Expanding Weber

In addressing the development of the (concept of the) state, Bernbeck (p. 534), Mann (p. 10ff.), and Routledge (pp. 22-23) all adopt Max Weber’s ideas about power and authority as useful (if Eurocentric and idealized) frameworks for defining “the state” as a locus of archaeological inquiry. Yet our seminar discussion focused more closely on the processes by which states exist (or are performed, experienced, materialized, etc.) and, consequently, on the Foucaultian definition of governmentality, Bourdieu’s practice theory, and Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. The absence of substantive comment or critique on Weber, who seems so foundational to literature about the state, prompted me to reflect further on his ideas of power, authority (legitimated power), and, most importantly, the process of routinization.

Routledge emphasizes the process of state production (e.g., “…there are no states, only the process of state formation itself” [25]) and critiques Weber’s “taxonomic approaches” for its exclusive focus on the state-as-entity, rather than on its continuous creation (p. 24). However, I find this to be an oversimplified evaluation.. In his treatment of legitimate domination, Weber delineates three “pure types” of authority (also listed, though not defined, by Bernbeck) that rest on rational, traditional, and charismatic grounds:

Rational grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).

Traditional grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally,

Charismatic grounds—resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)” (Weber 1978:215, emphasis added).

Legal authority is impersonal, rational, hierarchical, and based on abstract rules (laws); it has an intricate and established bureaucracy (Weber 1978:217-226). Traditional authority finds legitimacy amongst people with commonly-held beliefs and practices. Its governing rules are thus “age-old” rather than abstract; a present but restricted administrative staff supports an authoritative figure (a “personal master”) (Weber 1978:227). Charismatic authority is based on qualities of an individual, a “leader,” perceived to be extraordinary and associated with the supernatural and superhuman (Weber 1978:241-245). It is upon these articulations of authority that different forms of states rest.

We can easily see why Routledge would categorize Weber as taxonomic, for his explanation of power is decidedly typological. However, he also leaves room for dynamism and change in this framework. In providing ample examples of different forms of authority, Weber is historical. For example, he views charismatic authority as being particularly relevant in “primitive circumstances”, and his writings seem to treat charisma as a precursor to traditional authority (which in turn may develop into rational/legal authority). Thus, the authority of a charismatic leader, based perhaps on wartime heroics or perceived magical powers and links to the divine, may be accepted by followers and, through time, become traditional. This process is known as routinization, whereby prescribed rules, practices, performances, discourses, etc. become routine:

“With…routinizations, rules in some form always come to govern. The prince or the hierocrat no longer rules by virtue of his personal qualities, but by virtue of acquired or inherited qualities, or because he has been legitimized by an act of charismatic election. The process of routinization, and thus traditionalization, has set it” (Weber 1946:297; see also Weber 1978:246-254).

The actual process of routinization presently remains vaguely defined; the above definition is amongst the most concrete and specific I could find, though I admittedly did not review all of Weber’s work. Nonetheless, it many of his chosen examples suggest that this process is often closely associated with religion, which, for Weber, was a crucial component to the society and, by extension, to the state. A popularly cited example: Jesus Christ held charismatic authority, which was routinized into traditional authority as Christianity (the same could be said for Muhammad and Islam, for example) *see bullet point below*. Thus, far from seeing state authority as a static “thing” (as Routledge implies), I would argue that Weber pays considerable attention to the development of different forms of power and the consequent appearance of infrastructure and state apparatus through his explanations of routinization—explanations almost entirely absent from our readings.

My point is not necessarily (or at least exclusively) to critique our authors. Rather, I see routinization as a way to clarify some of the problems with practice theory and the state raised in class, e.g., practice theory does not reveal a generative mechanism for the state apparatus, as the state is always there already. Weber’s generative mechanism lies in charismatic authority, which may at any time challenge traditional or rationalized authority (often times in revolutionary ways)—or which may presumably arise in a non-state society to create one. Perhaps a useful concept for framing the origins and rise and “evolution” of the state from an archaeological standpoint?

From a Mesoamerican perspective, the notion of charisma seems particularly relevant, and I suspect this is not a regional or chronological peculiarity: the authority of Maya lords derived as much from their successful feats in warfare and their unique ability to commune with deities and the dead (charisma!) as it did in their capacity to rationally administer a community of subordinates. At least, this is the picture archaeologists can reconstruct from royal, monumental, and public inscriptions and iconography—categories of evidence typically conceived of as products created by and for the state…

Weber also wrote about routinization as a non-religious process, which might be more clearly related to our notion of the modern secular state. However, the associations amongst religious prophets/leaders, religion, and authority may be a productive way to explore Keffie’s question about the extent to which state and religion were separable in the past.

Weber, Max. 1946. The Social Psychology of World Religions. In H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 267-301. New York: Oxford University Press.

------. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press.