Robert McNamara, Nguyen Co Thach

Former U.S., Vietnamese leaders to reexamine war, chances for peace

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and former Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach will lead high-level 13-member delegations to a four-day conference on missed opportunities for peace during the Vietnam War. The conference, June 20-23 in Hanoi, is sponsored by the Watson Institute at Brown University and hosted by the Institute of International Relations. (See also 96-136a, a news advisory.

Editors: Conference dates have been changed since this release was first distributed.

PROVIDENCE, R.I. -- Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and former Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach will lead delegations of leaders and scholars at a four-day conference in Hanoi, June 20-23, 1997. Their goal: to learn whether either side missed significant opportunities to prevent the Vietnam war or bring it to an earlier conclusion.

The conference, to be held at the Hotel Metropole in Hanoi, is co-sponsored by The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University and the Institute of International Relations of Vietnam.

"More than three million Vietnamese were killed in the war, and the United States lost 58,000. I believe each nation could have achieved its geopolitical objectives without that terrible loss of life," McNamara has said about his involvement in the project. "There were, I believe, missed opportunities during the years 1961 to 1968 for either avoiding the war before it started or for terminating it before it had run its course. What were those opportunities and why were they not recognized at the time?"

Editors: Working sessions will not be open to the press. However, participants from each side will provide a daily briefing at 4 p.m., immediately following each day's last session. At 3 p.m. Monday afternoon, June 23, 1997, both delegations will meet with the press to summarize their discussions and offer comments on missed opportunities for peace. For additional information, contact the Brown University News Bureau.

About the Conference

The Missed Opportunities conference reflects the "critical oral history" approach used by the project's organizers at the Watson Institute. While the conference focuses on face-to-face exchanges between high-level leaders on both sides who participated in the historical events, the critical oral history approach adds two important elements to ensure that all exchanges conform to the historical record. First, each delegation will include respected scholars who have mastered the historical record and understand the significance of the discussions. Second, scholars and participants from both sides have had access to thousands of pages of new and existing documentary evidence, including recently declassified material, that bears directly on the substance of discussions.

The Conference Agenda

Friday 20 June 1997
The first three sessions will review the mindsets of each side early in the conflict, including the Cold War "domino theory" that was a significant U.S. concern.

• Opening ceremony (9-9:45 a.m.) Dao Huy Ngoc and Thomas Biersteker, directors of the hosting institutions, will make welcoming remarks during the opening ceremony, and participants will hear messages from Presidents Le Duc Anh and Bill Clinton, delivered by Nguyen Xuan Phong, of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador Douglas (Pete) Peterson. Press will be allowed inside the conference room for the opening ceremony only.
  
  
• SESSION 1 (10 a.m.-12:30 p.m): Vietnamese and U.S. Mindsets in January 1961.
  (Chairman: Dao Huy Ngoc)
  
  "Washington's Mindset Toward Vietnam in January 1961," Robert S. McNamara
  "Hanoi's Mindset Toward the U.S. in January 1961," Nguyen Co Thach
  
  Vietnamese Response: Tran Quang Co.
  U.S. Response: Chester L. Cooper
  
  
• Session 1 continues after lunch.
  (Chairman: Gen. Nguyen Dinh Uoc)
  (Brief presentations by Luu Doan Huynh and Robert K. Brigham)
  
  
• Daily Press Briefing: (4-4:30 p.m.)
  (Briefers: James G. Blight and Robert K. Brigham)
  
  The briefers will summarize the discussions of the day, distribute a supplementary hand-out with additional information about the day's discussions, answer questions from the press and discuss sample documents that were discussed in the day's sessions. Most documents will be available to press.

Saturday 21 June 1997

Sessions two and three will deal with principal events in the war as seen from both sides.

• SESSION 2 (9-10:30 a.m.): Main Events of the War, 1961-1968
  (Chairman: George C. Herring)
  (Brief presentations by Lt. Gen. Nguyen Dinh Uoc and Charles E. Neu)
  
  Which of these events or others seemed to Washington, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (NLF) to be the critical points in the war's escalation between 1961 and 1968:
  
  
  • The assassination of Diem and Nhu, November 1963.
  • The Tonkin Gulf episode and resolution, August 1964.
  • The attack on the Pleiku Barracks, February 1965.
  • Initiation of Operation Rolling Thunder, February-March 1965.
  • The U.S. decision to commit combat troops, July 1965.
  • The Tet Offensive, January-February 1968.
  
  How were these events interpreted on each side? What knowledge or impressions led each side to conclude that actions taken by them were necessary? In retrospect, do the actions seem to have been justified?
  
  
• SESSION 3 (11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.): Main "Non-Events" of the War, 1961-1968
  (Chairman: George C. Herring)
  (Brief presentations by Gen. Doan Chuong and John Prados)
  (Discussion by Senior Lt. Gen. Dang Vu Hiep)
  
  During the war, U.S. military and political officials proposed actions which were not carried out, but which they believed could have allowed the U.S. to achieve victory, or at least to avoid defeat:
  
  
  • Preventing Hanoi from re-supplying forces in the south by cutting off the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
  • Responding to the February 1965 attack at Pleiku with an immediate and massive bombing campaign of the north.
  • A U.S.-led invasion of the north, above the 17th parallel.
  
  How do Vietnamese former officials and scholars now evaluate the likelihood that any of these "non-events" - or alternative actions not taken - might have made a significant difference in the outcome of the war?
  
  
• SESSION 4 (2:30-4:00 p.m.): A Neutral South Vietnam, 1962-1964?
  (Chairman: George C. Herring.)
  (Brief presentations by Nguyen Khac Huynh and James G. Blight)
  (Discussion by Dinh Nho Lien)
  
  Much effort was expended between 1962 and 1964, none of it successful, to work out an arrangement for a government in Saigon that would be acceptable to Hanoi, the NLF, the Diem leadership and the United States. Who participated in these discussions? Why did these efforts fail? How might they have succeeded?
  
  
• Daily Press Briefing: (4-4:30 p.m.)
  (Briefers: James G. Blight and Robert K. Brigham)

Sunday 22 June 1997

Session five discusses major efforts between 1965 and 1968 to achieve a negotiated settlement. Many of these initiatives involved third-party intermediaries, including some foreign governments friendly to one side or the other, and also some non-governmental organizations. Why, in the midst of an increasingly destructive war, did these efforts to end the war, or at least to move to formal negotiations, all fail?

• SESSION 5 (9-10:45 a.m.): Perspectives and Issues in Secret Negotiations, 1965-1968
  (Chairman: Dao Huy Ngoc)
  (Brief presentations by Tran Quang Co. and Robert K. Brigham.)
  
  Did Hanoi view negotiation as a tactic of warfare to buy time and to strengthen its military capabilities?
  
  Did Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues feel betrayed by the results of the 1954 Geneva negotiations and therefore deeply suspicious about the capacity to negotiate a solution to the problem of unifying Vietnam?
  
  Newly available documents from Chinese and Russian archives suggest a pattern with regard to the negotiating initiatives: The Chinese urged Hanoi to reject negotiations; the Soviets urged Hanoi to pursue negotiations. Is this a correct impression?
  
  
• Session 5 continues (11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.): Secret Negotiations, May 1965 to January 1966
  (Chairman: George C. Herring)
  (Brief presentations by Luu Van Loi and James G. Hershberg)
  
  This session will discuss four secret attempts at negotiation:
  
  
  • "Mayflower," the first bombing pause in May 1965
  • "XYZ," talks between Mai Van Bo and Edmund Gullion in August 1965
  • The 1965 Christmas bombing pause
  • Rangoon contacts
  • The Ronning mission
  
  
• Session 5 continues (2:15-4 p.m.): Secret Negotiations, June 1966 to October 1968
  (Chairman: George C. Herring)
  (Brief presentations by Nguyen Khac Huynh and James G. Hershberg)
  
  This session will discuss three secret attempts at negotiation:
  
  
  • "Marigold," the Polish initiative in June 1966
  • "Sunflower," the Wilson-Kosygin initiative in early 1967
  • "Pennsylvania," the Aubrac-Marcovich-Kissinger initiative in summer 1967
  
  
• Daily Press Briefing: 4-4:30 p.m.
  (Briefers: James G. Blight and Robert K. Brigham)

Monday 23 June 1997

Session six will be devoted to lessons of the war.

Participants in the Hanoi conference have two principal objectives: to determine whether there were missed opportunities between 1961 and 1968 to avoid or terminate a Vietnam-U.S. war; and if there were, to state why the opportunities were missed and what lessons they believe can be drawn from that experience which can be applied to the prevention of such deadly conflicts in the future.

• SESSION 6 (9 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.): Lessons of the War, Part I
  (Chairman: Dao Huy Ngoc)
  
  "One American's Tentative Views of Lessons Learned," by Robert S. McNamara.
  "A Vietnamese Perspective on the Lessons of the War," by Nguyen Co Thach.
  
  Brief responses by Col. Quach Hai Luong and Thomas J. Biersteker. Each will be an attempt to synthesize the Vietnamese and U.S. perspectives on "Lessons of the War."
  
  Discussion by Tran Quang Co and Nguyen Minh Vy will lead to a general discussion of the presentations.
  
  
• Session 6 continues (11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.): Lessons of the War, Part II
  (Chairman: Dao Huy Ngoc)
  (Brief presentations by Col. Quach Hai Luong and Thomas J. Biersteker)
  
  
• PRESS CONFERENCE (3 p.m.) Press conference with principal participants
  (Chairmen: Dao Huy Ngoc and Thomas J. Biersteker)
  (To be held in the main conference room, Hotel Metropole)
  
  The former officials from each side will participate. Following the convening by the co-chairmen, who direct the co-hosting institutions, a representative of each delegation will make a summary statement: Robert S. McNamara for the U.S. team and Tran Quang Co for the Vietnamese team. These will be followed by an open question and answer session.

U.S. Participants

Former senior officials and decision-makers from the U.S. side include:

• Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, 1961-68
  
  
• Francis M. Bator, deputy special assistant to the President for national security affairs, 1964-1966
• Chester L. Cooper, participant in the Geneva conferences on Vietnam (1954) and on Laos (1961); National Security Council staff member, 1963-1966; deputy to U.S. Special Negotiator W. Averell Harriman, 1966-1967
  
  
• Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, deputy attorney general, 1961-1963; acting attorney general, 1964-65; undersecretary of state, 1966-69
  
  
• Gen. William Y. Smith (USAF Ret.), former fighter pilot who served as special assistant to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1961-64
  
  
• Lt. Gen. Dale Vesser (US Army Ret.), special assistant at the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; two tours of duty in Vietnam, including as commander of infantry, 1968-69.

Those former officials will be supported by a group of scholars who have mastered the documents and history of the Vietnam conflict:

• Thomas J. Biersteker, director, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University
  
  
• James G. Blight, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University and principal investigator for the "Missed Opportunities" project.
  
  
• Robert K. Brigham, Department of History, Vassar College
  
  
• George C. Herring, Department of History, University of Kentucky
  
  
• James G. Hershberg, Department of History, George Washington University
  
  
• Charles E. Neu, Department of History, Brown University
  
  
• John Prados, Takoma Park Maryland and National Security Archive

In addition, two scholars of the Cold War will serve the U.S. team as a "substantive staff" to help ensure that the testimony of former officials and the analyses of scholars is consistent with the known chronology of events and with the documentary record:

• Malcolm Byrne, director of analysis, National Security Archive, George Washington University
  
  
• David Wolff, director, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

Vietnamese Participants

Former leaders and decision-makers from the Vietnamese side include:

• Nguyen Co Thach [Nwin Ko Tock] was principal private secretary to Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap in 1945-49 and later a provincial chairman in the Red River Delta area. In 1954 he became director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and headed the commission that took over administration of Hanoi from the French. He served as consul-general in India in 1959 and as director-general of the Asia-Africa Department of the MFA. He became a member of the Central Committee in 1976, first deputy foreign minister in 1979, and foreign minister in 1986, retiring in 1991 as deputy prime minister. He speaks fluent English.
  
  
• Dinh Nho Lien [Deen No Leen] was supervisor of Thanh Hoa Province in the 1940s. In 1954, he went to Poland and in 1959 to India, replacing Nguyen Co Thach as consul-general. After serving in Cairo, he returned to Hanoi to serve as head of the "Solutions Department" for U.S. affairs throughout most of the 1960s. He participated in the Paris Peace Conference and became a deputy foreign minister and ambassador to the Soviet Union before retiring. He speaks fluent English.
  
  
• Tran Quang Co [Tron Kwong Ko]: Before joining the MFA in 1954, where he was a member of the teaching staff of the Foreign Affairs College, Tran Quang Co was an officer in the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). In 1964, he became first secretary of the embassy in Jakarta, before returning to Hanoi in 1966 to work in the "Solutions Department" for U.S. affairs. He participated with Nguyen Co Thach and Richard Holbrooke in the negotiations with the U.S. in 1977-79, while in the section on U.S. affairs. He later moved to the European Department of the MFA, before becoming ambassador to Thailand in 1982. In 1986, he was made a member of the Central Committee and became head of the "Cambodia Solution" section at the MFA. Made first deputy foreign minister in 1991, he retired in 1996. He speaks fluent English.
  
  
• Gen. Tran Van Quang [Tron Von Kwong] is a three-star general who comes from a revolutionary family that was close to Ho Chi Minh's father and several other early members of the anti-French resistance in the late 19th century. During the French war, he was deputy commander of the 4th inter-zone (central Vietnam). In 1954, he became director of the Bureau of Operations in the Defense Ministry and in this capacity participated in all negotiations with Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders throughout the war with the United States. During the U.S. war, he was also deputy chief of staff to Gen. Van Tien Dung. Now retired from active duty, he is the chairman of the Vietnamese Veterans Association.
  
  
• Gen. Dang Vu Hiep [Zong Voo Heep] is director-general of the Political Department of the Vietnamese Army.
  
  
• Nguyen Dinh Phuong [Nwin Deen Fong] was a teacher during the anti-French resistance war and later an interpreter and assistant to Ha Van Lau, the head of U.S. affairs at the MFA. He served in Paris for the duration of the Peace Conference, before returning to the U.S. Department of the MFA. He became ambassador to Sweden and was director of the European Division of the MFA when he retired. He speaks fluent English.
  
  
• Luu Van Loi [Lou Von Loy] was a civil service official during the French period. During the French war, he wrote speeches and proclamations in the Department for Proseltyzing the Enemy. In 1954, he joined the military delegation to the International Control Commission (ICC), where he became a deputy to Ha Van Lau. In 1961, he was named director of the U.S. Department in the MFA and participated in the Geneva Conference on Laos. He participated behind the scenes in many of the secret negotiating initiatives during the 1960s and later served on the "Frontier Commission" dealing with China, Laos and Cambodia, before his retirement. Since retiring, he has written several books on the negotiations with the Americans, both during the secret phase before 1968 and after 1968 in Paris.

Scholars for the Vietnamese side will include:

• Dao Huy Ngoc [Dow Wee Gop] is director general of the Institute for International Relations (IIR) and the overall coordinator of the project on the Vietnamese side. He is also a deputy foreign minister and former ambassador to Japan. Ambassador Dao will be the chairman of alternate sessions for the Vietnamese side. He speaks fluent English.
  
  
• Luu Doan Huynh [Lou Zwan Whinn] is a senior researcher at the IIR and a retired Foreign Ministry official who has become Vietnam's most important scholar on the war. His command of English is perfect, a result of his many years in the MFA, working in Delhi, Bangkok, Singapore, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere in the Anglo-Pacific.
  
  
• Nguyen Khac Huynh [Nwin Kok Whinn] is a senior researcher at the IIR and was a long-time Africa hand, serving in Mozambique for many years as ambassador, and later as a deputy foreign minister, before retiring in the late 1980s. He speaks fluent French and understands English, but prefers an interpreter for conversation in English.
  
  
• Gen. Nguyen Dinh Uoc [Nwin Deen Yawk] is director of the Institute of Military History (IMH).
  
  
• Gen. Doan Chuong [Zong Chong] is director of the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS).
  
  
• Col. Quach Hai Luong [Kwok High Long] is a senior researcher at the ISS. During the war, he was an artillery officer, eventually trained to operate Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missiles protecting Hanoi.

Several persons who played important roles during the war cannot, for various reasons, participate in the regular conference sessions. Four, in particular, are of special interest to the U.S. side. Conference organizers are attempting to arrange special interviews with them for the U.S. team:

• Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap [Vu Nwin Ziop] is the most famous living Vietnamese official from the war.
  
  
• Madame Nguyen Thi Binh [Nwin Tee Binn]: Madame Binh, a founder of the National Liberation Front (NLF), signed the Paris Peace Accords as the foreign minister of the NLF. She is presently the vice-president of the Council of State, but also was recently acting president, due to the ill health of Le Duc Ahn, who suffered a stroke last fall.
  
  
• Vo Van Kiet [Vu Von Kee-et] was a founding member of the NLF and was the military commander of NLF forces in the Ho Chi Minh City area for much of the war. Later, as he rose through the Party hierarchy, he became Mayor of Saigon. He is now prime minister and one of the Politburo's staunchest advocates of market reforms and improved relations with the West.
  
  
• Gen. Van Tien Dung [Von Tee-en Zung] became a member of the resistance forces in the 1930s and was known for his ability to escape from French officials. In 1946, he became director of the Political Department of the Vietminh Army, with the rank of major general. In 1954, he served in the Red River Delta campaign and was made chief of staff of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in 1956, a rank he held throughout the war with the U.S., ending in 1975. He was close adviser to Le Duc Tho.

Press coverage

The following events will be open to all news media at the conference:

• Opening ceremony. The conference will begin with messages from Presidents Le Duc Anh and Bill Clinton, delivered by Ambassador Douglas (Pete) Peterson and Nguyen Xuan Phong, of the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Press will be allowed inside the conference room for the opening ceremony, beginning at approximately 9 a.m., prior to the first working session.
  
  
• Daily briefings. Two participants will review the day's discussions and answer questions at a daily briefing immediately after the day's last session. Current plans are to hold the briefings at the Hotel Metropole. All briefings will be conducted in English.
  
  
• Photo opportunities. In addition to the working sessions, conference planners are attempting to arrange discussions between the U.S. team and other former Vietnamese leaders. These may begin with brief photo opportunities. Further information will be available through the Brown News Bureau.
  
  
• Concluding news conference. At approximately 3 p.m. on Monday, June 23, leading former officials from both sides will summarize discussions and draw conclusions from the conference. Robert McNamara and Tran Quang Co will make summary statements. The news conference will be chaired by Dao Huy Ngoc, director general of the Institute for International Relations, and Thomas J. Biersteker, director of the Watson Institute at Brown University. There will be some interview time following the news conference.

Admission to conference sessions will be limited to participants and a small number of observers. Working sessions of the conference will not be open to the press or the public.

Additional interview time may be available. Interpreters will be available, although most members of the Vietnamese delegation speak fluent English. Contact the Brown News Bureau for more information about the conference agenda, participants and sponsorship or to arrange interviews.

Sponsorship

Co-hosts for the conference, Missed Opportunities?: Former U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders and Scholars Reexamine the Vietnam War, 1961-1968, are The Institute of International Relations of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University.

Financial support has been provided by:

• The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University
• Office of the President, Brown University
• The Rockefeller Foundation
• Rockefeller Family and Associates
• Office of the President, Vassar College
• The National Security Archive, George Washington University
• The Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC