The Spats Decision
The Case
On September 23, 1995 there was a fight in a Thayer Street bar, "Spats."
The fight resulted in four hospitalizations. Among those hospitalized was
a cheerleader, who was punched three times in the face and
required reconstructive surgery to repair her broken nose.
Two members of the Brown football team, Joe Karcutskie '98 and Jon Bourbeau
'99, were brought before the UDC. After nearly 12 hours of testimony from
41 witnesses, the UDC found the two students "not guilty" of offenses II and
V of the Standars of Student Conduct. This decision was reported in the
November 1, 1995 issue of the BDH.
In a paid advertisement, Dean of Student Life Robin Rose characterized the
incident as a "classic barroom brawl." She expressed "concern and outrage"
that "excessive alcohol consumption" and "spontaneous violence" prevented
definitive identification of those responsible for the injuries.
Two days later, on November 3, 1995, the Brown University Academic Council
(which includes Brian Hawkins, James Pomerantz, Ken Sacks, Merrily Taylor,
and other high-ranking University officials) denounced critics of the UDC.
"As much as we may feel outrage at the violence that took place, as well as
frustration with the reality that due process takes time, it is important
that we allow the disciplinary process to work....This requires both time
and freedom from interference from any sector." Their statement continues,
leveling condemnation against those who, "acting without full information,
make careless accusations about the process followed or condemn the verdict
that resulted."
However, events a few months later made one wonder whether the Academic
Council had "full information" when it made its statement. The February 7,
1996 edition of the BDH reported that Karcutskie and Bourbeau pleaded "no
contest" to charges of assault.
Our Stance
This case illustrates the ACLU's point that the UDC needs formalized
guidelines. One of the important differences between the UDC hearing and
the Providence hearing is that witnesses came forward for the latter who had
declined to testify in the former. Had there been procedures for
publicizing the need for witnesses, this outcome may not have resulted.
On the other hand, we support the restraint exercised by the UDC in not
finding a student guilty when guilt was not clear. The UDC can be expected
to consider only the evidence it has before it. The standard of proof
required for conviction by the UDC is already at a very low level
(preponderance of the evidence). To insist that UDC members push it even
lower is very dangerous. We affirm the notion that it is preferable to let
a few guilty students off than to convict innocent ones.
Finally, we feel this case brings out the need for more vigorous cross
examination of witnesses. Presumably, the two charged students lied during
the course of their UDC trial. Cross examination should have brought this
out. Of course, the current trend (as of Fall 1997) is to reduce the vigor
of cross examination in order to make the UDC less adversarial. We feel
that the Spats case is a good argument against this trend.
