Do you have any recollection of that?

Mr. McFARLANE: I must be mistaken. I thought the memorandum Colonel North—

Mr. LEON: April, excuse me. April 9th, I should say.

Mr. McFARLANE: It doesn't ring any bells, but it is very possible.

Mr. LEON: But you never saw the diversion memorandum at any time?

Mr. McFARLANE: No, never.

Mr. LEON: Let me ask you about a PROF note that is in the Tower Commission Report on page B-165, if I may. On the right-hand side of that page, there is a closing paragraph to a PROF note that you wrote to Admiral Poindexter on October 4, 1986. If I may read that paragraph, it begins,
If you think it would be of any value, I might be able to take a couple of months off and work on the problem. No guarantees and no need for any sponsorship except for air fares and hotels, but I might be able to turn something up—think about it.
Was this an offer by you to come back and work as a consultant with the NSC on the second channel, the opening up of the second channel?

Mr. McFARLANE: I didn't know about the second channel at the time, and I don't know what really inspired that. I have had a long time to think a lot about what has occurred, U.S.-Iranian relations in the past 8 years, and I have talked to a number of Iranian analysts that believe they have some insight into how gradually we can prepare the day when there can be some move from hostility back to normalcy.

It didn't involve any of the kinds of things that were being done at the time, but simply as a statement that perhaps to reorient the strategy might have been of appeal to somebody in the administration, yes.