

SCOPE OF CIA ACTIVITIES
UNDER THE NICARAGUA FINDING

The Finding replaces the 1 December 1981 Finding which authorized certain covert action programs in Nicaragua and Central America. This program remains a critical element of U.S. policy in the region which recognizes that Nicaragua's Sandinista regime, with Soviet and Cuban active support, is implementing a strategy of full support for insurgent elements whose aim is the overthrow of democratic governments in the region. The political and paramilitary pressures created by this program are linked and are essential (1) to enable friendly Central American nations to strengthen democratic political institutions and achieve economic and social development, free from Soviet, Cuban, and Sandinista interference and (2) to induce a negotiated political resolution of international tensions in Central America.

This Finding authorizes the provision of material support and guidance to Nicaraguan resistance groups; its goal is to induce the Sandinista government in Nicaragua to enter into meaningful negotiations with its neighboring nations; and to induce the Sandinistas and the Cubans and their allies to cease their provision of arms, training, command and control facilities and sanctuary to regional insurgencies. This support is to be provided [redacted] in cooperation with others, as appropriate. The provision of political support and funding to opposition leaders and organizations [redacted] in order to maintain their viability is also authorized.

POLITICAL ACTION: Financial and material support will be provided to Nicaraguan opposition leaders and organizations to enable them to deal with the Sandinistas from a position of political strength and to continue to exert political pressure on the Sandinistas to return to the original premises of the revolution — free elections political pluralism, basic human rights and a free press.

PARAMILITARY ACTION: Arms and other support will be provided to Nicaraguan paramilitary forces operating inside Nicaragua for the purpose of pressuring the Sandinista government and its Cuban supporters to cease their support for regional insurgencies. [redacted] instructors will train these forces to attack targets in Nicaragua in order to deny facilities, interrupt support networks and to raise the price the Cubans and Nicaraguans and their allies must pay for continued support of insurgent groups elsewhere in Central America. [redacted]

U.S. support for paramilitary forces inside Nicaragua will be terminated when it is verified that: (a) the Soviets, Cubans, and Sandinistas have ceased providing arms, training, command and control facilities and logistical support for military or

paramilitary operations in or against any country in Central America, and (b) Nicaragua has committed itself to providing amnesty and non-discriminatory participation in the Nicaraguan political process by all Nicaraguans.

PROPAGANDA AND CIVIC ACTION: Guidance and media assistance will be provided to Nicaraguan opposition elements and paramilitary forces. Propaganda will be used to promote pluralism, human rights, freedom of the press, free elections and democratic processes inside Nicaragua and throughout the region. Paramilitary units will be trained in field medicine, basic agriculture and political/psychological action in order to assist local populations and to gain and maintain popular support.

FUNDING REQUIRED: \$19,000,000 is included in the Fiscal Year 1984 CIA budget for this program. Additional funding requirements, to be determined by developments in the area, could be as much as \$14,000,000. Any such additional funding will have to come from the Agency's Reserve for Contingencies or other authorized sources.

S E C R E T

RISKS: This proposal carries with it the risks that the Cubans may increase their military presence in Nicaragua to defend their installations and to control rising internal opposition to the Sandinistas, and that the Nicaraguans may increase their covert activities or take direct military action against Honduras. The USSR is not likely to take an active direct military role in Central America.

The Sandinista regime may heighten repression in Nicaragua but this would only continue the course of action in which the Sandinistas have been engaged since 1979 to eliminate democratic pluralism.

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