Mr. RUDMAN: ...You are familiar with exhibit 38A involving the DEA caper?
[The exhibit appears at p. 537.]
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: That describes a plan to bribe some people to free
two hostages for a million dollars apiece?
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: You approved it?
Mr. McFARLANE: The Attorney General approved it.
Mr. RUDMAN: And the Attorney General approved it. You both
approved it.
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: Did it involve the use of a couple of agents and
ransom money to be supplied by Ross Perot, if he was willing to
provide it?
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: Was that an intelligence activity? And if it wasn't,
What kind of an activity was it?
Mr. McFARLANE: Well, it wasn't intelligence in the context of
gathering intelligence. It was within the scope of the 1947 Act concerning
the CIA.
Mr. RUDMAN: It was within that scope, was it not?
Mr. McFARLANE: I think it was.
Mr. RUDMAN: In fact, Oliver North tried to carry this out, which
was a policy that had been approved by you. In fact, there was
$200,000 used to try to start the process? .
Mr. McFARLANE: That's correct.
Mr. RUDMAN: On the face of that memoranda, there is an acknowledgement
that the Attorney General of the United States,
Mr. Meese, whom you probably discussed it with since DEA was
under his jurisdiction, approved it?
Mr. McFARLANE: Yes, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: To your knowledge, was a finding ever signed for
this activity?
Mr. McFARLANE: No, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: Were congressional committees, House or Senate
Intelligence Committees ever notified of this activity?
Mr. McFARLANE: No, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: Should they have been?
Mr. McFARLANE: No, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: Tell me why.
Mr. McFARLANE: I will. It is more than passing strange to me
that we cannot aspire to a policy which is more effective to deal
with terrorism.
Now, it is undeniable that some countries are good at it and they
are good because terrorists know that whenever they commit terrorism
against Israel, something, somehow, somewhere is going to
happen. Now, it may not always be arms. It may not be pre-emptive
attack. It may be negotiation. It may be bribing, but you can
be goddammed sure if any Israeli is caught, he's going to have his
government going after people who did it. Now, that is to be a differentiated
approach.
Now, I don't pretend that in the United States we can pursue
that. The reason we cannot is because we must have a policy at all
times compatible with American values. And I agree to that. But I
believe that our government must have the gumption enough to be
able to differentiate between those terrorist events which are susceptible
to violence and those which are not.
Mr. RUDMAN: So if I understand your answer, it fell within the
parameters of the act. There was no finding, but you believe it was
so sensitive that there should not have been a notification, though
the law might have required it? .
Mr. McFARLANE: No, sir. I don't feel that way at all. You are distorting
what I said.
Mr. RUDMAN: I am just repeating your answer. .
Mr. McFARLANE: I don't think you are. My answer was the kind
of activity the DEA people undertook normally would also fit the
description of activities the CIA undertakes or the FBI or the
Army on occasion with special trained units.
None of those others opt to report to the Congress either. My
point was simply to say—
Mr. RUDMAN: So your suggestion was if there is ambiguity III
that law, the law ought to be changed?
Mr. McFARLANE: That wasn't my point.
Mr. RUDMAN: Your point was that a finding was required. There
was no finding. There was no notification.
Mr. McFARLANE: I am not being critical. I am trying to figure
out—
Mr. McFARLANE: It was handled by the CIA.
Mr. RUDMAN: There was a finding?
Mr. McFARLANE: There was no finding.
Mr. RUDMAN: I think we have your answer.
Mr. McFARLANE: A finding was not appropriate. The CIA did not
undertake to do anything.
Mr. RUDMAN: Of course, that would always give rise to the possibility
that things that the CIA might normally do might be delegated
to some other part of the government by people who are unscrupulous.
Certainly not you, Mr. McFarlane, but others who might be
unscrupulous might delegate it to someone, and therefore evade
the reporting requirements.
I am sure that is something that concerns you as much as it does
us.
Mr. McFARLANE: It does, yes, sir.
Mr. RUDMAN: Thank you very much.