Mr. LEON: When you arrived in Tehran, were you under an
impression that there was a specific deal with regard to certain hostages being released right up front?
Mr. McFARLANE: That is what I was told, yes.
Mr. LEON: Are you aware that General Secord testified last week
that that was not his understanding of what the status of the ar-
rangements was between the parties?
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes. I was surprised to hear that.
Mr. LEON: I believe you testified that Admiral Poindexter had
given you the impression that your understanding of the deal was
the same as his.
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.
Mr. LEON: Did you learn from Colonel North that he had a different
understanding from either you and Poindexter or Secord?
Mr. McFARLANE: No. This came to, or out of the open-at one of
the sessions we had with an Iranian official, where I complained
about their not having fulfilled their commitments for release of
the hostages, and he looked around the room at his own supporters,
and obviously assumed he had been misinformed, because he
had quite a different understanding of what the agreement had
been.
But in talking to my own staff at the time, Colonel North and
others, all of them reconfirmed yes, we do expect, and have all
along, the complete release of the hostages.
Mr. LEON: You testified that you learned about the diversion for
the first time while you were over there.
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.
Mr. LEON: I believe it was in Israel?
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.
Mr. LEON: At Ben Gurion Airport, and you have testified that
you were shocked to learn about it initially.
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.
Mr. LEON: But that you assumed that it had been authorized and
that North later told you it had been authorized.
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.
Mr. LEON: And when you met with the President, you did not
bring it up as a subject at that time?
Mr. McFARLANE: No.
Mr. LEON: Nor did you bring it up with Mr. Poindexter or
Donald Regan?
Mr. McFARLANE: No.
Mr. LEON: Have you seen the memorandum with the diversion
reference in it?
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes.
Mr. LEON: Were you aware that that was written only a matter
of days before you met with Ollie North in his office at the White
House, according to his calendar?
Mr. McFARLANE: No.
Mr. LEON: I believe his calendar reflects that you had a meeting
with him on October 9 at his office in the White House. Do you
have any recollection of that?
Mr. McFARLANE: I must be mistaken. I thought the memorandum
Colonel North—
Mr. LEON: April, excuse me. April 9th, I should say.
Mr. McFARLANE: It doesn't ring any bells, but it is very possible.
Mr. LEON: But you never saw the diversion memorandum at any
time?
Mr. McFARLANE: No, never.
Mr. LEON: Let me ask you about a PROF note that is in the
Tower Commission Report on page B-165, if I may. On the right-hand
side of that page, there is a closing paragraph to a PROF note
that you wrote to Admiral Poindexter on October 4, 1986.
If I may read that paragraph, it begins,
If you think it would be of any value, I might be able to take a couple of months
off and work on the problem. No guarantees and no need for any sponsorship except
for air fares and hotels, but I might be able to turn something up—think about it.
Was this an offer by you to come back and work as a consultant
with the NSC on the second channel, the opening up of the second
channel?
Mr. McFARLANE: I didn't know about the second channel at the
time, and I don't know what really inspired that. I have had a long
time to think a lot about what has occurred, U.S.-Iranian relations
in the past 8 years, and I have talked to a number of Iranian analysts
that believe they have some insight into how gradually we
can prepare the day when there can be some move from hostility
back to normalcy.
It didn't involve any of the kinds of things that were being done
at the time, but simply as a statement that perhaps to reorient the
strategy might have been of appeal to somebody in the administration,
yes.