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Inscription at Ostia: Originally over the Porta Romana as part of the walls of Ostia, parts of the phrase “Senatus Populusque coloniae Ostiensium” can be seen, April 2018 180
Rachel Sklar
Cover Art Statement

For this year’s issue subject of Aeneas’ shield, I hoped to divert from the typical artistic depictions of the presentation of the shield or the battle with Turnus. Instead, for the cover I chose to depict the creation of Aeneas’ shield in the hopes of capturing allusions of divine creation, as well as the warmth of the forge and of creation itself. Somewhat visible behind the workers a figure alluding to Venus is seen, carefully observing the work’s creation on her son’s behalf. For the back cover, I chose to depict Aeneas holding the shield at his side just below his face. Such a presentation flattens the composition slightly, in some way evoking a distance from reality. In doing this, I also have cropped the shield itself and have placed upon it a fairly intense light, obstructing it, to some extent, from view. In this, the viewer is led to envision what such a creation may look like, as well as how it may be used in the conflicts that plague Aeneas’ tale.
The Philosopher’s Flight: Cicero’s Contempt for Earthly Life in the *Tusculanae Disputationes*

David Sacks

“And therefore it is necessary hence to endeavor to flee thither as quickly as possible. And escape is an assimilation to God as much as possible; and this assimilation is to become just and holy, with wisdom.”
— Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176a-b

Introduction

Cicero’s *Tusculanae Disputationes* delineates his unique role for philosophy through discourses on the contempt of death and earthly ills, and the attendant happy and productive life. It is framed by its historical moment, composed around 45 BC at the height of his political foe Julius Caesar’s power in Rome and precipitated by the death of his beloved daughter Tullia, which caused his turn towards “philosophy as consolation.”¹ The work consequently carries urgent civic purpose and a personal significance as well, which allow insight into Cicero’s mind as he begins his final years. Through his unique vision of philosophy, he employs contempt of earthly ills — especially of death — praise of self-sacrifice and patience in life, and a unique imagining of the immortal soul’s ascent to heaven in his own philosopher’s flight, inscribing himself in the tradition commenced by Plato and imagining a new, Roman conception of the journey of the immortal soul.

This essay will explore how the *Tusculanae Disputationes* functions as Cicero’s own philosopher’s flight. It will discuss the work’s ideas and historical context before analyzing some of Cicero’s doctrine on perturbations, the virtuous life, and the immortality of the soul. It will then show how his characterizations of life and the soul fit into a larger tradition of the philosopher’s flight and constitute a new, Roman understanding of this Platonic idea.

The Purpose and Motivations for the *Tusculanae Disputationes*

Cicero’s period of literary and philosophical productivity came with a release from public duties. The *Tusculanae Disputationes* makes this clear from the outset; it is “after having been freed from the toils of legal defense and from senatorial offices…” that “after a long period of neglect” Cicero has “turned [him]self” at the “greatest exhortations” of Brutus to “those studies, which are called philosophy,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 1.1). His aim is not merely to restate Greek philosophical axioms, but “to illustrate” the philosophy of the past “with Latin language” to produce an essentially Roman philosophy, stemming from the Romans being “wiser,” “in all ways…than the Greeks, whether having made discovery by their own merits or having better effected those things they received from them,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 1.1). Cicero’s project is clear from the outset: he intends to romanize the philosophy of the past — that of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek schools — shaping it for Roman society, and finding it apt for “speaking ornately and plentifully about the greatest questions [of life]” as faced by his contemporary and future citizenry (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 1.6). Cicero’s project seems to indicate his dim view of the Caesar government’s interest and success in adhering to these sacred values.

Ingo Gildenhard sees the influence of Caesar’s tyrannical reign in the *Tusculanae Disputationes* from the beginning. He points out Cicero’s characterization of his ancestors’ Rome in the first two sections; Cicero uses tenses and irony to show how “the state of the *maiores* [forebears]” has been lost (Gildenhard, 114): “for what [nation] had such seriousness of purpose, was so steadfast, had such greatness of soul, probity, faith, what [nation] so excelled in every type of virtue in any place such that it should be compared with our elders?” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 1.2). Cicero extols his ancestors as unrivaled exemplars of virtue, models for all civilizations to follow, whose values are all but lost in Cicero’s contemporary moment. This seems a veiled jab at Caesar, and Cicero’s use of “having been freed” in 1.1 is ironic, as Gildenhard surmises (Gildenhard, 114). This reading is supported by Cicero’s view of Caesar in *de Officiis* 1.26: “the temerity of Gaius Caesar has…overthrown all laws divine and human on account of that principate which for himself he himself set up in error of opinion.” Cicero contends against Caesar’s tyranny, and turns to philosophy for comfort and education of the future generations to reclaim the old ways.

In the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, Cicero considers philosophy with a uniquely conceptual approach, viewing its practice as essential to living a happy and virtuous life. Philosophy is to Cicero “the mother of all arts—what is it but,

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2. See also *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 1.1, particularly the use of the word *liberatus*, to which I here refer.
3. *Declaravit id modo…principatum.*
as [says] Plato, the gift, [or] as [I say], the discovery of the Gods?” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.64). At the end of book 1, Cicero refers to philosophy as “able to lighten affliction, dread, [and] desire,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.119). Book 2’s introduction reveals Cicero to be devoted to philosophy, courtesy of “doing nothing” due to his unwilling absence from politics, and reaffirms his belief in its potency, provided it is studied as a whole (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.1). He terms philosophy “the cultivation of the soul,” which “extracts vices from their roots and prepares the soul to receive sowings…” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.13).

Cicero extends this idea in book 3, calling philosophy “the medicine of the soul,” which alone alleviates grief (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.6). Philosophy, as it is in large part constituted by reason, is the means by which “we get rid of this” onslaught of difficulties life poses (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.27). According to Cicero, the reason within philosophy reveals that “that evil is of [general] opinion, not of nature” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.31); this judgment of philosophy—and of various perturbations of body and mind—is echoed in book 4. Since the “causes of perturbations” all “originate from judgments of opinions and from wills,” correcting opinion through reason is “the greatest and most useful [purpose] to be wished for” of philosophy (Tusculanae Disputationes, 4.82). For philosophy is “made up from the collection of rational thoughts and arguments, from [which], if we wish to be both good and happy, [we may] seek all aids and helps to living life well and happily,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 4.84). Thus, Cicero’s vision of philosophy is of a rational force which allows people to live as best they can in what time they have—a remarkably practical view. This reveals Cicero’s object: though he draws copiously on the Greeks, his vision of philosophy is novel and breaks ground in its utility, affording a guide to following generations for living life thoughtfully and productively, and aiming successfully at virtue. It may well provide Cicero himself, politically disenfranchised and bereft of his daughter, with consolation in his final years—a way to rationalize, and ultimately escape, the many misfortunes that befell him in life.

Cicero’s Contempt of Life’s Pains and Toils and Belief in the Immortality of the Soul

The Tusculanae Disputationes illustrates its vision of the successful and virtuous life primarily through its contempt of various earthly trials. While
the most significant trial is death, covered in book 1, books 2, 3, and 4 cover life’s lesser issues. In particular, books 2 and 3 cover in most detail particular trials: pain and toil, and grief respectively. I shall focus first on these in order to show Cicero’s contempt of the ills of earthly life, before turning to book 1’s arguments for the contempt of death and the immortality of the soul.

Book 2 primarily refutes the hypothesis that *dolor* is the greatest of all evils (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.14). The word *dolor* has many meanings, but it seems in this context to mean “pain” or “anguish” of body. The hypothesis of bodily “pain” as the greatest of all evils is immediately rejected when Cicero brings up *dedecus*, “disgrace,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.14). Cicero attributes the common conception of *dolor* as the greatest of evils to “dread of pain,” and resolves to explain this phenomenon (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.15). This rational examination of what constitutes evil employs philosophy to explain why *dolor* ultimately is not an evil to be feared.

Cicero dismisses the notion of *dolor* as the greatest of all evils as “unmanly and malleable,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.15). He rejects the opinions that anyone is “perfectly happy, whose body has good constitution and knowledge that it will always be so,” and that “the highest good [is] to lack pain,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.17). Cicero scorns this notion of the highest evil and good being based on bodily pain or its absence, reasoning that a moral system based on momentary comfort can achieve nothing of “duty, praise, [or] glory,” and invites all “shame, [and] baseness…to flee bodily pain,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.16).

Cicero holds poets and other writers somewhat accountable for the promulgation of this false idea. Citing passages from Greek tragedy, translated by his own hand, Cicero observes the immortalization of the groans of various figures within the works by Greek tragedians; they are celebrations of bodily suffering (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.19-25). Cicero notes the prominent position occupied by poets, mentioning their use in lecture by philosophers, pointing to their power to inform societal perception of values and goals as they

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5. See *Dolor*, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?q=dolor&la=la&can=dolor0#lexicon. Note that we may be fairly certain *dolor* does not mean “grief” here, since Book 3 deals with *aegritudo*, which is closer to “grief” or “distress” of the *animus*, while *dolor* deals with the body.

6. Note how quickly his interlocutor turns to *dolor* as the greatest evil, (and how quickly, prompted, he abandons the premise).

7. The opinions he rejects are those of Metrodorus and Hieronymus, respectively.

8. Cicero refers to the sufferings of Hercules, Philoctetes, and Prometheus represented in various Greek tragedies. Since Cicero explicitly refers to Sophocles’ *Trachiniae* for his representation of Hercules, it is quite possible that for Philoctetes he refers to the Sophocles *Philoctetes* as well. *Philoctetes* has numerous occasions of lamentation at physical pain: viz., e.g. lines 730-826.
are “not only read, but also learned by heart,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.27). He sees poets as doing harm from this perch: “But do you not see what of evil poets bear forth? They exhibit the strongest men in lamentation, they soften our souls, so they are thereafter sweet,”(Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.27).

Cicero contends that while “pain is pain—for [that] is [why] fortitude is desired,” pain may be “overcome by patience…” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.27, 2.33). He claims that “if you hold this [view that dishonor is the highest evil]..you will know what must be put up as resistance to pain,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.28). To Cicero, bodily pain is closely related to toil; “bodily pain sometimes runs between these toilsome exertions: they [who perform these exertions] are impelled, carried, thrown away, they fall, and the toil itself brings on something like a callous to pain,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.36). This toil is necessary for training endurance to further pain and achieving virtue; the training of the Roman military is such that “he [who is] trained and a veteran is, on account of the [training], braver,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.38). Cicero thus conceives of bodily pain and toil as necessary evils which must be used to grow hardier and able to accomplish more as according to a life of virtue.

Cicero accordingly asserts what is honestum, or “morally upright,” as the highest good, and what is turpe, or “morally base,” as the highest evil, arguing that conceiving our moral system in this manner is the only true way “a remedy from pain is to be sought,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.45). Conditioning the soul in response to the enforcement of honestum by the perception of close associates is how the “more steadfast and hardy” men are made to be so (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.48). The man who easily endures bodily pain is one whose “pain of the soul is castigated” and whose “softer part of the soul has complied with reason,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.50). Cicero thus exhorts man to bear bodily pain—and other perturbations such as “anger” and “libidinoussness”—“peacefully and calmly” as we diligently seek. Furthermore, per our nature, honor, and “from this course and impetus of souls” we ought to go “towards true praise and moral good” and endeavor to lead a maximally virtuous and happy life (Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.58).

Cicero applies a similar approach to perturbations of the soul, though he considers “illnesses of the soul as more pernicious and multiple than [those] of the body,” perhaps because it is man’s essence (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.5). Cicero regards “every turbulence of the soul” to be insania: unsoundness of mind (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.8). Moreover, he considers sanitas…animi,
“soundness of mind” or of soul, to be manifest in sapientia, “wisdom,” and insipientia, “foolishness” or even “senselessness,” to be the sign of insania (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.10). This is the perturbation of mind brought on by an aeger animus; Cicero maintains that he who is wise cannot suffer from this senselessness, though the soul is by nature “somewhat tender and soft, which may be shaken by grief of the soul like by a storm,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.12).

Cicero continually emphasizes the surpassing significance of the soul: “Let that principle indeed so be held, that unless the soul is restored to health, which is not able to happen without philosophy, never will there be an end of miseries,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.13). He provides arguments in the manner of the Stoics, by which Cicero concludes that “grief is in conflict with fortitude,” and since “no one is wise unless [he is] strong, grief does not befall the wise man,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.14). Moreover, magnitude of the soul is requisite in him who is strong—and so, wise—and since he who is great-souled must be unconquered, the wise man must look down upon grief and other perturbations (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.15). It is “the office of the soul to use reason well and the soul of the wise man is so always in such a state that it uses reason in the best way”; the wise man must always be free from grief and affiliated disorders, through his soul’s perfect exercise of reason (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.15). His argument is thus dependent on philosophy and reason in the soul, while it becomes clearer that his conception of what makes man man—what informs his decisions, his temper, his life—is dependent in largest degree on the soul.

Cicero believes that all these perturbations of the soul “lacerate and consume the soul…unless we expunge this so that we cast it away, we are not able to lack in misery,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.27). He accordingly urges “premeditation of future evils,” since evils long seen to be coming have far less of an impact than those unanticipated (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.29). Like with pain of body, Cicero judges “that evil [of grief caused by impending evils] to be of opinion, not of nature” and believes that he “who thinks on the variety [of aspects] of life, who considers the helplessness of the race of man, is not sad, when he thinks about these things, but maximally he discharges the office of wisdom,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.31, 3.34).

Such is Cicero’s reasoning for all perturbations: any vexation, ailment, grief or pain is to be alleviated through reason and tempering of the soul, as it does not occur of nature. He rebuts the idea that it is “the cruel necessity” of bearing grief that causes grief, instead stating that it is “the necessity of bearing the human condition that prohibits us from contending with God and warns us that we are human, which cognizance lightens sorrow from a great burden,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.60). To him, the only means of comfort is “to

10. And 3.13, Stoicorum more agamus, qui breviter astringere solent argumenta).
11. Praeterea necesse est...non cadit igitur in sapientem aegritudo.
remove the grief from its roots” and impress upon the sufferer that there is little or no evil in grief, to realize the realities of the human condition, and to show the uselessness of being “overcome by grief”—essentially, to press on in spite of the soul’s distress (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.76-77). It is in the sufferer’s power, according to Cicero, to overcome the temptation to sink into grief by his will; this will be accomplished through philosophy, “should we only receive its care,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.83-84).12 As he does with pain, Cicero acknowledges the reality of grief—he himself undoubtedly suffered grief, having lost his daughter, when he wrote these words—and places comfort in the indomitability of reason and the soul.

The most fundamental perturbation, though, is death and fear of death. In his first disputation, Cicero argues that death is not an evil, and employs arguments for the immortality of the soul to help show why an end to life and to the mortal body is not to be feared. He emphasizes how one leads life—virtuously or not—over life itself, and so views posterity as of more consequence than the present.

Cicero proves that existence after death is not an evil, and uses this argument of the future to show that there is no evil in death itself (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.16).13 He acknowledges many views on death and the immortality of the soul, and asserts that regardless of the soul’s life beyond death, death itself still cannot be an evil (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.24). For either “souls remain after death or die at death itself,” and so, “if they remain,” they are happy, and “if they perish,” they are “not miserable, since they do not even exist,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.25). Therefore, death “either makes us happy with souls remaining, or not miserable [as we] lack sensation,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.25).

But Cicero subscribes to Plato’s view: that the soul is immortal. He expounds at length upon this theme, and throughout the book builds arguments around the idea that encourage living life as virtuously as possible. While extolling those who live and “also think about the future,” he brings up Hercules, who “went away to the Gods,” as the epitome of one who considers himself “born among men…to help, protect, and preserve his fellows”; to Cicero, “never would he have gone away [thus], unless, when he was among men, he had crafted that road for himself [through his service to others],” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.32).14 He views the path of Hercules, from mortality to immortality, as “time-tested and consecrated in the religiosity of all,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.32). Just as, like Hercules, man has “in their minds almost a certain prophesy of future ages” that justifies such a man who

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12. 3.84’s *nos modo curationem eius recipiamus* is quoted explicitly.
13. See also the argumentation through 1.9-1.15.
14. Note as well that Cicero refers here to the Choice of Hercules, from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, 2.1.21-34. Cicero also makes reference to the Choice of Hercules in *de Officiis*, quoting Xenophon in 1.118 and referring again to the choice in 3.25.
“always lives in toils and dangers,” and “believes by nature that Gods exist,” so
“we judge souls to remain by a consensus of all races of the earth.” This idea
of valor as tied to an immortality of the soul returns later in book 1 and pervades
the entire work, in terms of its practical application: if one believes in the
importance of the future over the transient present, and permanence of the soul,
one ought to act with virtue—valor, greatness of soul, love of country—rather
than have care for matters of the present and how they affect the self.

Cicero discourses extensively on various views regarding the
immortality of the soul, providing technical accounts that bolster his own
characterization of the soul’s permanence. He thus sets out to “learn by reason
what sort of essence souls have and in what seat they [generally] remain,”
(Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.36). Here, he emphasizes the distinction between
soul and body; he disagrees with the common conception that “since bodies fall
into the ground and are buried by earth, from which it is said that they are
buried…the remaining life of the dead is led below the earth,” and again blames
poets for exacerbating the erroneous conception (Tusculanae Disputationes,
1.36). Rather, he views “souls [as] living through their own selves,” and the
idea that they persist below the earth as merely a popular misconception
designed to rationalize the uncertainty of life after death (Tusculanae
Disputationes, 1.37). He believes souls ascend to heaven, and narrates:

If [the soul] remains uncorrupted and like itself, it is necessary that it is
carried in such a way that it penetrates and rends asunder this entire
sky, in which clouds, rain-showers and winds are collected…when the
soul has passed above this region and touched and gotten knowledge of
the nature similar to its own, it takes a stand by the fires joined from
delicate air and from the moderate burn of the sun and makes an end of
being borne higher. For when it has reached a lightness and heat similar
to its own, as though it is aloft in equilibrium, it is moved into no part,
and at last it comes to its natural seat, when it has come through to that
place which is similar to itself, in which place it lacks nothing and will
be nourished and sustained by the same matter by which the stars are
sustained and nourished (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.43).

This is the height of the disputation’s description of the soul’s
immortality, and it lends insight into how he envisions the flight of the soul after
death. It also implies a corollary—that the soul’s stay on earth is temporary—
that pervades the whole work. The soul is only on earth so long as the body
lives, and while the body lives and the soul remains in the body, it is there “like

15. See Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.33, for the doctrine of the ever-toiling man, and
1.36, which asserts this natural instinct and ties it to the soul’s immortality.
16. See also his critique of poet’s in Book 2 and its origins in Plato’s Republic, above
and in notes 28 and 29.
17. Compare with this paper’s epigraph from Plato’s Theaetetus, and Plato’s Phaedrus,
247c-249a.
it is in a foreign home,” while when it leaves and makes its way into the free sky, “it is as though it has entered into its own home,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.51). Cicero thus portrays life as even more transitory and insignificant in itself than without the idea of the soul’s immortality.

This concept of the soul’s flight after death lends even more insight into Cicero’s conception of life—a brief period in which to act as virtuously as possible before the soul, man’s best, most essential and most divine part, leaves the body and takes its rightful place in heaven.18 Moreover, Cicero views death as “daily imminent on account of uncertain things” in life, and “never able to be far away due to the brevity of life,” and not to “deter the wise man” from “taking counsel for the republic and for his associates”; thus even if the soul were not mortal, man will “strive for eternal things, not from desire of glory, of which he will not be able to have sense, but from desire of virtue, which glory follows by necessity, even if you do not accomplish [eternally-lasting deeds for glory’s sake],” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.91). Therefore, no life which has achieved virtue can be lived in vain, even short (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.109). Rather, he views life, much like Socrates in the Phaedrus, as a “prison” and “chains” from which eventually we are set free, and believes that “we were not birthed or created by temerity or fortune, but certainly there was a certain force which took care for the human race...[which after the human race] had endured all toils, then thrust on them, in death, eternal evil,” (Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.118).19

Cicero places little value on living life, in and of itself. He extols the flight of the soul, while denigrating earthly life and valuing only the virtue by which some mortals live selflessly. This low regard for life may well indicate Cicero’s contempt for life, eagerness to embrace death and to live for the rest of eternity as a soul among the stars. This makes sense, especially given his old age and losses of his daughter, his political power, and with those his earthly joys and opportunities to lead a virtuous life. The act of writing philosophy—the Tusculanae Disputationes itself—may be the most virtuous act Cicero has left on earth.20 It is duly unsurprising that he seems to care so little whether he lives or dies, and looks instead towards the philosopher’s flight as a means for salvation.

18. See Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.52, in which Cicero explains that the soul is the essence of who man is.
19. See Plato’s Phaedrus, where he describes souls after earthly life as “not entombed” or “carrying about what we call the body,” 250c1-c6.
20. See Section II above.
The Philosopher’s Flight in the Tusculanae Disputationes

The tradition of the immortality of the soul and the soul as a thing separate from body has its origins before Cicero. Cicero continually cites Plato throughout book 1 of the Tusculanae Disputationes as he provides justifications for the soul’s immortality; it is in Plato’s work that the idea of the soul’s flight, particularly that of the philosopher, comes to be. It is this tradition into which Cicero seeks to insert himself in the Tusculanae Disputationes.

The Palinode of Plato’s Phaedrus (243e8-257b6) and much of Plato’s Phaedo (in particular 106d-107a1) concern the immortality of the soul and the soul after death. In the Phaedo, Socrates describes how “when death comes to man, his mortal part as it seems, dies, while the immortal part, safe and imperishable, going away departs, withdrawing from death,” (Phaedo, 106e4-6). In the Phaedrus, Socrates describes the immortality and flight of the soul in great detail. He gives an argument for the immortality of the soul, and then describes how the soul “best following [their] god and representing his image raises the head of the charioteer to the place outside and is carried about in revolution…hardly looking down on the realities,” while others fight amongst themselves for admittance (Phaedrus, 248a1-5). In the strange and beautiful ritual by which souls ascend to the heavens, they are the souls of “the honest philosophers and lovers equipped with philosophy” which become winged in the three-thousandth year and go away,” (Phaedrus 249a1-5). Here is the flight of the philosopher, described so mystically by Plato, which may well have inspired Cicero’s own conception of the soul’s ascent to the heavens and his own idea of the philosopher’s flight.22

In book 1 of the Tusculanae Disputationes, Cicero sets forth a contempt of death: that explicit contempt of death is really a contempt of living and an embrace of the more sublime immortality of the soul which encourages the living of a virtuous life. This exhortation seems peculiar to Cicero; while hints may be given of such an idea in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, it seems fitting, given his purpose in the Tusculanae Disputationes, that Cicero tie in Roman virtue with the Greek concept of the immortality of the soul.23 This grants Cicero a legacy, and a place within the larger philosophical tradition of the philosopher’s flight. He has crafted his own philosopher’s flight through his emphasis on virtue and service to country, created a persona for himself within

21. See also 248a-e for more detail on what I describe outside the quotation.
22. See Section III above, and the reference to 1.43 of the Tusculan Disputations.
23. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle simultaneously exhorts man towards having care for his polis in Book I and holds up contemplation as man’s most divine quality and highest happiness in Book X. I interpret this seeming contradiction to combine into an idea which sees care for the polis as a quality of man necessary for living in the mortal world and contemplation as the highest, divine quality man has which he must embody as well. Thus Aristotle, in my view, urges man both towards the contemplative, divine life, while driving him to care for others outside of himself.
the philosophical tradition through his philosophical writing, and made himself the pioneer of a Roman philosophical flight—one which has contempt of death and physical and mental perturbations, and strives for immortality of the soul through virtue.

The figure of Regulus, as represented in *de Officiis*, epitomizes this flight for Cicero. Having been taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent as a prisoner to Rome, to barter for the return of some Carthaginian prisoners in exchange for him being allowed to remain in Rome and with his life. But his “greatness of soul and bravery forbade [this]”; he recused himself from giving his opinion in the senate, as he realized that it was far better for Rome as a whole that he, “already overtaken by old age,” lose his life, than the captive Carthaginians, “youths and good leaders,” be returned alive to their native land to fight another day against the Romans (Cicero, *de Officiis*, 3.99-100). Such an example demonstrates the immortality won by a selfless act such as Regulus’: his name lives far beyond his life, and this, perhaps, represents or complements the idea of the immortality of the soul that appears in Cicero’s account.

Useful parallels to Cicero’s account in the *Tusculanae Disputationes* are provided by The *Dream of Scipio*, sections 9-29 of the sixth book of Cicero’s fragmentary *de Re Publica*. It too romanizes the Greek philosophy of the immortal soul, drawing particularly Plato’s *Phaedrus* and the ritual through which the souls, good and bad, ascend to heaven. Cicero’s Africanus narrates: “Rise up and let it so be held, that you are not mortal, but this body [is]; for you are not that, which that form shows, but [rather] it is the mind of any man which is anyone, not that figure, which is able to be shown by a finger. Know that you are a God, if indeed there is a God, who thrives, who senses, who has remembered, who provides, who so rules and controls and moves that body, to which he is chief, as that ruling god holds this world.” (Cicero, *de Officiis*, 3.99-100). This language is striking, and as the close to Cicero’s work dictating the proper means of managing the Roman Republic, a sure testament to Cicero’s belief in the immortality of the soul as a guide for man.

Moreover, in the *Dream of Scipio*, Cicero intertwines the immortality of the soul and the most virtuous activities of man, pointing more insistently at a new Philosopher’s Flight that is Roman and based on virtue, particularly service to one’s country. “Exercise this [soul] in the greatest matters!” Africanus urges; for according to him, “the greatest cares regard the safety of the fatherland, by which matters the soul agitated and exercised more quickly will fly into this [heavenly] seat and its home,” (*De re Publica*, Book 6, Section 29). The importance of virtue to the immortality of the soul and the philosopher’s flight is

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24. See Sections 26-29 of *de Re Publica* Book 6, and *Phaedrus* 245c-253c, and the Palinode generally, from which the *Dream of Scipio* draws.

25. In the *Dream of Scipio*, Scipio Africanus, famed conquer of Carthage, appears in a dream to Scipio Aemillianus and sets forth exhortations of virtue, and this vision and conception of the soul.
driven home even further by what follows: “and this [the soul] will do more swiftly, if already then, when it is trapped in the body, it will emanate outside and those things, which will be outside, [and] contemplating as much as possible it will detach itself from the body.” Here, Cicero expands his doctrine in book 1 of the *Tusculan Disputations* and explicitly exhorts humanity to contemplate higher goods, and to exit the body and ascend, pure soul, to the sky, as quickly as possible. This account rounds out Cicero’s idea of the philosopher’s flight as one based on virtue, particularly in service to country, and as a goal to be striven for by the best of men.

**Conclusion: Philosophy and the Philosopher’s Flight as Cicero’s Consolation in Grief**

Cicero’s philosophical work at the end of his life, manifest particularly in the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, constitutes a consolation for his own grief—at the loss of his daughter, Tullia, and at his fall from political power—and is a testimonial to his own philosopher’s flight. He romanizes the old tradition of the immortality of the soul and its ascendance to heaven by providing his own account of the contempt of earthly sorrows and the immortality of the soul, and by extolling virtue and service to country as essential attributes of him whose soul most easily ascends to heaven. In so doing, he ensures his own immortality, inscribing himself into the philosophical tradition of immortality of the soul and the philosopher’s flight as, in his *Tusculanae Disputationes*, he lays out the path towards immortality.

Cicero’s unique philosopher’s flight immortalizes not only the great man himself, but more importantly, Roman values of virtue, honor, self-sacrifice, and service to country. But on a more personal and intimate level, its significance as a consolation of grief cannot be denied. At the work’s end, Cicero is “not able easily to say how much [he] will be a help to others,” but knows that there is “no other [cure]” than philosophy “able to lighten the most bitter sorrows and various and beleaguer ing burdens coming from all around,” (*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.121). That Cicero ends the *Tusculanae Disputationes* with this acknowledgement of his great pain speaks powerfully to the grief that informs his writing and may lead him to yearn for an end to life, and the promise of the soul’s immortality and the release it provides. His consolation is his own philosopher’s flight, that will at last allow his soul the release he seems ever patiently, yet so ardently, to desire.
References


Empathy Both Ways: The Use of Nature in Saigyo’s Poetry

JP Mayer

The poetry of Saigyo, as collected and translated by William LaFleur in *Awesome Nightfall*, is largely characterized by images of nature paired with descriptions of Saigyo’s own solitude. While a sense of melancholy does permeate the collection, there nevertheless remains a recurring sense of hope as well, for Saigyo, living in seclusion from the capital and society, repeatedly attempts to come to terms with his loneliness by seeking companionship in nature rather than humanity. This search for companionship in nature is highlighted by Saigyo’s references to and personification of natural images such as the moon and cherry blossoms, and it is further highlighted by his repeated use of the word *aware* (expressed roughly in English as the feeling one has upon perceiving something both beautiful and transient). As will be discussed below, Saigyo occasionally expresses a sort of double-*aware*—namely that which he feels for nature, and that which nature feels for him in turn. Ultimately, however, Saigyo fails to find in nature the same solace that he once had in society, and his poetry implies a man unable to fully come to terms with the abandonment of his worldly connections.

Saigyo wrote much of his work during a tumultuous time in Japan, and he himself had firsthand experience in the day-to-day atmosphere of the capital. Not only did Saigyo serve as a samurai under the Emperor Toba (and thus have an intimate knowledge of that particular violent lifestyle), but some scholars have speculated that his decision to take tonsure at the young age of twenty-three was the result of an affair with a woman of the court—perhaps even the future empress consort Taikenmon-in (LaFleur, *Awesome Nightfall*, 12-13). Additionally, Saigyo witnessed during his own lifetime some of the more violent and notorious turns in Japanese history. The Hogen Disturbance of 1156 and the war between the Taira and Minamoto families starting in 1180 were two such moments; the former set a dangerous precedent in Japan of using violence to attain power, and the latter built upon that precedent further still. As LaFleur writes, these violent turns in Japanese history no doubt contributed somewhat to Saigyo’s disillusionment with the capital and worldly affairs (LaFleur, 27, 45).
Ultimately, while the exact reasoning behind Saigyo’s decision to take tonsure is lost in history, the historical context of Saigyo’s poetry does provide some ideas as to why he might have decided to live in seclusion and seek the comfort of nature rather than that of humankind.

The earlier poems of Saigyo’s collection demonstrate clearly his efforts to seek solace and understanding in nature rather than humanity, and poem 105, concerning an “ancient cherry tree,” is a fine example:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{wakite min} & \quad \text{I must strain to see} \\
\text{oigi wa hana mo} & \quad \text{the few buds this old tree} \\
\text{aware nari} & \quad \text{labored to open;} \\
\text{ima ikutabi ka} & \quad \text{in pathos we’re one, and I wonder} \\
\text{haru ni aubeki} & \quad \text{how many more springs we’ll meet here.}
\end{align*}
\]

(Saigyo, 79)

Saigyo personifies the cherry tree with the image of it laboring to open each one of its blossoms, and he does the same when he thinks about meeting the cherry tree again, as if it were another person. Yet he takes this personification further: he attempts to find solace and understanding in the tree. The tree’s labor to open its blossoms is matched by the “strain” that Saigyo must endure in order to look for them. The two reflect one another, and Saigyo underscores this point dramatically when he declares that “in pathos we’re one”—“pathos” being LaFleur’s rendering of \\textit{aware}. Saigyo thus implies that his relationship with the cherry tree is more than one of coincidental similarity, but rather it is one of real, mutual understanding. He and the cherry tree both recognize the beauty in one another, as well of the transient nature of one another’s time on earth.

This mutual-	extit{aware}, however, is perhaps best exemplified in Saigyo’s poetry through his depictions of the moon. In poem 383, for example, Saigyo first demonstrates that the moon is capable of \\textit{aware}—more than that, he argues that the moon is capable of inspiring \\textit{aware} in others: “sympathy,” he writes, “lent this field by shafts / of the moon’s light on it” (Saigyo, 85). The mere touch of the moon’s light inspires “sympathy” (LaFleur’s rendering of \\textit{aware}) and understanding. That is not to say, however, that the moon is not itself capable of \\textit{aware}, for Saigyo implies as much in poem 457, concerning a nighttime pilgrimage:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{moro tomo ni} & \quad \text{We would go together} \\
\text{tabi naru sora ni} & \quad \text{make the journey, I on land} \\
\text{tsuki idete} & \quad \text{and it in the sky,} \\
\text{sumebaya kage no} & \quad \text{if the moon comes out to stay:} \\
\text{aware naran} & \quad \text{empathy both ways}
\end{align*}
\]

(Saigyo, 90)
As in his earlier poem concerning the cherry tree, the moon is personified heavily in this poem above. Here, however, the moon is characterized not so much as someone met in passing, but as an intimate companion of Saigyo—one with whom he is accustomed to travel. Moreover, that idea of togetherness with the moon, which is introduced in the very first line, reaches a climax in the poem’s conclusion as Saigyo revisits his theme of twofold aware, this time applying it both to himself and to the moon. There is a clear and intimate bond between them, he writes—an “empathy both ways.”

Indeed, Saigyo characterizes the moon throughout his collection in much the same manner as he does above, fashioning it as an intimate companion. One might even go so far as to say that Saigyo characterizes the moon as a lover—as a replacement for someone he once knew and cared for, but who he left behind in the capital after taking tonsure. Poem 610, for instance, finds Saigyo cold and “alone… needing / some companion somehow” (Saigyo, 96). Ultimately, the moon gives Saigyo the comfort and solace that he needs: “the cold, biting rains pass off / and give me the winter moon” (Saigyo, 96). The moon takes a more personified, more intimate appearance still in other poems such as 456, in which Saigyo writes, “I spend the night / in bed with the moon’s / light that slips in through / the gaps in my reed hut’s roof” (Saigyo, 89). Saigyo thus underscores his attempts to replace all aspects of his past life with companionship found in nature, implying that even such an intimate feeling as romantic love for another human being can be replaced by nature.

Ultimately, however, Saigyo’s attempts to seek solace in nature fall short of the connections that he felt for people in his past life in the capital—or, at the very least, his attempts to find solace in nature fail in the same ways as his connections to other people in the past. Poem 468, for instance, sets the stage well. In it, Saigyo writes that “Lovers’ rendezvous / slowly ends with many vows / to let nothing come / between them… then, as he moves off, / rising mists hide him from her” (Saigyo, 92). Not only does this poem imply that Saigyo once experienced such a “lovers’ rendezvous” in his past life (and likewise broke such promises as he describes in the poem when he left the capital), but it also foreshadows his failure to find that same solace—to experience that desired romantic love—while living in seclusion from the rest of the world. This failure of connection is best exemplified in poem 702:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>onokage ni</th>
<th>In the portrait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kimi ga sugata o</td>
<td>emerging on the moon I spied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitsuru yori</td>
<td>your face... so clearly,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niwaka nit suki no</td>
<td>he cause of tears, which then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kumorinuru kana</td>
<td>quickly cast the moon in clouds again.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Saigyo, 100)

Saigyo’s regret—his struggle to come to terms with his abandonment of his past life and past lover, is put on clear display in this poem. His longing for this
unnamed past love superimposes itself over the moon, his new companion in his new life. And just as the “rising mists” of poem 468 cut between the two lovers that Saigyo describes, so too do “clouds” now hide away the moon, the companion with whom Saigyo hoped to replace his past love, as he thinks about his life in the capital (Saigyo, 92, 100). Saigyo’s inner turmoil and regrets—his failure to come to terms with his past life—thus prevent him from obtaining the solace and comfort that he seeks in nature.

In the end, Saigyo’s poetry reveals his inner turmoil but offers no clear solution to the path forward. On the one hand, Saigyo recognizes the pain caused by his worldly connections, admitting in poem 1854 that he sees his “longing as pain” (Saigyo, 138). But on the other hand, Saigyo continues to search for connections in nature similar to those which he had in the capital—he continues in his longing nevertheless—and when those connections fall apart, he laments his solitude, as in poem 2170: “Here in these mountains / I’d like one other who turned / his back to the world” (Saigyo, 150). Saigyo’s, ultimately, remains a melancholy collection of poetry, a sad reflection on the limits of humankind and Buddhist practice in, as LaFleur translates it, the “age of the final dharma”—mappo, wherein enlightenment is considered near impossible (LaFleur, 56). Saigyo’s poetry and the contradictions of his human nature thus stand as a testament to the dispirited time in which he finds himself.

References:

The Presence of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* in the Conversions of Augustine's *Confessions*

Kelly Clark

Augustine's *Confessions* follow his transformation from fallen to saved, and he uses diction from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* when discussing both his own story and the stories of other figures in his life. In book 8, Augustine alludes to the *Metamorphoses* when discussing Victorinus' conversion and his own conversion, which are linked together by their proximity within the *Confessions* and by Augustine's wish to follow the same path as Victorinus. By using Ovid's diction at these moments, Augustine builds the narrative of book 8 with detailed attention to how he is changed and saved by his conversion in a way that would not be possible without God.

In *Metamorphoses* 5.572-641, Ovid tells, through Arethusa's voice, the story of her transformation into water. She says that she is "fortis" but known for being "formae" and thus called only "formosae" (Ovid 2015). She is ashamed of this physical gift and thinks that it is a crime to be pleasing: "ego rustica dote/corporis erubui crimenque placere putavi" (Ovid 2015). She tells of bathing in a stream that she does not know is the river god Alpheus and running away when he pursues her. She asks Diana for help, and the goddess turns her into a mist. She is afraid as Alpheus circles, comparing herself to a lamb surrounded by howling wolves: "anne quod agnae est, si qua lupos audit circum stabula alta frementes" (Ovid 2015). In this state of fear, she sweats and becomes a stream, but he recognizes her and transforms himself into water to mix with her. Diana, however, allows Arethusa to escape by splitting the earth so that she can go below and emerge elsewhere, still as water.

Augustine uses Ovid's diction in *Confessions* 8.2.4. In this passage, Simplicianus recounts the story of Victorinus to Augustine. He tells Augustine that Victorinus is a well-known orator in Rome, who found fame and made powerful friends through his skills. Victorinus reads scripture, but he will not enter a church, since he is afraid of offending his pagan friends. When he reads more, however, he fears that Christ will reject him and deny him entry into heaven. He becomes ashamed at his sins, his unwillingness to acknowledge the sacraments, and the pride that fueled his acceptance of pagan religious practices: "sibi magni crimini apparuit erubescendo de sacramentis humilitatis verbi tui et non erubescendo de sacris sacrilegis superborum daemoniorum, que imitator superbus acceperat" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). He tells Simplicianus that he will publicly convert, and he is baptized soon after.
The first connection to Arethusa’s story that Augustine draws is the association of shame with how one is perceived by others. In the *Metamorphoses*, "erubui crimenque" (Ovid 2015) appears where Arethusa explains that she was ashamed of her beauty and thought it a crime even though others would be proud of it. In the *Confessions*, Augustine writes "criminis apparuit erubescendo" (Augustinus and O’Donnell 1992) when recounting Victorinus' realization that he was ashamed of being a Christian. In using Ovid's diction, Augustine clarifies the source of Victorinus' shame: he does not want to be seen as a Christian, just as Arethusa does not seek praise for her appearance and values her courage more, yet it follows her anyway: "quamvis formae numquam mihi fama petita est, quamvis fortis eram, formosae nomen habebam" (Ovid 2015). Arethusa is ashamed to be known only for her beauty; similarly, Victorinus would be ashamed not of going into a church, but of being seen in a church and becoming known only for that, rather than his oratory skills and popularity.

Opposite shame, there is pride. Victorinus was led by his pride to follow pagan practices, unwilling to go against his pagan supporters: "non erubescendo de sacris sacrilegis superborum daemoniorum, quae imitator superbus acceperat" (Augustinus and O’Donnell 1992). Arethusa, however, does not have such earthly pride; though others would be glad to have her beauty, "quaque aliae gaudere," she is ashamed, "erubui" (Ovid 2015). Because of her lack of pride, Arethusa can be saved; she has no reason to be denied her request for Diana's protection. Likewise, when Victorinus sees and corrects his pride, he is able to enter into a church and be baptized, so he can be saved by God.

The other duality that Augustine brings into his story by alluding to Ovid is fear and courage. The one descriptor that Arethusa provides for herself other than “beautiful” (the descriptor she does not want) is "fortis" (Ovid 2015). When she hears Alpheus, however, she stops in fear, "territaque" (Ovid 2015). She compares herself to a dove pursued by eagles, a lamb by wolves, and a rabbit by dogs. Finally, as she is hidden and he comes close to her, she describes a cold sweat, "sudor... frigidus" (Ovid 2015). This is when her transformation into water occurs. As a character whose actions are driven by fear, Arethusa’s description of her own courage seems inconsistent with her story. However, there are two ways to reconcile this inconsistency. Ovid could be writing as if she is referring to her former self before this encounter, unafraid to bathe in the stream and unaware of what would happen to her. Alternatively, he could be writing of her courage not as a lack of fear, but as an ability to withstand fear and persevere through it.

This second concept of courage is relevant to Victorinus' story, as it is a more real and human way to portray courage. He fears the social consequences of conversion: "amicos enim suos reverebatur offendere." When he reads more, however, he is "firmitatem," and fears rejection by Christ, "timuitque negari a Christo" in a way that allows him to surpass his fears of social exclusion (Augustinus and O’Donnell 1992). The possibility of rejection by others does
not disappear when he reads more scripture. Many are angry at him: "superbi videbant et irascabantur" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). Instead of being distracted by their criticism, he is able to focus instead on his will to become a Christian, pushing past the fear that previously held him back from conversion. Thus, Victorinus' fear of God surpasses his fear of man, leading to his conversion; his courage is an ability to transcend earthly fear, an ability that comes from his firm decision to follow Christ.

By connecting Victorinus to Arethusa within his own autobiographical narrative, Augustine also connects himself to Arethusa in the idea of pursuit by sin, especially sin associated with corporality. Arethusa is followed by Alpheus as he seeks to control her body. Augustine is similarly followed throughout his pre-conversion life by sins associated with his body, whether literally, such as in the cases of eating the stolen pears and indulging his lust, or figuratively, such as the love for theater that he likens to an itch that becomes painful. Arethusa escapes pursuit by Alpheus through the intervention of Diana. Similarly, Augustine leaves behind his sinful life and transcends his physical existence when he turns to God. For both, the way to escape sins of the body is through an experience with incorporeality. For Arethusa, this comes in the form of her transformations into mist then water. For Augustine, the way to leave behind this sinfulness is through God, on whose lack of a physical form he often reflects.

The passages in the *Metamorphoses* and the *Confessions* are also connected through the symbol of water that brings salvation. After Victorinus decides to publicly become a Christian, he is baptized: "per baptismum regeneraretur" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). Arethusa's transformation into mist hides her, but when she changes into water, "in latices mutor" (Ovid 2015), she is able to escape through the earth. Just as Arethusa escapes Alpheus' sinfulness, Victorinus escapes sin through baptism, as does Augustine, since his own conversion story follows Victorinus'. The water of Arethusa's story, however, is pagan, and therefore not sacred in the same way as the water of baptism. The water itself comes from her fear, and she falls when she transforms, both literally, by falling into the darkness in the earth: "caecisque ego mersis cavernis" (Ovid 2015), and figuratively, by changing from divine nymph to a spring. In Augustine and Victorinus' baptisms, however, the water is sacred by association with God and therefore has the ability to lift them up out of their fallenness.

In *Metamorphoses* 6.103-145, Arachne weaves her image of the deceptions of the gods from myths, and Pallas reacts with anger. Arachne has gained fame as a skilful weaver, and she claims that she could beat even Pallas in a contest, so Pallas challenges her to one when she is unafraid and refuses to back down. Pallas depicts the majesty of gods alongside mortals whose demise was their hubris. Arachne depicts Leda, Danaé, Proserpina, and other mortal women who are deceived and violated by gods. Pallas is upset by Arachne's perfect work showing the crimes of the gods and tears the weaving: "doluit
successu flava virago/et rupit pictas, caelestia crimina, vestes" (Ovid 2015). She then strikes Arachne four times with her shuttle: "quater Idmoniae frontem percussit Arachnes" (Ovid 2015). This is unbearable for Arachne, so she hangs herself, and Pallas transforms her into a spider.

In Confessions 8.8.20, Augustine describes his conversion in the garden. Leading up to this scene, he realizes the shamefulness of the way he has been living, believing that learning can lead to an understanding of God, and that despite his education, he is still fallen. He sees that all he must do is truly will himself to accept God, and he is upset that he has thus far failed to do so. In his episode of intense emotional anguish, he describes being in control of his body and being able to move it as he wills it to: "si vulsi capillum, si percussi frontem, si consertis digitis amplexatus sum genu, quia volui, feci" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). He pulls at his hair, strikes his face, clasps his fingers together, and he holds onto his knees; he is able to do the things he wills himself to do. After this description, he reflects, asking God why he can will his body to do things but cannot will his mind to fully will anything.

Augustine uses Ovid's diction here in a way that connects him to Arachne through their shared sense of pride in their own greatness. Arachne's flaw is her hubris; she gains glory for her weaving and begins to think she is better than Pallas, saying that she would compete with the goddess: "certet... mecum" (Ovid 2015). Leading up to his conversion in the garden, Augustine realizes his pride in his studies. He writes that he said to Alypius, "surgunt indocti et caelum rapiunt, et nos cum doctrinis nostris sine corde, ecce ubi vultamur in carne et sanguine! an quia praecesserunt, pudet sequi et non pudet nec saltem sequi?" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). He realizes that his learning has not led to salvation, that many have found God without such scholarly pursuits, and that he may be prejudiced against following them because he has been considering himself superior. Arachne does not see her own pride until she is struck by Pallas; Augustine does realizes his own pride and falls into a crisis in which he strikes his own face.

Both Augustine and Arachne are also guilty of a sort of irreverent mimesis. Arachne weaves the "caelestia crimina" (Ovid 2015) of gods: Jupiter, Neptune, Phoebus, Bacchus, and Saturn. She depicts shameful acts perfectly. Augustine tries to use language to understand God; he reads scripture and writes his beliefs, but he cannot contain God in words. Arachne's misstep is excelling at doing something disrespectful to the gods: depicting the crimes of gods while competing with one. Augustine's mistake, however, is his failure to accept God as a mystery and his attempts to emulate God's perfection using fallen language and scholarship, "doctrinis nostris" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). Augustine can be redeemed from his sins because he has pious, Christian intentions and truly wants to understand God; Arachne, however, cannot be redeemed from her transgressions but can only become something less than human because her flaw is in her intentions, not her actions.
When Augustine uses Ovid's diction, his mindset reflects Arachne's: at the moment of the face being struck, both are facing the new, unbearable knowledge of their own mistakes. Ovid's "frontem percussit" precedes Arachne being unable to bear something, "non tulit infelix," but Ovid leaves ambiguity as to what she cannot bear: the physical striking by Pallas, or the knowledge of what she has done (Ovid 2015). Because she commits suicide as a result, it seems to be the thought of what she has done; she is struck more by awareness of her guilt than by the physical blows. Likewise, Augustine's "percussi frontem" is in the context of a passage where he wonders at the connection between his will and his body (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992). He is dwelling not on the pain of striking his face, but rather on the ability to use his will to control his body but not to control his will itself. The violence and aftermath of the striking of Arachne and Augustine's faces make clear that this moment reflects a painful knowledge of sinful decisions.

Striking the face is a violent act, but the source and target of this striking differs in the two passages. In the *Metamorphoses*, Pallas strikes Arachne, but in the *Confessions*, Augustine strikes himself. The figure of divinity, then, in Ovid's narrative, is susceptible to anger and human-like flaws just as the mortal character is, since Pallas is upset by Arachne's success: "doluit successu" (Ovid 2015). Conversely, in Augustine's story, he is the flawed character doing what he wishes, "volui, feci" (Augustinus and O'Donnell 1992), not God. Likewise, Arachne's weaving depicts the sins of other pagan gods, which contrasts with Augustine's God's perfection. Because Arachne is able to weave as well as Pallas, she has reached the same level as a goddess. This is impossible for Augustine; his God is perfect, and for God to be at the same level as a human would contradict everything about His existence. Augustine's allusion to Pallas striking Arachne, then, is his statement that the pagan gods are not perfect and infallible like his one true God is.

The moments containing this diction lead to transformations in both passages, but Arachne's transformation is negative, while Augustine's is positive. Arachne is driven to suicide by what she has done, and Pallas makes her into a spider out of pity and to punish her. Augustine, on the other hand, becomes a fully converted Christian. This is a commentary by Augustine about the divinities behind the changes. Because Pallas is pagan, she transforms Arachne in a punishing way: she is alive, but she is a spider, weaving a web forever. The Christian God, however, can transform Augustine into a better version of himself, one with faith, a greater understanding of God, and salvation. Thus, Augustine points out that the pagan gods cannot truly save their followers as the Christian God can.

In both of his uses of Ovid's diction in book 8 of the *Confessions*, Augustine explores conversion, the turning point of his life, as a transformation. In the stories of Arethusa and Victorinus, the transformation comes from shame, specifically that associated with the perceptions of others. For Arachne and Augustine, the transformation begins with a realization of a sinful pride.
Because the gods transforming Arethusa and Arachne are pagan, they are not truly saved, and they become trapped in a non-human form. Augustine's conversion is to the Christian God; the transformation of his conversion is full salvation, and he is not trapped in another form as the characters of the *Metamorphoses* are, but instead receives a way to someday be freed from the limitations of his human form by God in Heaven. Augustine uses moments from Ovid to illuminate the ways in which a true Christian conversion such as his own cannot occur in a pagan sphere, and he focuses especially on the sources and results of such a conversion.

**References**


Imperfect Representations of the Human Body in Hellenistic Greece, Republican Rome, and Medieval Germany

Kate Van Riper

An artistic representation of the body can be used as an artifact to trace the culture of origin’s priorities in regards to the human form. What characteristics are emphasized? Which body parts are exaggerated or minimized? When an artistic tradition emphasizes flaws of the human body, whether they be realistic or exaggerated, those flaws can contribute to the realism of the piece, add symbolic meaning to the piece, or stir emotions like pity, reverence, or disgust in the viewer. The Seated Boxer, Head of a Roman Patrician, and Röttgen Pietà are three works from disparate cultures: Hellenistic Greece, Republican Rome, and Medieval Germany. The bodies on display in each work contain flaws, whether those be scars, wrinkles, or open wounds. Each work uses marked imperfections in their portrayals of the human figure in order to emotionally engage with the viewer in some way. However, each work widely differs in audience and context, and so the intents of this engagement differ as well, perhaps most starkly for the Röttgen Pietà since it operates as an object for Christian devotion while the other works come from pre-Christian antiquity.

To understand the significance of imperfection in art about the body, it is helpful to review the history of bodily perfection in art. Many artistic traditions have constructed strict, canonical standards for the depiction of the human body. In Ancient Egyptian art, humans were drawn according to a metrical grid system (Legon). Even when Egyptian drawings of humans include details like a more complex hand gesture or position, their bodies are still mapped out according to a gridded design. Egyptian sculptures of pharaohs and royalty were generally serene in their expressions and unrealistically smooth and perfect in their bodies. However, statues of lower class Egyptians like the Seated Scribe did include deviations from flawlessness in the form of more lifelike details such as body fat and an individualized facial expression. In Archaic Greece, statues universally bore an “archaic smile,” or a small, almost resigned-
looking smile that may have symbolized well-being or health. Archaic Greek sculptures sometimes appear awkward to modern viewers because of their stiff positions and constantly tranquil expression, but they lack any intentional imperfections. Classical Greece provides perhaps the most well-known example of a rigid standard for bodies in art. Young, male bodies were considered the height of perfection, and in sculptures like the Doryphoros, they were designed according to mathematical standards laid out by sculptor Polykleitos in his book Canon. Though Classical Greek sculpture was naturalistic in many ways and often included the dynamic contrapposto position, its goal was to portray the human form in its peak glory. Along with perfection also came restraint; the phalli of Greek male sculptures are minimized in order to symbolize control over one’s desires.

The Seated Boxer (Fig. 1), from the Hellenistic period of Greek art, deviates from the standards of Polykleitos’ Canon, demonstrating the Hellenistic shift away from bodily perfection. The work also uses the boxer’s injuries to signify his humility and elicit a sympathetic connection with the viewer. In Hellenistic Greece, art flourished as wealthy families often commissioned copies of Classical Greek statues or original bronze statues like the Boxer (“Art of Hellenistic Greece…”). Roman art collectors also sought Greek art at the time, and many Hellenistic artists worked in Rome (“Art of Hellenistic Greece…”). The intended audience of the Seated Boxer is unknown, but it is likely that it was
commissioned by an art collector. Hellenistic sculpture was heavily influenced by earlier Greek sculpture and included portrayals of the same gods, but it also expanded the subjects of sculpture to include everyday people in all stages of life—childhood, middle age, and old age were represented instead of only perpetual youth. The Seated Boxer’s chiseled muscles do suggest the standard for an athletic, perfectly proportioned male body. However, the boxer is not in a position of composed victory, but rather sitting to rest after a tiring match. He is not triumphant, but not completely defeated either. Though Hellenistic sculpture includes more portrayals of people in vulnerable positions, it would be unlikely that the sculptor would choose a completely defeated man as his subject. His body is covered with reminders of his profession; his only clothing consists of leather boxing gloves and he bears scars and injuries from his career. Copper is used over the bronze sculpture to add injuries to his form. He has scars, bruises, and cuts on his face, and he exhibits both a broken nose and an condition common to boxers known as “cauliflower ear” for its disturbing shape. This man is not a young boy like the Doryphoros either. He wears signs of his years boxing all over him. The statue feels immediate, caught in a particular moment instead of representing an ideal. The drops of blood, also inlaid copper, that have fallen onto his thigh and arm (Hemingway) accentuate the active nature of the statue; he seems to be reeling from a particularly grueling fight. He is also breathing through his mouth, making him appear winded. Perhaps most striking about the Seated Boxer is his gaze upwards, as if in conversation with the viewer. The boxer feels undeniably human, and so his injuries combined with his almost mournful expression elicit sympathy in the viewer.

In contrast to the imploring Seated Boxer, the Head of a Roman Patrician (Fig. 2)'s imperfections are used as political and familial tools to establish the patrician’s importance. The Head of a Roman Patrician exemplifies the style of veristic portraiture, which originated in
Republican Rome. Instead of idealizing youth like Classical Greece, veristic portraiture portrayed old age as an advantage for patrician men. Public officials highly valued public service and military ability, and they saw wrinkles and spots as signs of commitment to the public. Busts like this one would be displayed prominently in the family home of the patrician. His bust would remain there for generations after his death in order to remind the current descendants of their venerable ancestors. The style of the portraits was also based off of traditional Roman *imagines*, or death masks of a family’s ancestors (Becker). These masks were molded to resemble the deceased and would be taken out at family funerals for a parade of one’s ancestors (Becker). For politicians that did not have a patrician lineage, they used veristic portraiture to appear as if they came from an established family. Veristic portraits depict the subject as possessing *gravitas*, a deep seriousness that was seen as essential to the Roman character. In the Head of a Roman Patrician, wrinkles are carved deeply into the skin, creating shadows that further amplify their appearance. His skin is sunken, and he appears weary—but weary from his great personal sacrifice to grave public affairs, not from physical exertion like the Seated Boxer. There is no aspiration towards beauty or perfection in this bust, as those would signify a too-untroubled leader and an unworthy ancestral background. However, this standard completely shifts throughout Roman history; later,

Fig. 3: Röttgen Pietà (Ross)
portraits of Roman emperors adopted classical techniques to idealize their bodies while utilizing the individualization of veristic portraiture to make their faces recognizable (“Roman Portrait Sculpture…”). Also unlike the Seated Boxer, the Patrician’s faults do not cause him to appear humble or approachable, but rather they ratify his stature in society. However, the imperfections of both the Boxer and the Patrician serve as “battle scars” of a sort—the Boxer’s injuries are literal reminders of his recent fight, while the creases of the Patrician’s skin symbolize the trials and concerns of life as a public servant.

About 14 centuries separate the Boxer and Patrician from the Röttgen Pietà (Fig. 3), a Christian wood carving from late medieval Germany. Medieval standards for depicting the body in art were far less concerned with exact proportions and anatomical musculature than Classical and (for the most part) Hellenistic Greek art. It should also be noted that religion was central to 14th century Germany, while in the Hellenistic and Republican Roman periods, religious figures were becoming more and more secularized (“Art of Hellenistic Greece…”). Especially in religious art, the “message” of the subjects, whether they be saints or the Madonna or disciples, often takes precedence over accurate depictions of their bodies or making their bodies appear as beautiful as possible.

In an extreme example of bodily imperfection, the Röttgen Pietà’s Jesus is portrayed as overly emaciated and bloodied in order to inspire sympathy, devotion to Christ, and prayer in the viewer. A pietà, meaning “pity” or “mercy” in Italian, depicts the dead Christ after coming down from the cross, usually along with a grieving Mary. In some pietàs, Mary appears serene and accepting of her son’s fate because she has received the knowledge at his birth that he will be resurrected. But in the Röttgen Pietà, Mary’s face conveys desolation and almost resignation. The portrayal of Christ certainly justifies this reaction. He is about as far from the healthy, muscled, mathematically allotted Doryphoros as possible. Christ is extremely emaciated, and his head is too large for his body. Rivulets of blood flow down his forearms, and carved blood spurts from a wound in his side, making him look truly gutted. The Boxer’s injuries elicit some pity from the viewer; this Christ elicits overwhelming sympathy combined with some revulsion at the grotesque nature of his wounds. That visceral response is evoked by the artist of this piece to provoke prayer in the viewer (Ross). When a pious viewer feels the pain of Christ, their prayer might be more focused or genuine. Christ’s deformed body is a graphic reminder of his ultimate sacrifice, and that reminder serves to cultivate the viewer’s personal relationship with God.
Out of these three embodiments of deliberate bodily flaws in depictions of the body, the Seated Boxer is perhaps the most realistic and literal of the three, since the Boxer’s injuries are relatively true to life. The Head of a Roman Patrician and Röttgen Pietà each exaggerate aspects of the human body; the Patrician does so in order to assert personal gravitas and inspire respect for one’s ancestors, while the Pietà aims to inspire deep compassion for Christ and piety. Portraying the human body in art yields the power of accessing almost instinctive reactions in the viewer; The Seated Boxer’s upward glance feels distinctly personal, the Patrician’s gaze instantly commands respect, and the Pietà’s mutilated Christ induces a sort of secondhand physical distress. Depicting the human body inherently appeals to the viewer’s basest impulse to recognize another human. Mutilation of that body, consequently, deeply appeals to the viewer’s basest impulse of compassion.

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Rays of Light over the Pantheon. Original photograph by Rachel Sklar. Used by Permission
For the Sake of Myself a God

Annabelle Hutchinson

Prometheus, Prometheus, why now go down to man?
He’s weakly and he’s thankless, brother, what now is your plan?
Tell us, what about this earth does captivate you so?
Tell us, brother Titan, why you bow yourself so low?

Titans, hear me loudly, man is more than what you see.
He’s weakly, yes, he’s thankless, but the men alone are free.
If captured must I be to curry favor with mankind,
Then let them praise a prisoner — you cannot chain a mind.

Titans, I will warn you that these men are greater yet
Than any creature in the spheres — met or yet unmet.
Brothers, I have seen the very nature of our kind.
We live, we move, but we exist inside the human mind.

The gods and we, the lords of all, survive at their behest.
We are the word of men, I tell you, creatures you detest
We’re speeches writ on pages and we pages can be burnt.
Stones are weathered, ink is washed, and we will be unlearnt

Prometheus, Prometheus, we’re older than the men!
We’ve lived for long before them and we’ll outlive them again.
Look at all our works, dear brother, see what we can see.
With a stroke, we Titans could reduce them to debris.

Titans, this is knowledge that I know and can’t unknow.
They speak us into being — what they say is what we show.
They are the way that we will live, and for this I would bleed,
We must win their approval and perform some righteous deed.

Prometheus, you mock us now, on this we won’t be moved.
We will not bow to mortals for some thesis you’ve unproved.
Leave this council now, at once, and sing of man no more.
Or would you suffer torment for these mortals you adore?

He does not have to thank me, Titans, only know my name,
And I will spring eternal, I, the word immune to flame.
He does not have that fire yet, but mark my words he will,
And when he tastes of power, he will taste of power’s thrill.

I don’t move so for humans, Titans; man is ever-flawed.
I speak this for the sake of me, myself a Titan god.
But hear me, Titans, know that when the humans hold the rod,
   I’ll still have reason to lament what man has made of god
The *palla*, a type of mantle worn by wealthy Roman women, is so central to Plautus’ *Menaechmi* that it could have been named *Fabula Pallae*. Confusing are the identities of the eponymous Menaechmi twins, who has and who thinks who has the *palla* is equally confusing and significant. The *palla* is important not because Plautus mentions it 42 times but because it is essential to expressing Plautus’ vision of the play and of the world. The *palla* makes conflicts darkly comedic rather than devastating and more narrowly materialistic and sexist than otherwise, and were the *palla*, say, a slave like Briseis instead, the character of the play would be altogether different. The *palla*’s role is the focal point of *Menaechmi*, and through its qualities and connotations, the *palla* grounds the play in Plautus’ view of people as greedy, vindictive, and deceitful in life’s everyday challenges.

The *palla* is central to almost every conflict in the play, whether arising from its theft, desire for it, or its symbolism to various characters. Menaechmus I first steals the *palla* from Matrona as payment for Erotium. Menaechmus II takes it from her ostensibly to take it to the tailor, and Menaechmus I demands it from the baffled Erotium after Matrona finds it missing. Eventually, the Menaechmi reunite, and the *palla* can return to Matrona. The *palla* complicates Matrona’s and Menaechmus’ tense relationship when Peniculus promises:

\[
Pallam ad phrygionem cum corona, ebrius ferebat, hodie tibi quam surrupuit domo.
\]

Drunk and wearing a garland, he was bearing the *palla* to the embroiderer. (*Menaechmi*, lines 563-564)

Matrona responds:

\[
sed pallam non fert.
\]

But he’s not carrying the *palla*! (*Menaechmi*, line 568)

Peniculus adds this vivid and inaccurate description of Menaechmus to the truthful accusation of theft, driving the couple further apart. In the couple’s confrontation, Menaechmus I brazenly asks:
Quis eam surrupuit… Quis is homo est?

Who stole it (the palla)?... Which man is it? (Menaechmi, lines 649-650)

This takes unwitting advantage of Menaechmus II’s removal of the evidence. Moreover, the palla is more than an expensive object to Matrona because in a way it represents her marriage. Supposedly smelling of her, its disappearance marks a crisis in Matrona’s marriage and Menaechmus I’s dismissive attitude towards her. The fighting over the palla is a proxy fight for more important struggles over marriage and wealth.

*Menaechmus* is so funny because these grander wars are fought by means of battles over such an insignificant and sordid object as a piece of unadorned cloth used to pay a prostitute. The characters’ overblown reactions to its theft clash with the value of the disputed object, and this dissonant attitude allows Plautus’ sense of farce to shine throughout the scenario. The least sympathetic characters, Menaechmus I and Peniculus, most elevate this discrepancy. Menaechmus celebrates his theft by declaring:

Hoc facinus pulchrum est, hoc probum est, hoc lepidum est, hoc factum st fabre.

This deed is beauteous, it is virtuous, it is elegant, it has been done ingeniously. (Menaechmi, line 132)

And Peniculus later chimes in with:

Meo quidem animo ab <H>ippolyta subcingulam Hercules haud aequae magno abstulit periculo.

Indeed, in my opinion, Hercules did not steal the under-girdle from Hippolyta with danger equally great. (Menaechmi, lines 200-201)

In a great epic like the *Odyssey*, the protagonists fight over *time* and the spoils of war, in that case Briseis, but in *Menaechmus*, they quarrel over textiles yet imagine they are dashing heroes.

Through the *palla*, conflict erupts over material wealth, sex, and revenge and waged through the deception, theft, and threat Plautus made essential to his artistic vision. In keeping with the play’s emphasis on deception, the *palla* is a malleable object so that, when emboidered:

eadem ignorabitur, ne uxor cognoscat te habere, si in via conspexerit.
It will be unrecognizable as the same so that my wife will not recognize that you have it if she notices you on the street. (Menaechmi, lines 428-429)

Having stolen it in a fit of pique at Matrona, Menaechmus I makes the *palla* an object of particular mendacity in his confrontation with his wife, asking:

MEN. *Quid negotist?* MAT. Pallam – MEN. Pallam? MAT. *Quidam pallam.*

MEN. What’s it to me? MAT. A *palla…* MEN. A *palla?* MAT. A certain *palla* (Menaechmi, line 609).

Menaechmus II’s greed for the *palla* is likewise tied up in the various misdeeds that fill the play:

*Prandi perbene, potavi atque accubui scortum; pallam et aurum hoc <apstuli>.*

I ate very well, I drank and I lay with a prostitute; I stole the *palla* and this gold (Menaechmi, lines 1141-1142).

The *palla* forms the focus around which the players reveal their vices and Plautus reveals his cynical attitude. The materiality of the *palla* demonstrates how petty are the financial disputes in which the characters engage, while its role as payment for a prostitute indicates that the Menaechmi hold similarly petty and combative attitudes with regard to sex. The *palla*’s function is to embody the small-minded corruption upon which *Menaechmi* depends through its low value, deceitful potential, and stench.

The specific nature of the *palla* unintentionally reflects another aspect of Republican, or at the least Plautine, society, the sexual nature of this mad competition of greed. The *palla* is a necessarily feminine object, one worn by women only and an object closely associated with Matrona in *Menaechmi*. Furthermore, being the payment Menaechmus I steals from his wife and gives to a prostitute. The garment presumably smells of its owner Matrona, but when Menaechmus I addresses Peniculus, and Peniculus cruelly responds:

*MEN. Quid igitur? Quid olet? Responde, PEN. furtum, scortum, prandium.*

*MEN. What then? Of what does it smell? Answer. PEN. A theft, a prostitute, and a meal (Menaechmi, lines 169-170).*

Nevertheless, Menaechmus I’s flagrant dismissal of sexual morality does not go unremarked, for Matrona chides him:
Equidem ecaster tuam nec chlamydem do foras nec pullium cuiquam utendum. Mulierem aequom est vestimentum muliebre dare foras, virum virile.

Indeed, by Castor, I do not give your cloak away for anyone to use. It is right that a woman give away women’s clothing, that a man give away men’s (Menaechmi, lines 658-660).

The sexual aspects of the *palla* provide an opportunity for some Plautine ribaldry but also serve as a symbol of Menaechmus I’s attempted trade of Matrona for Erotium and the treatment he bestows on his wife, whom he cherishes as much as the *palla*. The garment’s function of calling attention to the nature of corruption in Plautus’ imagination extends to exposing the commodified sexual vice so central to *Menaechmi*.

Plautus’ vision in *Menaechmi* is that self-interested, dishonest, ignorant people exploit each other for money, sex, and revenge. As extravagant as the scenario is, the *palla* is a constant reminder that the play’s events are humorous because they are rooted in the most mundane of human disputes. Through this banality, Plautus makes the characters typical: Matrona as the nagging wife, Peniculus as the parasite, Menaechmus I as the philandering husband, Messenio as the loyal slave. Menaechmus I points out their adherence to type when he believes that Erotium has conned him:

Condigne autem haec meretrix fecit, ut mos est meretricius.

This prostitute has acted very worthily, just as is the custom of prostitutes (*Menaechmi*, line 906).

Despite the grim view Plautus seems to hold about people, just as Menaechmus I:

gaudeo edepol siquid propter me tibi euenit boni,

I celebrate, by Pollux, if it turned out well for you in any way because of me (*Menaechmi*, line 1143).

The characters seem to have sorted out their errors by the end of the play with no one too much the worse off.
References

The Byzantine Hippodrome and Circus Factions: The Political Power of Constantinople’s Sporting Culture

Thomas Wilson

Introduction

Modern-day cities are hubs for vibrant political and sporting cultures. Across the globe, cities house sports clubs that draw tens of thousands of people in single arenas to support local teams. Similarly, democratic cities often have forums and town-hall events that allow for accessible civic participation. While there are rarely large political revolutions taking place during sports matches, this experience is certainly relevant today; U.S. President Donald Trump is often booed or cheered on by spectators at sporting events that he attends (Markowitz). For example, in 2019, President Trump was met by a wave of boos at a World Series game in Washington, DC – the opposite was seen at a college football game in Alabama (Markowitz). This is a definitive historical parallel to the methods that Byzantine citizens used to express their discontentment with their rulers, although modern political expression is not most powerful in sports arenas, as it was in Constantinople.

The Byzantine city of Constantinople is a particularly useful example for understanding these modern-ideas. As the capital city of the Eastern Roman Empire, better known as the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople was a center of the medieval world. Low estimates place the city’s population peak at over 500,000 during late antiquity – this made it the largest city in the Mediterranean at this point in time (Harris 13). This population rivaled the earlier peak of Rome, which was the model city for Constantinople and, by extension, the Byzantine Empire. Because medieval Constantinople served as the capital for an entire empire, it was an important political space that is useful for us to draw comparisons to today. Demonstrations that occurred in the city of Constantinople were often representative of demonstrations that occurred across the empire. Simply, Constantinople provides us with a prominent, populous city filled with applicable athletic-political intersections to examine.

On the surface, medieval Constantinople had a strong sporting culture, but it lacked an accessible political realm. Jonathan Harris noted that for the citizens in Constantinople, “there was no established mechanism for them to
have any say in government and politics” (Harris 119). This statement is misleading; though it was not a traditional source of power, the Hippodrome, the hub of the Byzantine capital’s sporting world, was the real established mechanism for the people to have a say. Here, the political powers of Constantinopolitans were constantly on display. There, emperors heard public grievances; it was where the city crowned new emperors and executed old ones. The sporting culture of Constantinople gave common citizens a stage in the form of the Hippodrome, and it gave them a voice in the form of groups known as the Blues and the Greens (Harris 31). While these two organizations originally started as racing teams, they later became much stronger political, or circus, factions.¹ Through an examination of the sporting culture of Constantinople from Constantine’s expansion of the Hippodrome in the fourth century until Justinian’s dismantling of this system in the sixth-century, with a decussation of parallels that arose through the twelfth century, this paper will demonstrate that both the Hippodrome itself and the sports-affiliated factions that rose from within it were a popular outlet in medieval Constantinople for political expression for both the ruled and the rulers, though it often proved ineffective for the former.

Hippodrome Background

In order to best understand the impact of the sporting community on medieval Constantinople, the history and context of the Hippodrome must first be examined. In its simplest form, the Hippodrome was a 1500-foot-long stadium built for chariot racing (Crawford 209). As Constantine shaped his new eponymous city, it was clear that he wanted it to emulate the power of Rome. According to Hesychios Illoustrios, a chronicler from the age of Justinian, when Constantine “wanted to build the Hippodrome, imitating that of Rome, he found the Hippodrome of Severus and finished it” (Berger 37). Construction on that earlier version of the Hippodrome began in 200 A.D. under the Emperor Septimius Severus, but Constantine made plans to build it to its full glory. The Hippodrome would now include a place for him to display his imperial power in the kathisma, or emperor’s box, which overlooked the entire crowd of the arena. At its completion in the fourth century, the Hippodrome had twelve gates on its northeastern side that allowed for 100,000 spectators to enter (Harris 13). This essentially meant that even when the city’s population peaked around 500,000 during late antiquity, nearly a fifth of all Constantinopolitans could be in the same place at the same time (Harris 13). Constantine clearly undertook a

¹. These groups were called “circus factions” because of their association with the events of the Hippodrome, often called the “circus.”
concerted effort to build a place that would entertain the entirety of Constantinople – the Hippodrome served this purpose well.

The Hippodrome housed a variety of events, but few were as important to the identity of Constantinople as chariot racing. Whenever the birthday of the city was celebrated, citizens from across the city gathered in the Hippodrome to participate in rituals surrounding it (Berger 111). Religious festivals dedicated to patron saints took up much of the arena’s schedule as well (Harris 118). Even with this variety of key events occurring in the Hippodrome, chariot races were the most effective at stoking the passions of the populace” (Harris 118). Chariot races occurred regularly from the reign of Constantine in the fourth century to the reign of Justinian in the sixth century as each race day “gripped the city with feverish excitement” (Harris 118). Chariot racing was a competitive sport, with drivers racing their horse-drawn carts around the Hippodrome’s track on behalf of their respective teams, named for colors. The most successful of these drivers were idolized, illustrating the popularity of chariot racing in Constantinople. In his work on Porphyrius, one of the most famous charioteers in Byzantine history, Alan Cameron notes that the Byzantines idolized two types of people: “the winner in the chariot race and the ascetic saint” (Cameron, “Porphyrius” 3). Artisans from across the city found different ways to express their pride in these heroes, whether through monuments or mosaics (Cameron, “Porphyrius” 250).

The people of Constantinople were obsessed with the main sport of their city, but these races were important for more than their entertainment factor alone.

**The Hippodrome as a Stage for the Expression of Power**

Even average chariot races in the Hippodrome were an intricate exercise in the presentation of power for the rulers and the ruled in Constantinople. The chariot races were seen as a gift to the people from the emperor. It was the norm for leaders, like Justinian, to fund the races personally in order to validate their benevolence and power in front of the people (Cameron, “Porphyrius” 257). The placement of the kathisma high over the crowd also allowed emperors to glorify themselves. Races would not start until emperors came out onto their box and blessed both teams, while the emperor expected to be showered with praises in the meantime. Calls like “Many upon years!” and “Christ-loving emperor, may you conquer in the name of God!” were common during this exercise of power (Harris 119). When the emperor left his box for the midday meal, the races would pause and interludes like animal shows took center stage; the main events of the day were not going to happen without the power that made them possible, and it was clear that the people understood (Harris 119). This does not mean that the rules of the emperor were respected entirely throughout the day. Gambling, among other things, was
forbidden by Justinian at the Hippodrome, but this mandate was ignored. For example, there was a simple ball game that citizens would bet on that was immensely popular on gamedays (Stephenson 118). Small demonstrations like these showed some level of resistance to authority during normal races. The daily interactions between the emperor and his crowd often validated the power of the ruler, but the rulers of Constantinople would need to do well at their job to stay in favor. When they lost this favor, the crowd also used the Hippodrome to demonstrate their collective power.

There was no singular place more important for the citizens of Constantinople to display their power than the Hippodrome. Political uprisings that led to the rise and fall of emperors almost always culminated here. For example, Anastasios, who was initially crowned in 491 in the kathisma, came out into that same box to quell a series of riots (which had arisen in response to his religious beliefs) in the stadium (Stephenson 147). During his pleas to the people, Anastasios removed his crown to show his humanity and give in ever so slightly to the crowd – he understood the atrocities the crowd was liable to commit (Stephenson 147). In the twelfth century, the emperor Andronikos I Komnenos was lynched inside the Hippodrome by a “furious crowd” for having led a paranoia-fueled string of executions (Harris 68). These events are unique because neither of them was directly tied to chariot racing or political factions, while the Nika riots (discussed later) were. The people simply gravitated towards the Hippodrome when they wanted to establish their power, because they recognized it as their space for political expression. These types of extreme political occurrences illustrate how the ruling class’s fortune was secured in the Hippodrome (Crawford 211).

## Importance of Circus Factions

The sporting culture that was created within the Hippodrome further empowered citizens by giving them two circus factions that acted on their behalf, both inside and outside of the arena. On the surface, these parties were chariot racing teams, known as the Greens and the Blues; when the Hippodrome was imported from Rome, they were as well. However, in Rome, they were primarily private sports clubs; in Constantinople, they took on a much more politically-active role (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 5). In Rome and Constantinople, there were actually four racing teams, as the Reds and Whites competed in races as well; however, in Constantinople, the Reds and Whites had little if any political importance, with some scholars arguing that after they left the racetrack they essentially integrated themselves into either Blues or Greens (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 46). Regardless, the Blues and Greens both played prominent roles in civic and military duties, and had their own viewpoints on
politics and religion. For example, when an earthquake shook the city in 447, the Greens and Blues worked in tandem to rebuild the walls of the city (MacLagan 35). Traditionally, the Greens were associated with the lower classes because of their promotion of commerce and religious beliefs like monophysitism, while the Blues had closer ties to the land-owning aristocracy and favored religious practices associated with Chalcedonian Orthodoxy (MacLagan 44). Cameron argues for this claim, as he mentions the Blues were as likely to rebel against the nobles as the Greens were (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 97-99). Despite this political murkiness, location in the city and family history were also key factors in deciding to which team one would belong (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 74). According to Cameron, “the whole of Constantinople (and of other cities) was divided between the two colors” (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 74). These divisions were on display during chariot races, but there was constant violence between the two groups on the streets that was a result of the fanatical obsessions many citizens had with their teams. The Blues and the Greens were essential parts of civic life in Constantinople, especially during the fifth and sixth centuries.

The civic importance of the Blues and the Greens were vital in giving the people of Constantinople a political presence. The circus factions acted quite similarly to 19th and 20th-century American political machines, such as Tammany Hall; they would bring in families from across the city, exchanging support for political advocacy and physical protection. The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium emphasizes this comparison; factions didn’t necessarily act as political parties with platforms in this era, but were acted to serve “civil roles” for their members (McCormick). There were two basic methods used by factions to carry out these responsibilities for their supporters: starting petitions and conversing with the ruling class, and (when the other options were ignored) rioting against each other and the emperor (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 285). Oftentimes during the games, spokesmen for the factions would directly address the emperor in order to advocate for certain measures supported by their members. This is especially well documented in dialogue from the Chronicle of Theophanes the Confessor which describes one of these pleas from the Greens, who had experienced a rash of murders, to Justinian:

> Every person seeks a post of authority, to secure his personal safety. Your majesty must not be indignant at what I say in my tribulations, for the Deity listens to all complaints. We have good reason, O Emperor! to mention all things now. For we do not even know where the palace is, nor where is the government. (Bury 73)

This demonstrates the efforts of the Greens to secure safety for their members from the ruling class. In essence, these traditional forms of political advocacy were a way for citizens to express their needs to the ruling class. Unfortunately,
as Cameron notes, these types of petitions were often unsuccessful, arguing that, “Byzantine emperors paid remarkably little attention to petitions from the factions” (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 285). This apathy is what would lead factions to resort to riots as their primary tool of civic communication.

Throughout the fifth and sixth centuries especially, riots were popular when the factions felt they had no other voice; from 491-532, close to ten major riots were documented (Cameron, “Porphyrius” 234). Of these, only two did not start or move into the Hippodrome, proving just how important the arena was as a political stage. These riots would often start as reactions to unpopular new laws or taxes; corn taxes for example caused several riots (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 271). Admittedly, what seemed to start as movements for the people could often devolve into abject hooliganism, with little political intrigue (Cameron, “Circus Factions,” 271). Once these riots devolved, they amounted to little more than violence directed towards members of the other team. In fact, this form of political expression wasn’t ubiquitously popular; oftentimes, shops, churches, and other public buildings were leveled because of these riots” (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 288). The Blues and the Greens were a mouthpiece for the people, but rarely were they an effective one.

Nika Riots

The Nika Riots exemplified the political power of the Hippodrome and its sporting factions. In the year 532, during the reign of Justinian, an extremely vicious round of riots broke out. Essentially, the Greens and the Blues united against Justinian, who was known for supporting the Blues, when he sentenced members of both teams to death for their roles in an earlier episode of violence (Crawford 217). So, on the 13th of January, the Hippodrome erupted in cries of “Nika” (Greek for conquer) during one of the last chariot races of the day – extreme riots ensued, as much of the city was burned and looted (Crawford 217). During the madness, the crowd decided to crown Hypatius, a nephew of a former emperor, as their new emperor in the kathisma of the Hippodrome (Crawford 219). The people wanted change, “which aimed not merely at a reform of the administration, but at a change in the dynasty” (Bury 42). These riots and this crowning, led by both circus factions and culminating in the Hippodrome, are possibly the most politically empowering moments in Constantinople’s sporting history. It was essential that these crowd-driven changes culminate in the Hippodrome, as it shows that the people of Constantinople knew that it was their realm. Unfortunately for the ruled, the Hippodrome also allowed for Justinian to demonstrate his powers. As the crowds rioted in the Hippodrome, the emperor’s forces marched in and killed 30,000 citizens in order to restore order; after this, the political hierarchy was established, and expression was repressed (Harris 36). The Nika riots thus
demonstrate how the Hippodrome and political factions allowed for normal citizens to express themselves, but in the end, the riots did the same for the emperor.

Conclusion

As the Byzantine Empire declined, so did the political power of its sporting culture. The decline of the Empire didn’t cause the decline of the Hippodrome’s power (Justinian did), but the two things did happen simultaneously. By the twelfth century, the number of chariot races had dwindled to two every year, with one to celebrate the birth of the city and one to celebrate Easter, with additional ones included to celebrate military victories (Harris 118). These races were still the center of attention for the city, but their political importance to the ruled peaked in the sixth century. This is partially attributable to the fact that factions became more of a tool for the emperor than for the people towards the seventh and eighth centuries; emperors would employ them in ceremonies to validate their own rule (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 298). Even though political factions and chariot races were still involved in everyday life, no more notable riots or uprisings occurred, as the Blues and the Greens had become too closely linked to the ruling class they’d once spoken against (Cameron, “Circus Factions” 299). It seems that from the end of the sixth century until the fall of Constantinople to the forces of the Fourth Crusade in the thirteenth century, both the Hippodrome and the circus factions were no longer effective mouthpieces for the people, save a few executions of overthrown emperors (Crawford 224). What was left of the Hippodrome was destroyed after the Ottoman Empire conquered the city in 1453 (Crawford 226). The Hippodrome and circus factions had their maximum grassroots political impact from about 400 to 600 A.D., even though they remained useful tools for emperors until the demise of the city.

Though the sporting culture of Constantinople was limited in its usefulness, due to both time and imperial reaction, there is no doubt that it was a form of political expression for the people of the city. The Hippodrome was a place in which power was displayed by both the ruled crowd and the ruling emperor. The emperor’s displays here were much more ritualized and normal – average races were attributed to the emperor’s might. Only in circumstances of unrest did the people truly use the Hippodrome for their own exhibitions of strength. The Blues and the Greens were admittedly (quite) vicious and unruly, but in the arena, they directly advocated for their members, and outside of it brought them together, even if often for violent riot. These riots were often quelled, and their petitions often ignored, but this only shows that their effectiveness was limited, not that the factions were not speaking for the people.
After the sixth century, most of the sporting culture’s political significance was for regular imperial use, but this is a key form of power nonetheless. Ultimately, the Hippodrome and political factions were sport-derived tools that were utilized by both the ruled and ruling to express their political will in the city of Constantinople.

References


The Sense of Smell in the Homeric Hymns
to Dionysus, Aphrodite, and Demeter

Victoria Lansing

Introduction

This paper explores the olfactory language employed in the hymns to Aphrodite (5), Dionysus (7), and Demeter (2). The main argument of the paper relies on what Reinarz calls a ‘sensual turn’ (Reinarz 2014, 3).

This shift entails refocusing studies of the past on the five senses, whether through an archaeological or literary inquiry. Works such as Butler and Purves’ “Synesthesia and the Ancient Senses,” and Hamilakis’ “Archaeology and the Senses” have used the sensual turn to rethink Aristotelian hierarchies of all senses.

This work focuses on the sense of smell alone. This does not imply a valuing of the sense of smell above others, nor does it suggest a novel way to engage with the ancient experience of the senses, as the formerly cited works do. Rather, a narrow focus on the sense of smell allows the paper to evaluate the dictional and thematic elements that surround the sense of smell in the Homeric hymns. In turn, the shared and divergent ways that scent-language is used throughout the corpus of Homeric Hymns emerges.

1. This paper has surveyed all moments of distinct scent-imagery in the 33 works forming the corpus of Homeric Hymns. The appendix to this paper includes each of these moments. Based on the author’s review of the literature, this particular catalogue, which is based on any olfactory language and not just on a single word, has not been attempted before.

2. As described by the editors, “what all of this volume’s essays share is their resistance to hierarchies of the senses, Aristotelian and otherwise, especially those which place vision at the top and dissociate it from the other senses” (2013, 8).

3. Hamilakis describes the process of using the senses to engage with the past as “ontogenetic,” creating a new discipline and approach to material culture. “The sensorial approach advocated and developed here is an intervention not of epistemological but of ontological nature. It constitutes a new paradigm for the archaeological, and for scholarly fields that deal with materiality and time” (2013, 128).
This paper presents a study on three hymns in which scent language is used in two ways. In the first case, scent-language is used to emphasize a single, central plot point in a given hymn, specifically in the hymns to Aphrodite and to Dionysus. In the second case, scent-language marks crucial moments in the narrative arc of the hymn itself, as in the hymn to Demeter. The paper is therefore divided into two sections, one which examines the hymns to Dionysus and Aphrodite and the second which explores the hymn to Demeter.

Scent in Dionysus and Aphrodite: ὀδὴ ἀμβροσίη and ἐλαίῳ ἀμβρότω

Both in the hymn to Aphrodite and in the hymn to Dionysus a single, scent-heavy scene marks a crucial moment of the narrative. This section analyzes both moments before remarking on how scent is used to emphasize the key elements of the deity’s identity in the specific context of the hymn.

In the hymn to Dionysus, pirates come across the god and immediately attempt to capture him. They are compelled to kidnap him based on his beautiful appearance, because they think he is the son of a king: ὦ ὦν γὰρ μὲν ἐσαντο διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων / ἐκεῖ (7.11-12). As with other scenes preceding epiphany, Dionysus’ physicality points to a special status. The pirates are also ironically close to guessing that he is a god when they describe him as a διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων, since Dionysus is indeed the son of Zeus, the “διὸ” of διοτρεφέων. As Dietrich argues, “gods were distinguished by weight and size, like Poseidon’s feet which gave him away in the Iliad. Beauty, fragrance, and above all shining brightness marked out the advent of the still only too human Olympian” (Dietrich 1983, 71).

Though the pirates suspect Dionysus’ importance, it is the god’s use of magic which gives away his true nature. The pirates seize Dionysus (ἐλόντες) and attempt to bind him. Dionysus releases the bonds then sits back smiling (µειδιαών). After escaping the crude bonds, Dionysus makes fragrant wine appear on the deck of the ship: οἶνος µένπροτστα θοὴν ἀνὰ νῆα ἀνὰ ἡδύποτος ἔλαιναν / ἡδύποτος κελάρυζ᾽ ἔωδής, ὡρνυτο δ’ ὀδὴ / ἀμβροσίη: ναῦτας δὲ τὰφος λάβε πάνταζιδόντας (7.35-37). Three descriptors are given for the wine: ἡδύποτος (sweet to drink), εὐώδης (sweet smelling), and ὀδὴ / ἀμβροσίη (with an ambrosial smell). These three separate words draw the reader’s attention to the sensorial dimension of the god’s magic, emphasizing the smell of his divine wine. The text also includes that Dionysus plays this trick πρώτοστα, which also emphasizes the importance of the sense of smell. When Dionysus breaks the bonds, one of the pirates expresses concern, suggesting that Dionysus could be a god. But the captain of the ship dismises those concerns, saying that Dionysus
was not a god, but that a god had been kind enough to throw the wealthy stranger on their path: ἡμῖν ἐμβάλε διάμοι (7.31). Thus, the action of unbinding himself was not enough to convince all the men onboard of the god’s power. In contrast, once the fragrant wine flows over the ship, ναύτας δὲ τὰ φος λάβε πάντας ἱδόνας (7.37). The use of λάβε here compliments the earlier usage in which the sailors seized Dionysus (ἐλόντες, 7.9), believing they could best him. After the sense of smell begins the process of divine revelation, the pirates realize their folly and are in turn seized by fear of the god.

Dionysus continues to play tricks on the pirates, spreading vines over the ship, turning himself into a lion, and even turning the crew into dolphins. Dionysus turns to mercy in the end, telling the pirates not to fear him. But first, while still in the form of a lion, the god pretends to eat the captain: “ἀρχὸν ἔλ’” (7.51). Though the god only pretends to devour the captain, Sowa describes Dionysus’ wrath as typical to all epiphanies, though represented less dramatically in the Hymns. She argues, “this divine hostility appears in Aphrodite’s threats to Anchises, Apollo’s threats to the sailors, Demeter’s anger at the Eleusinians, and the generally frightening behavior of Apollo, Demeter and Dionysus” (261).

Each of the tricks following the initial one is described vividly. However, each of these additional magical moments is described twice, at most. For example, the vine that Dionysus makes appear is described as bearing many clusters πολλοὶ βότρυες (7.39-40), which elaborates on the form of the plant but does not provide an adjectival description of it. Similarly, Dionysus makes ivy appear, which bears flowers and fruit ἀνθεσι τηλεθάων, χαρίεις δ᾽ ἐπὶ καρπὸς ὀρώρει (7.41). However, the only adjective associated with the ivy is μέλας (7.40). In turn, the lion is only described as δεινὸν (7.45) and the bear as λασιαύχενα (7.46). The fragrant wine alone bears three adjectives, marking out the sense of smell and the initial moment of wine flowing over the ship from the other incarnations of Dionysus’ magic. Dionysus’ epiphany is indicated by the greater number of adjectives and the smell of the wine being the first part of his revelation process. Specifically, the sense of smell represents the process Dionysus uses to reveal himself to the pirates, which is the central plot point of the hymn.

Similarly, scent is used to highlight features of Aphrodite in a single scene replete with scent-language (lines 57-67). In these lines, on account of Zeus’ trick, the goddess falls in love with Anchises and goes to her temple on Cyprus to prepare herself to meet the mortal. The hymn describes Aphrodite as she is seized by an overwhelming desire for Anchises: κατὰ φρένας ἱερος εἶλεν (5.57). Desire acts as the agent, compelling Aphrodite to bathe and dress in a disguise. At Cyprus, the goddess’ temple is described as θυώδεα (5.58), and her

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4. Or as Scully elaborates “since some god certainly put this prize in our way” emphasizing Dionysus in disguise as a prize, not just a chance traveler whom the pirates discover (2008, 210).
altar is called θυώδης (5.59). These words emphasize the unique smell of Aphrodite’s temple and altar. The two versions of θυώδης in lines 58 and 59 are matched by two versions of ἀμβρότος; ἀμβρότῳ (5.62) and ἀμβροσίῳ (5.63). Richardson draws particular attention to the repetition of ἀμβρότος, stating “the repetition in 62-3 i s similar to that in II. 14.170-8,” in which Hera beautifies herself with Aphrodite’s help (231).

Lines 60-64 describe Aphrodite as she closes her temple doors and is bathed by the Graces.

The Graces first bathe the goddess and then anoint her with ambrosial oil. The oil adds to her fragrance, as an ambrosial smell already grew on (ἐπενήνοθεν, 5.62) her skin. Clements describes godly ambrosia as “the divine unguent that when rubbed into the skin replenishes their appearance and beautifies them with its sweet ‘breath’” (51). This intensifying of the goddess’ fragrance underscores the central plot point of the hymn: Zeus’ ability to use Aphrodite’s powers against her so that she sleeps with Anchises. Aphrodite’s ambrosial smell is part of her sex-appeal. However, her fragrance is used in order to make her irresistible to Anchises. One could understand the Graces anointing Aphrodite with extra oil as an innocent action that helps the goddess prepare to fulfil her desire. However, the scene also encapsulates Aphrodite’s loss of agency as the sweet smell of the oil encourages the union of Aphrodite and Anchises, which in turn fulfills Zeus’ will.

Lines 5.60-64 are echoed in two other places in the Homeric corpus. Once, at Odyssey 8.360-5 and again at Iliad 14.166-174. In the scene from the Odyssey, Hephaestus traps Aphrodite and Ares, who mingle in his bed, believing he has left for Lemnos. Once Hephaestus frees Aphrodite and Ares, they part ways, Aphrodite going to Cyprus, where again “ένθ’ ἤ γ’ εἰσελθοῦσα θύρας ἐπέθηκε φαεινάς: ἐνθ’ δὲ μὴν Χάριτες λούσαν καὶ χρίσαν ἐλαίῳ ἀμβρότῳ, οῖα θεοὺς ἐπενήνοθεν αἰὲν ἐόντας, ἀμβροσίῳ ἔδανῶ, τὸ ρά οἱ τεθυωμένοι ἦν.”

5. As Olson notes, “The Graces serve Aphrodite as epic slave-women do their masters or their masters’ guests...the goddess is accordingly passive throughout the procedure...but the Graces’ anointing, dressing (64), and ornamenting her with jewelry (65) also echoes the behavior or mortal functionaries who provided similar services for cult statues in temples” (2012, 172).
from the *Iliad*, the deception works in the opposite direction, as Hera prepares to deceive Zeus. She enters her inner chamber and closes the shining door ἔνθ᾽ ἥγ᾽ εἰσάλθοδσα θύρας ἐπέθηκε φαεινάς (14.169), then anoints herself with oil ἐμβροσίῳ ἐδανῷ, τὸ ἐὰν οἱ τεθυωμένον ἤτεν (14.172). In all three contexts scent is associated with deception, whether it be Aphrodite using ambrosial oil after Hephaestus’ trick or Hera using the fragrance to deceive Zeus.

While the sense of smell is associated with Dionysus’ power in hymn 7, in the hymn to Aphrodite, the sense of smell plays the opposite role, emphasizing the goddess’ vulnerability. Aphrodite feels shame after she sleeps with Anchises. She even tells Anchises that the son resulting from their union will bear the name Aeneas as a mark of her shame τῷ δὲ καὶ Αἰνείας ὀνόματι ἔσσεται, οὕνεκα ἀἰνὸν / ἐσχεν ἀχον, ἐνεκα βροτοῦ ἀνέρος ἐσχεν εὐνῇ, using wordplay to reference her αἰνὸν at bearing Aeneas (5.198). In the hymn to Dionysus, the god was victorious—able to break the bonds of the pirates, terrify them with his magic, and conclude by enjoining them to worship him. In contrast, Aphrodite was tricked by Zeus, fulfilled his will, realized her actions, and expressed her shame. Although Anchises himself did not trick Aphrodite, she was still overcome by a mortal, whereas Dionysus defeated the mortal pirates.

These examples show two different ways in which scent language is used in the Homeric Hymns. While scent can be indicative of the power of a god and terrify mortals, it can also help make a god vulnerable. In both cases examined above, scent relates to the central point of the hymn. In the story of Dionysus it emphasizes his power over men, and in the hymn to Aphrodite, it explains how Zeus came to defeat the goddess by turning her own powers against her.

**Scent as Indicator of the Narrative in the Hymn to Demeter**

While in the hymns to Dionysus and Aphrodite scent is central to a single scene, in the hymn to Demeter scent is tied to a series of plot points which together point to key moments in the narrative arc of the myth. The first mention of fragrance comes early in the hymn, at line 13. Here the Narcissus flower, the crucial element which makes Persephone Hades’ prey, is described as ἡδιστ’ ὀδη (2.13). Aside from smell, the flower is enchanting also because of its wondrous appearance, which includes one hundred blossoms—ἑκατὸν κῦρα (2.12). The flower is so distinctive that even the earth which puts the flower forth according to Zeus’ will (2.9) laughs for joy along with the sea at its sight—
γαῖᾳ τε πᾶσ᾽ ἐγελάσσε καὶ ἄλμυρὸν οἶδα θαλάσσης (2.14). The reader’s first encounter with scent in this hymn emphasizes its ability to awe Persephone (who reaches for the trap), but also older beings like the earth. The next mention of scent appears when Demeter visits Eleusis in an effort to distance herself from the gods. At line 97, Eleusis is called θυώδεσσης. At this moment, Demeter sits next to the maiden well, which would become a fixture of the Eleusinian mysteries.

After these mentions of scent, four more mentions follow in lines 231, 244, 277, and 288. First, Demeter is described in terms of scent (ὄς ἄρα φονήσασα θυώδει δέξατο κόλπῳ, 2.231). The goddess is still in disguise and receives the baby Demophon in her bosom as if she were a nurse. The next mention of scent also relies on a form of θυώδης, as Metaneira’s chamber is called θυώδεος (2.244). In these first two moments, the goddess and Metaneira are both associated with a fragrance that is described in the same way. But, while Metaneira’s chamber smells pleasant, Demeter’s own bosom is described as fragrant. This recalls the image of fragrant Aphrodite mentioned above, as the bodies of the immortals put forth a divine-smelling scent.

Following the pattern, the next mention of scent is associated with Demeter. At this point in the hymn, the goddess realizes Metaneira is spying on her care of Demophon. This prompts Demeter’s epiphany. As with the hymn to Dionysus, Demeter’s beauty, and the light emanating from her body already made Metaneira suspicious. When Demeter stepped through the threshold of the home, Metaneira nearly fainted: τὴν δ᾽ αἰδώς τε σέβας τε ἱδὲ χλωρὸν δέος εἷλεν (2.190). Despite her suspicions, Metaneira allowed Demeter to care for her son. But, as soon as Metaneira spies Demeter’s terrifying process of making Demophon immortal, Demeter unleashes the full force of her epiphany. She thrusts away her old age (2.275-276) and then uses scent to further reveal herself, making a divine smell diffuse from her clothing: ὠδὴ δ᾽ ἰμερόεσσα θυηέντων ἀπὸ πέπλων / σκίδνατο (2.277-278). At this point, the language used to describe the scent shifts slightly. The word for the scent is virtually identical to the word used in the two previous scenes. But, θυήεις (smoking with incense, fragrant) is used instead of θυώδης (smelling of incense, sweet-smelling). While

6. The image of the earth laughing recalls the land of Delos smiling when Leto gives birth on the island at line 118 of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo: μείδησε δὲ γαῖ ὑπένερθεν.
7. As Kerenyi says “it is a waste of time to try to identify it with other wells in the region or to situate it anywhere except where it was put by the planners and builders of the sanctuary in the sixth century B.C. and where it stands today” (1967, 36).
8. Clements draws attention to Demeter breathing on Demophon during the process of turning the mortal child immortal, linking the goddess’ breath to ambrosia. Clements suggests that Demeter must be anointing Demophon with the same type of ambrosial oil that Aphrodite uses to beautify herself as well as the same substance “Thetis sprinkles into the nostrils of the dead Patroklos to ensure that his corpse will not decay (Iliad 19.38-39; cf. Iliad 23.186-87)” (2015, 51).
this shift is slight, the greater change comes in the form of an addition—ὁδήδ᾽ ἱµερόσσεσσα is paired with θυηέντων. The result is that the entire line is pervaded with scent language in the same way that Demeter fills the room with her smell.⁹

After this scene, the focus on smell again returns to Metaneira, whose inner chamber is again described as θυώδες. After Demeter’s epiphany, Metaneira retains the same word that described the smell of her bedroom as she had before the scene of epiphany. In addition, she only bears this single word to describe her scent. On the other hand, Demeter’s smell post-epiphany is described with two separate adjectives, which emphasizes the importance of the sense of smell. This also draws attention to the connection between Demeter’s state when disguised—in which she shares Metaneira’s single adjective (θυώδης)—versus when she reveals herself and bears two adjectives to describe her godly scent (ὁδήδ᾽ ἱµερόσσεσσα θυηέντων, 2.277-278). Unlike Demeter, Metaneira has not undergone a change, and therefore remains in the human realm where the home around her is fragrant, but she herself is not as sweet-smelling as a goddess.

In the same way that Metaneira’s scent has not changed, Eleusis is also described by a single word relating to fragrance—θυώδος (2.318). Demeter goes to the citadel of fragrant Eleusis and then mentions scent again when she declares that she will not visit fragrant (θυώδος) Olympus until she sees her daughter again (2.331). The next two mentions of fragrance relate to the scent of the temple that Demeter occupies. The temple is described as θυώδες at 355 and at 385. Although the diction does not change, it is important to notice that these four total mentions of fragrance when Demeter was inside Metaneira’s home.

The final two mentions of fragrance in the hymn come at lines 401 and 490. At line 401, Demeter explains the time of year in which Persephone will return to her mother and the other immortal gods “ὅππότε δ᾽ ἄνθεσι γαῖ᾽ εὐώδεσιν εἰαρινοῖσι” (2.401). The sweet-smelling flowers of springtime signal Persephone’s return to Olympus. Unlike the ἅθυρμα that the earth put forth in line 16 to trick Persephone, the smell of the flowers of spring signify the reunion of mother and daughter.¹⁰ The scent of flowers transitions from deceptive and

⁹. Clements focuses on the pairing of scent and brightness, suggesting that scent comes at moments of “the suspension—or overload—of the other senses” such as when “the leakage of Demeter’s unseemly scent accompanies the blinding light of her divine radiance as she sheds her human guise” (2015, 48). There is also a focus placed on Demeter’s ability to change her stature at line 275.

¹⁰. When Persephone describes the smell of the narcissus flower to Demeter, she says it was ὡς περ κρόκον (2.428). According to Lefkowitz, the smell of a crocus signals deception in the myth of Zeus and Europa. “When in the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women, Europa was gathering flowers, Zeus changed himself into a bull and ‘breathed from his mouth the scent of saffron’” (2007, 77). This scent attracted Europa to the bull, which then took her up and carried her to Crete in order to rape her.
disjointing to benevolent and uniting. Emblematic of this change is the mention of Gaia, who will put forth the friendly flowers. Once Gaia has returned to Demeter’s control, mother and daughter can unite. During their brief time together, they discuss the roles each will play in the future; Demeter will bring the seasons, and Persephone will be Hades’ wife. Once the status of the goddesses is determined, attention shifts back to Eleusis.

The final moment of scent-language comes in the poet’s farewell to the goddess in which Eleusis is again referred to as θυοέσσης (2.490). This time, though, Demeter is described as holding Eleusis ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ Ἐλευσῖνος θυοέσσης δήμον ἔχοσα. This shift in the narrative also indicates a shift in time—back to the present moment in which the bard is singing and Demeter already holds Eleusis (since the origins of how she came to hold it have been told). In that present time, the Eleusinian mysteries were likely already occurring. Therefore, just as the scent of flowers shifted from a threatening fragrance to a joyful one, so too does Eleusis shift from being fragrant on its own to fragrant due to Demeter’s presence having begun the mysteries.

It is the contention of this paper that when gathered together each of the moments that mentions scent in the hymn to Demeter forms a structure that can be listed like so:

Initial two moments:
1. Fragrant flower signals Persephone’s abduction (2.13)
2. Eleusis before Demeter begins the Mysteries (2.97)

Middle four moments (1):
1. Demeter’s fragrance (2.231)
2. Metaneira’s fragrant chamber (2.244)
3. Demeter’s fragrance (2.277)
4. Metaneira’s fragrant chamber (2.288)

Middle four moments (2):
1. Eleusis once Demeter’s visit begins the story of the Mysteries (2.318)
2. Fragrant Olympus (2.331)
3. Demeter at the temple in Eleusis (2.355)
4. Demeter at the temple in Eleusis (2.385)

Concluding two moments:
1. Fragrant flowers signal Persephone’s return (2.401)
2. Eleusis after the Mysteries have already been established (2.490)

As the list makes clear, the initial and closing pairs of moments describing scent mirror each other. The middle two sets of four moments point to crucial moments within the narrative arc of the hymn. In fact, much of what occurs in the plotline is outlined if one were to only read the moments containing scent language. This shows the centrality of the sense of smell in the hymn to Demeter. While the sense of smell was central also to the hymns to Dionysus and Aphrodite, the way the scent language is communicated is more dispersed in
the hymn to Demeter than in the other hymns. As the list above shows, this dispersal is not at all random, but in fact signals each major shift in the narrative.

Conclusions

This essay has examined the way scent language is employed in three different Homeric Hymns. In the hymns to Dionysus and Aphrodite, a single scene contains scent language. The scene is emblematic of the central plot point—signaling Dionysus’ ability to outwit the pirates, or Aphrodite’s union with Anchises at the will of Zeus, respectively. In these two texts, language relating to scent was used just once in the entire hymn, but this single usage was emphatic in both cases. For instance, both scent-heavy scenes bear multiple adjectives describing the scent. The rarity of this scent language makes the scenes involving scent all the more striking. In comparison, in the hymn to Demeter, scent language is dispersed throughout the hymn, signaling many plot points as opposed to just one. In the case of the hymn to Demeter, all of the most important plot points are accompanied by a mention of scent. As in the hymns to Dionysus and Aphrodite, Demeter’s scent is described with more adjectives than the scent of a mortal. The greater number of adjectives used to describe the scent of the three gods points to the importance of the sense of smell in each of their respective hymns.

In the hymns to Dionysus and Demeter, scent was closely associated with the god or goddess’ epiphany. But in the hymn to Demeter and in the hymn to Aphrodite, scent was also associated with the deception of Zeus, who made the Narcissus flower for Persephone and put desire in Aphrodite’s heart. Therefore, it is impossible to associate the sense of smell with a single aspect of a god or with a single moment in the narrative of any of the hymns. But, this lack of a singular use of scent does not detract from its importance. Rather, it speaks to the broad significance of scent despite the varieties in length of the hymn, god or goddess being hymned, and the structural ways that scent is employed (at one moment or at many).

One reason to highlight the sense of smell is that it can bridge the gap between mortals and immortals. For the mortals in the hymns who interacted with the gods directly, the sense of smell literally and figuratively struck them, making the god or goddess’ power known. In scenes of epiphany, scent altered how the mortals perceived the god. Both Metaneira and the pirates believed that the respective god in disguise was under their control—either as a servant (in Demeter’s case), or as a prisoner (in Dionysus’ case). The mortals became terrified of the power of the gods once it was revealed to them through scent.
Scent could still communicate the differences between mortals and immortals in a time after mingling between gods and men ceased. Communicating directly (if not physically as with Anchises, Metaneira, and the pirates) could still be accomplished through religious practices, and particularly through sacrifice. Clements suggests that κνῖσα, or the steam and odor of the fat from a sacrifice, is emblematic of this idea. Once direct contact between mortals and gods stopped, divinities and mortals still “mingled” by sharing in a sacrifice, with the men who eat the meat remaining on earth and the “hungry gods who feed on the smells of sacrifice” on Olympus (48). In a future version of this paper, it would be useful to examine how the senses played into religious practices. In the case of the hymn to Demeter, an examination of the Eleusinian mysteries could provide a useful starting point for this inquiry. For example, it would be worthwhile to explore how the draught that Demeter asks for at 2.208 affects the senses. It could also be useful to broaden the texts analyzed to potentially gain insight into the way mortals perceive the gods beyond the corpus of Homeric Hymns.

Appendix: Scent Language in the Homeric Hymns

Demeter #2
13: κῶς’ ἧδιστ’ ὃς
97: ὃς τότ’ Ἐλευσίνος θυοέσσης κοίρανος ἦν.
231: ὃς ἀρα φωνήσασα θυώδει δέξατο κόλπῳ
244: καὶ κέν μιν ποίησαν ἀγήρων τ’ ἀθάνατον τε,
 ei μὴ ἄρ’ ἀφραδίῃσιν εὐξόνοις Μετάνειρα
νῦκ’ ἐπιπερήσασα θυώδεος ἐκ θαλάμου
σκέψατο:
277: ὃς δ’ ἵμαρόεσσα θυηεόντων ἀπὸ πέπλων
288: μητέρ’ ἀναστήσουσα θυώδεος ἐκ θαλάμου.
318: ἢκετο δ’ ἐπιλείθθη Ἐλευσίνος θυεέσης.
331: οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτ’ ἐρασκε θυώδεος Οὐλύμπιον
355: ἢσται Ἐλευσίνος κρανάν ἐπιλείθθην ἐξούσα.
385: νηοῖο προπάροιθε θυώδεος:
401: ὀπότε δ’ ἄνθει γα’ εὐώδε[σιν] εἰαρινο[σι]
490: ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ Ἐλευσίνος θυοέσης δήμον ἐξουσα

Apollo #3
58: εἰ δ’ κ’ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐκαέργου νηὸν ἐξηύθα,
 ἄνθρωποι τοι πάντες ἀγινήσουν ἐκατόμβας
ἐνθάδ᾽ ἀγείρόμενου, κνίσσῃ δὲ τοι ἀσπετος αἰεὶ δήμου ἀναίζει

87: ἦ μὴν Φοίβου τῆς θυώδης ἔσσεται αἰεὶ βουμὸς καὶ τέμνους. τίσι δὲ σὲ γ᾽ ἔξοχα πάντων.

Hermes #4
65: ἂλτο κατὰ σκοπὶν εἰνδῶδος ἐκ μεγάρῳ ὅρμαινον δόλον αἰτὶ ἐνι φρεσίν, οἷα τε φοίτες φηλαται διέπουσι μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἐν ὀρῇ.

131: ἔνθ᾽ ὅσιης κρεάων ἠράσσατο κύδις Ἑρῆς:

135δηµόν καὶ κρέα πολλά, μετῆρα δ᾽ αἰὴν ἀνάειρε, σήμα νεὸς φορῆς: ἐπὶ δὲ ξύλα κάγκιν᾽ ἀγείρας οὐλόποδ᾽, οὐλοκάρηνα πυρὸς κατεδάµνετ᾽ ἄνειρε, σῆ σα ναυταὶ φωρῆς:

227-237: ὡς εἰπὼν ἦιξεν ἄναξ Διὸς ὑιὸς Ἀπόλλων: Κυλλήνης δ᾽ ἀφίκανεν ὀροῦ καταείνεν ὑλῇ, πέτρῃς ἐς κευθῶνα βαθύσκιον ἐνθὰ τε νῦν ἀφβροσίη ἐλόχευσε Διὸς παῖδα Κρονίωνος.

321: ἄτὰρ κατόπισθε Διὸς καὶ Λητοῦς ὑιὸς.

Aphrodite #5,

65ἐνθ᾽ ἦ γ᾽ εἰσελθοῦσα θύρας ἐπέθηκε φαεινάς: ἔνθα δὲ μν Χάριτες λοῦσαν καὶ χρῆται ἐλαίῳ ἀμβρότῳ, οἷα θεοὺς ἐπενήνοθην αἰέν ἐόντας, ἀμβροσίῳ ἐδανὸ, τὸ ρὰ οἱ τεθυμένου ἦν. ἐσσαμένη δ᾽ εἴ πάντα περὶ χροὶ ἐματα καλά 65χρωσὶ κοσμηθείσα φιλομελεῖδης Αφροδίτη

Dionysus #7
35-7: οἶνος μὲν πρώτιστα θοήν ἀνὰ νήα μέλαιναν ἡδύποτος κελάρυς· ἐφώδης, ὀρνυτο δ᾽ ὀδη ἀμβροσίη: ναύτας δὲ τάφος λάβε πάντας ἰδόντας.

Pan #19
24-25: δαίμων δ᾽ ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα χορῶν, τοτε δ᾽ ἐς μέσον ἔρησον, ποικά ποσίν διέπει, λαῖφος δ᾽ ἐπὶ νότα δαφοινὸν λυγκὸς ἠχεί, λεγερίσων ἀγαλάμμενος φρένα μολπαίς 25ἐν μαλακῷ λεμόνι, τόθι κρόκος ἢ ἀλακών.

Dionysus #26
6: δ ὀ δ᾽ ἀέξετο πατρὸς ἐκη ἄντρῳ ἐν εὐώδει μεταρίθμιος ἀθανάτοισιν.

References
Sicilian Muses, let us sing a greater verse!
Orchards and humble tamarisk do not please everyone;
If we should sing of the woods, the woods would be worthy
of the Consul.
Now the furthest age of Cumean prayer arrives;
A great order of people is born from all:
And already Justice returns, and Saturn’s kingdom;
Now a new family is sent down from the high heavens.
Only you, pure Lucina, favor the born child, under whom
The first iron age will end and the golden age will rise
Over the whole world: your Apollo now rules.
And truly this glory of the age will begin with you as consul,
Pollio, and great months will begin to proceed;
With you as leader if any tracks of our wickedness remain
They will be made fruitless and will free the earth from endless terror.
He will accept a god’s life, and will see heroes
Mixed with gods, and he himself be seen by them
And will preside over the peaceful earth with his father’s powers.
And to you, child, the uncultivated earth will pour forth its first little gifts,
Wandering ivy and cyclamen everywhere,
And lily mixed with laughing acanthus.
The she-goats themselves will come home, their udders brimming with milk,
And the cattle will not fear the mighty lions;
Your very cradle will flow out pleasant flowers to you.
And the snakes will die, and the deceitful plants of poison
Will languish, and the Assyrian spice will arise all over.
Yet at the same time you will read of the praises of heroes and the
Deeds of your parents, and will be able to know what virtue might be
Gradually the plain will turn gold with soft grain,
And ruby grapes will hang from overgrown briars,
And the rough oak trees will sweat dewy honey.
However a few traces of the ancient faults will lie
underneath,
Which will order humans to try the sea with rafts, enclose
Towns with walls, and carve into the earth with furrows.
Then there will be another Tiphys, and a second Argo
Which will carry the chosen heroes; there will be another
war,
And great Achilles will be sent again to Troy.
Henceforth, when the powerful age of heroes has created
you,
And the helmsman will withdraw from the sea, and the
naval ship
Will not trade merchandise; each land will bear everything.
The soil will not suffer the plows, the vines not the sickle;
Each sturdy farmer will now release the yokes of bulls;
And wool will not learn to imitate many colors,
But in the meadows the pleasant ram will change its own
fleece,
Now having become flushed with purple, now with yellow,
By its own will red will clothe the pasturing lambs.
‘Let such ages roll on,’ said the Fates in harmony, to the
spindle
With the power of steadfast fate.
Oh dear offspring of the gods - the time is already near -
Seize your great honors, the great son of Jove!
Look at the world floating with its domed weight,
And the lands and the tracts of the sea and the boundless
sky;
Look, as everything delights in the age about to come!
Oh let the last part of such a long life endure for me,
And enough life to tell of how great your deeds will be:
Thracian Orpheus will not conquer me with song
Nor Linus, although his mother aids one, his father the
other,
Calliope to Orpheus, beautiful Apollo to Linus.
Even Pan, if he contests with me with Arcady as a juror,
Even Pan, with Arcady as a juror, would say that he was
bested.
Begin, young child, to recognize your mother with a laugh;
Ten months have brought long labor to your mother.
Begin, young child, for whom his parents do not smile,
And no god honors at his meals, no goddess in her bed.
Tiberius’ ‘Mancave’ (Sperlonga, Italy). Original photograph by Braden Donoian. Used by Permission
Commentary: Demeter's Tale of Her Past
(122-134)

Hannah Grosserichter

122-134 In response to the four daughters' questions about Demeter's origins, she recounts a fictitious tale of her past. Feigning mortality, Demeter introduces herself with a pseudonym and pretends to be from Crete; abducted by pirates, she allegedly travelled over wide stretches of sea. When her captors landed at the harbor of Thorikos to take more women onto their ship, she fled while they were preparing a meal. Having arrived here in the course of her wanderings, Demeter claims to be unaware of her whereabouts.

Demeter assures the girls from the beginning that she is telling the truth (121 ἀληθέα), when in fact every part of her story is fabricated. Even so, the story carries elements of truth below the surface: Demeter alludes to Persephone's abduction and her own reaction to the loss of her daughter. By weaving elements of reality and her true emotions into the tale, Demeter convinces the girls of her false identity as an old Cretan woman who has escaped the toils of slavery.

Δώς: There have been many suggestions to mend the meter; R makes a convincing argument for an emendation to Δωσώ. The meaning of this pseudonym ("Giver") might suggest the goddess's true character, namely her function of giving (F). It may also allude to one of Hades' epithets, "the receiver of many guests" (πολυδέγκµων 17, 31, 404, 430): Demeter has been forced to give away her daughter, and Hades in turn has received her.

tὸ γὰρ θέτο πότνια μήτηρ: In the tale, Demeter has received her name from her mother. R points out that elsewhere, the father sometimes gives the name (e.g. E. Phoen. 12-13 καλοῖς δ' ἱοκάστην με· τοῦτο γύρα πατήρ / ἔθετο). The explicit mention of the mother-daughter relationship is reminiscent of Demeter's description of her daughter in the speech to Helios (cf. 66). F points out that Demeter is called Daughter of Rhea twice in the poem (cf. 60, 75), noting the emphasis on the matrilineal links among the three generations of females that Zeus and Hades disrupt.

123 Κρήτηθεν: Demeter may have chosen Crete because it is suitable to a false tale; the tradition of Cretan tales – lies like the truth – is common in the Odyssey (F). Demeter's alleged origins may also denote a Minoan influence on the Eleusinian Mysteries (R).
66  GROSSERICHTER

124 ἤλυθον: < ἐρχομαι.

124-5 ἤλυθον... ἀπήγαγον: The diction in these lines is striking: "οὐκ ἐθέλουσα," "βιὴ," "ἀδεκούσαν," "ἀνάγκη," and "ἀπήγαγον" all point to Demeter's unwillingness and the forceful nature of her fictitious abduction. Moreover, Demeter is the subject in the beginning of the sentence, but she turns into the object by the end of it. 124 is composed only of dactyls, probably reflecting Demeter's emotional distress. ληϊστῆρες interrupts a long alliteration: ἄδεκοουσαν ἀνάγκη / ἄνδρες λῃστῆρες ἀπήγαγον. This emphasis points to the pirates' active role in the abduction, contrasting it with Demeter's passive fate.

Both theme and diction in these lines are strongly evocative of Persephone's abduction in the hymn. Hades seized Persephone against her will (19 ἀδεκοουσαν, 30 ἀδεκαζομένην); in her speech to Helios, Demeter repeats that someone has taken her daughter from her, against her will and by force (72 νόσφιν ἐμεῖο λαβὼν ἄδεκοουσαν ἀνάγκη). Notably, Demeter specifies that the pirates who abducted her were male (125 ἄνδρες); this is reminiscent of Zeus' and Hades' combined efforts to make Persephone's abduction possible (cf. 2-3, 9, 30-1, 77-80).

In the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, Aphrodite also tells a false narrative of her forceful abduction. Some of the diction mirrors Demeter's tale: Hermes has "snatched her away" to take her to Anchises (117 ἀνήρπαξε, 121 ἥρπαξε), and she states that she is subject to a mighty force (130 κρατερὴ δὲ μοι ἐπλετ' ἀνάγκη). However, the tale of Aphrodite's abduction has a different purpose from Demeter's: it serves as part of her plan to seduce Anchises, and the undertone is a humorous one.

126 Θορικὸν δὲ: Thorikos is on the north-east coast of Attica and serves as a natural harbor for ships from Crete (R). Demeter's choice of Thorikos for her tale may carry meaning for the Eleusinian Mysteries: the direct route from Thorikos to Eleusis leads through Athens, and Demeter's alleged journey may parallel part of the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis (F). Archeological evidence suggests that mystery rites like those in Eleusis and Lykosura may have also taken place at Thorikos: a cult-building on this site from the early fifth century, with 38 Doric columns and two entrances on the longer sides, was probably dedicated to Demeter and Persephone (R). Moreover, fragments of a Demeter-type statue were found in Athens along with columns from the cult-building from Thorikos, which had been relocated and reused in a small temple on the Agora; this statue probably also came from Thorikos (R).

127 αὐτοὶ refers to the ἄνδρες λῃστῆρες (125)

129 ἦρατο: imperfect of ἐραθ'). The imperfect is not found in Homer or Hesiod (cf. R); here, it may indicate the long duration of her lack of appetite. With a negative (οὐ), the imperfect can also denote resistance or refusal (cf. S).

131 ὑπερφιάλους σημάντορας: R takes this phrase to mean "my
arrogant overlords. The choice of σημαντός is significant, as it evokes Hades' epithet πολυσημάντος (cf. 31, 84, 376). For parallels between Demeter's abduction by male pirates and Persephone's abduction by Zeus and Hades, cf. 124-5.

132 ἀποναίατο: aorist optative of ἀπονίναιμα, following from "δόφρα μή" in the line above. Demeter employs transactional language: she fled to prevent the pirates from selling her (περάσαντες) without having paid the price (ἀπριάτην) and drawing any benefit (ἀποναίατο) from her worth (ἐμῆς... τιμῆς). Such words of transaction are elsewhere used in the context of marriage, such as in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite. Pretending to be a young woman who was abducted by Hermes, Aphrodite employs "ἀποναίματα" (140) to refer to her dowry, a word that usually stands for a compensation or price paid. Given the close parallels between transactions in the slave trade and transactions in the context of marriage, Demeter's language might reflect the injustice she feels at Persephone's forced union with Hades.

133 ἀλάλημην: < ἀλάομα. Once more, Demeter incorporates an element of truth: in search of Persephone, she did in fact wander the earth. The word employed earlier is στρῶμα (cf. 48), which can mean "to wander, roam about, turn about" in the passive (LSJ).

References (and Abbreviations)

LSJ The Online Liddle-Scott-Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon [available also under http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj#eid=1].
How Do You Read Homer?  
Ethics, Epistemology, and the Self in Homeric Scholarship 

Aliosha Pittaka Bielenberg 

In twelfth-century Constantinople, Eustathios of Thessalonica wrote a series of monumental commentaries on Homer’s epics. Eustathios saw the bard’s poetry as a “beautiful spectacle” that was beyond scorn; the role of the Homeric scholar for Eustathios was to glean pearls of wisdom, rhetorical tools that could be admired and employed for modern ends — not least, to write more effective propaganda for the Byzantine court that employed him. To read Homer in this way, Eustathios drew on more than one and a half millennia of Homeric scholarship. At the same time, Eustathios was chronologically closer to modern Homeric scholarship than to any of these ancient precedents. Indeed, he was only three centuries removed from the first stirrings of Renaissance humanism, and only a few centuries further from the philhellenism of Enlightenment Germany. 

When Friedrich August Wolf published his Prolegomena to Homer in 1795 — the first major work of modern textual criticism — he engaged directly with Eustathios and classical scholars. But Wolf broke with Eustathios over how to appropriately admire Homer. Although Eustathios was “universally acknowledged to be the best interpreter of Homer,” Wolf wrote that “he deserves less praise than he commonly enjoys” because “he admired in Homer only the beauty of the poetry” (Wolf, 48, 54.). Wolf, as a German philhellene of the Enlightenment, admired Homer just as much as Eustathios. But he faulted the Byzantine scholar because he only admired the beauty of Homer’s poetry. Wolf’s approach to Homer, by contrast, was inflected by the rise of objectivity as a distinctly modern epistemic virtue. To enjoy Homer for Eustathios was to be a spectator removed from the verse’s gore and occasional infelicities. The reader of Homer (no less than the scholar) should approach the Iliad by cultivating himself as a “sagacious listener.” For Wolf, by contrast, to appropriately admire Homeric verse is to engage in ascetic practices that sharpen one’s critical faculties. When reading Homer, Wolf himself is said to have sat up “the whole night in a room without a stove, his feet in a pan of cold water, and one of his eyes bound up to rest the other” (Sandys, 51). In short, Eustathios and Wolf both belong to a long, continuous line of scholars devoted to admiring Homer’s verse. Where they differ is on what practices of the self are epistemologically and ethically necessary to approach this task of admiring Homer. In this paper, I ask: What mental and physical regimes of inquiry — and
hence what profile of the scientific or scholarly self— do Eustathios and Wolf explicitly describe and implicitly demand in their Homeric scholarship?

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Answering this question is a significant undertaking, but one might question whether such an arbitrary comparison is worthwhile. After all, everything changed between twelfth-century Byzantium and nineteenth-century Germany—so of course the way people read Homer was different! What I believe makes this study especially interesting is the paradoxical juxtaposition of rupture with continuity. Eustathios and Wolf are part of a long, uninterrupted tradition of studying Homer from Aristotle, through the Hellenistic Alexandrian scholars, to Byzantium, to Wolf (Daston and Galison, 18.). All these scholars admired Homer; many also engaged in ascetic practices of the self in order to study his verse. The emergence of the scientific self is often told as a story of modernity; the epistemic virtue of objectivity blinks into existence with the onset of a disenchanted, rational world. But when looking at Homeric scholarship, we must tell a story that is characterized by much stronger continuity between the premodern world and the Enlightenment.

To sketch a history of the self that produces knowledge about Homer is not, then, to tell the familiar history of modernity. The scholarly self does not exist in one stable form for Eustathios and a different one for Wolf—a shift that could easily be explained by their vastly different contexts. Instead, the self is constantly being made under the slowly shifting constellations of epistemic virtues. The shift from Eustathios to Wolf should not be read as the sudden appearance of a liberal subject. Rather, telling a history of the self with Wolf and Eustathios means being attentive to the continuous fashioning of the self as one epistemic virtue (objectivity) comes to supplement, not supplant, another (the “beautiful spectacle”). As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison put it:

This history is one of innovation and proliferation rather than monarchical succession. … Instead of the analogy of a succession of political regimes or scientific theories, each triumphing on the ruins of its predecessor, imagine new stars winking into existence, not replacing old ones but changing the geography of the heavens. (Daston and Galison, 18.)

Objectivity becomes another celestial aid for the mariners trying to navigate through verse. Admiration of Homer remains the North Star; both Eustathios and Wolf work their way through his texts by following their deep liking of Homer. Objectivity is a constellation that blinks into existence as part of the broader institutional and intellectual transformation of the Enlightenment. Wolf still orients himself by the North Star, but has an irreversibly different

1. I use these two terms interchangeably, recognizing that “scientific” and “scholarly” are both anachronistic.
experience of the night sky and navigation than Eustathios. To put it a different way,
this is a history of dynamic fields, in which newly introduced bodies reconfigure and reshape those already present, and vice versa. The reactive logic of this sequence is productive. You can play an eighteenth-century clavichord at any time after the instrument’s revival around 1900 — but you cannot hear it after two intervening centuries of the pianoforte in the way it was heard in 1700. Sequence weaves history into the warp and woof of the present: not just as a past process reaching its present state of rest — how things came to be as they are — but also as the source of tensions that keep the present in motion. (Daston and Galison, 19.)

Homeric scholars continued to play the clavichord, rather than switching to fashionable “modern” objects of study. But the sound was unmistakably, irrevocably inflected by the emergence of objectivity as a supplemental epistemic virtue. In other words, this is not a story of the general rupture in scholarship produced by modernity, of which a different approach to Homer is merely an epiphenomenon. Instead, the 2500-year history of Homeric scholarship is primarily about self-conscious, durable continuity where the regimes of inquiry always included admiration of Homeric verse and meticulous, ascetic attentive practice. This paper sketches the heavens at the time of Eustathios to then demonstrate how the scientific self changed with the appearance of a new star in the sky — objectivity.

This paper’s primary object is therefore to describe in some detail the two different profiles of the scientific self in Eustathios and Wolf. In addition, this project makes two important interventions that will resonate beyond historians of Homeric scholarship. First and most simply, my work demonstrates how the history of the scientific self can be usefully and convincingly expanded to include other kinds of scholarship. In this case, I focus on the history of classical philology — but much the same project can be imagined for literature or for history itself. Second, my project suggests some stronger assertions about the ontology of the self. The guiding theorist for many historians of the self is Foucault. His work demonstrates how ethics and epistemology are joined at the hip by looking back to the epimeleia heautou (care of the self) practiced by Greeks and Romans in the first centuries CE. My work critically responds to Foucault’s theoretical paradigm, not least because discussing the history of Homeric scholarship involves touching on some of the same sources Foucault himself treated. Instead of the self as a given waiting to be shaped in different ways by Eustathios and Wolf, I maintain that the self is constantly in the making — it is never a completed object, and hence always ready to change with the stars.
In my analysis of Eustathios and Wolf, I am focusing on the self shaped by mental and physical practices, in part because this usefully imbricates ethics and epistemology. A particularly persuasive history of a scholarly self is found in the seminal 2007 work by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity*. Beginning with the recognition that epistemology has an ethics, Daston and Galison provide a critical history of objectivity by tracing the shifting epistemic virtues against which the emergent scientific self is formed. By elucidating this history of the self, Daston and Galison tell us why descriptions of scientific practice and scientific personae tend to moralize. Daston and Galison give us a tight triad of *morals, ethics,* and *virtues* — the latter of which “earn their right to be called virtues by molding the self, and the ways they do so parallel and overlap with the ways epistemology is translated into science” (Daston and Galison, 41). Thus, ethics and epistemology are joined at the hip through the *self,* which operates as both the knower (epistemological subject) and moral person (ethical subject). In other words, a history of the self is not only another way of recognizing Eustathios’ and Wolf’s scholarly approaches to Homer. Rather, these scholarly approaches are recognized as *practices* that have as much of an effect on the self as on the knowledge produced. To read Eustathios and Wolf with a theoretical approach drawn from Daston and Galison is to ask what kind of knower is expected — and thus both what kind of knowledge and what kind of self.

In their work, Daston and Galison lean into the insights elucidated by Michel Foucault. Foucault’s late preoccupation with the care of the self can be seen as a continuation of his longstanding concerns with power and knowledge. But by focusing on ethics and epistemology, Foucault shifts our attention to the self’s constitution from the ground up, rather than from the top down. As in his earlier work, Foucault gives a powerful account of morality as:

> a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies such as the family (in one of its roles), educational institutions, churches, and so forth. (Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, 25)

But Foucault now recognizes ethics as the process:

> in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. (Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, 28)

Ethics, in other words, encompasses the practices of the self undertaken in response to prescriptive morality. As scholars, we should look for morality not
just in codes, or even in conduct, but in all practices that shape the self — including the practice of reading Homer. After all, there is

no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without “modes of subjectivation” and an “ascetics” or “practices of the self” that support them. (Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 28)

One practice involved in the “self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’” is how you read and how you produce knowledge (Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 25). To be ethical is to engage in the care of the self, which

came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science. (Foucault, The Care of the Self, 45)

Care of the self, then, lies at the foundation of both ethics and epistemology. For ethics is about moral conduct of the self with respect to moral codes; equally, epistemology is about the conduct of a knowledge-making subject with respect to epistemic virtues. Foucault tells us that ethics is the formation of the self in response to society, which is identical to the practices of knowledge production. We read the practices of knowledge production elaborated by Eustathios and Wolf, and can now recognize that these are identical to practices of ethics.

Foucault draws this fundamental insight — ethics as care of the self — from the ancient Greek idea of επιμέλεια εαυτού, which he translates as souci de soi-même.² He writes that

moral conceptions in Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity were more oriented toward practices of the self and the question of askesis than toward codifications of conducts and the strict definition of what is permitted and what is forbidden. (Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 30)

Just what are these practices? One might make the analogy to techniques a potter would use to shape clay. By dieting or “depriving oneself of pleasure or by confining one’s indulgence to marriage or procreation,” one makes the self (Foucault, The Care of the Self, 41). But although epimeleia heautou is indeed about making the self, the self is never made — it is never a finished clay vessel, not to be altered by what gets put in it.

². Note that the translation “care of the self” inserts a definite article where neither the Greek nor the French has one; it might be more accurate then to speak of “care of self.”
Rather than an object to be described, I follow James Porter in arguing that for the ancients the self is “whatever answers to, without answering, the kind of problem that searching for one’s self poses whenever it arises” (Porter, 114). This means a history of the self is not a history of any sort of object, but rather a history of repeated, shifting answers to a common problem. Rather than thinking of the self as a lump of clay, “a given waiting to be shaped and elaborated,” we should think of the care of the self as the “dangerous experience of becoming who one is” (Porter, 116, 133). Porter criticizes Foucault for failing to acknowledge that the self is at ontological risk. For Porter, selves do not emerge in antiquity; “they are ongoing emergencies, ongoing experiments in living on the edge and in extremis, the aim of which is to find an ethical relationship not in the first instance not to one’s self, but rather to the unfathomable dimensions of the world in all its absolute and irrevocable necessity. … The experience of the self is that of a never-ending crisis” (Porter, 133). Eustathios and Wolf explicitly describe and implicitly demand physical and mental regimes of inquiry in studying Homer. These regimes of inquiry are not wholly dependent on their context; in their work, Eustathios and Wolf themselves are searching for one’s self by studying Homer. In asking what these two profiles of the scientific self look like, we should also recognize the agency Eustathios and Wolf have in responding to this problem.

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In what follows, I aim to isolate the profile of the scientific or scholarly self sketched in Eustathios’ Homeric commentaries. One form this self takes is as the reader demanded by Eustathios’ commentary on a famously problematic Homeric passage. At the end of the fourth book of the *Iliad*, Homer is in the midst of describing a brutal battle scene — the first in the entire poem. The violence of war is on full display:

"Antilochus thrust first, speared the horsehair helmet right at the ridge, and the bronze spearpoint lodged in the man’s forehead, smashing through his skull and the dark came whirling down across his eyes — he toppled down like a tower in the rough assault."

(Homer, 160)

The battle scene rages. Then, Homer takes a step back. He realizes that describing more messy melees would just numb his audience to the horrific violence of war. So, instead, he writes about what a spectator might feel who was thrust into this fight (4.539–544):

"no man who waded into that work could scorn it any longer, anyone still not speared or stabbed by tearing bronze who whirled into the heart of all that slaughter—"

How do you read Homer?

not even if great Athena led him by the hand, 
flicking away the weapons hailing down against him. 
That day ranks of Trojans, ranks of Achaean fighters 
sprawled there side-by-side, facedown in the dust. (Homer, 163)

Ἐνθὰ κεν οὐκέτι ἐργὸν ἄνήρ ὀνόσατο μεταλθῶν, 
There no more could a man who was in that work make light of it, 
ὦ τις ἄβλητος καὶ ἄνοσατος ὀξεῖ χαλκῷ 
one who still unhit and still unstabbed by the sharp bronze 
δἰνεύοι κατὰ μέσσον, ἄγοι δὲ Ἡ Πάλλασ Αθήνη 
spun in the midst of that fighting, with Pallas Athene’s hold on 
χειρὸς ἐλοῦσ’, αὐτὰρ βελέων ἀπερύκοι ἐρωήν: 
his hand guiding him, driving back the volleying spears thrown. 
πολλοὶ γὰρ Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαίων ἡματι κείνῳ 
For on that day many men of the Achaians and Trojans 
πρῆνες ἐν κονίῃσι παρ’ ἀλλήλοις τέταντο 
lay sprawled in the dust face downward beside one another.

The spectator Homer conjures exists in a sort of liminal space; we are unsure 
what his ontological status is. In English, we need a subject for our verb. But 
Homer conjugates verbs in the potential optative mood and third person singular 
(δἰνεύοι, ἄγοι) to conjure a potential spectator without quite naming him. The 
spectator is not described as another character on the battlefield; but neither is he 
directly addressed as someone who exists outside of the narrative universe. 
Homer’s turn of phrase makes the spectator live in a kind of liminal space. The 
observer is “a kind of embedded war-reporter who roams over the Trojan 
battlefield protected by Athena and can vouch for the intensity of the battles 
there fought” (de Jong, “After Auerbach: Ancient Greek Literature as a Test 
Case of European Literary Historiography,” 125). Like a reporter in battle, “the 
liminal position of the observer, who is simultaneously present and absent, 
points to the liminal position of the audience in relation to the world of the 
story” (Myers, 39). As Jenny Strauss Clay paraphrases the passage, “if our 
amonymous observer were present and viewed the scene — and yet was not part 
of it, in fact, was able to traverse the battlefield unscathed — he would admire 
the vivid depiction of the intense battle fought long ago (‘that day’)” (Clay, 25). 
If this spectator (θεατὁς) were present, he “would not scorn the battle” (οὐκέτι 
… ὀνόσατο) — for he is being led by the hand not only of Athena but also, 
implicitly, of the poet.

Interlinear text from Homer, Iliad, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of 
As even this short discussion makes clear, it remains uncertain what exactly is going on in this passage. In other words, Homer poses the self as a problem; using negation and the optative tense maintains the ontological ambiguity of the observer. This ambiguity has provided fertile ground for Homeric scholars since at least the Alexandrian period.\(^5\) In other words, this passage at the end of book 4 of the *Iliad* is a fruitful site for author upon author to discuss the self. Eustathios has something particularly interesting to say about the problem of the self posed by *Iliad* 4.539–44:

Such a spectator \([\text{θεατὴς}, \text{lit. listener}]\) might have been the audience \([\text{ἀκροατής}, \text{lit. listener}]\) of the poet, who experiences none of the evils of war, but who enjoys in his mind the beautiful spectacle \([\text{καλοῦ θεάματος}]\) of the war narratives, visiting different parts of the battle without any risk of danger, and without having to scorn \([\text{ὀνόσασθαι}, \text{the same lemma Homer uses in 4.539}]\) or disparage or blame any of the Homeric verses — and all the more so, if the Homeric Pallas \([\text{Athena}]\) should lead him \([\text{by the hand}]\), the truly systematic genius of writing, the mother of wisdom according to the ancients, who turns the pages of the Homeric book with her hand, and in this way fends off the blows of the weapons. This same Pallas leads the reader by the hand, avoiding danger, through every detail of Homer’s poetry, making him an understanding audience \([\text{συνετὸν ἀκροατήν}, \text{lit. sagacious listener}]\).

\[\text{τοιοῦτος δ’ ἂν εἴη θεατὴς ὁ τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀκροατής, ὃς οὐ τῶν τοῦ πολέμου κακῶν μετέχει, ἀλλὰ τῶν τῶν πολεμικῶν διηγήσεων κατὰ νοῦν ἀπολαύει καλοῦ θεάματος, ἀκινδύνους τὴν μάχην περιόν καὶ μηδὲν τι ἐχον τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν ὄνοσασθαι, ἦτοι ἐκφαυλίσας καὶ καταμεμψαθαί, καὶ μᾶλλον, εἰπέρ ἄγοι αὐτὸν ἡ Ὁμηρικὴ Παλλᾶς, ἡ τοῦ γράφειν δηλαδή μεθοδικὴ δεινότης, ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν σητῆρ κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς, χειρὸς ἔλουσα τὰς πτύχας ἀνελιττούσης τὰς τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς βίβλου καὶ οὕτω βελέων ἀπεράκουσα ἐφοίν. ὁν καὶ χειραγωγεῖ ἀκινδύνως ἡ τοιαύτη Παλλᾶς εἰς τὰ καθέκαστα τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς ποιήματος οἷα συνετὸν ἀκροατήν]. (van der Valk, 802)

For Eustathios, the spectator in Homer’s passage is a model of how the audience of Homer should behave. The spectator should not wallow in the violence of Homer; he should grasp the hand of Pallas Athena instead, so as to remain


\[6\) My translation, amended from Porter, Cullhed, Pizzone, and de Jong.
“unspeared and unstabbed” (ἄβλητος καὶ ἀνούτατος) by the bronze spears thrown in battle. Indeed, Athena not only guides the observer through the tumult of battle but also lets the reader rise above the fray of Homeric verses. Just as Homer says that the potential observer would not scorn the battle (οὐκέτι ὸνόσαιτο), Eustathios writes that the ideal reader of Homer would not “scorn [ὀνόσασθαι] or disparage or blame any of the Homeric verses.” Indeed, just as Athena “turns the pages of the Homeric book with her hand,” it is “in this way [that she] fends off the blows of the weapons. This same Pallas leads the reader by the hand, avoiding danger, through every detail of Homer’s poetry, making the audience [ἀκροατής, lit. listener] understand it all.” There is a slippage here between the spectator conjured by Homer (who already inhabits a liminal space) and the reader Eustathios addresses: our attitude towards Homer’s verse should be like that of the potential observer of battle in Homer’s poem.

Eustathios explicitly describes the ideal reader Homer by discussing a self that exists in a liminal space between the reader and the narrative. Eustathios provides ethical injunctions: the reader of Homer should enjoy the beautiful spectacle of verse; the reader should not scorn the bard’s writing. These are mental states in which one must be to read Homer. The reader, the scientific self Eustathios conjures, responds to this moral code with his own practices. In other words, in glossing Homer Eustathios gives us an example of an epistemic virtue: enjoying Homer as a beautiful spectacle as a way of knowing the verse. As Aglae Pizzone notes, Eustathios’ imagination of the self as a sagacious listener enjoying the beautiful spectacle is present in a number of his other works, as well. (Pizzone, 238–43.) The self is both an ethical subject, responding to Eustathios’ moral code, and an epistemological one; you generate knowledge about Homer by fashioning your self in response to Eustathios’ moral injunctions to enjoy the beautiful spectacle of Homer and avoid criticizing his verses. Thinking of the self as a problem lets us go a step further. Not only do we recognize the ethics and epistemology created by the practices of the self Eustathios advocates; we also note how Eustathios maintains the self in an ambiguous ontological space. The self is not a historical given, waiting to be shaped according to Eustathios’ wishes. Instead, the self here is precisely what “answers to, without answering, the kind of problem that searching for one’s self poses whenever it arises” (Porter, 114.). The self is constantly being made, in this case in response to the epistemic virtue of uncritical admiration. This is the mental regime of inquiry into Homer that Eustathios explicitly describes in his scholarship.

To give a full portrait of the scientific self for Eustathios, we should also consider his intended audience. Eustathios wrote his commentary for

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7. Note that Eustathios uses both listener/audience (ἀκροατής) and spectator (θεατής), but not reader; the reference to different senses reminds us of how Homeric poetry was received, orally.
8. My italics.
students of rhetoric who were trained to read and comment on Homer for a public audience. In the introduction to his commentary on the Iliad, Eustathios explicitly describes his intended readership:

Since it has been established that he who toils over Homer is not completely laughable [γελοῖος], it remains for me to do what I intended — that is, not to further commend the poet but to do what I have been commanded, not by some important patron [μεγιστάνων] whom the literati [κοψίων] serve, but by my dear disciples [φίλων ὁιλητῶν] who think well of me. It was their desire to go through the Iliad and draw out useful elements for the novice [διεξοδεύοντι] — in other words, not for the learned man [ἀνδρὶ λογίῳ] (for in all likelihood none of these [elements] would escape his notice) but for the youth just beginning his studies [νέῳ ἀρτι ἀνθάνοντι] and perhaps for those who have learned but are in need of reminding.

Λείπεται δὴ ἡμῖν, ἐπεὶ ἀποσέφανται μὴ γελοῖος εἶναι πάντῃ ὁ ποιηταμένος περὶ τὴν Ὀμήρου ποίησιν, γενέσθαι οὐ εὐκοπήσαμεν καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον συνιστάν τὸν ποιητήν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐ πρὸς μεγιστάνων τινῶν ἐπετάχθημεν, ὥσποῦ τινα παλάντονται οἱ κοψίων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς φίλων ὁμιλητῶν, οίς υπολήμεσος τὶ χρησίμης περὶ ἡμῶν ύπερτίν. ἢ ἐν τῷ φυλικὸν θελήμα διὰ τῆς ἤλιος ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἐκποίησασθαι τὰ χρήσιμα τῷ διεξοδεύοντι, οὐ λέγω ἀνδρὶ λογίῳ, ἐκεῖνον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀν τῶν τοιούτων εἰκός λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ νέῳ ἀρτὶ μανθάνοντι· τυχὸν δὲ καὶ μαθόντι μὲν, δειμένῳ δὲ ἀναμνήσεως.(van der Valk, 3)

The profile of the scientific self includes not just a “sagacious listener” but also the student who reads Homer to become sagacious. Indeed, Eustathios intends his commentaries to provide a general education for such students. As Eric Cullhed writes,

Any aspiring intellectual needed to know how to make use of the epics in a manner characterized by Wittiness, rhetorical virtuosity and polymathy. ... Eustathios commentaries are in

9. My translation, adapted from the translations in Eustathios, Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey. Volume 1: On Rhapsodies A–B, ed. Eric Cullhed, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Byzantina Upsaliensia 17 (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2016), 9* and Eustathios, “Critical Remarks on Homer’s Iliad: Introduction,” trans. David Jenkins, David Bachrach, and Darin Hayton, 2002, http://ark.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01f7623c69h. Cullhed translates ὁιλητῶν as disciples where Jenkins has friends; this is the definition given in the Liddell-Scott-Jones dictionary but by modern Greek the word has come to mean rather speaker or lecturer. The argument for disciple is strengthened by the following sentence, which uses διεξοδεύοντι, or one who exits, novice.
fact wide-ranging anthologies organized not by themes … but by the Homeric epics. The rhapsodies and verses [of Homer], deeply familiar to any educated person of the time, are used as a series of hooks to facilitate the interplay between memory and archive in organizing the diversified mass of knowledge required to qualify as logios [learned] in the textual life of middle Byzantium. (Cullhed, introduction to Eustathios, Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey, 4*)

Eustathios explicitly describes certain regimes of inquiry for the reader of Homer. Because his work is directed at students, these explicit descriptions are also implicit demands. By reading Homer as Eustathios wants them to, Byzantine students shape themselves. Against the background of epistemic virtues Eustathios identified for them, the scientific self is constantly being made by reading Homer. And indeed, Eustathios was enormously successful: at his death, Michael Choniates hyperbolically claimed that “the leaders of almost each and every church in the Roman [Byzantine] empire had been educated by him.”

We have already seen what kind of self Eustathios conjures in his commentary on the Iliad, and what kind of readers he explicitly addresses in his work. To get an even better sense of the scientific self that Eustathios imagines, we should take a further step back to consider his context and reception. Eustathios’ commentaries helped his students perform appropriately to win commissions from the Komnene royal family. As Marina Loukaki puts it, these students sought to become “professional writers” hired to “exalt the diverse members of the imperial family and their exploits, in diverse circumstances.” Indeed, René Nünlist argues that Eustathios was explicitly providing Homeric quotations that future speechwriters for empire could mine as needed. In his commentary, Nünlist says, Eustathios “singles out a remarkably large number of particular passages that the students can reuse when they develop their own rhetorical skills by modelling them after Homer’s” (Nünlist, 508). Eustathios thus writes that

Homer’s dexterity is to provide to students [ὁμιληταῖς] numerous artful [τεχνικῶς] passages [τόπους] of blame and praise.

10. Quoted in ibid., 10*-11*.
12. My translation, adapted from Nünlist, n. 33.
In other words, Eustathios sees Homer as a source for passages that orators can mine for use in their careers. Eustathios sees his own role as facilitating this mode of reading Homer.

Finally, the way Eustathios addresses the problem of the self is but one example of many at his time. Homeric scholarship proliferated after the Komnene rise to power in 1081. To quote Cullhed again:

The new aristocracy and its patronage of the arts effected a professionalization of education and literary production in the capital. ... The son of Alexios I [Komnenos], Isaac Porphyrogennetos, wrote treatises on the epics and scholiated the Iliad. His sister, the famous Anna Komnene, entitled the history of their father Alexias — like Homer’s Ilias — and wished to describe her husband in her work “as Homer extolled Achilles among the Achaeans.” For writers who depended on their patronage and favor, Homer was the obvious model to express the military ideology of the Komnenians. (Cullhed, 1*-2*)

It is interesting to note here the role of Anna Komnene; elite women were also patrons of Homeric scholarship in Constantinople, and “not a few appeared to read at least summaries and paraphrases of the epics, if not the originals” (Emmanuel Bourbouhakis, personal communication to author, 19 December 2019). Perhaps there was room in Eustathios’ scientific self for a “she” as well as a “he.” Many of Eustathios’ contemporaries participated in this vigorous economy of Homeric scholarship: John Tzetzes (c. 1110–70) wrote a Theogony and Homeric Allegories dedicated to Komnene royals, and Michael Psellos (c. 1018–1078) provided the model for both Eustathius and Tzetzes in his Homeric commentaries. This was scholarship that should be pursued by all learned people of Byzantium, even if in so doing the reader must endure poverty and misery; in his letters to the Emperor Komnene, Eustathios complains of trudging through snow and eating rodent-ridden food. 13 All these Byzantine Homeric scholars articulate similar ways the scientific self should approach Homer: the “sagacious listener,” the learned Byzantine man, should enjoy the “beautiful spectacle” of Homer without “scorning” his verse.

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Friedrich August Wolf is firmly situated in the context of the German Enlightenment. Schiller’s enchantment with Greek antiquity is only matched by

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13. See Foteini Kolovou, Die Briefe des Eustathios von Thessalonike: Einleitung, Regesten, Text, Indizes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006). A compendium of such self-referential passages by Byzantine Homeric scholars has sadly yet to be compiled.
the dominance of philhellenism in the German educational system. As Suzanne Marchand puts it, “the founders of [the University of Berlin and the Gymnasien, classical secondary schools] shared Schiller’s admiration for the ancients and his belief in the possibility of human self-transformation through the cultivation of the arts and sciences; they simply put the emphasis on scholarship (Wissenschaft) as the proper means to understand and appreciate the Greeks” (Marchand, xvii). This emergence of scholarship or systematic knowledge (Wissenschaft) is the background for Wolf’s scholarship. He placed classics (Altertumswissenschaft) on a firm textual-critical foundation, ready to take its place alongside the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft) in the modern research university. Wolf placed philology above theology to transform humanist classicism into nascent Altertumswissenschaft, realizing what Wilamowitz would call the “conquest of the ancient world by scholarship.” This undertaking by no means meant abandoning the admiration of Homer so valued by Eustathios. Indeed, Wolf’s scholarship is founded precisely in this earlier Homeric scholarship. After all, Wolf said, Eustathios “is universally acknowledged to be the best interpreter of Homer” (Wolf, 48). But Wolf’s work did come as part of a sea change in scholarship: the emergence of objectivity as the prime epistemic virtue.

This new objectivity valued the knower’s self-effacement and disciplined, diligent labor — by contrast with earlier truth-to-nature, which valued the probity and Bildung (formation) of the knower. Indeed, the very notion of objectivity is defined by the suppression of the subject. Earlier truth-to-nature scorned hard labor as unworthy of the gentleman-scholar; by the mid-nineteenth century, the objective scientist must cultivate an ethic of self-effacement that requires copious amounts of precisely such hard labor. Thus Victorians praised Newton for his “diligent application and perseverance” and Humphrey Davy and Michael Faraday for their “industry and patient thinking” (Daston and Galison, 229). Why would an English gentleman aspire to industry, the characteristic of the day laborer? The answer, Daston and Galison argue, lies in an ethics of sacrifice and self-denial. For the Enlightenment philosopher, man’s distinguishing capacity was his judgement. By the mid-nineteenth century, the scientific self had been transformed from a rational individual trusted to make judgements in attempting to elucidate true causes in nature — and thus necessarily involved in the process of knowledge-making — to a laborer valued for his diligence, whose hard-working self-effacement is valued precisely as a way to get out of the business of knowledge-making.

This self-effacement took the form of ascetic practices of the self. Take, for instance, the work of Charles Bonnet. In 1745, Bonnet wrote the Traité d’insectologie, ou, Observations sur les pucerons based on detailed and exacting observations of caterpillars. For over a month, Bonnet watched “a single aphid confined in a jar every day for over a month from circa 5:00 AM to 10:00 PM”

14. Quoted in Marchand, 18.
Bielenberg (Daston and Galison, 238). He cataloged births by date and hour, and left an asterisk to mark that he did not witness the birth, having momentarily left his watch; he was reportedly “disconsolate when one fine June day he lost sight of” the aphid that was giving birth (Daston and Galison, 241). Bonnet certainly exercises the “self-respect … as concerns one’s rational nature” through “depriving oneself of pleasure” that Foucault speaks of. In other words, Bonnet’s is an ethical response to a moral code that yields knowledge. Bonnet imposed this regimen on himself to produce knowledge about the caterpillars. Later on, even he would recognize the consequences of his observational regimen, which apparently left him blind (Daston and Galison, 239). But even this response is framed in terms that are at once ethical and epistemological. His critics cast aspersions on “the very detail and quantity of the observations,” which, “imprinted upon the soft-wax sensorium of the observer, threatened to dissolve the object of observation into a swarm of sensations” (Daston and Galison, 238.). These ascetic practices are at once ethical and epistemological, because they involve the formation of the scholarly self.

Wolf and his contemporary classical scholars exercised very similar practices of the self as Bonnet. As a child, Wolf is said to have sat up “the whole night in a room without a stove, his feet in a pan of cold water, and one of his eyes bound up to rest the other.” Once this “severe ordeal ended with his removal to the university of Göttingen,” Wolf nonetheless “spent only three minutes in dressing, and cut off every form of recreation.” By the end of his first year at university, Wolf “had nearly killed himself” (Sandys, 51–2). It is worth acknowledging that these reports come from a 1908 history of classical scholarship, and so reflect the dominant epistemic virtues in 1908 as much as in Wolf’s own time. Yet even if these reports are less than perfectly accurate, the fact remains that prominent classicists of the late eighteenth century are often lauded for their punishing self-discipline and abnegation. The life of Wolf’s teacher, Christian Gottlob Heyne, was described as “exemplary in its frustration and servitude.” In order to read “all the ancient authors in chronological order,” Heyne at university “slept only two nights a week, and naturally enough fell ill of a fever.” After graduating from Leipzig, Heyne “was given floor-space by a licentiate in divinity and slept with folios for his pillow; often his only meal in the day was peapods” (Constantine, 84–85). Time and again, scholars of Homer were idolized for their sacrifices in service of objectivity. These ascetic practices, in short, constitute the regime of inquiry that is implicitly demanded of young Homeric scholars. These biographical anecdotes explicitly describe the profile of the scientific self found in Wolf’s work.

Such regimes of inquiry were also described by Wolf and his colleagues in their scholarly publications. Wolf’s Prolegomena begins with a description of how scholars should edit Homer. One approach to emendation entails more effort and, I might almost say, misery; the other, more leisurely delight. Each, if rightly applied, is useful; but
one is more useful. Take someone, even someone poorly equipped with the best aids, who gives us a writer restored to a more correct form, either by conjecture or by the use of a few manuscripts; even if he removes just thirty warts, and leaves a hundred, no one will deny that he has rendered service to literature. (Wolf, 43)

This reader of Homer should still admire verse; indeed, his work is in service to literature. But no longer is it proper to delight in Homer’s beautiful verse. The proper reader of Homer

must emulate the prudent custom of a good judge, who slowly examines the testimony of the witnesses, and gathers all the evidence for their truthfulness, before he ventures to put forward his own conjecture about the case. (Wolf, 45)

Wolf also describes the ascetic practices involved in his recension of Homer, implicitly demanding similar work of other scholars of Homer:

By no means, then, will I complain about the vast amount of trouble I endured in preparing such a varied stock of equipment, in reading through so many writers. … I am far from boasting of my industry; I do not wish to be praised, if I have either worked at it in an inappropriate way, or omitted anything that could have helped toward a true emendation. (Wolf, 56)

Wolf explicitly describes a mental state of critical acuity for readers of Homer; with reference to his own practices, he implicitly demands a physical state of abnegation and diligent labor. The scientific self that is made under the star of objectivity has distinct characteristics even as it continues to put admiration of Homer first.

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In this paper, I have isolated the scientific or scholarly self in Homeric scholarship by Eustathios of Thessalonica and Friedrich August Wolf. To do so, I have shown how the self is explicitly described in the authors’ commentaries; how ascetic practices are implicitly demanded by reference to their and their colleagues’ discipline and abnegation; and how this scientific self resonated beyond their own work, whether through the pervasive prestige of Homer in Constantinople or the widespread ideal of objectivity in Enlightenment Europe. The ideal reader of Homer changed markedly between Eustathios and Wolf, primarily due to the rise of objectivity as a new epistemic virtue in the eighteenth century in Europe. Yet perhaps as intriguing as these changes are what remained the same. Despite their vastly differing contexts, both Eustathios and Wolf endured poverty and misery and were driven by a deep admiration of
Homer's verse. Tracing the contours of these profiles of the scientific self has helped us to tell not just a story of modernity, a fundamental rupture in the practice of scholarship; it has also helped us appreciate the strong continuity between seemingly "ancient" and recognizably "modern" scholars. By broadening our project of tracing the scientific self to encompass Homeric scholarship, we can tell a richer story of how the self is continually made and remade under the influence of constantly shifting constellations of epistemic virtues.

Considering the history of philology as a history of the scientific self gives us a richer understanding of how ethics and epistemology have shifted historically. Furthermore, describing distinct profiles of the self involved in philology points us to a more capacious ontology of the self. For Eustathios and Wolf, as for their contemporaries in the natural sciences, the scientific self was implicitly demanded (especially in pedagogical materials) and explicitly described (for instance, in biographical anecdotes). But natural scientists do not generally encounter the problem of the self. In reading Homer, Eustathios and Wolf had to themselves tackle the status of the self as a reader, author, narrator, and even conjured spectator. When writing a history of the scholarly self that exceeds the boundaries of the natural sciences, it behooves us to recognize all these ways that scholars outline their profile of the scholarly self.

Such an approach ultimately enables a rich account of the different profiles of the scientific or scholarly self in Eustathios and Wolf. Most transparently, this account details different ways of coming to know Homer — that is, different epistemologies. But I have shown how telling a story of reading practices implies a story of how one should live one’s life — that is, an ethics. And intertwined in this history of regimes of inquiry and the self, markedly so in the case of Homeric scholarship, are concerns about the fundamental constitution of the self as a fictional device, as a reader, and ultimately as the problem of what selfhood even is — that is, concerns with ontology. Eustathios and Wolf are valuable touchstones for answering these questions in ways that gesture towards rich histories of the scholarly self beyond the natural sciences.

References

How do you read Homer? 85


“Deadly Erinys of Latium”: Cleopatra’s Power in Lucan’s Civil War

Michal Loren

Lucan’s Civil War, also called the Pharsalia, tells in epic verse of the war between Julius Caesar and Pompey, ending after Pompey’s death with Caesar visiting Cleopatra’s Egypt. While all of the other human women in the Civil War – Julia, Pompey’s first wife; Marcia, Cato the Younger’s wife; and Cornelia, Pompey’s second wife – are married, the closest Cleopatra has to a husband is her brother Ptolemy as co-ruler. This already places her in an unusual position of strength, but in book ten of the Civil War, Lucan emphasizes and adds to it. He paints Cleopatra as an extravagant, lustful, depraved woman. As this depiction debases her, it grants her a perverted power.

Cleopatra asserts this power by displaying her obscene riches at the banquet that she hosts for Julius Caesar. Lucan describes her palace as “equal to a temple” (10.111); all who enter are expected to worship her as they would a deity. Inside the palace, “onyx in abundance was trodden on, ebony of Meroë does not veil / the doorposts huge but stands in place of ordinary timber” (10.116-18). Rather than use these precious materials on the surface of the palace to show off, Cleopatra’s wealth is abundant such that they compose the structure of the building. She uses them as she would use oak, stone, or other standard building materials. Her floor is onyx; her doorposts are ebony. She has access to enough of both that human hands and feet can wear them down without concern for their great value. Cleopatra will be able to replace them.

In addition to Cleopatra’s use of expensive materials for functional purposes, she adorns her palace with precious stones and luxurious fabrics. Her doors are “embellished with abundant emeralds. / Jewels glitter on the couches and the furnishings are tawny with jasper” (10.121-2). The light glinting off of these vibrant gemstones from all directions would strike a visitor like Caesar upon entering the palace. In case this display does not suffice, Cleopatra also decorates her palace with “coverlets… long steeped / in Tyrian dye” (10.123-4), the Phoenician purple prized in the ancient world. Some of her other fabrics “shine embroidered with golden feathers,” while “some blaze with cochineal” (10.125), a scarlet. Her palace is a show of brilliant color, of her excesses of wealth. By dazzling her illustrious guest, Caesar, and his crew, the architecture and adornment of Cleopatra’s palace is a dizzying proclamation of her wealth, and thus, her power.
Lucan criticizes Cleopatra for flaunting her riches, exclaiming, “O what madness, blind / and frantic with ostentation – to reveal one’s treasures / to a man waging civil war” (10.146-8). She should not be obvious about her wealth, and by association, her power, because she runs the risk of inciting Caesar, the “man waging civil war,” to desire to conquer her kingdom for it. Lucan’s use of “madness,” the frenzy that drives the epic, to refer to Cleopatra’s lavishness places her as Caesar’s equal; Lucan often describes him in much the same way. Though Cleopatra’s luxurious banquet is dangerous for her prospects as queen in the face of Caesar and his army, its depiction associates it with power that places her on the same plane as him. It is dangerous for Caesar as well. She would prove a formidable enemy.

Cleopatra’s opulence is also a negative aspect of her appearance. Like the palace encrusted with jewels, she is “loaded with the Red Sea’s booty, on her neck and in her hair / Cleopatra wears a fortune” (10.139-40). Just as she glitters like her palace decorations, so she is also made up of the palace’s ebony and onyx, those black materials. She can put on a beautiful, sumptuous exterior, but her essence, though still showing her wealth, is dark and threatening. Lucan writes that “she strains beneath her finery” (10.140), that this splendor weighs her down. It is grotesque. He emphasizes this by opening the image of Cleopatra’s appearance “with excessive make-up on her harmful beauty” (10.137). Her beauty is painted on, not reflective of her inner darkness, and damages those who behold it. Cleopatra’s power, through the show of opulence on her body, becomes negative, yet she does not let it go so that she may be perceived as good.

Lucan’s Cleopatra also uses her looks to manipulate the people around her. Upon her introduction, Lucan compares her to “the Spartan woman,” Helen of Troy, and her “harmful beauty” that “knocked down Argos and the homes of Ilium” (10.60-1). By comparing Cleopatra to Helen, Lucan likens her to the most beautiful woman in the world. Helen’s beauty holds the power to start wars and cause thousands of deaths, and so must Cleopatra’s. After the introduction of this simile, Lucan continues to refer to it throughout the book. At the end of Cleopatra’s speech, Lucan calls Caesar, Cleopatra’s lover, “the judge” (10.106), a term used to refer to Paris, Helen’s lover. By using the phrase “harmful beauty” to describe Helen in 10.60 and Cleopatra in 10.137, Lucan continues to pull the reader back to Helen and her destructive looks. The Trojan War, for which Helen is often blamed, is chaotic and deadly. Through her comparison to Helen, Lucan suggests that Cleopatra can cause a travesty as devastating as the Trojan War by existing in her beauty. Again, Cleopatra’s influence is strong but ruinous.

Her beauty in Civil War does not have theoretical power alone; she uses it to control Caesar. After spending a night with him, she approaches him “adorned with simulated grief / as far as was attractive ” (10.83-4). In order to get what she wants from him, she puts on a façade of sorrow. She is superficial, hyper-aware of her beauty and its power, and she uses it to selfish ends. For Caesar, it
is not her words that convince him to make peace with her. It is the “impure beauty” that “finishes her speech” (10.105) for her and convinces him to spend “an unspeakable night” (10.106) with her. Here, Cleopatra uses her looks to her advantage, exerting control over Caesar’s desires and decisions. In calling her beauty “impure” and her emotion “simulated,” Lucan continues to express Cleopatra’s depravity in her exercise of authority.

Cleopatra’s appearance is never far from her seduction. In his description of Cleopatra at her banquet, Lucan makes deliberate note of the fact that her “white breasts shine through the Sidonian thread” (10.141) that is intentionally loosened to reveal them. Just as her wealth is a negative display of power, her dress inverts her role as queen. She should be stately, honoring a guest as mighty as Caesar, yet she presides over this feast while showing off her breasts, suggesting sexual indecency. This echoes the destruction of convention that Lucan weaves throughout his epic. Earlier, her beauty allows her to “bribe the judge” (10.107), Caesar, to have sex with her after demanding that he cause the end of Pothinus, her brother’s advisor and rival to her leadership. Lucan’s Cleopatra is a harlot, even though she is also the co-ruler of Egypt. Cleopatra exercises her agency in choosing to have her dress loosened and in using her sexual allure to win Caesar’s favor. Though this subverts the expectations of a ruler’s power, it is still power, and Cleopatra’s extravagant femininity fuels it.

Cleopatra’s enchantment is so strong that Lucan excuses Caesar for leaving the civil war to spend his nights with her. “In the midst of madness, in the midst of frenzy” (10.72), the chaos that Lucan argues is the natural state of the world, Cleopatra rises above it, drawing Caesar in and away from the war. Caesar, who insists on crossing the Rubicon and who cannot be held back even by a distressed, personified Rome in Book One (1.85-205), stops his rampage for Cleopatra. After spending the entire epic fighting off Pompey and his troops, Caesar lets “the routed party gather strength in Libya’s furthest realms” (10.79) while he sleeps with her. After conquering much of the Mediterranean, Caesar could take Egypt, too, yet Cleopatra beguiles him such that “he prefers to make a gift of Pharos” (10.81) and let her keep it. In any other circumstance, Caesar’s passion would drive him to continue fighting the civil war and to take Egypt while he can, but Cleopatra, immovable, stands in his way.

Lucan writes that “fire devoured Caesar’s stubborn / heart” (10.71-2), that Caesar is not in control of his lust for Cleopatra. Caesar’s stubbornness suggests that his heart is otherwise set on constant warfare, yet Cleopatra’s flame obscures that focus. The fire, Cleopatra, has agency in this moment, not the heart, Caesar. Under Cleopatra’s all-consuming influence, Caesar combines war with “illicit union and progeny not born from wife” (10.75-6). His heart forces him to make room for her. Before her, there was no room in his heart for anything but battle. The lust that Cleopatra inspires gives her power over Caesar’s emotions. She is the one figure in the epic who can make him stop fighting, who can redirect his passion: even Rome herself does not have that skill.
The connection between Cleopatra’s sexual behavior and her power is most evident in Pothinus’ speech to Achillas before they try to murder Caesar. Pothinus states “the guilty sister is marrying her brother – / the Latian general she has already married – and racing to and fro between / her husbands she possesses Egypt and she whores to gain Rome” (10.357-9). In this picture of Cleopatra, she is corrupt beyond redemption. Lucan chooses to describe her not just as Ptolemy’s sister, but as his “guilty” sister. She has two husbands, one of whom is her brother, yet she does not marry either in the text: the act of sex marries her to Ptolemy and to Caesar. Pothinus’ words show Cleopatra sleeping with both men in one night, perhaps multiple times. She is “races” between them, striving to cement her sway over each of them. This behavior is not becoming of a queen, yet the sentence ends with Cleopatra’s established rule over Egypt and her growing power over Rome through sex with Caesar. Her “whoring,” not her statesmanship or diplomacy, places her in control of him and of Rome.

Cleopatra’s words, her opportunity to speak for herself, are the crown on her assertion of power. In her speech to Caesar, she seems to submit to him by saying that she will remain an exile “unless [his] hand restores [her] to her destiny of old” (10.88), so she is powerless unless he chooses to act. But in that same statement, she invokes her right to the throne as her destiny. She does this again when she says, “I as queen embrace your feet” (10.89). Embracing Caesar’s feet is a subservient action, but as she does this, she calls herself queen. She legitimizes her sovereignty by telling him that she will “not be the first woman to rule / the Nile’s cities: with no distinction of sex / Pharos knows how to bear a queen” (10.90-2). Unlike in Rome, she argues, an Egyptian woman’s right to rule is equal to an Egyptian man’s right to rule. Her father gave her “shared rights to power” (10.93) with her brother which comprise the foundation of her reign.

Cleopatra also compares her independence to her brother’s weakness. Ptolemy’s “emotions and his swords / are subject to Pothinus’ sway” (10.95-6). He is a teen, a young man at most, and has no control over his actions as king. Pothinus manipulates him for his own ends. On the other hand, Cleopatra declares herself rightful queen numerous times throughout her speech and has established control through her display of erotic grief before Caesar. She contrasts herself with her brother, as she speaks and acts of her own volition. She molds Caesar as Pothinus molds Ptolemy. In asking Caesar to “tell the king to be a king” (10.99), she suggests that her brother is not regal, but she is. She knows how to lead.

Despite declaring her power to Caesar in these ways throughout her speech, this declaration would be useless (10.105) if she did not look the part of the desperate woman. She “would have tried” and failed “to influence the stubborn ears of Caesar” (10.105) if she only had her words. Again, “her face,” her “impure beauty” (10.106), and her night with Caesar make him bend to her will, not her words. Lucan undermines her one moment of unadulterated power by
writing that it would have been unsuccessful if she was not a beautiful woman willing to falsify her emotion and act as a prostitute. Her agency stems not from her invocation of Egyptian custom, but from her unqueenly behavior. Lucan’s *Civil War* is a devolution into frenzy, and only in its last book can a woman have her own power, unconnected to that of her husband. When all is chaos, Cleopatra can rise to prominence. Her strength comes not from her right to the Egyptian throne and her effective leadership, but from her opulent, feminine, sexual presentation. These are all threatening and harmful qualities that, in a world bound by convention, would debase her. In Lucan’s universe of madness, she is able to ascend. Lucan encapsulates his Cleopatra in his first description of her as “the disgrace of Egypt, deadly Erinys of Latium, / promiscuous to the harm of Rome” (10.59-60). As a disgraceful, deadly, promiscuous Fury, Cleopatra embodies all of the vile qualities of womanhood. Her dreadful power extends beyond the borders of her kingdom.

**References**

Catiline and the *Confessions*: An Indictment of Human Sin

*Shawn Kant*

A craven callous cretin of unique, irredeemable decrepitude. A complicated, multifaceted criminal indicative of broad moral failure in society. In a curious twist, both statements refer to the same man. The former stems from the fiery, relentless character assassination of Cicero’s *Catilinarian Orations*. The latter encapsulates the moralizing monograph of Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinam*. Each author writes with a different purpose, leaving readers with the unenviable task of determining which depiction, if any, represents the real Catiline, an icon of invidiousness and intrigue during the late Roman Republic. Centuries later, St. Augustine resurrects these two Catilines from the annals of the classical tradition in his *Confessions*, a pioneering work in the growing space of Christian literature.

The strong classical presence within the *Confessions* represents a hidden treasure, accessible to readers through the numerous tags (and in certain cases, direct quotations) Augustine infuses into his text. At first glance, a devout Christian author alluding to his pagan predecessors seems paradoxical. However, further interrogation of specific moments reveals how the classical literary tradition can complement and even complete the Christian project Augustine embarks upon. Indeed, one such set of allusions occurs late in Book 2, involving the invocation of Catiline. Interrogating Augustine’s words in Book 2, I will investigate how tags referencing Ciceronian and Sallustian depictions of Catiline develop his meditations on emotion, the problematic nature of language, and the motivations behind human sin. This in turn allows Augustine to set the stage for a deeper analysis of the origins of evil, the chief saboteur of the human condition in the mortal world.

The concept of intense emotion as a vehicle for human expression proves a useful control for understanding the themes broached in Book 2. Indeed, the first line of 2.2.2 captures this animating spirit: “et quid erat quod me delectabat, nisi amare et amari” or “And what delighted me, besides to love and be loved? (*Conf*, 2.2.2). Two converging streams of emotion, active (“amare”) and passive (“amari”) forms of love, meet in an all-encompassing textual embrace, fusing together to become one. Indeed, read aloud in meter, “amare” would elide into “et amari” in seamless progression.
In Book 1, feeling emerges as the fundamental prerequisite for faith and forging an intimate relationship with God (cf. Conf 1.1). That sort of feeling represents a transcendent emotional state, with the ears of the heart opening themselves up to the Word of God. The closest analogy would be the sensation of falling in love, but even that proves problematic—the Fallenness endemic to temporal love, no matter how pure, renders it impossible to equate it to feeling God’s love. Language, the icon of humanity’s fallenness, breaks down attempting to describe this phenomenon. Young Augustine in Book 2 struggles to square this circle. His ignorance of God shackles him to the wrong sort of strong feeling, a temporal emotional state poisoned by human depravity and corporality.

“Amare et amari” travels through the looking glass as “to love and be loved” takes on the tone of “to lust and be lusted after.” Cicero percolates in “amare et amari” with a moment in the Second Catilinarian. There, Cicero describes young boys participating in Catiline’s scheme obsessed with rampant hedonism on one hand, violence and murder on the other—“amare et amari…set etiam sicas vibrare et spargere venena” or “to love and be loved...but also to brandish daggers and to scatter poison” (Cat. 2.23). In the line, Cicero juxtaposes the pure pleasure of “amare et amari” with the senseless cruelty of “vibrare et spargere”, creating a poignant antithesis. In addition, with respect to sound, the verbal slide of “vibrare” into “et spargere” mimics that of “amare” into “et amari”, a further structural chain yoking the two phrases together. “Vibrare et spargere” becomes a linguistic anchor tied to “amare et amari”, dragging the latter down into the depths of degeneracy.

Furthermore, according to Cicero, Catiline considers these poor, deluded youth his most intimate associates: “de eius dilectu, immo vero de complexu eius ac sinu” or “among his beloved, truly indeed of his embrace and bosom” (Cat. 2.22). “Complexu” and “sinu” paint a charged, erotic picture of Catiline embracing these young men in a manner reminiscent of lovers. Yet these lovers have no knowledge of true love. Instead, like young Augustine, they crave visceral sensation and feeling devoid of substance. This furnishes the degeneration of “amare et amari” discussed above and furthers Augustine’s point regarding the extent of corruption underpinning privileging meaningless corporality over meaningful spirituality.

Moving forward, 2.4.9 and 2.5.11 contain the beating heart of Catiline, Ciceronian and Sallustian versions in Augustine’s Confessions. The echoes of original sin that resound in Augustine’s recollection of his theft of pears from a pear tree cannot be ignored; it forms the fulcrum upon which Book 2 rests. That resonance speaks to the sorrow with which Augustine views this moment, a major moral trough of his life. The pears, “ne forma nec sapore inlecebrosis” or “with attractiveness neither with respect to appearance nor taste”, become emblems of pure wantonness, plucked for no discernable purpose other than to annihilate Augustine’s self-decency (Conf. 2.4.9).
In that recollection, Augustine characterizes his band of friends as “nequissimi adulescentuli” or “most wretched young boys” (Conf. 2.4.5). “Adulescentuli” takes readers to Cicero and Sallustian Catilines in one fell swoop. Addressing Catiline before the senate in his First Catilina rian, Cicero excoriates Catiline’s seduction of young Romans to violence and crime—“cui tu adulescentulo, quem corruptelarum illecebris inretisses, non aut ad audaciam ferrum aut ad lubidinem facem praetulisti” or “to which youth, whom you might have enticed by the allure of corruption, have you not offered a sword or recklessness or a torch for their lust” (Cat. 1.6.13). Here, Catiline resembles Satan in serpentine form in the Garden of Eden, whispering into the ears of unsuspecting youths to bend their minds to his will. He weaponizes the sinful state of human language, honing rhetoric as a tool of deception.

Note once again the erotic undertone of Cicero’s verbal barrage against Catiline, involving words like “illecebra” and “lubidinem”, “entanglement” and “licentiousness” that have strong sexual charge (cf. Cat 2.22-23). Through language, Catiline masks lust under the façade of love, and seduces vulnerable souls. This fits well into the thematic framework provided by “amare et amari” as sexual, fallen human eroticism collides against heavenly affection within the thematic backdrop of the Confessions.

A brief interlude – in a perfect testament to the duplicity of language, Augustine utilizes the Pro Caelio in Book 2 as well, with the tag “ne adulterarem” in Conf. 2.3.7 (cf. Pro Caelio, 18.42).1 Readers of the Pro Caelio will find Cicero unrecognizable when he discusses Catiline in near-Sallustian fashion, even excusing his defendant Caelius’ association with the man as a forgivable youthful error. Cicero of the Catilinarians would have condemned young Caelius to death without appeal. Different circumstances, however, require Cicero to make a radical shift in his attitude towards Catiline lest he fail at his new task: defending his client. Readers can imagine Augustine’s wry amusement, as with simultaneous allusions to the Pro Caelio and the Catilinarians he asks through the text if the real Cicero, if he exists at all, could stand up and tell us what he truly believes, if possible.

Turning to Sallust, “adulescentuli” transports readers to chapters 14-20 of the Bellum Catilinam, the tail end of the introductory chapters. Variations of “adulescentuli” itself appear first in chapter 14, where Sallust describes Catiline’s particular affinity for surrounding himself with vulnerable youth—“sed maxime adulescentium familiaritates adpetebat” or “but most of all, he used to seek the association of the young” (Bell. Cat, 14). Then, they surface again in chapter 18, where Sallust confects a striking portrait of unchecked youthful volition in the figure of the young Gnaeus Piso, a Catilinarian co-

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1. There is more than can be said about the Pro Caelio tag beyond its relevance to language and Catiline, but those dimensions would be the focus for a different discussion. I have included a brief mention of this tag here to illustrate this one point about language that proves relevant in this context.
conspirator—“erat eodem tempore Cn Piso, adulescens nobilis” or “there was in that time a distinguished young man, Gnaeus Piso” (Bell. Cat, 18).

On one level, readers can draw a parallel to themes of seduction broached in Cicero. Sallust’s Catiline spins a web of passion and lies, using duplicitous language as his medium, to ensnare young recruits and stimulate development of new vices within them. The superlative “maxime” emphasizes Catiline’s skill and success in this endeavor. Piso, Sallust’s proof of concept, ends up dead, ruined by the consequences of his fall to Catiline. Nevertheless, in Augustine’s mind, at least Piso had a well-defined motive for sinning, as did the youth described by Cicero: they believed Catiline’s promises of rewards and power in exchange for supporting his revolution. Meanwhile, Augustine admits that he sinned for the sole sake of sin, the basest non-motive imaginable. Therefore, the followers of both Catilines, as horrible as they may be, pale in comparison to the magnitude of young Augustine’s depravity.

In the 1900s, renowned psychologist Abraham Maslow created what he called a hierarchy of needs leading up to the ultimate goal of human self-actualization (fulfillment). Centuries earlier, while meditating on the nature of sin Augustine describes his own version of a hierarchy of needs, a spectrum extending from fallen to sacral spaces, segmented by levels of true “good” in Confessions 2.5 (“et…tua”) (Conf. 2.5.10). “Amare et amari” from 2.2.2 acts as a marker for tracing the soul’s position on this spectrum of spiritual needs. A soul caught in the throes of physical concupiscence exists trapped in fallen temporal space. Forging a true friendship with another human beyond physical intimacy begins to elevate the soul, but it remains, at its core, fallen. To ascend further and escape the shackles of worldly space, the soul must embrace God and love God alone.

Sallust’s presence dominates 2.5.11, not least because of Augustine’s direct quotations. One quote refers to Catiline maintaining the resolve of his followers through endless criminal activity, lest their minds start to recoil from the idea of committing sins—“ne per otium…torpesceret manus aut animus” (Conf. 2.5.11; Bell. Cat. 16). Readers can imagine Sallust’s Catiline standing before a legion of the fallen, like Satan at the head of his army of fallen angels expelled from Heaven. In a perverted parody of the classical Roman general exhorting his troops to glory and victory, Catiline exhorts his troops to murder and mayhem.

Augustine, having examined the motivations of Catiline’s followers, concludes by turning to Catiline’s personal motivations for crime. Again, Sallust provides the general framework, for Augustine writes that Catiline desired to accumulate enough power and wealth so that he would never need to fear the law or poverty again (“ut…scelerum”) (Conf. 2.5.11). Within this section, the words “inopiam rei familiaris et conscientiam scelerum” or “poverty of familiar matters and the feeling of wickedness” evoke chapter 5 of the Bellum Catilinam, where Sallust first introduces his Catiline. There, Sallust’s special fascination with the connection between the physical condition of the body and inner character comes into vivid focus. Indeed,
authors from Sallust to Suetonius and beyond placed a premium on the impact of this link. Sallust describes Catiline’s body as capable of enduring extremes of temperature, starvation, and sleep deprivation while his devious mind and violent passions never rest—“huic…vexabant” (Bell. Cat., 5). Incredible physical fortitude combined with mental alacrity and personal charisma develops a unique, terrifying new breed of villain, akin to a modern-day “super-villain.” This detailed portrayal adds multiple dimensions to Catiline’s that render him far more than just another ordinary criminal, going well beyond seductive charm alone.²

The introductory chapters of the Bellum Catilinam hold special significance as a statement of Sallust’s purpose for his project. According to Sallust, virtue and piety among Rome’s citizens propelled Rome to glory and success (Bellum Cat, 9). These values unified Romans against their enemies. The turning point occurred after Rome’s final defeat of Carthage, Sallust argues, at which point peace and stability gave way to complacency. Complacency provided fertile ground for greed, selfishness, and above all, the lust for power to take root (Bell. Cat, 10).

Unlike Cicero’s Catiline, Sallust’s Catiline represents a malignant tumor spawned from the mutant morality of a decadent Roman society. Catiline’s remarkable, inhuman physical resilience resembles the imperviousness of tumors to normal limiting factors of cell survival. Tumors grow without restraint, overwhelming “good” cells in the tissue around them. Sallust’s Catiline remakes decent men into licentious fiends in his own image (Bell. Cat. 14.4). Left unchecked, a cancerous tumor will metastasize, spread throughout the body, and corrode it from within. Sallust’s Catiline unmasks and unleashes the evil lurking beneath Roman society. Stopping this cancer requires more than a simple surgical resection—removing the tumor, or in Sallust’s case, defeating Catiline in battle. To cure this cancer requires a much more difficult course of treatment: reviving Rome’s moral purpose.

² Although long after Augustine’s time, Sallust’s Catiline resembles John Milton’s Satan from Paradise Lost to a striking degree. Both characters possess stunning physical strength, and the ability to rally followers with strong personal charisma. Even Catiline’s argument to his co-conspirators about slavery versus self-rule resembles Satan’s declaration “better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.” To a lesser extent, even Cicero’s Catiline, with all of his arrogance and seductive charm, bears some similarities to Milton’s Satan. Catiline’s seduction of youth quite literally parallels Satan whispering to Eve in Milton’s Eden. I think that in the context of Book 2, Augustine might find parallels between Catiline and Milton’s Satan thought-provoking, to say the least. After all, even Milton’s Satan, the Devil himself, committed his sin against God for a reason: obtaining power. This point becomes a damning indictment of how low Augustine sank when he committed a sin for no reason other than enjoying the crime.
This thematic point makes Sallust’s Catiline of special relevance to Augustine. Throughout the *Confessions*, including in Book 2, he describes the sinful state as a festering illness mutating his soul into a murky swamp (e.g. Conf. 2.2.2). In fact, Sallust even likens the spread of vice in Roman society to the contagion of plague, “ubi contagio quasi pestilentia invasit” or “as if when a deadly plague has invaded” (*Bell. Cat.*, 10). Thinking about Sallust’s Catiline as a disease pervading human society allows Augustine to tap into an old Roman social-moral critique using Christianity as the new control. This cancer deafens fallen humans to God, and in the absence of God, purges good from the soul. Later in the *Confessions*, Augustine will explain that this unnatural condition, a void in the soul left behind by the disappearance of good, goes by another term: evil. To purge evil requires returning to God. This natural chemotherapy will revivify the fallen soul’s lost moral purpose—to live a moral life according to the teachings of God.

A final set of overarching observations for Book 2 can help tie together interpretive threads woven by Ciceronian and Sallustian tags to Catiline. These center on the notion of dualities. As obvious as it may be at this point, it is worth emphasizing again the strong presence of two Catilines. Indeed, the Ciceronian resonance imbued within “amare et amari” in 2.2.2 and the Sallustian quotation of “inopiam rei familiaris et conscientiam scelerum” bracket a series of tags to Catiline in Book 2. Moreover, a single word, “adulescentuli” in 2.4.9, alludes to Cicero’s *Catilinarians* and Sallust’s *Bellum Catilinam* with equal potency. Neither author’s Catiline overwhelms the other. Each exists alongside the other in a paradoxical state of symbiosis and tension.

This symbiosis stems from both Catilines’ roles as fallen figures; neither Cicero nor Sallust would argue otherwise. After all, to traditionalist Republican Romans, betraying the fatherland for revolution (the dreaded words “*res novae*”—or “new things”) carries the same sense of horror as Original Sin does in the minds of Christians. Tensions flare from each author’s development of their Catilines, with different implications and areas of focus clashing with each other within and between tags.

The animating force of two Catilines emblematizes the internal conflict within Augustine as he articulates the nature of his own sins and ponders his potential for ablation. Consider this: towards the end of the *Bellum Catilinam*, the Roman senate debates whether or not to execute a number of Catiline’s co-conspirators without a trial (*Bell. Cat.*, 51-55). This remarkable scene features Julius Caesar challenging this illegal idea (and illegal it was under existing Roman law), arguing instead for life imprisonment. Cato the Younger disagrees, arguing for summary execution of these traitors to the state.

Themes of justice and judgment animate their dueling speeches in the *Bellum Catilinam*, with little doubt concerning which argument Sallust, a pro-Caesarian partisan, favors, even as Cato wins. These themes percolate in the *Confessions* as well. For Augustine, God represents the ultimate arbiter of justice, and every human will one day stand trial at the court of God. God has
mercy, but mercy does not mean automatic forgiveness. Therefore, the question for young Augustine becomes whether or not he will achieve a chance at redemption before that time. Or will he face judgment and be sentenced to suffer a painful, Catilinarian end?

Next, the presence of two Catilines complements two distinct states of intense emotion coursing through Book 2: pure love and polluted lust. Tantalus and the apple hanging just out of reach, so close yet so far, mimics young Augustine’s relationship with true love. “Amare et amari”—he seeks love, but trying to find pure affection outside of God in the temporal world resembles seeking oxygen in outer space. Augustine spiritually suffocates himself in that pointless quest, and as a consequence, falls victim to lust—the dark alter-ego of love. Note that lust need not be restricted to lust of the flesh. General greed falls under the umbrella of lust. After all, Cicero’s Catiline embodies the self-destructive consequences of indulging in lust for power on the individual. Sallust’s Catiline represents the product of a society that, in his view, wallows in every dimension of lust. Both embark on the path towards evil, with the light of goodness illuminating the soul flickering less and less until it burns out.

In the end, neither Catiline survives for long. Lust and sin, exacerbated by language, doom both to inevitable death. For Augustine and his readers, this becomes a warning to avoid the path of lust and sin, regardless of one’s motivations, regardless of how easy and tempting it may be. Tread instead on the difficult yet rewarding path of virtue. Sharpen the inner ears, hear the Word of God, and experience the true divine pleasure of “amare et amari” in a sacral space above the plane of human existence. Do this soon, Augustine implies, before time runs out.

**References**


Discovering the Alcmaeonidae. Original artwork by Maya Smith. Used by Permission
Pindar and the Artistic Self in Olympian 1

David Del Terzo

Although Pindar’s Olympian 1 celebrates the athletic achievements of Hieron, the lyric expands the epinikion by including numerous allusions to the poet’s skills. Pindar complements his praise for Hieron by intertwining explicit and implicit references to his own literary abilities. Through parallels hinting at artistic merit, mythological storytelling, and wise advice, Pindar demonstrates his intellectual and moral prominence to his audience, professing his superior literary authority.

Pindar’s opening descriptions that center around supremacy suggest that his poem will also be excellent in nature. The ode begins by stating, “Best is water, and gold, like blazing fire by night, / shines forth preeminent amid the lordliness of wealth” (Olympian 1, Lines 1-2). Such characteristics of excellence symbolize athletic prowess—nourishment in order to be victorious and rewards as a result of victory. Pindar follows these images with one celebrating a notable athletic competition: “Nor let us herald any games as superior to Olympia’s / from which comes glorious song” (Olympian Lines 1, 7-8). The Olympic games become part of Pindar’s list of great excellences and acknowledge the greatness of the unfolding story. Pindar’s allusion to the “glorious song” in turn requires a glorious performer—the perfect introduction to Pindar as a literary power.

For the remainder of the ode, the associations of greatness relate to Hieron, allowing for the creation of a parallel between Pindar’s literary merit and the talent of his patron. In the midst of introducing Hieron’s achievements, Pindar affirms his purpose as poet: “[Hieron] culls the foremost of all excellences, / and he is made resplendent too / by music’s choicest strains, / such songs as we men often sing...the Dorian lyre...place[s] your mind beneath the spell of sweetest thoughts” (Olympian 1, Lines 13-16, 18-19). Pindar uses Hieron’s awe for his literary work to elevate his own status as a poet. A man of great nature appreciates a poem of great content; thus, the poem’s creator must also be great.

To uphold his self-warranted claims of literary authority, Pindar displays his mythological knowledge. A central part of the ode involves Pindar’s adjustment of the famous myth of Pelops, declaring that “tales embellished beyond the true account / with lies of cunning pattern, / cheat and lead astray...contrary to earlier accounts I shall / proclaim...it was he of the splendid
trident snatched you up” (Olympian 1, Lines 28b-29, 36, 40). Although the changes in the myth may intrigue a listener, Pindar’s identification of the deceit involved in the traditional story is more remarkable, creating a sense of enhanced insight and raising Pindar to a more sophisticated level of narration. Beyond providing the truth of Pelops’ story, Pindar employs his talent to enlighten his listeners as to the moral lessons of the story.

Pindar transforms the Pelops reference into a conceit about Hieron, a ploy that allows Pindar to offer further life wisdom. By extending Pelops’ myth into a metaphorical model for Hieron to live by, Pindar asserts his highest form of literary authority: presentation of advice. Although Hieron corresponds to Pelops, Pindar employs Tantalus’ fateful nectar consumption as instructions about modesty and honesty: “In his greed he gained / excess of ruin...if in any action any man / hopes to elude divinity, he is in error” (Olympian 1, Lines 56-57, 64). Pindar exercises a lesson on the danger of gluttony and power through Tantalus’ transgressions, constituting himself as a knowledgeable and wise figure. This reference to the possible flawed tendencies of human nature, delivered by none other than a human, heightens Pindar’s perceptiveness as a narrator.

Pindar’s counsel also incorporates the divine realm, addressing human interaction with the gods through the inclusion of a personal statement and examples of conduct. In addressing the classic version of Pelops’ myth, in which Tantalus serves his son as a meal to the gods, Pindar condemns such a thought, proclaiming “it is impossible to call / any of the blessed gods a glutton: I stand apart” (Olympian 1, Line 52). Here, Pindar capitalizes on the opportunity to make two points: establishing his separation from the crowd and advocating for universal respect for the gods. The latter idea of divine reverence appears again at the ode’s close, during Pindar’s parting instructions to Hieron: “In different matters different men show greatness, but / the utmost peak belongs / to kings. Extend your gaze no further” (Olympian 1, Lines 113-114). The previous message of moderation reappears in the recognition of Hieron’s future successes because Pindar wants to remind his listeners of the perilous greed that prosperity often brings. This final piece of advice is an illuminating paradox—an individual’s great endeavors ought to be curbed to believe in the greatness of the gods and, in doing so, such veneration augments the greatness of that individual.

Pindar completes his claims to literary authority through a final elaboration of the ode’s significance, by emphasizing on the responsibility of championing Hieron in an ode, and through an affirmation of his literary capability. The prestige of being crowned an Olympic victor creates a burden: “Fame / gleams far and wide from the Olympic races / of Pelops...to crown / that
[victorious] man with music in the Aeolian mode, a tune fit for a horseman, is my duty” (Olympian 1, Lines 93-95, 100-103). The prominence ascribed to the story’s events requires a gifted and dedicated storyteller. A confirmation of Pindar’s suitability for this position follows: “I am confident that no host exists who can lay claim to deeper knowledge of noble ends or yet to greater power...to be embellished with loud folds of song” (Olympian 1, Lines 103-105). Despite not including much evidence, this declaration is neither unfounded nor uncalled for; Pindar’s previous assertions of literary power, supported by his handling of myth, forms a solid testimony to his literary mastery.

Olympian 1 highlights the accomplishments of an individual. The ode completes this task in two ways—first, in the form of an immediate commemoration of Hieron’s victory and, second, as a larger tribute to Pindar’s literary capabilities. In upholding his literary authority, Pindar illustrates his identity. Self-pronouncements of merit speak to a confident and exemplary character, while mythological reference and analysis reveal a grand understanding and intellect: true testaments to the power and singularity of Pindar’s self.

References

Cato the Elder: A Model of Romanitas

Annabelle Hutchinson

Cato the Elder was the model Roman military statesman. He embodied traditional Roman values including constancy, vigor, discipline, dignity, frugality, eloquence, observance of custom, modesty, and above all else, duty to the state. Plutarch’s biography of Cato is twofold in purpose: to extol Cato’s character while warning of the danger of excessive adherence to a value-system that is not meant to be upheld without limit. Cato epitomized the Roman tradition just as that tradition was being upended, working within and beyond the norms of his era. Through Cato’s biography, Plutarch defends *aurea mediocritas*, that everything should be done in moderation, including moderation.

The virtues of Cato are abundant, and Plutarch characterizes Cato as a figure worthy of emulation. Cato’s primary goal, in his youth and onward, was military glory in service of the Roman state. He was deeply impacted by his first military campaign against Hannibal in Italy (Waterfield 1999, 9). Famous for repeating *Carthago delenda est*, Cato may have developed his distrust of Carthage during this period in Italy. Hatred toward Carthage bookends Cato’s life of service to Rome and illustrates his *constantia*. Plutarch refers to Cato’s lifelong vigor on several occasions. His passion for agriculture and working his own fields, a Roman ideal that links Cato to Cincinnatus, demanded a strong body. Other personal behaviors, like his simple, healthy dietary habits marked by temperance and his strength in military action, demonstrate physical fitness (Waterfield 1999, 9).

Through his discipline Cato typifies yet another Roman virtue. He maintained an orderly estate and kept his slaves obedient with a brutal hand (Waterfield 1999, 12-13). As praetor in Sardinia, he was “uncompromising in his administration of justice” but his demands were just, unlike previous extortionary praetors who drew from public funds to support their extravagance and cruelty (Waterfield 1999, 13-14). The expenditure of wealth for only necessities is a virtue persistently highlighted by Plutarch.

When an excessive grain dole was to be distributed, Cato spoke out against it (Waterfield 1999, 13). When his attendant Paccius bought three slaves unnecessarily, Paccius hung himself because of he disappointed Cato; Cato, of course, sold the slave boys and donated the profit to the state (Waterfield 1999,
He wore simple clothing, spent little money on food and no money on inessentials. This personal ideal played into his political maneuvers, such as when he enacted heavy taxes against luxury items to the dismay of ostentatious aristocrats, cut off public water from private homes, and repossessed public lands encroached upon by private individuals. The Roman elite deeply resented these actions, although they were good for the state treasury (Waterfield 1999, 25-26). In Cato’s perspective, the accumulation of wealth must never be for personal luxury; rather, it must always bolster the **gloria** of one’s family and enlarge the strength of the state.

Furthermore, Cato had a clear distinction between **dignitas** and arrogance. Righteous pride could be won by successful military exploits and had a specific, useful function in the state. Plutarch writes that Cato often boasted of his success but that “he thought the mark of a good citizen to be reluctant to hear himself praised unless the state benefited from it” (Waterfield 1999, 26). Cato’s rationale, then, was that praising his great deeds did in fact benefit the state because of increased morale among the citizenry (Waterfield 1999, 21). In contrast, boastfulness for boastfulness’ sake was a mark of immoderation and excessive arrogance because it elevated the individual without elevating the state.

Modesty was also of great importance to Cato. As censor, he removed a senator who kissed his wife publicly, an act he considered incredibly indecent. Problematic, then, is Cato’s own behavior in hiring a prostitute after the death of his wife. Plutarch offers a defense of Cato, however, by blaming Cato’s act on his incredible vigor and strength even in old age (Waterfield 1999, 31). Defending Cato’s marriage to a young woman, Plutarch says that Cato was doing so in duty to the state, to “leave [his] country more citizens like [his dutiful son]” (Waterfield 1999, 32).

Cato deviated from his contemporaries in a variety of ways. A **novus homo**, Cato adopted the Roman tradition like a zealous religious convert: his adherence to the *mos maiorum* was more severe than the *nobiles* who did not have to prove themselves to their colleagues because of their well-established names. As such, he did not adopt the philhellenism that marked other senators of this age. He departed from other writers in using Latin, not Greek, to author his history of Rome (Waterfield 1999, 19). He favored the concision of Latin, a concision that fit well into his paradigm of simplicity over decadence.

When an Athenian embassy of philosophers visited Rome, Cato was repelled by the teachings of the Skeptic Carneades to whom the young men of Rome eagerly listened. The Skeptic teachings about the lack of absolutes proved deeply antithetical to Cato’s absolutist views of morality. Cato feared that the young Romans would abandon the greatest good, military success, in order to pursue purely intellectual pursuits; he had the embassy quickly do their business with the Senate so that they would leave Rome (Waterfield 1999, 30-31). Likewise, Cato opposed praising Socrates because Socrates subverted the
traditions of his home city. Convention and tradition were pure good; *mos maiorum* was not to be upended.

Immoderation and luxury were highly unethical according to Cato’s moral system. Plutarch writes, “By that time Rome had grown too big to preserve its integrity; so many lands and people were under its control that it was in contact with a variety of practices, [and] was influenced by all kinds of customs” (Waterfield 1999, 12). While great swaths of other Roman elites were displaying their wealth in order to impress others, Cato did the opposite. He clung tightly to traditional Roman values while other elites were corrupted by the riches won by military conquest abroad and the influx of foreign cultural influence at home.

However, like his contemporaries, Cato operated within a system that necessitated alliances, glorified military exploits, and required the accumulation of wealth among the powerful. When his son married a woman from the Scipio family, it was well within the norms of Roman society that the marriage was politically-motivated (Waterfield 1999, 28). Cato’s unending obsession with military conquest, from his first campaign against Hannibal, to his campaign in Tarentum, to that in Greece against Antiochus, was also typical. The Roman elite knew that military success was a clear and easy way to receive glory and political clout. Therefore, Cato’s insistence that *Carthago delenda est* was not out of the ordinary, although the degree to which he urged it might have been unusual. Cato’s frugality did not eliminate his desire to accumulate wealth, a common goal among elites, but his purpose was to preserve and augment the *dignitas* and legacy of his family rather than display his wealth to others. Moreover, his devotion and duty towards family was a societal ideal that any good *paterfamilias* would strive toward.

Plutarch’s primary purpose of his life of Cato the Elder is to exhibit a model of *Romanitas* while warning against taking any single value system too far. While his frugality is praised, the excessiveness of it is not to be imitated. For example, Plutarch plainly disapproves of Cato’s treatment of slaves as mere economic tools. They deserve, Plutarch writes, to be treated as better than animals and more than the profit they bring to the household (Waterfield 1999, 12-13). Likewise, Cato’s practice of “bottomry,” a capitalistic practice meant to minimize risk by splitting it among investors, is offensive to Plutarch because it takes the blame off Cato at the expense of others (Waterfield 1999, 28). Plutarch writes that, “[Cato] went too far when in a rash moment he said that any man whose account-books show that he added to his estate more than he inherited deserves to be admired and revered as a god” (Waterfield 1999, 30).

His rejection of foreign cultures, though valiant in its patriotism, fails to acknowledge changing norms and is associated with undue strictness. His obsession with military victory, especially over Carthage, failed to realize the sound logic of Publius Scipio Nasica who argued that Carthage ought to exist in order to “curb the rashness of the masses” as a unifying enemy (Waterfield 1999, 35). Even so, Plutarch meant for Cato to be admired. His distinction as a soldier, statesman, and citizen, though extreme, is exemplary. If studied
critically, Cato’s positive qualities leave much to be imitated by Plutarch’s contemporaries.

References

In Xenophon’s Poroi, he advocates a policy of inclusion for the metic population in Athens. Xenophon’s policy proposals may seem a “bold” (Figueira 2016: 676) example of liberalism and appreciation for individual rights in the context of war-torn 4th century B.C.E. Athens (Carugati et al. 2016: 1). However, in comparing this work with Lacedaimonion Politia (Lac. Pol.) and Hieron, it is clear that Xenophon did not see immigration or inclusivity as a moral good, but rather as a practical imperative. In Hieron, Simonides represents a pragmatic reforming figure, innovating upon Hiero’s desire for mercenaries using similar logic and rhetoric as Xenophon uses when arguing to expand metrics’ rights. In Lac. Pol., meanwhile, Xenophon establishes Lycurgus’ insular military state as philosophically ideal, reflecting the system for which Xenophon seems to yearn in the Poroi.

In Hieron, Simonides cedes to Hiero’s desire for mercenaries out of pragmatism; he advises Hiero to make these foreigners not accepted members of Athenian society — much less members of the elite spaces Hiero occupied— but rather, subordinates to the entire citizenry. In the dialogue, Simonides is a Socratic figure, attempting to mold Hiero, an “imperfect hero,” into a more benevolent, ethical ruler (Sevieri 2004: 278-9). Xenophon’s unusual choice of Simonides, a poet, to fill this role reflects the text’s emphasis on addressing the tyrant’s personal needs, as Simonides had a reputation for dealing in self-interest (Parks 2018: 385). Simonides seeks not to make Hiero the morally immaculate ruler, but rather to work within the bounds of his tyranny in order to confer more benefits upon the general public.

Indeed, Simonides only concedes that mercenaries may be necessary in Chapter 10 as a caveat to his prior argument in Chapter 9 that should Hiero gain the goodwill of the people, he will no longer have to fear as much for his life. Simonides acknowledges his need for mercenaries, replying to Hiero that like horses, some human beings are liable to become insolent or unruly. (“ὥβριστος”) (Xenophon Hiero, 10.2 in The Shorter Writings). Here, Simonides recalls Hiero’s justification for fearing his own subjects, in which he argues that a “good horse” may nonetheless make his master “fearful lest it do something fatal” (“φοβερὸς δὲ μὴ ἀνήκεστόν τι ποιήσῃ”) (Xenophon Hiero, 6.15).
Therefore, Simonides accepts the tyrant’s justification for foreign protection as an unfortunate but unavoidable truth.

Simonides then suggests modifications to Hiero’s current use of mercenaries which further imply that foreigners should serve at citizens’ and the tyrants’ pleasure. He does not advocate mercenaries fulfilling public service (as opposed to serving the tyrant alone) to allow them greater equality or prospects for integration into Athenian society. Instead, he outlines three practical, self-serving objectives that render the mercenaries subservient to the tyrant and native citizens alike: to make Hiero’s protection more secure; to make “laborers and sheep” (“ἐργάταις καὶ κτήσιν”) more secure, therefore conferring an economic benefit by strengthening agriculture “throughout the countryside” (“ἀνὰ τὴν χώραν”); and to convince the citizens to pay for and house the mercenaries, rather than the tyrant shouldering the entire cost of their services (Xenophon Hiero, 10.4-8.). In this scenario, the mercenaries are beholden even to the lowest economic strata, the ἐργάται, or menial laborers.

In making this case, Simonides juxtaposes a comparison of mercenaries to “δούλοις” (“slaves”) with, in the previous line, “καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς” (“virtuous good men”), referring to the citizens (Xenophon Hiero, 10.3-4.). He further differentiates between the citizen who deserves “σχολὴν” (“leisure”) and the mercenaries, who must “work and run risk and keep guard before [the citizens]” (Xenophon Hiero, 10.5-6). Finally, his use of polysyndeton in listing the mercenaries’ duties (“τούτους γὰρ προπονεῖν καὶ προκινδυνεῖν καὶ προφυλάττειν”) further emphasizes the manifold duties that they will be taking over, in relation to the other citizens “suitable” (“εἰκὸς”) to be enjoying military campaigns in relative safety (Xenophon Hiero, 10.6.). Through these linguistic contrasts, Xenophon emphasizes the distinction between the moral, privileged citizen and the servile, expendable mercenaries.

In the Poroi, Xenophon similarly calls for increased rights for metics from a practical rather than ideological standpoint. As Thomas Figueira has argued, in the Poroi, as Simonides voiced in the Hieron, Xenophon adopts an “early psychology of purposive, opportunistic decision-making” (Figueira 2012: 683). It was not the time for idealism; given the turbulence of the late fifth and fourth centuries, there was a dire need to improve the lifestyle of Athenians, causing Xenophon to advocate greater inclusion of metics as a rational solution by which to increase revenue without raising the eisphora or liturgies that Athenians could not afford at that time (Figueira 2012: 674). Xenophon appeals to his audience with the same strategy Simonides employed towards Hiero, laying out tangible incentives for structuring Athens as he recommends (Schorn 2012: 704). Allowing metics to serve in the cavalry, build homes on available land, and be overseen by a “Guardian of the Metics” (“µετοικοφύλαξ”) does not benefit them. Xenophon intends these privileges to “make [the metics] more friendly,” “render the city stronger and greater,” “increase revenue” for Athens, and make those wishing to live in Athens “more and better” (Xenophon Poroi, 2.5-7 in The Shorter Writings).
Moreover, Xenophon does not propose total inclusion; he only desires to remove those societal barriers which “do not seem to help the city as much as they provide disgrace to the metics” — in other words, denigrating metics is acceptable if it confers clear benefits upon Athenian citizens (Xenophon Poroi, 2.2). If anything, his proposal to create such a μετοκοφόλαξ would have strengthened the existing political segregation between the metics and native citizens by creating a separate office governing the former group alone (Schorn 2012: 704).

In the Lac. Pol., unlike Athens or Hiero’s domain, Xenophon describes Sparta as a morally ideal society. A key element of this virtue is its insularity. Xenophon opens Lac. Pol. with his realization that although Sparta is “one of the most scantily populated cities,” it was once “both the most powerful and most well-known city in Sparta” (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 1.1 in The Shorter Writings). Its population is an important qualification; Xenophon tends to put the most important words or phrases in the beginning of his sentences, and he places “ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων” before “δυνατωτάτη” or “ὀνομαστοτάτη,” reflecting the significance of this small yet mighty group of natives. Sparta, under Lycurgus’ leadership, has no need for mercenaries because, as Xenophon outlines in Chapters 2-5, citizens spend their entire lives preparing to be soldiers, from boyhood, to their teenage years (as ephors), to adulthood.

Xenophon underscores the moral superiority of this system, challenging “anyone desiring” to examine for themselves which society produces men “more obedient, and more modest, and more capable in those things which are needed” (“ἐπίσημοντεροι καὶ αἰσθηματοσεροι καὶ ὀν δὲ ἀγρατάτεροι”) (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 2.14). He presents this idyllic image as a foil to “other cities,” whose customs “do not oppose the boys’ desires” (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 2.14). In addition, Sparta is self-sufficient because Lycurgus “forbade free men from matters regarding money-making,” including from being a “merchant” or “shipowner,” professions which necessitate interaction with foreigners as Athens did (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 7.1-2). He sets this isolationism and frugality in a philosophical register — invoking diction he uses in Memorabilia and which are common in Plato’s works — calling it “εὐδοξότερον” (“more honorable”), and a “ψυχῆς…ἔργον” (“labor of the soul”). This philosophical tone strengthens the theme of Lycurgus and Sparta as morally immaculate.

In Athens when Xenophon delivered the Poroi, it was too late for a society like the one Lycurgus created in Sparta— the city had already established itself as a major mercantile and naval power. However, it was critical that the city cultivate a more “militarized and hyper-politicized citizen body,” as Lycurghus had created (Figueira 2012: 672-3). Therefore, Xenophon strikes a balance between using foreigners as necessary for economic stimulus and isolating Athens in the ways that remain feasible, given the circumstances. For instance, Xenophon wants to free metics from the obligation of joining the infantry
(Xenophon Lac. Pol., 2.2). Like his other proposals, this measure is not benevolent towards foreigners, but rather a xenophobic reforming mechanism for citizens’ benefit. “The city would be done a service,” he argues, “if the citizens served in the army with one another rather than being drawn up in line with...Lydians and Phrygians and Syrians and all sorts of other barbarians” (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 2.3).

Xenophon echoes the themes of militarism and self-sufficiency he developed in Lac. Pol., claiming it would be an “ornament for the city if Athenians seemed to rely upon themselves rather than themselves in battle” (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 2.4). He alludes to the Lac. Pol. explicitly, claiming that his reforms will make Athenians “εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ ἕθηλεμωτέραν. Here, he echoes the diction (particularly the first adjective, “εὐπειθεστέραν,” but also with the following two words, both of which begin with the prefix “εὐ-”) and grammatical structure (using polysyndeton and comparatives) as when he described Spartan men as “εὐπειθέστεροι καὶ αἰδηκότεροι καὶ ἧν δεῖ ἐγκρατέστεροι” due to Lycurgus’ reforms (Xenophon Lac. Pol., 4.51; Poroi, 2.14).

The Poroi is consistent with Lac. Pol. in its glorification of self-sufficiency, particularly in war; and with Hiero in its depiction of drawing upon foreigners out of practical necessity rather than ideology. Although Xenophon does indeed propose reforms that would grant metics more privileges within Athens, he draws upon foreigners as an economic resource, akin to the iron ore he argues could revert Athens’ economy and mitigate social unrest. Xenophon neither advocates structural social change nor argues that foreigners are equal to Athenians. In short, he creates the guise of progressive, inclusionary reform in order to more easily achieve self-serving, discriminatory policy. Synthesizing his arguments from across these three texts, therefore, provides a lesson in the importance of critically evaluating the impact of public policy beyond its stated intent.

References


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Lamentable Expectations: Understanding the Woman’s Lament Through the Wealtheow/Grendel’s Mother Dichotomy in Beowulf

Opal Lambert

The Woman’s Lament is a puzzling poem: it lacks enough context for the narrator’s situation to be fully understood, yet enough detail remains to make her position compelling. The woman writes during her time in a cave underneath an oak tree, likely due to conflict stemming from her husband, causing the striking situation to appear at first glance to parallel that of Grendel’s mother in Beowulf. Both characters exist in an anti-hall space, separate from society, though Grendel’s mother lives underwater and the woman lives under a tree. Yet through establishing a dichotomy in which Wealtheow, the queen of and wife to Hrothgar, represents the ideal early English woman and in which Grendel’s mother represents the opposite, this dichotomy reveals that the narrator’s lament in The Woman’s Lament cannot be what it seems: the narrator’s situation forcing her to act like Grendel’s mother. Instead, her lament stems from her inability to perform the duties of an ideal early English woman, or in other words, that she cannot behave like Wealtheow.

Wealtheow here acts as the archetype of the model early English woman. Her behavior in Beowulf reveals her exemplary character, especially her behavior at the feast and celebration in Heorot – the hall of Wealtheow and her husband, Hrothgar. Once Beowulf has defeated Grendel, Wealtheow gives both advice and gifts; the poem also shows her in her role as part of the ideal mead hall. During the feast, Hrothgar makes a speech, proclaiming that he now sees Beowulf as his son. Wealtheow is quick to respond, first by offering gifts to Beowulf, then to berate her husband, saying, "'I have been informed that you wished to take the warrior [Beowulf] as your son. Heorot is purged, the bright ring-hall; make use, while you are permitted, of your many blessings, and leave to your family the nation and rule when you shall go forth to witness the decree of Providence' (Beowulf, line 163). In this instance, by telling Hrothgar to leave his kingdom to his family – specifically his sons – Wealtheow is advising him not to adopt Beowulf, as that situation could potentially cause tension between Beowulf and her sons, who otherwise could not have ruled over the nation had
Hrothgar actually adopted Beowulf. Clearly, then, her advice is warranted: the court accepts it without argument, revealing Wealthow as the model queen because she knows what advice to give to her husband. Not only this, but her place within the court is well-established. The fact that no one questions her advice and all listen to her indicates that there is no strenuous relationship here; she functions as an undeniably crucial and helpful part of the court.

Her gift-giving, too, exhibits her model personality. Once she has given her advice, the court moves into action as Beowulf receives gifts: “A cup was brought to him and friendship offered expressly, and wrought gold presented with good will, two armlets, a garment and rings, the largest collar on earth that I have ever known of” (*Beowulf*, line 165). The role of a woman — especially a queen — in an early English mead-hall was to give gifts along with the king. Because Wealthow is exemplary, however, her gifts are such — the narrator breaks into first person to emphasize how large the collar is. After all, a larger collar means it is made up of a greater amount of expensive material and thus is more valuable. But with these gifts comes good will, another indicator of Wealthow as an ideal early English queen. The personal relationship the armlets, garment, rings, and collar come with is mentioned twice (and therefore stressed) so that the reader understands that the relationship between Wealthow and her court — here, her guest Beowulf specifically — is crucial for the society depicted by the Old English poet. Wealthow is partially responsible for maintaining that relationship, and she does so perfectly — her generous gifts, as well as prudent advice, keep the court running smoothly.

Wealthow also exists in the model mead-hall, which contributes to her character as the ideal early English queen; she directs part of her speech to Beowulf, describing how Heirot works: “‘Here every man is true to the other, kindly of heart, loyal to his lord; the thanes are in harmony, the people completely ready; the reveling men of the corps do as I ask’” (*Beowulf*, line 167). Her mead-hall sounds almost utopic — no strife seems to exist between the court and Hrothgar or amongst the court itself, which she cleverly attributes to the character of the men, rather than her talents as queen. Her description of this utopic mead-hall ends with an important signifier of her power and control over her court: all do as she asks. Yet because the indication of her power comes as part of the description of a model mead-hall, it can be assumed that her power isn’t important in and of itself. Rather, her power is important to an ideal, functioning mead-hall instead. Each part of her list: the good men of her court, their harmonic nature, and her own power all contribute to what makes Heirot so idyllic, and therefore it can be concluded that Wealthow has a pivotal role in maintaining an ideal mead-hall.

In comparison, Grendel’s mother is antithetical to the Wealthow archetype. For example, the anti-hall imagery acts as a reversal of Wealthow’s ideal character and model mead-hall. When Beowulf fights Grendel’s mother, he does so in her own hall, which is underneath a lake. Beowulf surveys it,
realizing, “that he was in some sort of oppressive hall where no water could harm them, nor could the perilous grasp of the flood touch them on account of the roofed structure; he saw firelight, radiant illumination shining brightly” (Beowulf, line 187). Though the hall of Grendel’s mother resembles, in some form, a mead hall – it has firelight, it has a roofed structure, it protects from the dangerous water – it is described as an anti-mead hall in its atmosphere. The hall is not comforting; though it keeps water out, the adjective “oppressive” indicates that Beowulf feels trapped in this hall, rather than safe. It is as if the dangers of the water are, in fact, preferable to the dangers of the hall, which is the opposite of a mead hall: the dangers of the woods are certainly not preferable to the safety of the hall.

While Wealtheow maintains a good relationship with the members of her court through advice-giving, Grendel’s mother rejects this typically feminine role, as evidenced by the fight between Beowulf and Grendel’s mother. As the fight progresses, Grendel’s mother gains the upper hand: “Then she held down the hall-visitor and drew her long-knife, broad and bright edged; she wanted to avenge her child, her sole heir” (Beowulf, line 189). The behavior of Grendel’s mother is the opposite of Wealtheow’s in terms of Beowulf. Not only does Grendel’s mother attack Beowulf – easily contrasted to Wealtheow extending friendship and care to Beowulf – but she wants to take revenge herself. Because one duty of a wife and queen of a hall was advice-giving, the queen would advise her male relatives or husband to avenge her; Grendel’s mother, however, seeks revenge herself, taking on an inherently masculine role and rejecting the duty of advice-giving. In fact, the poem highlights this as a difference between Wealtheow and Grendel’s mother because the text glosses over the reality that Grendel’s mother doesn’t have male relatives. The reader isn’t supposed to consider this as to why she is taking revenge herself, but instead see it as a rejection of the advice-giving duty expected of a queen. Thus, the behavior of Grendel’s mother opposes Wealtheow’s, both in her treatment of her guest – attacking compared to extending friendship – and her rejection of women’s roles in this society.

When Beowulf steals the sword, it becomes a final inversion of the parallels between Wealtheow and Grendel’s mother: where Wealtheow gives gifts, Grendel’s mother is stolen from. Beowulf is finally able to secure victory due to this sword, which he finds in the hall of Grendel’s mother. Among the weapons, Beowulf sees “a victory-blessed weapon, an ancient ogreish sword firm in its edges, a badge of distinction for warriors; that was the choicest weapon – except that it was larger than any other man could bear into battle-play, good and richly equipped, the work of giants” (Beowulf, line 189), and then takes it. Unlike Wealtheow bestowing riches onto Beowulf, Beowulf instead steals a valuable sword from Grendel’s mother: thus, the sword acts as an anti-gift. In fact, the narrator goes into detail about how valuable the sword is, paralleling the way the narrator went into detail about the high value of the gifts Wealtheow gave to Beowulf. The size of the sword is emphasized, just as
how, earlier, the size of Beowulf’s new collar was emphasized. Therefore, because the sword is not so much a gift as it is stolen, it functions as an anti-gift and provides further evidence that Grendel’s mother and her hall’s possessions form the inverse of Wealtheow. Through the anti-hall of Grendel’s mother, rejection of the advice-giving role, and the anti-gift used to kill her, one can conclude that the pair exemplify a dichotomy: one – Wealtheow – representing the ideal early English woman, and the other – Grendel’s mother – signifying a reproachable one.

While it appears that the narrator of The Woman’s Lament resembles Grendel’s mother in terms of her isolation and inability to perform societal norms, instead, she cannot behave like the idealized Wealtheow due to her surroundings. The narrator of The Woman’s Lament is forced into hiding, due to a feud involving her husband. The narrator explains that she is in the forest because “the man told me to stay in a grove of the woods, in an earth-cave under an oak-tree” (The Woman’s Lament, line 11). The woman is forced to stay in an anti-hall, which at first glance seems most similar to the anti-hall of Grendel’s mother. It is underground, the way Grendel’s mother lives under a lake, as well as deep in the midst of nature. Additionally, the usage of the word “hall” contrasts with the typical understanding of the word, just like how Grendel’s mother has a hall which is contrasted with Heirot. Both “halls” lack what a typical hall has: mead, friends, a sense of security. The narrator continues to describe the anti-hall where she is staying: “Old is this earth-hall. I am overcome with longing” (The Woman’s Lament, line 12). Yet the difference between Grendel’s mother and the narrator is stark: the narrator doesn’t want to be where she is, indicated by how she is overcome with longing. By contrast, Grendel’s mother lives in her hall under the lake and seems content with her home; it is not a temporary place, unlike the narrator’s hall.

Though the narrator is in a temporary place, she does not want to be there: in fact, she longs to perform the typical role of a woman in a mead-hall. As the narrator continues to describe her predicament, she dwells on her isolation, saying that “there are friends and lovers on earth; they are still in bed when I pace alone at dawn throughout this earth-cave under the oak-tree” (The Woman’s Lament, line 15). The woman laments that she cannot be the ideal early English woman: unlike Wealtheow, she is forced to pace alone in her anti-hall. The juxtaposition of friends and lovers at rest to her movement emphasizes that the woman is still, technically, on a journey: she is unable to make this hall a makeshift home partially because it is a temporary place – thus, as mentioned earlier, she is “overcome with longing.” Additionally, she is unable to contact these friends, again drawing another distinction between herself and Wealtheow; where Wealtheow is able to insert herself into her husband’s court, and with success, the opposite is true for the narrator of The Woman’s Lament. Indeed, the juxtaposition of movement as opposed to stationary friends and lovers further indicates the space between the two groups. All parts of their lives remain different, from her motion, which represents her temporary place, to their
stagnant and comfortable lives. The narrator cannot reach these friends; she is unable to perform that key role of being a queen of a mead hall, though she may want to.

Just as she cannot reach members of a potential court, the narrator also can’t perform that role of advice-giving towards her husband. As the poem comes towards its conclusion, the narrator slips into the gnomic mode to impart advice: “A young person may be sad in mind, with terrible thoughts, but is still supposed to act cheerfully, even with a heart full of anxiety and long-lasting sorrows to endure” (The Woman’s Lament, line 18). The narrator also tries to perform another role of a wife to a husband: advice-giving. However, her husband is absent partially because she has done what he told her to do, already a reversal of traditional Germanic gender roles. Yet the narrator still shifts into the gnomic mode, giving advice to the reader, signifying that the narrator wants to do what is expected of her, cannot direct it to her husband, and therefore directs advice to the reader instead. She cannot exist as the ideal early English woman because her anti-hall also lacks a husband to give to whom she can give advice, but her behavior indicates she would fulfill just that and give advice if she could: she wants to be like what Wealtheow represents and cannot.

Establishing the dichotomy of Wealtheow and Grendel’s mother is crucial because, when applied to The Woman’s Lament, it changes the reader’s understanding of exactly what is so tragic about the woman’s situation. Upon first read, Grendel’s mother and the woman seem to have similar qualities. Despite the fact the woman and her husband bonded over terrible things, despite the fact the woman is removed from society, despite her anti-hall, the difference between Grendel’s mother and the narrator of The Woman’s Lament illuminates the real tragedy the narrator is facing: because of her isolated and temporary situation, she is unable to behave like the Wealtheow archetype. In the end, The Woman’s Lament is not about her character, but rather, her place in early English society. Therefore, the woman is not lamenting her own moral failings, begging another question: can one be the model early English woman and still be “unlucky, miserable, hiding feelings, thinking about human cruelty” (The Woman’s Lament, line 7)?

References

Agency in Ancient Exile Literature

Kaleb Hood

Displacement has been an issue since the ancient world also extends across cultural boundaries. Similar themes such as hope, despair, and regret exist in exile literatures regardless of culture. The survey of texts offered here will show that the agency of a displaced person is inherently tied to gender and political position in ancient exile literature of both the East and West. Identity also plays an important role in these texts since the emotional turmoil represented in them is essentially linked to whatever place the person in exile calls home.

Euripides’ Trojan Women contains a vicious spiral of despair that ends with the death or displacement of all Trojans. The focus of this work, unlike Virgil’s Aeneid and many other exile stories, is on the female characters of Troy, in place of the archetypal male hero. This shift in perspective gives us a glimpse into the female experience of exile, a genre that is primarily dominated by men in the Greco-Roman sphere. The fate of the Trojan women is completely controlled by their Greek conquerors. “Unhappy Troy, you have vanished. Unhappy are those who are forced to leave you: those who are living, and those who’ve been crushed” (Sophocles 2008: 184-186). The Greeks have razed the city and there is nothing left for the Trojans at their ancestral home. They do not even have the option to rebuild, since the Greeks are taking them away into exile, whether that be into slavery, marriage, or both. The contrast between the living and the dead is interesting, because, as Hecuba points out, both groups are forced into exile from Troy.

The difference between the living and the dead is a recurring theme that comes up again later in the play after Polyxena’s murder. Hecuba remains optimistic in her address to Andromache, “Life and death, child, are two different things. One is nothing. There’s some hope in the other,” but Andromache does not share her point of view (Sophocles 2008: 654-655).

In my opinion, never being born
Is just the same as death, and I’d much rather
Die than live a life that’s filled with pain.
The dead no longer feel the sting of sorrow.
But when one falls from fortune to misfortune
One’s soul is exiled from its former joy. (Sophocles 1988: 656-661)
The exile that Andromache is feeling is not only the physical detachment from her homeland, but also the spiritual and emotional exile from joy. Most of her family was slaughtered during the Trojan War, minus Hector and her son, Astyanax. However, Hector was killed by Achilles and Astyanax is soon to be ripped away from her and flung from the walls of Troy, to prevent him from growing up and avenging his people. The Greek treatment of this deed is particularly cruel.

Don’t cling to him; grieve nobly for your sorrows,
And since you have no strength, do not suppose
That you have any power. Look around:
There is no safety for you anywhere.
Your city is destroyed, your husband dead,
And you’re defeated – we can certainly
Hold our own against a single woman. (Sophocles 1988: 755-761)

Andromache has no choice but to endure the loss of her home, her husband, and her children. The Greek Talthybius makes it quite clear to Andromache that she has no hope, there is no one left to protect her. Again, Andromache has to feel the ‘sting of sorrow’ due to the destruction of her homeland. The Greeks use her womanhood as a tool against her. She is powerless to fight back against the Greeks herself and they are able to use her son to further hurt her. Because Andromache and the other characters are women, the play-write positions them as unable to do anything to stop the Greeks and resist exile.

A similar example of the female experience in exile is Cai Yan’s 18 Songs of a Nomad Flute. This example differs from Trojan Women in that it was actually written by a woman who had experienced exile. The themes of despair, motherhood, and displacement all make another appearance in this work, despite being from a completely different culture separated by thousands of miles.

I travelled across the land of Han and entered barbarian domains,
My home was lost, my body violated; better never to have been born. The felts and furs they make into clothes are a shock to my bones and flesh, I cannot hide my disgust for the taste of their rank-smelling mutton. War drums pulse through the night until it grows light, The barbarian wind roars with great noise and obscures the border camps. Appalled by the present, regretting the past, my third song is done, My sorrow builds, my anger mounts; when will there be peace? (Yann 199: Song 3)

From the beginning of the poem, Cai Yan sets up an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. She does not identify with the customs of her captors and separates herself from them with her harsh language. Not only was she taken away from her home, but she was also assaulted and forced into marriage, a uniquely female result of her capture. Again, we see the opinion that death, or never having been born at all, is a better alternative than exile. Even the land itself seems to be roaring along
with the war drums, supporting her captors and further isolating her. She then turns inward and reflects on her own turmoil, similar to the commotion around her. Like Andromache, Cai Yan doesn’t seem to have any hope for the future here. However, later on, she expresses a view more similar to that of Hecuba.

I am not one who clings to life on account of a fear of death.  
But I could not do away with myself; my heart had its reasons:  
If I lived I could still hope to return to the land of mulberries and catalpas, But if I died my bones would be buried here, in the empty plains.  
(Yan 199: Song 11, 1-4)

Her reasoning for not wanting to die is interesting because it shows how strong her loyalty still is to her homeland. She does not want to be buried in the land of her captors, but of her people. Again, Cai Yan uses physical imagery to convey her inner emotions. She contrasts the fecund fertility of her country with the bareness of her exile.

This resurgence of hope also coincides with the introduction of her children. “My nomad husband was fond of me, and we had two sons. I nurtured them, brought them up, I can feel no shame for this. I felt for them, pitied them, born in the far frontier” (Yan 1999: Song 11, 6-8). Having children did not entirely shift her loyalty to the nomad people, but it certainly did create a new sense of connection to her children and by extension the land on which she lived. However, this new happiness, however small, would not last long.

Suddenly we meet an envoy from China, bearing a direct order;  
He offers a thousand pieces of gold as a ransom for me,  
I rejoice that I lived for a chance to return to greet our enlightened ruler,  
But I grieve at parting from my two young sons, with no chance of meeting again.  
My twelfth song balances sorrow and joy,  
My twin emotions – go, stay – to whom can I reveal them?  
(Yan 1999: Song 12, 5-10)

Cai Yan finally has what she has been wishing for all this time, a chance to return home. But, after having her children, the decision is no longer so simple. Just like she first had to say goodbye to her homeland, she must now say goodbye to her children. Her motherhood, although not explicitly being used against her like in the case of Andromache, still hurts her deeply since she is forcibly removed from her children. She also feels like there is no one she can talk to about her feelings. How could she express the sadness that she feels in the face of such good fortune? How could any of the men in this situation understand her grief as a mother? She is alone again.

The nomads and Han, different lands, different customs,  
Heaven and earth separate us, alas! – children west, mother east.
Bitter am I, angry my spirit, flooding to the great void,  
The length and breadth of the universe cannot contain this feeling!  
(Yan 1999: Song 18, 7-10)

The end of her last song, like the beginning of her first, reminds us of the differences between her home and the land of her captors. But this time, her laments come after her return home. It is no longer the exile from her country, but the absence of her children that is the source of her grief. This kind of lamentation is unique to the female perspective in exile literature.

In these representations of female exile, they possess little to no agency. Andromache is powerless to stop the slaughter of her son and Cai Yan has to wait for the men at home to ransom her before she can return. This stands in contrast to some of the male representations of exile such as Aeneas or Odysseus. Aeneas is able to sail around on adventures, eventually founding one of the most influential empires of all antiquity. Odysseus is able to return home on his own initiative, albeit with some major setbacks, and gain glory along the way. Even Ovid, although unable to return back to Rome, is able to use his literary skill and connections back home in order to stay relevant. In one of his letters to his wife, Ovid writes, “Great is the role imposed upon thee in my books: thou art called the model of a good wife. Beware thou fallest not from that: that I may have proclaimed the truth, look to the work that fame has wrought and guard it well” (Ovid 2008: 375). Here, even though she is in Rome, the coveted position he is striving for, Ovid still tries to use their relationship as a tool for giving orders. He tells her that she needs to guard his reputation and later tells her to pray to the gods to bring back his return. He uses his wife as a political tool to garner sympathy for his cause. He also uses this opportunity to fan his own ego about his fame,

If Ulysses had wandered less, he would have been less famous;  
Philoctetes’ great name is due to his wound. If there is some place  
among such mighty names for the humble, I too am become a man of  
mark by reason of my fall. (Ovid 2008: 377)

Even though he had no control over his punishment, Ovid is able to use his male agency to order his wife around and make these bold claims about his fame.

Another example of male agency in exile is Sophocles’ Oedipus. Oedipus, after discovering that he was the cause of the plague that had befallen Thebes and that he killed his father and married his mother, put himself into exile after gouging his eyes out. A messenger recounts Oedipus’ decision to the chorus before he comes back on stage after his discovery.

He’s shouting.  
‘Loose the bolts, someone, show me to all of Thebes!  
My father’s murderer, my mother’s –’  
No, I can’t say repeat it, it’s unholy.  
Now he’ll tear himself from his native earth,
Not linger, curse the house with his own curse. (Sophocles 1982: 1422-1427)

Oedipus is the agent of his own exile. No one is forcing him to do it, and in fact Creon wants to wait and consult the oracle before giving in to Oedipus’ wishes. However, Creon eventually submits. Even though Oedipus should have been put to death by order of the decree from the beginning of the play, he is able to go into exile instead due to his position of male power. Even though his chosen punishment may be worse than death, a view held by the Chorus, it is significant that Oedipus is able to choose for himself what fate befalls him. This choice is a luxury that few other characters have in this genre.

A case where agency is more complex is Qu Yuan’s *Encountering Sorrow*. In this long *fu* poem, the narrator changes form multiple times, shifting between a male spirit to a female shaman and back again. This changing gender complicates the male female dichotomy explored so far. I would argue that in this case, it is not gender that is the primary reason for lack of agency, but political position. In the beginning of the poem the spirit takes the role of advisor to the mortal ruler. However, the ruler soon begins to resist their advice.

Around [your chariot] I would run, eye on the road, front and read,
Till it rolled in the tracks of the ancient kings,
But, Lure Leaf, you do not look to see what I harbor within,
No, trusting slander instead you boil in sudden rage.  
(Yuan 2017: 37-40)

The spirit has been loyal, but the ruler is starting to listen to the ‘cabal’ that wishes to lead him astray. The spirit is eventually driven away and laments the hardships that they have to endure. The spirit, now possessing a shaman, goes to visit Sister Nü Xu.

So how is it that you, lover of adornment, speak the unadorned truth?
You alone bear this tangle of beautiful trappings:
The others fill our house with puncture vine, hairy joint grass, and cocklebur.
Yet here you stand, conspicuous and lonely, refusing to wear them.  
(Yuan 2017: 133-136)

In this passage, the shaman is criticized for being so virtuous and being such a good subject. Sister Nü Xu suggests doing away with what is proper and just joining the crowd that the ruler has fallen in with. However, instead of falling in with them, the spirit leaves the realm altogether.

It is hopeless! The state has no statesmen! And no one sees value in me.
Why remain attached to my old home, the royal city?
Since no one is up to the task of working with me towards beautiful rule,
I will follow Peng and Xian, and go where they dwell.  
(Yuan 2017: 370-373)

The spirit, like Oedipus, is going into a voluntary exile, abandoning what they used to call home. The subject remained loyal to the ruler, until the ruler was no longer fit to rule. It took the spirit a lot of time to realize that they had an option to leave, and it is not until the very end of the poem that they decide to do so. Up to this point the spirit, as an officer of the court, did not have the agency to leave, even though they were already in a political exile.

Regardless of gender or political position, the common thread among these exile narratives, is the emotional toll taken on the person in exile. Exile is a punishment for a reason. Being ripped away from one’s home has a massive impact on one’s identity, especially in the ancient world. We can understand this better by taking a look at the Greek polis as a case study. In ancient Greece, there was no conception of ‘Greece’. People were loyal to their city, polis in ancient Greek, and tied their identity heavily to it. This separation into city states created an even narrower conception of ‘us and them.’ The city is also important because it is the giver of life. It is much more difficult to live alone in the wilderness than it is to live in or around your city. With protection and identity so heavily tied to your homeland, it is no mystery why this genre is so emotional and mournful. The people in exile will usually do anything it takes to get back. Ovid even goes to far as to wish he would become his book so that he may see Rome again. “But do you go in my stead, do you, who are permitted to do so, gaze on Rome! Would that the gods might grant me now to be my book!” (Ovid 2008: 7).

The common thread in many of these examples is loyalty to the state, even in the face of exile. Ovid especially remains loyal to the Roman empire, even though he is devastated by the exile. Why does he remain so loyal to the state that is currently putting him through so much pain? Perhaps it is the same reason that Cai Yan rejoices even while grieving for the loss of her children: the feeling of belonging that can only be found at home. When an ‘us’ that has been separated from their homeland and all familiarity has to exist within a ‘them’, that ‘us’ will use whatever agency they have in order to get back.

References

The Last Struggle of Oenone

Michael Geisinger

I can’t believe he had the nerve to come back. After scorning me, abandoning me for the Queen of Sparta, beginning the Trojan War with his selfishness, and killing our son, my prodigal husband returned to me and asked me for help. Wounded by Philoctetes’ arrow, Paris begged me to heal him. Of course, I should never have expected that sniveling coward to lie down and die. All he ever did was survive.

....

I looked down at the meek, pleading form of the man I once loved. I could not believe I had been so smitten with the idiotic youth.

“Please Oenone, my love, heal me!” Paris begged. “I haven’t got much longer!” He coughed and a gallon of blood came out.

I glared back. “Why should I help you? I loved you, and you left me the second a better offer came around. I sent our son to reason with you, to beg you to return to me, and you killed him! You ruined my life, and destroyed the lives of thousands of men, both Greek and Trojan, all because you were obsessed with that Spartan hussy!” As I spoke, my anger rose. “Get out of my sight. Go back to Helen’s bed, and see if she can heal you.”

I turned from Paris and retreated into the depths of her cavernous home on Mount Ida. I sat on my perfumed couch and sighed. Despite my outward ferocity, I was conflicted about my decision. I had loved Paris, I truly pitied him and wanted to help, and yet when I considered going back to help him, my blood began to boil. I could never forgive him for what he did to me.

“My lady!” my reflection was interrupted by the arrival of her friend Agelaus, the faithful shepherd. She rose to greet him. “My lady, Paris is dead. He succumbed to his wounds minutes after speaking with you.” Agelaus reported in a somber tone.

I faltered. I suddenly felt a sharp pain creep across my heart, as if a knife were tearing it in half on the inside. I collapsed onto the couch, startling Agelaus, and in a trance-like state raised my hand as if to ward off an avenging fury. Agelaus sprinted to where I was lying and began to fan, desperately hoping to revive me. I watched as my friend’s lips moved. I assumed he was pleading with me to get up, yet I couldn’t hear a word he was saying. All I processed was one simple truth. It was a truth I desperately wanted to cover up, to deny. And yet I knew that I couldn’t deny it anymore. I still loved Paris. He betrayed me,
took away everything I hold dear, and yet I couldn’t help but love him. And then the sad fact of the matter struck me like a fiery bolt from the heavens: “Paris is dead. Paris is dead, and I could have saved him.”

My spirit raged like the fires of Mt. Aetna. I suddenly sprang up, startling the poor shepherd once more. Before Agelaus could say a word I fled from my home. I inexplicably felt the urge to travel, to see all the sights of the Hellenic world. I felt I could be happy anywhere except for Troy, the land in which I had experienced so much heartbreak and misery. “I need to move on,” I thought to myself, “I just need to move on.”

I flew down the slopes of Mt. Ida and entered the burning city of Troy, running through its chaotic streets. “Good, let Troy burn. This land has brought me only grief. Greece… if I can get to Greece, where the gods sit at Olympus, I can find the happiness I lost so long ago.” With my new plan worked out, I decided to make my way to the Greek camp.

As I moved through the city, I suddenly came across a sight that made my blood run cold. Hecuba, my friend and the once proud Queen of Troy was being led away by two Greek soldiers. I shadowed them, watching as they shackled Hecuba to a line of Trojan women, many in tears over the loss of their husbands and sons. The soldiers heckled and mocked the enslaved women, going up and down the line and sizing them up, trying to decide whom they would claim as their own. One of them stopped near Hecuba.

“She’s a bit old for my tastes, but I suppose she’d make a good maid-servant. I’ll take her,” the soldier said. I watched in horror as the soldiers divvied up the women amongst themselves as if they were no more than cattle. I hurried away in tears. Maybe I was wrong about the Greeks. They seemed far more brutal than I had imagined. All of a sudden, a cry rang out from the Temple of Athena. I rushed over and arrived just in time to see the Trojan princess Cassandra being torn from the temple by Agamemnon.

“Please!” Cassandra screamed. “Don’t violate the laws of sanctuary. By removing me from the goddess’s temple you will anger her!” But of course the warning of the cursed prophetess went unheeded. I turned away from the disgusting scene, feeling sick to my very core. I thought about pursuing Agamemnon and trying to rescue Cassandra, but I realized it would be pointless. Agamemnon, the renowned warrior, would easily strike me down.

I began wandering aimlessly through the ruined city. The Greek warriors can be savages, but “perhaps, I thought, “if I could just make it to an enlightened land like Athens, I could start a new life among a kind and fair people.” As I began to ponder my next move, I noticed a figure standing at the top of a nearby cliff.

I sprinted towards the man, a soldier, dressed in Athenian armor. The man held a young boy in his arms. The soldier was soon joined by some of his allies at the top of the cliff.

“With this death, we finally end the bloodshed of this war!” The soldier cried out. I stopped short and gasped as the soldier threw the young boy off the
cliff. The boy cried out as he fell. When the cry reached her ears I nearly doubled over. The voice of the boy was one I knew well. Astyanax, her beloved nephew, was the boy the Athenian had just murdered.

I fell to my knees, and as the soldiers walked away, I let out a savage howl. My last hope had been dashed against the rocks below. My friends and family were dead or enslaved. “What can I do now? Greece was supposed to be a land where I could find refuge. Yet it is even worse than Troy. Where can I go? Is the whole world this… this… awful?” And suddenly, the real question, the one hidden in the chaos of my mind, flashed briefly into consciousness, into form, into being: what did I have left to live for? I closed my eyes. I already knew the answer. I rose and solemnly walked back to Mount Ida. When I arrived, I found my husband’s funeral pyre still burning.

…..

“Though in life, we were together only briefly, in death, we shall never be parted.” With my final words, I throw myself onto the burning pyre and scream in both anguish and pleasure as the flames at last consume the pain that has haunted me for so long.
Ruins of a Roman Street in Beit She'an. Original photograph by Rachel Sklar. Used by Permission
Horace recalls Augustus’ rise to power, and his short-lived civil war with Mark Antony and Cleopatra, in the penultimate poem of *Odes* Book I. He explores Cleopatra’s identity as a queen, an enemy of Rome, and an individual woman. He compares and contrasts her state alone and with her followers, and leads the reader to question how different the Romans are from the Egyptians, and by extension, how different Augustus himself is from Cleopatra. Horace ultimately reaches a philosophical space where he privileges the individual and portrays the group as a corrupting force, and also reaches a political space where he rebukes the state of Roman governance and propaganda.

Horace introduces the concept of corruption by a group with drunken celebration. He begins the poem with a group of Roman friends, and says “now is the time to drink, / now tread the earth with our dancing, / now set Salian delicacies before the Gods’ couches” (Ln 1-4). This beginning places the readers in a space that is celebratory, public, and Roman. Horace evokes drunkenness and dancing at a party with the first two lines, but in the next two, he connects this to some of the loftiest aspects of Roman tradition and religion. He invites the reader to sacrifice “Salian delicacies” to the gods, which implies that even the gods are partaking in the drunkenness, and the descriptor “Salian” in particular refers to the Salii. These “dancing priests” were one of the most ancient colleges of Roman priests, and had strong ties to Mars and the supremacy of the Roman army. “Salian delicacies” is synonymous with a lavish feast, but Horace’s diction here is especially significant because Augustus had his name inserted into the Salian hymn which the Salii would sing in remembrance of Rome’s glorious history (*Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, XX). In this stanza, Horace equates these holy, stately priests of Mars, the gods, and even Augustus himself to a boisterous crowd of drunk, dancing party goers. From the beginning of the poem, before he even reveals the cause for this celebration, Horace questions the value of celebrating at all, if it degrades Rome to its core.

After this striking but broad statement, Horace situates his reader in current events by remembering Augustus’ recent war against Cleopatra. After all, the “crazy queen … with her polluted train” (Ln. 7-8) could be no one but she, whom Augustus defeated less than a decade ago. While she lived as an enemy to Rome, he says, “It had been a sin / to produce Caecuban [wine] from ancient
This is a further allusion to the foundations of Rome, since Caecuban wine was made in Latium, one of Rome’s oldest territories. In the Latin, the “ancient racks” are “cellis avitis”, which is similar diction to “atavis”, the word Horace uses to describe Maecenas’ exalted lineage in the first ode. Given the natural parallelism between the first and last odes of book 1, and Horace’s well-known esteem for his friend, this line seems to place great value in wine, in contrast with the previous stanza. However, this value only exists while it is a sin to drink the wine, and it stays where the ancestors left it. The wine’s value therefore does not exist in its consumption, but in its representation of Rome’s glorious past.

Horace’s introduction of Cleopatra is also noteworthy in his focus on her companions, and the power dynamic between them and her. Unlike the Romans, this group is unknown, Eastern, and villainous. Rather than the Roman Caecuban, Cleopatra is “swimming in Mareotic,” an Egyptian wine (Ln. 14). Like the Romans, however, Cleopatra is drunk, on luck in addition to wine, and therefore contaminated. This drunkenness leads Cleopatra and her companions to attempt to destroy the empire, but cause their own destruction, as this is a “hopeful derangement” (Ln. 11). Horace’s invocation of Fortuna emphasizes this, since the Roman concept of luck was as a fickle goddess who was not to be trusted as Cleopatra trusts her. The absence of Mark Antony, her lover and co-conspirator, in this piece is also striking. In this stanza, the destroyed fleet (Ln. 12-13) is Cleopatra’s, when in reality it was Mark Antony’s. This gives Cleopatra a greater degree of agency as an individual, and also takes agency from Mark Antony. Though Horace depicts Cleopatra as raving and drunk, she is nonetheless in control of her faction, whereas Antony does not merit mention.

The following lines represent a stark shift in the tone of the poem, as Horace begins to consider Cleopatra the individual. As soon as Horace introduces Cleopatra’s mad drunkenness, “Caesar [Augustus] dragged [her] back to fearful reality” (Ln. 14-15). This transition from drunkenness to sobriety begins an important shift in the poem, and in Horace’s depiction of Cleopatra. This begins Cleopatra’s transformation from an exotic enemy of Rome to an individual. This shift towards sobriety is also a shift towards solitude, since Horace says, “the escape / from the flames of scarcely one ship / dampened her fury” (Ln. 12-14). This creates an image of a lone ship, representing Cleopatra, separating from the fiery ruin of her “polluted train” mentioned earlier. This point in the poem crystallizes around the two figures of Augustus and Cleopatra. Though there is a clear power dynamic between these two individuals, for a moment, Horace creates a space for the interaction of two people, without any followers to corrupt them.

This moment does not last long, though, as Horace allows followers to reenter this space, now on the side of Augustus, in a move to compare him to the Cleopatra earlier in the poem. Horace first transfers agency from Caesar to Caesar’s troops, as “his galleys harried her [Cleopatra] fleeing” (Ln. 17). In this way, while there is a group here, this group now belongs to Caesar, not
Cleopatra. While Caesar is in control, he is no longer the sole active figure. The most important shift in Horace’s depiction of Cleopatra follows this with an ambiguous group of lines. Whereas she was once a raving madwoman, she is now both pitiable and monstrous. He says that Caesar’s men “harried her … just as the hawk the mild dove, / or the quick hunter the hare across Thessaly’s plains of snow” (Ln. 17-20). In sharp contrast to his previous depiction, Horace invites the reader to empathize with the now meek and helpless queen. After establishing the plurality of Caesar’s side, the image of a lone dove, or hare struggling through deep snow as it avoids a more powerful predator emphasizes Cleopatra’s singularity.

Horace then depicts the Roman vision of Cleopatra which Augustus has been promoting, making it appear strange and ridiculous in relation to Horace’s previous words. He tears the reader away from the imagery of the previous stanza by saying that Caesar’s men were pursuing her “in order / to put the curs’d monster in chains” (Ln. 20/21). In the Latin, this line is even more striking, as what is translated as “curs’d monster” is “fatale monstrum.” The word *fatale* alludes to the Aeneid, where Vergil uses it to various ends. In particular, though, it harkens to two moments in book six: the “fatalis virgae” (*Aeneid* 6.409), and the “fatalis equus” (*Aeneid* 6.515). The first allusion foreshadows Cleopatra’s death, as this “fatalis virgae”, or “fateful twig”, is the bough that Aeneas presents to the ferryman Charon to cross the river Styx and enter the underworld. In this sense, Romans’ image of Cleopatra as a cursed monster in chains is what empowers her to take her own life at the end of the poem, just as the bough empowers Aeneas to enter the underworld alive. The “fatalis equus”, or “fateful horse”, on the other hand, occurs as Deiphobus speaks to Aeneas, and refers to the Trojan Horse. This legend, associated closely with Odysseus, is an emblem of trickery and false appearances. By invoking this moment, Horace both recalls the death of a hero and indicates that Cleopatra is not the “fatale monstrum” he describes. Rather, the deadly beast is what her adversaries perceive, while the individual beneath is of a different nature.

Horace then paints Cleopatra as an epic heroine in her own right, distinct from others in a more traditional vein, and gives her struggle and eventual suicide a noble undertone. Seeing that her cause is hopeless, she chooses death as a queen over life as a captive. Unlike Aeneas, she does not “retire / with her fleet to uncharted shores” (Ln. 23-24). Instead she acts like old king Priam of Troy, “her face serene, she courageously viewed / her fallen palace” (Ln. 25-26). Rather than old arms and armor, though, she “handled fierce snakes, her corporeal / frame drank in their venom” (Ln. 27-28). This calm, collected version of Cleopatra could not be more changed from the Cleopatra at the beginning of the Ode. By contrasting the two versions, some of the most important ideas Horace wishes to convey in this ode become apparent. Standing abandoned among the ruins of her power, Cleopatra reaches the pinnacle of courage, calm, and nobility. Surrounded by her “polluted train” (Ln. 8), she was deranged and raving. From this, we can understand that the crowd, or perhaps
power, is a corrupting influence to be avoided. The same can be said about alcohol and drunkenness. When Cleopatra is drunk on wine and luck, she lacks control, which she regains by substituting alcohol for snake venom.

By describing Cleopatra’s rise and fall in relation to Augustus and the Romans, Horace invites the reader to consider the problems within Rome, and the possible remedy. Wine and drunkenness can be read as equivalent to power, and if snake venom is the cure for an excess of drunkenness, then solitude, or the loss of power, is necessary for the individual to exercise control and composure. In the last line of the ode, Horace directs this message to the Romans by describing the fate which Cleopatra avoided as being subjected to “an overweening Triumph” (Ln. 32). In the Latin, “overweening” is “superbo,” which harks back to the last king of Rome, Tarquinius Superbus, whose violent arrogance led to the end of the Roman kingship. By ending the poem with this powerful symbol of excessive pride, Horace accuses the Roman people, and Augustus himself, of repeating the errors of Rome’s least popular king, and of mirroring the madness of Cleopatra.

Through the lens of the famous conflict between Caesar and Cleopatra, Horace contemplates the effect that command over followers has on the individual, and he finds it to be detrimental. In the first half of the poem, Horace prepares his argument through Cleopatra, a comfortable enemy. This makes it more impactful when he reveals the similarities on the Roman side, and demonstrates that the Romans are falling into the same state of corruption which they reviled. Cleopatra becomes a heroic figure, and through her suicide, she denies Augustus the victory he so enthusiastically claimed by instead taking her fate into her own hands. The poem leads the Roman audience to reflect on their degree of difference from the Egyptians, and it warns Augustus himself against succumbing to the corrupting influence of the nation he controls, lest he lead Rome to the same fate Egypt suffered.

References

From the first millennium of the common era, the works of three women writers are extant: Sulpicia, who can be dated to the lifetime of Tibullus (d. 19 B.C.E.), Faltonia Betitia Proba, (d. ca. 353 CE), and Dhuoda (d. ca. 844 C.E.). Yet it cannot be said that these figures are well studied, especially given the vast scholarship devoted to male authors of the same period. Further work clearly needs to be done in order to examine the ways in which female authors write and how their male models and the male gaze of their contemporaries alter their creativity. Each of these female authors displays a reluctance to take up the literary space they attempt to carve for themselves. Each claims incompetence in writing or in ability, yet they prove themselves with their words. By downplaying their own roles and significance, these ladies find safety in their own hypocrisy, yet they have the ability to disrupt common perceptions. Sulpicia hides the true prison of being a woman in ancient Rome in her womanly “trifles”; Proba paints Eve as a wicked being, yet adds depth when one considers the motivations that her models have for their evil actions; and Dhuoda minimizes her accomplishments to bolster her son’s chances at success, yet proves her prowess through her complex feats of wordsmithing. Sulpicia is an author of particular obscurity. Her work is in the third book of Tibullus’ corpus of elegies, and her gender has always invited controversy, as does her literary value. As Fulkerson states, “On one side are those who accuse doubters of misogyny; on the other, those who use the material realities of women’s lives in Rome to convict ‘believers’ of naivety” (Fulkerson 2017: 46). Advocates in doubting Sulpicia as a woman also argue that the “ventrilquizing” of the female voice occurs in contemporary elegiac poetry, such as Ovid’s Heroides (Fulkerson 2017: 22). Matthew Santirocco, an advocate for the worth of Sulpicia’s cycle, make the argument that Sulpicia’s “debt” is to Roman epigrams and to Catullus in particular (Santirocco 1979: 237) and that one should be cautious as to not conflate great skill in writing with literary worth, as Sulpicia “held up a mirror to the private world inhabited by women of her class” (Santirocco 1979: 239). For the sake of this examination, Sulpicia will be regarded as female, given inadequate evidence to the contrary. I wish first to examine here two poems (3.14 and 3.15), the “Birthday Poems.” In these short works, the poet laments her feelings of confinement, imposed on her by her uncle, and her feelings of attachment to her lover, Cerinthus. In the first of these poems, she despairs:
Sulpicia is unable to make her own decisions for her personal “holiday,” as her uncle dictated otherwise. She continues on to describe herself as *abducta* (3.14.7), which further conveys her feelings of helplessness. Sulpicia concludes this distressing episode in the second poem, wherein she states, *Natali Romae iam licet esse tuo* (3.15.2). The separation of the same topic into two parts gives the poems the feeling of a personal journal or diary. Furthermore, the impersonal *licet* adds to the sense of the imposition of male authority onto women. “It is permitted” for her to spend her birthday in Rome. The speaker is not able to make informed decisions for herself. Sulpicia’s complaints suggest a lightness and immaturity at first, since her views seemingly pander to a male audience in their descriptions of female frivolity and a concern for seemingly trivial issues. The Birthday Poems seem less serious than the writings of her male counterparts, yet her work still indicates a dissatisfaction with the status quo and a frustration with the suppression of women’s voices. Her light topic matter attempts to flip the narrative. Sulpicia writes of her own struggles in the seemingly immature voice of a woman, creating a space for a woman in ancient Rome. The poet’s writings are also succinct. She gives a brief nod to classical models, while her male contemporaries, including Propertius and Ovid, take far more space to create similar connections.

In poem 3.16, Sulpicia writes of Cerinthus’ relations with a prostitute with disdain, while elevating herself by mentioning her father. She calls the other woman a *scortum* (3.16.4), which adds an edge to her voice that is absent from the Birthday Poems. This addition creates emotional depth to express the helplessness and frustration as a woman in a male dominated society. As Santirocco reminds us, “Rome was very much a man’s world” and women were under *patria potestas* until marriage, when they would then be under the control of their husbands (Santirocco 1979: 239). Thus, verbal vitriol is one of the limited resources for a woman in Sulpicia’s position and time. Sulpicia also claims that she is glad that Cerinthus is neglecting her, *Gratum est securus multum quod iam tibi de me permittis subito ne male inepta cadam* (3.16.1-2). This claim undermines the emotional vitriol that comes later in the piece, underscoring the power of words versus physical action for a woman in Roman society. She also laments that he family fears for her and her retention of purity (3.16.5-6), but she disregards this worry in her care for Cerinthus. Additionally, in 3.18, Sulpicia mourns that she regrets:

1. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
In this way, Sulpicia reclaims space with her impassioned and contradictory words.

Another author in Tibullus’ corpus is the male poet Lygdamus, who takes an opposite approach to elegy. Using his deceased wife as his muse, his poems are lengthy and contain long-winded allusions and questions. His poem 3.3 illustrates this. In this piece, Lygdamus plays the role of the typical elegiac lover, desperate and sick for the love of Neaera. He commences the poem with an anaphoric trail of questions beginning with variations of *quid prodest*, asking what use any luxury in life is worth having if his lover is not with him (3.3.1). The poet goes on to swear off riches if only she gives him love: *paupertas tecum iucunda, Neaera* (3.3.23). Such grand claims conceal an underlying threat. The flattery and seeming reverence give the illusion of choice, yet threats of self-harm and suicide negate this.

Catullus (c. 84-54 B.C.E.), a possible source of inspiration for Sulpicia and Lygdamus, provides another more obvious view of twofaced poetry in his corpus. Men, such as Catullus, feel the need to clarify that they are not only defined by their exploits in love. Catullus portrays himself as a love-sick fool who finds thrills in the chase, but not the consummation of love itself. The women he seeks possess a wild, magic quality to them that allows the poet to build an association between women and wickedness in his writings (*Carmen* 92.1), yet he does not want these characteristics of weakness to define him in his real life (*Carmen* 16). In *Carmen* 16 he asserts that he is as much a man as his critics by using violent sexual imagery. The threat in his words are overt in a way that Lygdamus avoids, as his cyle in the *Corpus Tibullianum* lacks the same forward, bluntness that Catullus unfolds in his *Carmen* 16. The male authors mask their virility with the façade of a hopeless lover, while Sulpicia masks her pains with the expected stereotype (3.14 and 3.15).

Proba’s single extant piece is her cento (c. 360 C.E.), which features lines from the *Aeneid*, reimagines and refigured into the story of the Bible (*Probae Cento* line 23). She establishes Aeneas as Biblical Adam when she writes of “an image of great piety” (Cullhead 2015: line 118) to describe God’s first man. When describing Eve’s first appearance, the poet tends towards a more trivial depiction, rather than the loaded image she grants Adam, as she writes that Eve is “a maiden with illustrious features and a beautiful breast” (Cullhead 2015: line 130). She furthers the idea of the meekness of women through God’s warning to Eve: “let no one’s violence overcome you...”
Brossoie (Cullhead 2015: line 155), despite the reader’s knowledge of Eve’s inevitable miscalculation. When Proba writes of the serpent’s trickery, given the connections to the Aeneid, one must consider Laocōn’s fate at the mercy of a serpent (2.199-233). The beast kills him after he attempts to dissuade the Trojans from admitting the horse into the city, while in the Bible, the serpent convinces Eve to disregard the word of God. Both beasts, biblical and pagan alike, lead to an oppression of unheard or underrepresented voices. Another notable parallel is that of Dido and Eve. Proba describes Eve as “devoted to future calamity” (Cullhead 2015: line 200), which relates to praecipue infelix pesti devota futurae (1.712) in the Aeneid. She continues to characterize Eve as an “insane woman” (Cullhead 2015: line 212), pointing to Virgil’s notumque furens quid femina posset (5.6). Dido is Proba’s model for Eve in her recreation of the book of Genesis. She is the victim of circumstance and fate, and seems to be unreasonable to the men around her. Her brother abused her, and Aeneas deceives her. There is no space for her in the world of power she lives in, so she reaches a tragic end. Proba characterizes Eve as a foolish, yet seemly woman. However, the poet models Eve after Dido, a misunderstood and mistreated figure. Eve is made for a man and based on a man (Probae Cento lines 122-132). Adam is described at his creation in this manner:

\[ tantae pietatis imago…os umerosque deo similis (Probae Cento lines 118, 120). \]

“with an image of such piety…face and shoulders similar to God.”

Eve, on the other hand, is called:

\[ donum…iam matura viro, iam plenis mubilis annis (Probae Cento lines 129 and 132) \]

“a gift…already mature for a man, already at a satisfactory, marriable age.”

Despite her seeming foolishness, her divergence from the “right” path is inevitable given her lack of space in the world she is brought into by force. The serpent’s enticement offers the illusion of free will, yet God also created the snake to be deceitful and cunning to begin with (Probae Cento lines 173-196). Proba panders to the male audience and belief of a wretched woman in mankind’s origin story but adds depth by employing a complicated character like Dido. She makes it difficult to view Adam as the victim, by creating a subtle sense of victimhood within Eve.

Virgil is the clear model on which Proba’s cento is built. In the Aeneid, Virgil takes the classic approach in characterizing his female characters. Previous to Aeneas’ tryst with Dido at Carthage, he was married to a woman
named Creusa in Troy. He loses her during the Greeks’ invasion when she failed to keep pace with him, Anchises, and Ascanius. The act of leaving behind his wife in the fires of Troy haunts Aeneas, as he was resolved to find her, no matter the risk to his own life (Aeneid 2.749-50). While desperately searching for her, Creusa later appears to Aeneas as an infelix simulacra and umbra (Aeneid 2.772) (“sad likeness” and “shade”). On the surface, Creusa is a weak, disposable character to shape Aeneas’ multifaceted experiences, Juno is mindless in her savagery and vengeance, and Dido is almost pathetic in her need for Aeneas to survive. The poet places significant emphasis on the volatilty of women and their ever-changing emotions. However, in making the wickedness of women a significant motivator of his plots, he allows women to play an instrumental role in shaping Aeneas’ renowned character. Additionally, despite the superficial characterization of women in the Aeneid as sinister and meek, women also possess a deeper story and significance. Women were prized for their beauty before any other more substantive talents, so long as their skills could maximize war, as was the case with Minerva. Juno was enraged due to Paris’ judgement of her as less than perfect, but also in part because of a pent-up frustration with the status quo. Since beauty was of such great importance to a woman and her standing in the world, a poor assessment was not just a scuff to her ego, but a serious blow to her overall reputation.

Married into Frankish aristocracy, Dhuoda’s husband, Bernard, used their children for his own political gain, leaving her alone. As a demonstration of loyalty, Bernard sent both sons to live at the court of Charles the Bald, while he traveled and worked on behalf of the crown and Dhouda stayed at home. Given her role as a tender to the home and family, the loss of a child left Dhuoda to process her own usefulness and productivity after being stripped of a significant role assigned to her by society. Part of Dhuoda’s grief goes into the writing of her Liber Manualis for her eldest son, William. This work is known as a Princely Mirror, or a didactic piece meant to instruct the reader on how to live and behave like a proper nobleman. In the introduction of her Liber Manualis, Dhuoda writes that she has “observed that most women in this world take joy in their children” (Thiébaux 1998: 43). This statement begins a recurring theme of unworthiness and meekness on the part of the author. Dhuoda separates herself from the other women in her community. She continues with the hopeful suggestion that although she is “ill at ease,” she is “eager to be useful” to William (Thiébaux 1998: 43). The writer is tentative, yet assertive as a mother. She attempts to bridge the gap between her own short-lived experiences as a mother and the relationship she bears witness to between mothers and sons in her community. By being “useful” to William, she establishes herself as a diminutive figure in the grand scheme of the Manual.

Dhuoda continues with this approach in the prologue. She declare, “I, Dhuoda, although the frail sex and living unworthy among women who are worthy, am nonetheless your mother, my son William” (Thiébaux 1998: 47). She assumes a position of limited worth in society and before her family to
conform with hierarchical standards of the day. Rather than forcing an opinion on her son, almost a stranger to her, she suggests how he might best live a worthwhile life in the hope that a modest entreaty might grant her greater appeal. She states this sentiment with less obscurity when she writes, “Again, I ask and humbly appeal to your noble youth as if I were there with you…” (Thiébaux 1998: 59) in the opening part of Book 1. Dhuoda continues to debase herself in Book 1, but in a different manner than in earlier sections of the book. She tells William to “fear, love, and be faithful in all ways to Bernard, your lord and father” and warns her son, “Do not despise him when you are strong” (Thiébaux 1998: 85). Despite Dhuoda’s grief over her son’s departure at the hands of her absentee husband, she still encourages William to adore his father and pay his respects, just as the Bible dictates. She possesses an ability to set aside personal grudges. Although her world does not allow for much choice for women, she makes the decision to overcome adversity. The author lowers her own worth to bolster the connection with her son and attempts to rectify the physical rift between father and son. By encouraging a positive relationship between father and son, she attempts to ensure the long-term wellbeing of her son. She also hopes William’s male gaze might better absorb her words if she conveys them through a position lower than his own. She stands as his best chance at becoming a cultured man, given her knowledge as a woman and politician, so she must get her message across despite the seeming worthlessness of a motherless child.

Fortunatus comes two centuries before Dhuoda, but he writes to many friends, several of which are female, such as Radegund and Agnes. When writing of Radegund’s ceaseless religiosity, the poet pens:

> et corpus crucias, animam ieiunia pascunt//solo quam dominus servat amore suus

“And you torment the body, fasting feeds the soul, which its own master serves with a single love”

Fortunatus’ corpus deals with multiple female figures, all of which he treats with careful adoration. This poet’s depictions of Radegund’s mortification of the flesh conveys the sentiment that women could best find power over themselves during religious devotion. His interactions with Placidina indicate that those not involved in the church as a nun or abbess could not hold the same level of self-expression and freedom, as his diction is more careful and calculated (Carmen 1.17). This difference in female freedoms points to an association between a woman’s ability to have control and self-determination and a man’s connections with her. Women who are members of the institutional church have little to no ties with individual men; therefore, they lack a responsibility to a man, while married women and unmarried young women’s freedoms are dictated by the men they fall under in the familial hierarchy.
We can learn much from canon male authors, but we can only learn so much of the actual experience of women through the male view. Pygmalion crafts an ideal woman with a body due to his own dissatisfactions with women on the mortal plane:

*qua femina nasci nulla potest* (Ov. Met. 248-9).

“with which no woman is able to be born.”

So-called ‘ventriloquizing’ male authors craft women to fit their own idealized conceptions. Ovid employs a self-debasement from the perspective of Dido and writes:

*non ego sum tanti* (Ov. Heroides. 4.45).

“I am not enough.”

This sentiment does not resonate as strongly as when Dhuoda debases herself in an attempt to save her sons. While the great male elegists are undisputedly skilled in capturing emotion, personal experiences heighten confected emotions. The inability of an individual to live the experiences he writes of hinders his ability to clearly convey lived experiences.

References


Restraint and Moderation in Archilochus’
Fragment 26

Reid Merzbacher

Archilochus appears to maintain a calm and collected disposition in the face of triumph and tragedy. Verses such as: “[n]either by weeping shall I bring about any cure, nor shall I make things worse by pursuing enjoyments and festivities” (fragment 5, lines 1-2) or “thrust aside this womanish grief” (fragment 6, line 10), speak in favor of emotional moderation and restraint. Fragment 26—a poem that discusses these themes—never explicitly rejects these views and appears to promote a similar ideology.

However, he provides insights into his true feelings through his use of intentionally contradictory language. In this fragment, he does not endorse restraint but instead shows its absurdity. He reveals that while he may indeed strive for emotional suppression, it torments him.

The poem follows an unusual form: Archilochus begins with an emotional outburst and then slowly reins himself in, leading to a calm conclusion. He begins by describing an impassioned, violent struggle on the battlefield. He then denies himself the ability to rejoice at victory or lament his defeat in favor of emotional moderation. The scope of the poem shifts in the final lines: he suggests that grand displays of emotion disrupt the rhythm of life. His language mirrors the content: as he talks about maintaining a calm disposition, he also writes in a more collected and gentler manner.

The key to the meaning of the poem lies in the first line. Archilochus begins with: “[O] heart, my heart, churning with unmanageable sorrows” (fragment 26, line 1). This exclamation—a burst of feeling and pain—thrusts the reader into the poem. He addresses this line to his heart, a symbol commonly associated with love and passion. This language evokes heartbreak and suffering. He speaks to his heart as if it were an independent being. This personification strengthens the opening: he does not merely describe his emotions, but elevates them, giving them agency and control.

The repetition in the phrase “[O] heart, my heart” makes the outburst seem more spontaneous and organic. This spontaneity implies that the exclamation is not calculated, but is a genuine expression of his feelings. The word “churning” evokes a state of restlessness and agitation. He cannot find peace, since he is overcome with emotion. The phrase “unmanageable sorrows” is worthy of particular consideration. As the poem progresses, he forces himself to contain
his anguish, leading the crucial contradiction: how can he manage something that is unmanageable?

In the next passage he makes specific requests: “rouse yourself and fiercely drive off your foes / with a frontal attack, standing hard by them / steadfastly” (fragment 26, lines 2-4). He chooses the poem’s central action with his audience in mind: he is a soldier writing for fellow soldiers, who can relate to this description of combat. The fight that he describes is also universally applicable to emotionally and physically taxing acts that are often painful or unbearable. The phrase “rouse yourself” suggests a change of state from rest to action, and emphasizes the level of energy needed for this confrontation.

He does not attempt to conjure up physical strength in this passage, although it is implied. Instead, he is concerned with generating enough passion and feeling to drive off his enemies. He still speaks to his heart and treats it as an independent being. His use of the pronoun you reinforces the role of the heart as a character in the poem, a choice that heightens the emotional weight of the passage; he does not disassociate himself from his heart, but instead emphasizes its power and control over him. He still performs the actions described, but his heart drives him.

The tone of the poem shifts suddenly, before the end of the sentence. This shift occurs at the exact midpoint of the fragment, halfway through the fourth line (of seven). Archilochus writes, “and neither exult openly if you win, / nor, if you are beaten, fling yourself down at home in lamentation” (fragment 26, lines 4-5). The poem is now grounded in a specific time: the fight is occurring, and the outcome has not yet been determined. He forbids himself from making grand outward displays of elation or anguish, whether he wins or loses. In fact, he does not allow it in the privacy of his own home, suggesting that these restrictions are set by and for himself, and are not mandated by others. These lines are a dramatic break from the previous material, and this change of tone comes as a surprise. He has clearly identified this fight as a powerful experience, even asking his heart to guide him as if he were in love. To require himself to be emotionless after the outcome seems unbearable.

Archilochus ends with a gentler tone and changes his focus to talk about life more generally. He writes: “[j]instead, rejoice in what is joyful, grieve at troubles, / but not too much: be aware what sort of rhythm rules man’s life” (fragment 26, lines 6-7). He allows himself some vulnerability of expression, but then pulls back: he can grieve and rejoice but “not too much”. He wants to have emotional freedom, but instead exerts control over himself, which parallels the larger form of the poem. He concludes by rejecting emotional extremities, saying that they disrupt the rhythm of life.

The beginning and ending of the poem are at odds, intentionally so. In the first lines he calls upon his heart in order to attack his enemies. He “rouses” himself, implying that he is transitioning from a peaceful state to a combatant one, which is a clear disruption of his life’s rhythm. By then saying that emotional vulnerability is the disruption—as if strenuous combat were a natural
part of everyday life—Archilochus shows the absurdity of his self-imposed restrictions.

It is unclear from this fragment why exactly he feels such extreme pressure to be restrained. Perhaps he feels that it is what society expects from him. Perhaps it comes from his ideas about his own masculinity. Perhaps it is a deep-rooted inhibition against vulnerability. These reasons are all purely speculative, but whatever the cause, the restraint is overwhelming and constricting.

The crucial contradiction (how can he manage unmanageable sorrow?) remains unresolved. He provides no consolation and makes no efforts to ease his pain. Instead, he diverts the focus of the poem and forces himself to maintain a calm disposition. The abrupt change of tone in the middle represents his struggle with his own emotions: he is unable to console himself, so he pivots in an effort to hide his feelings—both from the audience and from himself. The poem’s structure and use of language shows that he is tormented by his unjustifiable and irrational repression.

Archilochus’s use of his heart as the central character in the poem is crucial for understanding this torment. When he talks about the battle he addresses his heart directly. As discussed previously, his language is typically reserved for descriptions of love and heartbreak. He has no reservations about describing war with this outburst of feeling, perhaps because the socially accepted bravery of combat outweighs them. However, when he changes focus—going from the discussion of the battle to the aftermath—his use of language changes.

The ending of the poem is much more subdued: he has abandoned the violent and impassioned tone of the beginning in favor of moderation and level-headedness. He becomes self-conscious, no longer willing to speak directly to his heart. He has stopped using the pronoun you, making these lines read as his general thoughts, rather than being directed toward his heart. This clever change of focus makes these final lines far less dramatic than the preceding material and creates a striking contrast in tone. In the last lines, it is unclear with whom he is speaking—possibly to the audience, or to himself. This ambiguity allows him to discuss defeat or elation from a removed standpoint. In this way, the poem’s language is self-referential: he only displays his feelings when he talks about situations in which he is comfortable doing so. This second layer of expression shows his insecurity and his deep emotional repression.

Fragment 26 is a fascinating display of inner turmoil. The poem’s language and structure demonstrate Archilochus’ restrictive notions about how he should act in the face of defeat or success. These notions are unattainable because he admits that his sorrows are unmanageable. He gives the reader a view into his own consciousness, offering glimpses at the passionate personality that he is so desperate to conceal. Behind his cold, emotionally calculated exterior, he reveals himself to be a vulnerable man, overcome with repressed feelings. The poem is cathartic and self-aware; while he cannot overcome his need to restrain himself, he can at least share his torment with the readers and acknowledge the unfortunate absurdity of forced emotional moderation.
References

Euripides, 2019

JP Mayer

Charcoal slipping between my fingers, 
the stumbled lover, Paris’s hands—
the drag of a paintbrush.
Cigarette. Soft lips. I miss Helen.

Shotgun eidolon, coughing blots
of pastel paint against the wall,

I have to go, Red. He leaves me there.
I have to go.

Lilac Apollo, strobing satellites, his
godlike god look at those goddamn
thighs walking down the alleyway,
my silhouette, left me spray-painted
loose unstenciled—

I have to go.

Tongue-tied acrylic, the artist’s lover,
static jettisons me hard against the brick
wall. Kiss me deep, I said, like Cassandra,
Daphne, Coronis, leave me here,
shot down in hues of blue and green. Sighed
deep—not a kiss, the tender artist,
Marriage appears as a central theme in many Ancient Greek texts. By exploring these relationships, we can increase our understanding of how the Greeks viewed marriage. Thus, it is interesting that in myth, there are many married women who receive a particularly negative portrayal. Clytemnestra, Phaedra, and Helen come to mind as just a few of the women who are highlighted for their inability to appropriately display the qualities of an ideal wife. However, while many texts focus on how ‘not’ to act, far fewer contain examples of how an ideal wife should act. Thus, it is notable that in *The Odyssey*, Odysseus’ wife, Penelope, is given a notably positive portrayal by Homer. As a married woman, Penelope is praised for her ability to remain loyal to her husband and to stand by his side as an intellectual equal. Penelope is one of the few women in myth thought by scholars to exemplify the qualities of the ideal Grecian wife (Bolmarcich 2001, 206).

While Penelope represents the ideal mortal wife, as the goddess of marriage, Hera represents married women as their patron goddess. What is interesting about Hera’s role, however, is that her marriage to Zeus is frequently portrayed as one that is full of conflict (Synodinou 1987, 13). In contrast to the idealistic and harmonious marriage in *The Odyssey*, the portrayal of Zeus and Hera’s marriage in *The Iliad* makes the couple seem less than idyllic. Unlike Penelope and Odysseus, who display an emotional and intellectual connection, Hera and Zeus spend a majority of *The Iliad* in conflict with one another. Not only do the two fight on different sides of the Trojan War, but they bicker throughout the epic and Zeus even threatens to physically harm his wife on multiple occasions.

Thus, it seems odd that Hera, the goddess of marriage, is portrayed as having such a tumultuous relationship. However, despite the negative aspects of her relationship with Zeus, the portrayal of Hera as the goddess of marriage in *The Iliad* is actually well aligned with Homer’s depiction of Penelope, who is thought to represent the ideal Ancient Grecian wife. Both women display many similar qualities and given their respective situations make decisions that align with the Greek’s ideas about what it means to be a wife. Over the course of this paper I will compare two depictions of the women, focusing on Penelope’s and Hera’s intellectual capabilities and their loyalty to their husbands. I ultimately
will show that Hera does, in fact, exhibit the qualities of the ideal wife through her similarities to Penelope. I will additionally show how the extremities of Hera’s marital situation enable her to solidify her role as the ideal immortal wife.

**Like-Mindedness**

As we begin to think about the ideal Grecian wife, one of the prominent qualities displayed by both Penelope and Hera is intellect. The Greek word *mētis* refers to one’s “mental and manual prowess” (Bergren 1993, 8). During *The Odyssey*, it is Penelope’s *mētis* that Homer repeatedly praises as excellent (Bergren 1993, 8). Homer uses the epithet “wise” to describe Penelope on numerous occasions during the epic. To accompany this description, Penelope’s *mētis* is displayed during a few important scenes. One of these scenes takes place during Book 2, when Homer describes how Penelope was able to trick her suitors into prolonging an engagement. Scholar Ann Bergren argues that Penelope was uniquely able to yield the power of false speech (Bergren 1993, 8). She was cleverly able to “analyze [the] complex problem… and design a solution” in a way that displayed the strength of her mind (Bergren 1993, 11).

Like Penelope, Homer draws attention to Hera’s ability to solve complex problems. In Book 14, after watching her husband cause the Greeks to struggle on the battlefield, Hera crafts an elaborate scheme to seduce Zeus. Homer dedicates a majority of the book to describing how she crafts and implements her plan. Not only is Hera able to successfully deceive Zeus, who Homer describes as an established “mastermind” (*The Iliad* 1998, 14.196), but during the book she also successfully outwits Aphrodite and persuades Sleep into doing her bidding. Thus, since both Hera and Penelope are portrayed as being highly intelligent and capable of crafting intricate schemes, we can see that intellectual capability is one of the core desired qualities of a Grecian wife.

Not only does Homer highlight Penelope’s intellectual capabilities, but he makes the argument that Penelope’s mind mirrors her husband’s. As Odysseus’ perfect match, not only does she exemplify a mastery of wits, but her mind mirrors her husband in a way that makes her an excellent partner for strategizing. While the scene in Book 2 displays Penelope’s craftiness, Odysseus, too, is praised for his mind. On numerous occasions Homer describes Odysseus as being a “master of exploits” and skilled at devising clever plans (*The Odyssey* 1997, 132). Thus, Sarah Bolmarcich argues that Homer portrays Penelope and Odysseus as each other’s ideal match because of their similar minds. Odysseus and Penelope are described to have *ομοφροσύνη*, meaning a “unity of mind and feeling” (Bolmarcich 2001, 207). The word, *ομοφροσύνη*, is not used to describe any other male-female paring throughout Homeric epic, and
Bolmarcich finds it interesting that such a term typically used to describe two men discussing battle strategy is used to describe Homer’s ideal married couple (Bolmarcich 2001, 213). Thus, it is evident that Homer believes that Penelope’s ability to mirror her husband makes her uniquely suited to be Odysseus’ consort.

Likewise, in *The Odyssey* Homer emphasizes the importance for couples to use their similar minds to strategize against their enemies. Following the famous recognition scene in Book 13, Odysseus and Penelope share a tender moment where they put their minds together to craft a plan to stop the suitors (*The Odyssey* 1997, 390). This particular moment emulates the words spoken by Odysseus to Nausicaa earlier in the epic.

No finer, greater gift in the world than that...
when man and woman possess their home, two minds
two hearts that work as one. Despair to their enemies
joy to all their friends.

(*The Odyssey* 6.200-205)

The scheming scene only further exemplifies how Odysseus and Penelope function as the ideal couple. As a couple they are able to plot with one another and to unite their minds against their enemies (Bolmarcich 2001, 8). Thus, as the ideal wife Penelope is able to support her husband not only as a lover but as a confidant.

Similarly, in *The Iliad*, Hera displays an intense desire to plot and scheme with her husband and to share a moment similar to the one Penelope and Odysseus share in *The Odyssey*. The goddess is clearly bothered when she sees her husband engaging in a private conversation with Thetis, and she is quick to confront Zeus and express her desire to be included in the formulation of his plans.

Always your pleasure, whenever my back is turned,
to settle things in your grand clandestine way.
You never deign, do you, freely and frankly,
To share your plots with me—never, not a word!

(*The Iliad* 1.650-654)

If the Greeks believed that there was truly nothing greater than two minds that worked as one, then it is logical that Homer specifically depicted Hera, the goddess of marriage, as desiring to have strategic conversations with her husband. Hera longs to exhibit ομοφροσύνη with her husband in the same way that Penelope exhibits it with Odysseus.

Likewise, in the way that Penelope’s mind mirrors Odysseus’, Homer draws attention to the fact that Hera’s characteristics and upbringing quite clearly
still. you must not make my labor come to nothing.
I am a god too. My descent the same as yours-
crooked-minded Cronus fathered me as well,
the first of all his daughters, first both ways:
both by birth and since I am called your consort
and you in turn rule all the immortal gods.
So come, let us yield to each other now
on this one point, I to you and you to me.

(The Iliad 4.67-73)

Scholar Joan O’Brien argues that Hera is troublingly quick to give
away her three prized cities. The fact that Hera gives away the cities almost
instantly, and seemingly has a disregard for mortal life, diverges from Homer’s
portrayal of other female goddesses, such as Athena or Artemis, who are known
for valiantly protecting their mortal cities (O’Brien 1990, 111). However, in this
case the mortal cities merely function as unfortunate collateral damage. While it
is true that the goddess is quick to negotiate away the lives of many mortals, her
actions can be explained by her desire to prove herself to Zeus. She is willing to
give up her favorite cities so long as her husband will recognize her strength and
determination. Hera wants to be taken seriously, and she chooses her words
carefully. First, she brings up her age (that she is his elder), her parentage (that
she, like Zeus, is a descendent of Cronos, a very powerful deity), and then her
current role as queen of the Olympians. She says all of this to remind her
husband of her rightful place—which happens to be by his side.

As Hera reminds her husband of her capabilities, Homer reminds the
readers that Hera is Zeus’ match in every way. They have the same parents,
similar intellectual capacities and oversee the same realm on Olympus. While
Zeus may be king of the gods, Hera is his queen, and his elder. Thus, the final
lines of her speech demonstrate Hera’s desire to exhibit an ideal relationship,
akin to the one portrayed in The Odyssey. She says to Zeus, “come let us yield
to each other… I to you and you to me” (The Iliad, 1998, 4.73-4). The use of the
word “yield” invokes the image of two well matched adversaries choosing to
engage in a respectful draw and the eloquent chiasmus “I to you and you to me”
highlights Hera’s desire to be seen as an equal adversary. Displaying the
qualities of Homer’s ideal wife, Hera does not want to continue to fight with
Zeus. What she truly wants is for them to come together as equals and for their minds to be united as one.

One might point out that for the majority of *The Iliad*, Hera and Zeus’ minds are not united. If the Greeks believed that there is no greater thing than a man and woman uniting against their enemies, how can Hera represent the ideal wife when she is constantly fighting *against* her husband? The fact that the couple is constantly in conflict with each other further exemplifies the need for their unity. During most of *The Iliad* they are on different sides of the Trojan War, not working together but each actively trying to outwit the other. As a result, hundreds of mortal men die, including many who are beloved by the gods. It is only when the two definitively cease their fighting, at the end of the epic, that the mortal deaths stop. It is no coincidence that the couple’s unhappiness is correlated with turmoil on earth. Thus, even though Zeus and Hera do not exemplify the ideal Ancient Grecian couple, Hera still exhibits qualities of the ideal wife. She deeply desires to scheme with her husband, and not against him, and it is the fault of Zeus that leads them down different paths.

**Loyalty**

Referred to by Homer as “the soul of loyalty” (*The Odyssey* 1997, 388), Penelope is praised during *The Odyssey* for her ability to function as a constant for her husband. For twenty years Odysseus is away from home, fighting in the war, sailing the seas, and struggling to find his way back to Ithaca. During the long span of time, Penelope is left home to watch over their land and son, and during the entire time she is completely unaware of Odysseus’ fate. She has no idea if or when Odysseus will return, if he is even still alive, or if he has found another woman to start a new family with. By the time *The Odyssey* begins, it is likely that Odysseus will never return home. Yet, despite the seemingly bleak situation, Penelope still yearns for her husband and remains hopeful that he will return home. Homer emphasizes Penelope’s emotional attachment to Odysseus, depicting her weeping for him on multiple occasions (*The Odyssey* 1997, 72, 75, 282). It is Penelope’s love for and dedication to Odysseus that keeps her hopeful as she waits for his return.

Not only is Penelope characterized by her love for Odysseus, but Homer additionally emphasizes her remarkable loyalty through depicting her refusal to remarry in her husband’s absence. While Odysseus is gone, Penelope is tempted by a hundred and eight of Ithaca’s finest men, each vying for her hand in marriage. Many of these men come from wealthy, reputable families and could make excellent husbands. Not only would a new husband provide financial security, but he would also provide protection for herself and her son. Yet, despite the qualifications of each suitor and her situation as a presumed widow, not once does Homer suggest that Penelope considers their offers.
Instead, he repeatedly emphasizes her disdain for the suitors and reiterates her unwavering desire to wait for her husband to return. Even when suitors begin to pressure her into selecting a new husband, Penelope is able to prolong making an engagement by tricking them. Thus, despite having clear monetary and practical incentives to take a new husband, Penelope remains an “unmoving, immovable place and space” for Odysseus (Bergren 1993, 6). While Odysseus is away, he yearns to return to his wife, and Homer praises Penelope for her ability be there for him when he does.

It is Penelope’s unwavering loyalty and dedication to Odysseus that makes her the ideal wife. Homer articulates this during Book 11, when Agamemnon’s ghost, speaking to Odysseus, cries “what a fine, faithful wife you won...the fame of her great virtue will never die” (The Odyssey 1997, 399). Ann Bergren points out that Homer’s description of Penelope in this scene is particularly unique because he uses the Greek word *arête*, meaning excellence (Fagles translates it to mean “great virtue”). Notably, Penelope stands to be the only woman in Homeric epic to be described using such a word (Bergren 1993, 9). Thus, not only does Homer believe that Penelope’s unwavering loyalty is worth praising, but he argues that the extent to which she stays loyal to her husband during their time of turmoil makes her stand out as one of the best amongst women.

Mirroring Penelope’s ability to remain a constant during her husband’s physical absence, in The Iliad, Hera displays an unwavering, stubborn dedication to her husband despite his emotional absence. Emotionally, Zeus remains detached from Hera; he engages in multiple affairs with both mortal and immortal women. While he does not have any other sexual encounters during the epic, Homer references his previous adulterous relationships with Semele, Demeter and Leto, to name a few (The Iliad 1998, 14.380-90). Even at the start of the epic, Hera catches Thetis clasping her husband’s knee during a secret conversation (The Iliad 1998, 1.612). Zeus’s relationships with women other than Hera parallel Odysseus’ encounters with Calypso and Circe during the duration of The Odyssey, and just as Penelope remains a constant figure for Odysseus to return to, Hera never cheats on Zeus, nor does she ever leave her husband.

Like Penelope, Hera has many incentives to leave her husband. Not only is Zeus emotionally detached from his wife, but he also threatens to physically abuse the goddess on multiple occasions. In Book 1, he threatens to “throttle” her after she

1. Described by Amphimedon’s Ghost on page 397, Penelope told the suitors she would choose as husband after she finished weaving a shroud for Odysseus’ father. Each day she worked on completing the shroud but each night she unraveled the progress she made, thus allowing her to make no progress.
2. He specifically expresses this desire to Calypso on pg. 84.
3. She is presented in contrast to Clytemnestra, who was found to be disloyal upon her husband, Agamemnon’s return. (The Odyssey 1997, 399).
4. Odysseus slept with both women before returning home to his wife.
confronts him about his conversation with Thetis (The Iliad 1998, 1.683). He later threatens to “hurl [Hera] from her chariot” in Book 8 (The Iliad 1998, 8.662), and in Book 15, after Hera successfully tricks him into falling asleep, Zeus threatens to torture her by hanging her upside down (The Iliad 1998, 15.20-44). By threatening physical abuse and engaging in numerous affairs, it’s clear that Hera has justified incentives to leave her husband. Likewise, similar to Penelope, Hera is described as being very beautiful (The Iliad 1998, 14.257), and it’s likely that if she desired to find another husband, she would be able to secure one with little difficulty. However, despite her clear incentives to leave, Hera stays with Zeus. Even after he first threatens Hera in Book 1, she is depicted sleeping by her husband’s side only fifty lines later (The Iliad 1998, 1.735). Thus, even though Hera faces incentives to leave her husband, she displays an unwavering loyalty to Zeus.

Immortality & Extremities

Lastly, any comparison of Penelope and Hera would be incomplete without acknowledging Hera’s immortality. While Penelope serves as the mortal wife to a hero, Hera serves as an immortal wife to a god. With both women displaying qualities of the ideal Grecian wife, are there any distinctions to be made between the role of a mortal and immortal wife? The extremity of Hera’s situation is used to create a distinct comparison between the mortal and immortal wife. During the Odyssey, Odysseus engages in a few affairs. Yet, Penelope is unaware of her husband’s infidelity, and for the majority of the epic she is unsure if Odysseus is even alive. Still, Odysseus displays remorse for being away from his wife and makes it clear that he is still invested in their marriage (The Odyssey 1998, 84). For example, in Book 5 Odysseus spends time with Calypso and has the opportunity to stay with her on her island. Yet, he rejects this offer and explains to the goddess that despite her beauty and charm, he still desires to return home to Penelope. He says “my wise Penelope. She falls far short of you…nevertheless, I long—I pine, all my days—to travel home and see the dawn of my return” (The Odyssey 1998, 84). He says this right before he returns to bed with the goddess. This moment showcases the tension faced by Odysseus; while he continues to cheat on his wife, he still acknowledges that he misses her and that his end goal is to return to his marriage bed.

In contrast to Odysseus, Zeus’ affairs in mythology are dramatic, intricate, and frequent. His lack of awareness is almost comical and is most evident when he attempts to use his affairs to convince his wife to sleep with him (The Iliad 1998, 14.380-90). Unlike Penelope, Hera knows about her husband’s affairs, and not only is she fully aware of his infidelity, but on many occasions, she is forced to interact with her husband’s illegitimate offspring.
Likewise, Zeus and Hera’s marriage is notably conflict-ridden, but the fact that the couple never truly addresses Zeus’ infidelity is quite unique (Synodinou 1987, 13). While it is not unusual for husbands in Greek mythology to sleep with women other than their wives, it is odd that Zeus almost seems puzzled as to why Hera is continually upset by his infidelity. In many texts that depict disloyal mortal husbands, such as *Agamemnon* or *Medea*, eventually the conflict is resolved by someone’s death (be it Agamemnon’s in his play, or Jason’s children in Medea’s). This idea of resolution is even present amongst the gods. Take, for example, Hephaestus, who catches his wife, Aphrodite, having an affair with Ares (Deris 2013, 11). The conflict is resolved after Hephaestus is able to trap and embarrass the couple in front of the other gods, bringing closure to the situation. However, unlike any of the other couples mentioned in Homer, Zeus and Hera never address the underlying issues with their marriage nor experience closure in relation to Zeus’ affairs (Pratt 2018, 46). In *The Iliad* we are never led to believe that Zeus feels any level of remorse for his actions, putting Hera in a unique situation where her husband’s infidelity is well known, but unlike with other couples, there is no finite ending to his cheating. In depicting Hera, Homer builds upon the trope of the faithful wife by using Zeus’ antics to exaggerate the severity of her marital situation.

Thus, it is Hera’s decision to stay by Zeus’ side, despite all of the issues present in their marriage, that is particularly impressive. Scholar Katerina Synodinou attributes Hera’s loyalty to a psychological co-dependence (1987, 13-22), however in actuality, Homer depicts Hera’s unwavering loyalty as commendable. If loyalty is one of the key qualities held by an ideal wife, then as the goddess of marriage Hera takes this virtue to the extreme. Her exaggerated display of loyalty provides an explanation for why she continues to stay with her husband despite his many abuses. Since, as the patron goddess of the married women she represents the ideal qualities of a wife, and for the Greeks, the ideal married woman stays by her husband’s side no matter what, Hera presents the image of the wife who is almost loyal to a fault.

Thus, Homer is able to use the extremity of Hera’s situation to create a distinction between the ideal mortal and immortal wife (Pratt 2018, 32). While the ideal mortal wife is responsible for displaying the qualities of loyalty and intelligence, the immortal wife is expected to be all that, and more. Not only does Hera display qualities similar to that of Penelope, but she is able to do so while being a part of one of the most strained marriages in antiquity. It is Hera’s unwavering ability to display qualities of the ideal wife despite her situation that distinguishes her from even the best of mortal wives.
Conclusion

Both Penelope and Hera represent the idealistic Grecian wife. In their respective poems, both women display intellectual capabilities and significant loyalty to their husbands. While it seems that Hera and Zeus’ marriage is less harmonious than Odysseus’ and Penelope’s, we can attribute this difference to two important things. First, the two texts highlight a distinction between mortal and immortal marriages and as a result, Hera’s depiction as the ideal wife does not rely on Zeus’ depiction as the ideal husband. Putting Zeus against Hera as an adversary gives Homer the chance to display Hera’s intellectual capabilities and knack for scheming. Secondly, even though Zeus functions as Hera’s main adversary, Homer uses their tumultuous relationship to show why Hera’s loyalty is so impressive. The goddess never dissolves the marriage and throughout the epic it is clear that she desires to one day unite her mind with her husband’s.

One may question how much of Hera’s characterization can be attributed to Homer. After all, the character “Hera” existed before the Iliad was written. The marriage of Zeus and Hera has been portrayed in various different mediums. What makes Homer’s portrayal unique, however, is that Hera serves as a multidimensional character who is given a wide range of scenes. Unlike other depictions that solely focus on Hera’s role as a “jealous, vicious wife”, Homer’s Hera is intelligent, ambitious, loyal, and even at times sympathetic (Xu 2017, 6).

Therefore, Hera’s depiction in the Iliad allows her to flourish in her role as a multidimensional, immortal wife. Even though in the epic Zeus and Hera are not portrayed as the ideal couple, by highlighting the similarities between the portrayals of Penelope and Hera we can see that Homer’s Hera does, in fact, exemplify the qualities of an ideal Grecian wife.

References


5. Zeus’ various threats of physical abuse, for example, allow Hera to rise as a sympathetic figure in the scenes.


The Alexander Mosaic

James Flynn

The Alexander Mosaic is one of the most famous surviving Roman mosaics, both because of its memorable and possibly nearly contemporary depiction of Alexander the Great, and because of the glimpse it gives us into Classical and Hellenistic Greek painting. Yet more recent interpretations also emphasize the distinctly Roman context in which a painting was transformed into a mosaic. The Mosaic was discovered in 1831 in an exedra in the 2nd century BCE House of the Fauns in Pompeii, and it is now housed in the Naples National Archaeological Museum. By stylistic and archaeological evidence, it dates between 120 and 100 BCE (Cohen 2000: 1). It comprises about one million
tesserae, assembled in the style of *opus vermiculatum* (“wormlike work”), so called for resembling brush strokes in painting (Stewart 1993: 131). The Mosaic sustained damage in an earthquake of 62 CE, evidenced by repairs to some areas of it, and after the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE it remained buried for almost two millennia (Stewart 1993: 131). The Mosaic depicts Alexander the Great heroically leading a charge of Macedonian cavalry against the forces of Darius III, the Persian King who served as Alexander’s main adversary in his conquest of the Achaemenid Empire in the 4th century BCE. The Persians, distinguished by their turbans and long pants, are in a state of panic and disarray, as their king, towering above the others on his chariot, flees the battle. Alexander, while stabbing one unfortunate Persian, is heading straight in pursuit of Darius.

The Mosaic is replicating an original Hellenistic painting. It is true that Roman art historians have more recently challenged the tendency to view all Roman paintings as mere copies of Greek originals, and try instead to emphasize qualities of the reproductions that are distinctly Roman (Cohen 2000: 52). Yet while acknowledging that it is better in general to challenge the bias against Roman innovation, Cohen concedes that, “in this particular case, it is clear that the Greek assumption is legitimate,” (Cohen 2000: 52). The distinct four-color palette—black, white, yellow, and red—is popular with classical Greek painters; and the shallow composition, in addition to the palette, points to a late 4th century BCE composition (Palagia 2017: 179; Stewart 1999: 131). Moreover, some of the motifs in the Mosaic are found in Macedonian paintings of the late 4th century BCE. The best example of this is the particular depiction of horses, which resemble those in the hunting relief in Tomb II at Verginia, the so-called Philip II Tomb, that some have surmised them to be the works of the same painter (Cohen 2000: 54). Most striking, however, is the accuracy with which the Mosaic depicts both Macedonian and Persian armour, clothes, and weapons. Alexander’s corselet resembles the distinctly Macedonian corselet discovered in Tomb II at Verginia (Cohen 2000: 52). The Persian outfits are distinctly Achaemenid; they are not Parthian nor are they generically eastern (Cohen 2000: 52). The Persian in the Mosaic suspected to be Oxathres, the brother of Darius III, wears a diadem, which Xenophon tells us in his Cyropedia was worn by the King’s close relations (Pagalia 2017: 180). This accuracy could not possibly be replicated by Roman artists centuries later, making scholars believe the original painting to have been informed by veterans of the depicted battle itself (Pagalia 2017: 179; Stewart 1999: 133; Cohen 2000: 52). Alexander also has not yet taken on the divine features that characterize the portraits made of him after his death, which could indicate a date for the painting soon after the battle (Stewart 1999: 133).

Scholars have therefore searched among Hellenistic figures for the possible painters of the original painting. The most likely candidate is Philoxenos of Eretria. Pliny the Elder describes a pupil of Nichomachus of Thebes named Philoxenus of Eretria, “who painted for kind Cassander a picture representing one of the battles between Alexander and Darius, a work which may bear
The Alexander Mosaic 161

comparison to any," (Natural History 35.110). Though Cassander became king of Macedon only after 305 BCE, it has been suggested that he could have commissioned the painting in 317 BCE upon assuming the regency (Stewart 1999: 134). Another candidate is Helena of Egypt, who was active in the 4th century. Ptoelmaios Hephaistion tells us that around 100 CE a painting of a battle of Alexander by Helena of Egypt was displayed in the Temple of Peace (Cohen 2000: 63). Supporting for this idea are the other paintings in the House of Faun, which seemed to be inspired by scenes from the Egyptian city of Alexandria—such as the Nilotic scenes of crocodiles and cobras—indicating an Alexandrian theme to the decorations of the house (Palagia 2017: 180). Whoever the painter, it is clear that he or she was active in the late 4th Century BCE and could have learned about Alexander’s battles from first-hand accounts.

Out of the three possible battles that could be depicted here, there is near scholarly consensus that this is the battle of Issus in November of 333 BCE (Stewart 1999: 134). In his campaigns, Alexander fought three major battles against the Achaemenid Empire—those of Graniucs (334), Issus (333), and Gaugamela (331). In the first Darius was not even present, whereas in the latter two Darius is described—as depicted in the Mosaic—as fleeing his position of leading the Persian forces (Bosworth 1988: 61-62, 84). The details that rule out Gaugamela are more subtle. The scenery depicted in the Mosaic consists of a single tree and bare rocks, but at Gaugamela Darius is said to have cleared out the battlefield beforehand to make room for his chariots and cavalry (Stewart 1999: 134). The leafless tree, and the fact that the Persians are dressed for cold, indicate, at least to Stewart, that snow must be about to fall, and therefore the Mosaic could not depict the barren and hot desert of Gaugamela on October 1 (Stewart 1999: 134). Also, in the Mosaic Alexander is surrounded only by the Companions, whereas at Gaugemela he was said to have lead a phalanx into the charge (Stewart 1999: 137). And in the Mosaic Darius is being ushered away by his driver, whereas at Gaugemela he had seized the reins of his chariot himself (Stewart 1999: 137).

At the Battle of Issus, Alexander himself lead the Companions down the right flank, then pushed left heading directly for Darius, who was surrounded by his personal guard, which is depicted in the Mosaic (Bosworth 1988: 60-61). Literary sources here begin slightly to differ. The court historians, who are generally favourable to Alexander— Ptolemy and Aristobulus, as related by Arrian’s history and by fragments of Callisethenes— portray Darius as fleeing at the very first engagement, in order to belittle Alexander’s adversary as a cowardly contrast to the brave general (Bosworth 1988: 61). By contrast, the vulgate tradition —Diodorus, Q. Curtius, and Justin — say that Darius fought from his chariot all the way up to the point when his own guard was slain and he was nearly captured. Bosworth and other scholars take the latter version as the more accurate and as the one that is depicted in the Mosaic (Bosworth 1988: 61). Q. Curtius Rufus describes vividly the scene of the Mosaic:
Alexander performed the duties not more of a commander than of a soldier, seeking the rich renown of slaying the king; for Darius stood high in his chariot, a great incentive to his own men for protecting him and to the enemy for attack. Therefore his brother Oxathres, when he saw Alexander rushing upon the king, interposed the cavalry which he commanded directly before the chariot of Darius...The Macedonians around their king—and they were encouraged by mutual exhortation—with Alexander himself broke into the band of horsemen. Then indeed men were laid low like a building fallen in pieces...And already the horses of Darius’ chariot, pierced with spears and frantic from pain, had begun to toss the yoke and shake the king from his place, when he, fearing lest he should come alive into the enemies’ power, leaped down and mounted upon a horse which followed for that very purpose, shamefully casting aside the tokens of his rank, that they might not betray his flight. Then indeed the rest were scattered in fear, and where each had a way of escape open, they burst out... (Curtius III 7-12).

The Mosaic does a good job of capturing the chaos among the Persian bodyguards described here. It also captures the panic of the horses of Darius’s chariot, which are veering maddeningly in different directions. The horse in front of Darius’ chariot, which a Persian soldier leads by it reins, is probably the one that Darius mounts in order to flee more swiftly (Stewart 1999: 139). The Persian soldier who is mounted on horseback directly behind the one being stabbed by Alexander might be Oxathres who is wearing a diadem, the symbol of the royal court (Palagia 2017: 180). Alexander is almost certainly riding his famous horse Bucephalus—meaning “Oxhead”—as can be seen in its white ears, which are supposed to resemble ox horns (Stewart 1999: 137). Darius’s gesture in the Mosaic is subject to different interpretations. He could be nobly and empathetically expressing distress at the nobleman whom Alexander is stabbing—possibly one of those named by Diodorus and Curtius as being killed by the Macedonian charge (Cohen 2000: 91). Or he can be seen as cowardly, pleading with Alexander for his life, an interpretation seemingly validated by the literary sources but rejected by Cohen (Cohen 2000: 91).

Though it is based on a Greek painting, the Mosaic itself must be understood in its Roman context. In the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE, Romans adopted a philhellenic attitude to art (Cohen 2000: 58). They looted many Greek paintings in the mid-2nd century BCE conquest of Greece. We know of other artistic depictions of Alexander that were looted by the Romans, such as Granikos monument by Lyssipos, which was taken by Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus in 146 BCE (Cohen 2000: 59). Artifacts such as the Apulian vases from c. 330 BCE and the Etruscan urns from the 2nd century BCE depict so similar an image to that of the Mosaic that scholars disagree on whether they all derive from the one original painting (Cohen 2000: 59). There is speculation that
the Romans took the original painting as booty from the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE, or from Metellus’s defeat of Andriskos in 148 BCE (Cohen 2000: 59).

The location of the Alexander Mosaic in the House of the Faun, on the most fundamental level, incurred prestige on its patrons and owners. Since there is no overall theme connecting the Mosaic to the others in the house, it may be best to see it as an elaborate decoration. An imitation of a Greek painting such as this was seen as a luxury to be desired, and it signalled the fine taste and wealth of its patrons and owners (Cohen 2000: 197). The prestige that this mosaic must have signaled attests to Alexander’s status as an important cultural icon to the Romans. From the time of his conquests to the late 2nd century BCE when the mosaic was created, Alexander became something of a super-star. The Romans could have had many reasons to replicate the battles of Alexander. To them, he represented many positive traits for a military leader to embody: success in conquest, the capacity for self-glorification, and the triumph of the west over the east in a universal empire (Cohen 2000: 188). Indeed, the earliest use of the appellation “the Great” is found in Plautus’s Mostellaria of the late second century BCE (Cohen 2000: 187). And in the first century BCE, Pompey styled himself after Alexander in his eastern conquests, even through adopting the anastole haircut, made famous in countless busts of Alexander. As the mosaic demonstrates, Alexander’s legacy was not just in his military conquests, but also in the countless artistic representations of him, reproduced by the Romans and by countless generations following in their footsteps.

References

Temple of Hera (Paestum, Italy). Original photograph by Braden Donoian. Used by Permission
A Comparative Analysis of Cretan Law at Dreros and the Hammurabi Code

Colin Olson

The notion of the “Greek Miracle,” the ideologically loaded belief of an Ancient Greek inventiveness laying the foundation for Western political, societal, and ethical practice, has, along with the historiography on such topics, tainted an understanding of the inception of Hellenic written law. While today’s viewing of the Bosphorous as separating the East from the West continues to constrain historical interrogation along postmodern boundaries, the concept of an interconnected Mediterranean, linked not only in trade but along personal lines, has recently achieved greater notoriety in the form of Martin Bernal’s Black Athena: the Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization and its controversial nature, as well as scholarly discussion on military movement (Kaplan 2003: 1-31) and trade (Foxhall in Fisher 1998: 296-309). Prompting a discussion of the earliest extant Greek written laws, found in the settlement of Dreros on the island of Crete, is Gagarin’s recently published reference source, which, on the whole, denigrates a discussion of Near Eastern legal influence on the Hellenic world, especially with regards to the Hammurabi code.

Dreros, “located on the Gulf of Mirabello in northeastern Crete...” according to Gagarin’s estimates, using an inscription he terms Dr1 describing the role of kosmos, contained at least two hundred citizens (Gagarin 2016: 197, 57-8). Boasting, in the form of eight inscribed laws discovered on the premises of the temple to Apollo Delphinios dating to c.650 BCE, (Gagarin 2016: 197-200) what seems to be the earliest extant Greek written laws, Dreros fits well into its Cretan surroundings amongst societies such as Gortyn which would later become renowned for its Gortyn Code. This early legal inscription piques the particular interest of James Whitley, as, especially on the island, “...signs of informal or widespread literacy are slight” (Whitley 1997: 635). With literacy an inhibiting factor, Gagarin’s premise that these laws arose without outside influence “...to be read and used by a large segment of the population...” seems lackadaisical and symptomatic of “Greek Miracle” rhetoric (Gagarin 2016: 131). For among the Dreros inscriptions are bilingual documents written in Greek and Eteocretan, a local language. Cyrus Gordon suggests Eteocretan is derived from a North Western Semitic tongue (Gordon 1975: 149).

In order to discuss the potential Near Eastern impact, whether direct or indirect, on these earliest Hellenic laws, contextualizing Dreros with respect to the larger Mediterranean world appears necessary. Gagarin, despite his
vehement opposition towards the idea of Near Eastern origins in Greek legislature, acknowledges that, even with an impoverished material record linking Crete to foreign entities, the island’s geographical position as a natural waypoint for seafaring traders, and its probability as an arena for agricultural exchange support a multi-cultural, cosmopolitan Cretan world (Gagarin 2016: 116-7). Gagarin attests to the presence of Near Eastern craftsmen on Crete at a contemporary period (Gagarin 2016: 130). Furthermore, Raymond Westbrook, in his discussion on law out of the East, or *Ex Oriente Lex*, speaks to the later practice of *nomothetes*, or lawmakers, travelling to Crete and then the East in search of inspiration, perhaps outlining an ancient recognition of legal thought, originating in the East, disseminating across the Mediterranean through the tablets of Cretan settlements like Dreros (Westbrook 2015: 63).

Thematic and dictional commonalities permeate the eight laws at Dreros, despite the obvious fact that these laws, on the whole, are very fragmented with some almost unintelligible. By far the best preserved inscription, assigned *Dr1* in Gagarin’s reference source, relates to the position of *kosmos*:

> May god be kind (?). The city has decided as follows: when a man has been kosmos, for ten years that same man shall not be kosmos; if he should become kosmos, whatever judgements he gives he shall himself owe double, and he shall lose rights to office as long as he lives, and whatever he does as kosmos shall be nothing. The swearers shall be the kosmos, and the damioi and the twenty of the city.
> (Dillon and Garland 2010: 1.45)

Clearly, *Dr1* is interested in the regulation of élite behavior; while assumptions may prove dangerous, *Dr1*, seems at present to regulate a consolidation of power via the hegemony over what Dillon and Garland postulates is the role of chief magistrate (Dillon and Garland 2010: 1.45). Without delving into conjecture regarding the socioeconomic prerequisite for such a powerful role, much like the other seven laws found at Dreros which regulate positions or cap activities such as hunting, *Dr1*, while theoretically applying to all, seems explicitly tailored to the curbing of power struggles amongst élite, ambitious individuals. In approaching this purposeful remonstrance of authoritative transgression, the eight codified texts at Dreros share a common vocabulary. In taking ownership of their legislation in a purposeful way, in attributing a law with its law-giver in a form of formalized legal rhetoric, “…at least four…and probably five, of these texts begin with an enactment clause that includes the verb *ewade*, ‘it was pleasing [to X]’ (i.e., ‘X approved’ or ‘X decided’), and the other two may have begun in this manner but the opening words of each are now lost. Such explicit enactment clauses are rare in the laws from the other cities” (Gagarin 2016: 200).
Here, it is worth noting that these early inscribed laws in no way presuppose an advanced judicial society nor lay the groundwork for such a society to a greater degree than their near Eastern counterparts. Whitley’s emphasis on how “...the Greeks in the Archaic period were particularly concerned to record procedural law...” (Whitley 1997: 640) demands close scrutiny in that its italicized emphasis, an implication of a uniquely Greek pre-judicial discovery, is tempered by its explicit derivation from Gagarin’s thought and the directly subsequent claim of a society moving toward “...a more enlightened political order” (Whitley 1997: 640) Robin Osborne provides a much less dramatic reading of the source material, and perhaps recognizes the diverse and interconnected world of Crete at the time; for he, rather than ascribing a fundamental inventiveness to the seventh-century Hellenes, instead points out how these laws should be taken as formal elements superimposed onto powerful groups competing for a limited number of exalted positions, perhaps anticipating the Solonian funerary and religious reforms (Osborne 2009: 175-6). To further illuminate the agenda pursued in the former of these analyses, a direct engagement with Near Eastern source material is incumbent.

Attempting to relay discernable similarities between the earliest Greek and Near Eastern codified law, seeing as this ultimately speaks to Greek reception, a careful curation of Near Eastern material should produce only those laws which would have, to a great degree of certainty, been readily available to the Greek lawmakers either directly or through principles associated with the practice of law formation as a whole. It is with this in mind that the Hammurabi code, and the legal tradition surrounding its formation, proves most useful. Composed in 1754 BCE, the Hammurabi code is most appropriate not only because of its great renown, but because it served as a formative text within Near Eastern legal thought. It is a lengthy and official document not only laying out its specific precepts, but also implicitly what it means to rule and regulate through inscription.

The Hammurabi Code, much like the eight statutes found at Dreros, seeks specifically to dissuade the rich and powerful from using their clout to circumvent established practice in the form of law by often punishing perpetrators in relation to their station (May 2019). The outright will of Hammurabi to oppose the powerful via legislation is visible in certain pockets of the exhaustive list (perhaps not featuring in the famous “eye-for-an-eye”) as is written “...If a free-born man strike the body of another free-born man or equal rank, he shall pay one gold mina...If a freed man strike the body of another freed man, he shall pay ten shekels in money” (King 2008). Obviously, paying a heavier fine is very different than regulating the term limit for a formal government position like kosmos, yet it is important to remember the political context within which these laws were written. For in the monarchic Near East at the time of Hammurabi, high status citizens physically could not vie for comparable positions of authority. In his prologue, Raymond Westbrook refers to as an “intellectual (or didactic)...nature in the structure of the codes
themselves…”, that maps well onto the ewade opening of the Dreros laws (Westbrook 2015: 63). Hammurabi makes his intent clear, saying God instructed him “…to bring about the rule of righteousness in the land, to destroy the wicked and evil-doers; so that the strong should not harm the weak…” (King 2008).

Ultimately, Gagarin’s claim that real law “…owes nothing to the Near East but appears to be a purely Greek phenomenon (Gagarin 2008a)” underplays the interconnectedness of the Mediterranean from the perspective of trade and military involvement (Gagarin 2016: 131). With mobility possible, to claim any cultural product as wholly owing to a single geographic area, or group of people, seems extreme if not outright incorrect. While the institutions of government admittedly differ between Hammurabi’s domain and seventh century Dreros, the explicit usage of law to curb élite enthusiasm and the tendency to ascribe such law to a ruling authority from the outset, imbuing it with auctoritas, render these differences as no more than a product of the time distorting Dreros from Hammurabi and by no means negate any influence imparted from the legal societies of the Near East onto the Greek world. While these similarities lack the definitive force of an obvious transmission, the legal logic that Westbrook uses to reach a similar conclusion of Near Eastern legal influence applies here as well. These aforementioned points serve not so much to provide an answer regarding the origin and transmission of law, but instead serve to curb the enthusiasm of individuals like Gagarin who, too soon it seems, dismiss the notion of a non-Greek institution which has fundamentally shaped the socio-political terrain of the West today.

Clearly, to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, more excavation and scholarship is necessary. Gagarin highlights some of these difficulties as he comments, “New laws are continually being discovered and continuing excavation may add [to the extant corpus]…[Furthermore, different cities] wrote them on more perishable materials which no longer survive” (Gagarin 2016: vii). Above all else, the tendency to prioritize sources West of the Bosphorus to search for Western cultural origins is not only detrimental to our understanding of the past, but also confounds the very notions of ethnic differences and cultural hierarchy that plague our rapidly globalizing, and diversifying world today.

References
A Comparative Analysis of Cretan Law


Oliver, Professor Graham “Lecture 29.”


Aeolus

Joseph Fleming

bulged, lip-loosed and
sagging then
taut, the sack strains—
whipped, push-pulled, a heart and a lung,
it’s breath sour, then warm, then wet,
wheezing
seething
pressing
waiting for the
slip
of a knuckle, when something as simple as
spilling the milk
can break wide the
hatch,
the little chaos beside mismatched, the loosened latch sending the hoary winds
bending toward their quarry suspended and snatched, the horrid growl careening
off the walls, the howls of swarming torrid squalls and you cowering, the blue
storming scouring the halls, showering your futile bawling, the brutal pounding
on closed doors and brawling, sprawled on the floor under resounding blows
falling, the violent throes of liquor numbed limbs lolling, the bicker bash
thrashing, eyes dimmed flickering calling crashing, the grim fist, the doll house
smashing, the searing
fear and bleary
leer, world weary, the
tear, sneering, jeering, and
sudden,
precious,
long awaited

clearing

the fog is always last to arrive, sneaking under
the crack of your bedroom door.
over time, it may hide the scuff
on the floorboards, the splinters
strewn about the ground, the little doll
with the broken arm.
What the Ancient Roman Taboo on Eating Dormice Can Tell Us About the Modern French Taboo on Eating Ortolan

Daniel Betensky

Every society places taboos on certain foods. Some taboos might have a religious basis, while others are based on broader notions of impurity and fear of disease. However, very few taboos are in fact codified into a national law, but instead remain prohibited by certain unspoken rules. One of the exceptions to this norm is the French taboo on eating ortolan bunting, tiny songbirds considered in the past (and by some French chefs today) to be the finest and most delicate of birds to eat (Montagne 2001). In 1979, the French government outlawed their consumption (Burros 1997). We can compare the modern French taboo on eating ortolan to the ancient Roman taboo on eating dormice, small rodents considered a delicacy to wealthy Romans. While at first glance these two animals might seem entirely different based on their origins and historical placement, they are in fact excellent comparisons, and played similar roles in their respective societies: they were farmed and prepared in nearly identical ways, but more important, they both held the status of luxurious delicacies. Because of this status, both the ancient Romans and the modern French came to view the respective foods as symbols of extravagance and greed. However, the Romans banned luxuries such as dormice not just because they seemed immoral, but also because the bans limited the power of the wealthy elite. By analogy, the French ban on ortolan can be viewed as part of a broader socialist movement against wealth inequality beginning at the end of the 20th century.

The modern French ortolan and the Ancient Roman dormice are first similar in their trapping and storage. According to Martial, Roman farmers gathered “sleepy dormice” from their fields and brought them to villas of wealthy statesmen and merchants to sell (Martial 3.58.63). Likewise, every summer, families in the Landes region of France capture ortolan with special nets called matoles as they fly from Northern Europe to Africa (Paterniti 2008). Neither of these animals are farmed: they are seized and sold to the wealthy by opportunistic families. After their capture, dormice were stuffed into special dolia (small, grooved ceramic vessels) filled with nuts. These containers limit their movement, and the darkness incites them to gorge themselves, a process meant to fatten them up prior to eating (Beerden 2012). Ortolan are also kept in darkness (though historically have been blinded) prompting them to devour
grapes and millet. After three weeks they can quadruple in mass from thirty grams to one hundred twenty grams, much of which is fat (Alderman 2014). These unconventional trapping and fattening practices of dormouse and ortolan are nearly identical.

The dormice and ortolan are also similar in their preparation methods and eating styles: both animals are roasted and then eaten whole. Petronius writes in his *Satyricon* that dormice were served roasted and sprinkled with honey and poppy seeds at Trimalchio’s feast (Petronius 31). Apicius provides a recipe for stuffing dormice with pork and “dormouse meat trimmings” before roasting them. Meanwhile, the French prepare ortolan by drowning them in armagnac and roasting them in their own fat (Burros 1997). The eater then consumes the tiny bird in a single mouthful, bones and all (Reynolds 2018). Both animals are traditionally roasted whole and sweetened: dormice were sweetened with honey, and ortolan are sweetened with armagnac. It is unclear how exactly the Romans ate dormice, but, we can guess that they ate them with the bones left inside — just as the French ate ortolan — because the miniscule bones would have been difficult to pick out.

Finally, ancient Romans must have viewed dormice just as contemporary French society views ortolan: as luxurious delicacies for the wealthy and as a disgusting form of gluttony for the poor. Given the paucity of literary sources attesting to the lower-class Roman diet, we must look to archaeology to understand this. Recent studies have suggested that the average Roman diet was centered around cereals and pulses (Alcock 2006). Clearly, then, meat such as dormice could not have been a part of the typical Roman meal, and must have been gourmet foods reserved for the elite. However, the lack of primary literature concerning the Roman diet has led to a widespread debate about its true staples. Both bioarchaeological studies of skeletons and stable isotope analyses have shown that Romans had significant numbers of carious lesions on their teeth, suggesting a carbohydrate-based diet (Bonfiglioli et al. 2003; Killgrove 2010). Meanwhile skeletons analyzed in what are believed to be wealthier areas of Rome possess fewer lesions, suggesting a diet of meat and other food groups beyond carbohydrates (Erdkamp 2018). Even as the Roman empire expanded, giving them access to food markets from across the Mediterranean, plebeians rarely had access to these new markets. Even fish were an elitist luxury (except for Romans living at ports) (Alcock 2006). The lack of material evidence for significant meat and fish consumption suggests meat in general was a luxury rather than everyday food item, dormice even more so.

But Romans must have also seen dormice as a symbol of extravagance. In this case, literary sources can shed light on elite dining practices. In Petronius’ *Satyricon*, Trimalchio (an arrogant former slave who throws plush
parties to compensate for his lower status) serves dormice at his feast: Petronius writes *ponticuli etiam ferruminati sustinebant glires melle ac papavere sparsos* (“also, little bridges soldered to the plate were holding dormice sprinkled with honey and poppyseeds”). Petronius, here, is satirizing the *nouveau riche* tendencies of Trimalchio, relying on the Roman stereotype of dormice as a lavish food for the wealthy. For this satire to work, Petronius assumes the Roman reader’s familiarity with this stereotype about dormice.

Today, world renowned French chefs and the ultra-wealthy consider ortolan to be one of the world’s most luxurious delicacies, and it has become a symbol of wealth and power. French celebrity chef Michel Guérard has even said about ortolan that “to eat the flesh, the fat and its little bones hot all together, is like being taken to another dimension” (Alderman 2014). The bird is so highly regarded that in 1995, French President François Mitterand placed it on the menu for the last meal before his death (along with foie gras, capon and oysters) and dared to consume two whole birds, breaking the historical custom to eat only one at a time (Allen 2002). Now the bird is only available via the black market, which adds to its exclusivity. Additionally, the bird has become enough of a symbol of extreme money and clout that it has appeared on two television dramas that explore the lives of the ultra-wealthy. In the HBO drama, *Succession*, Tom Wambsgans teaches his cousin Greg how to be rich by taking him to a “pop-up restaurant” where they indulge in ortolan (*Succession* season 1, episode 6). And in the Showtime drama, *Billions*, Bobby Axelrod and his associate Wags dine on ortolan, even daring to ask if they could eat more birds after the first one, much like Mitterand (*Billions* Season 3, Episode 6). These satirical television series are modern equivalents to Trimalchio’s feast in the *Satyricon*, criticizing the extravagant lifestyles of the ultra-wealthy.

The Romans also considered eating dormice to be a sign of extravagance. Many Roman social critics considered luxury a vice, and throughout Roman literature we find them blaming luxury for the degeneration of the individual, the State and society at large (Zanda 2011). In the second century BCE, to combat what it considered social degeneration, Rome implemented a series of sumptuary legislation, which regulated how much individuals could spend on private feasts and what specific foods they could serve there (Beer 2010). In 115 BCE, the Lex Aemilia banned the consumption of dormice as part of the effort to curb the extravagant consumption considered to be corrupting society (Zanda 2011). The public assumed this sumptuary regulation was meant to heal the moral illness of the empire stemming specifically from the gluttonous ingestion of dormice.

The modern French have come to view eating ortolan as immoral because the bird provides little nutritional value and is eaten solely for personal pleasure and showcasing status. On top of that, the bird has become
endangered in France from over-hunting. Traditionally, one eats ortolan by placing a cloth napkin over one’s head and face as they eat the bird. Although the origins of this tradition are heavily debated, the two most popular theories are that it allows the eater to savor more fully the aromas of the bird, and that the napkin hides the shameful, gluttonous act of eating the bird from the eyes of God (Solly 2019). Many are disgusted by the thought of eating these birds because they are so small and seemingly innocent, and they provide little physical nourishment. Rather, the eater of ortolan aims to experience a taste some have described as bliss—hence the perception that the act is greedy and gluttonous. France banned their consumption in 1999 in response to concerns about their diminishing numbers and status as a “protected species.” (Alderman 2014). The public could not ethically accept eating what they believed was a true “endangered species.”

This, however, cannot be the full story: there must have been other factors that led to the ban on ortolan because many other species that are truly endangered have not been banned for consumption in France. In fact, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature only lists the status of the ortolan as “of least concern,” three levels below “endangered” (BirdLife International 2017). Clearly, ortolan are not truly an endangered species like the French government claims. Meanwhile, the Atlantic bluefin tuna is listed by the IUCN as truly “endangered,” and people continue to eat it (Collette et al. 2011).

So why have governments placed a ban on catching and eating ortolan, which is officially listed as endangered but is not a truly endangered species like tuna? To answer this question, let’s explore the logic behind the Roman sumptuary legislation. The stated purpose of Roman sumptuary legislation was to curb immorality, but many scholars have argued the regulations also served political and economic means. In addition to restricting the particular foods that Romans could eat, other sumptuary laws limited the number of guests allowed to attend feasts and the amount of money the host could spend (Rosivach 2006). However, no laws were passed to limit spending on other luxury objects. This suggests the sumptuary legislation was meant to target dinner parties specifically because they could be used as a source of social influence for political rivals (Rosivach 2006). Furthermore, the legislation prevented people from using private wealth to create political groups that might have caused instability in the ruling class (Zanda 2011). Furthermore, in another scholar's view, these laws were meant to limit the power of the aristocrats by decreasing the inequality gap between them and the common folk (Beer 2010). It appears Roman sumptuary legislation, including that on dormice, arose as a political measure to restrict the power of wealth and aid social equality just as much as a way to heal the moral ills of the state.

If dormice and ortolan make such a good comparison, perhaps then the modern French ban on ortolan consumption also stems from a desire to
punish the wealthy. The consumption of ortolan is a current symbol of wealth, power and status. By preventing the wealthy from indulging in ortolan, the French government is prohibiting them from using this status symbol to gain influence. Much like dormice for Romans, the French elite could have purchased ortolan as a method of gaining prestige. With the ban on their consumption, it would now be more difficult for wealthy French citizens to buy power through food. The French government was able to target this particular food — rather than any other status symbol — without significant public pushback because it was already associated with immorality and greed.

Additionally, this movement to ban ortolan coincided with the rise of the modern French socialist movement and fight against wealth inequality. This movement (which strived to lower the wealth gap) began in May of 1968 and reached the height of its power with the election of socialist-candidate François Mitterand as president in 1981 (Duyvendak 1995). The election of a socialist candidate suggests a broader public support in France for the redistribution of wealth and power. Furthermore, during the end of the 20th century new political associations developed in France that attempted to reduce inequalities privately. One example of this was the Restaurants du coeur created in 1984 which attempted to mitigate poverty by donating free meals to the needy (Waters 2003). The presence of these “associations” which fought inequality alongside a socialist government sets the context for the ortolan ban. The greater French socialist movement seemingly used the taboo on ortolan as a prop for their wider political purposes.

Why do taboos on food exist in the first place? Two of the most famous theories about food taboos in general are those of Mary Douglas and Frederick Simoons. Both Douglas and Simoons used specific cultural examples of taboos to formulate a larger argument about why food taboos exist. In her book “Purity and Danger,” Douglas argues that foods become taboo or “polluted” either if they interfere with certain social or religious rituals and traditions, or they are unhygienic and physically filthy (Douglas 1995). From this perspective, the French taboo on ortolan might have arisen because their consumption represents a mortal sin in Christianity: gluttony. Meanwhile, Simoons claims that food taboos develop based on a culture’s “foodways” and a desire to maintain “good health” (Simoons 1961). He believes that Westerners have used false information about health and disease as excuses to impose taboos on food and other objects that in fact develop for other reasons. Much like my argument, Simoons might dispute that the taboo on ortolan has developed based on false environmental factors — their decreasing numbers — and that in fact there is another factor that makes the bird ritually pure (and

1. I must also point out the irony that the socialist Mitterand, prior to his death in 1995, decided to devour two ortolan, thus perpetuating a symbol of wealth and power.
therefore inedible). Taking both of these views into account, we can see that the true political and economic factors contributing to the taboo on ortolan are being veiled by these false environmental and moral issues previously understood to be the central causes.

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Inscription at Ostia: Originally over the Porta Romana as part of the walls of Ostia, parts of the phrase "Senatus Populusque coloniae Ostiensium" can be seen, April 2018. Original photograph by Rachel Sklar. Used by Permission
An Ode to My Past Self

Jeremy Jason

Best is wind, whose essence flows like the sands of time,
Light yet strong, oppressive yet nurturing
To the leaf whom he guides during autumn’s presence,
From green to orange, orange to red.
I, Iberius, call out to you, Zephyr, for your guidance
In understanding the track of my wanderings.

I write *Meae Umbræ*, always younger than I,
the other half of my soul,
whose current journey I know well, yet whose story remains untold.
*Misera Umbra*, you are made up of bitter darkness
and flickers of light, a story of younger years.
It is not your fault, rather it is our nature.
Unable to speak for yourself, not even to sing a pretty song.
Do not weep, my twin, for I have wept before you,
And as your sibling,
I will shed light upon your darker days.

I recall a time where I rested myself far from my Spanish Farm
Beneath a Laurel tree during a colder night.
Unable to find tranquil shelter and frightened with fear
I prayed for a sign of Faith and Fortune.
A gentle nod breezed to me in the form of
Nine birds who came to the metamorphic tree:
The thoughtful crow, the screeching owl, the proud penguin,
The graceful swan, the wily kingfisher, the skilled quetzal,
The loud puffin, the clever cockatoo, and the brave eagle.
Despite not finding any augur to console me,
I too saw it as a sign of my destiny to help create a kingdom,
Which I now know has grown to become a vast empire,
More bountiful than what you and I could ever anticipate.

To this day, I do not know the true origins of these divine creatures.
I may be as naïve as young Telemachus in distant Pylos,
But I am very much wary of what these birds have offered.
These birds accompanied me in my peril,
These birds sang of a world beyond strife.

As winter neared, the wind bid them to fly away,
And I too flew away with them, a prediction that would
Move even Plato himself towards his shifty beliefs.
Cast yourself out, shadow, towards the light.
Look up to the skies and let the wind’s *Fidem Fortunaque*
nurture us, like a feather floating to whatever distant land,
guided by the current of winter’s breeze.
Launch out on your story, *Mea Umbra*, follower of Zephyr,
Start from where you will – prosper for our time too.
The Devīmāhātmya tells the story of the goddess Devī’s fight against the demon-kings Śuṃbha and Niśuṃbha, who want to kidnap and marry her, in its sixth chapter. The chapter’s beginning portrays Śuṃbha and Niśuṃbha hatching their plan to send their servant, the demon Dhūmralocana to capture Devī for them. The first four verses give extensive detail about and description of Śuṃbha and Niśuṃbha’s plans and intentions, and the ninth and tenth verses relate Dhūmralocana’s first interaction with Devī. These verses create particularly fascinating translations in Greek and Latin, since these themes of abduction and battles between divine beings also appear in Greek and Latin literature. These two translations make varying interpretive choices with the Sanskrit text that showcase different ways to view this narrative.

Sanskrit Names in Translation

The opening two verses of the sixth chapter introduce the key characters for this portion of the Devīmāhātmya’s narrative. The Sanskrit text reads:

ऋषिच्यव || इत्याक्रमं कचो देवा: स दूरोत्तमंपूर्वितः ||
समाचन्द्रे समाग्म्य देवयराज्य विस्तरतः ||
तस्य दूरत्त्य तद्विवर्गमकण्यासुरस्न: ततः ||
The sage spoke. Having heard the goddess’ speech, the messenger was filled with anger and told the demon-king in detail. When he heard the messenger’s speech, the demon-king was filled with anger and spoke to the lord of the demons, Dhūmrālocana.

While these verses seem to be fairly mundane exposition, they raise crucial questions about how the Greek and Latin translations convey these characters into the two languages and literary traditions. The Greek translation reads:

Ἀκούσας τοῦ λόγου τῆς Θεᾶς ὁ ἄρστολος, λίων ἠγανάκτησε καὶ ἐθελὼν, εἴρηκε ἀεὶς τῷ Τιτανομέδοντι. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας τῶν, ὃν εἶρηκεν ὁ ἄρστολος, ἐγκοτος γενομένος, ἔφη τῷ στρατηγῷ τῶν Τιτάνων, ὃ ὄνομα Δουμραλόσανας.

Having heard the word of the Goddess, the messenger was exceedingly vexed; and wishing this, he told everything in breadth to the Titan-ruler. And when he heard these things that the messenger said, became malignant and spoke to the general of the Titans, whose name was Doumralosana.

Perhaps the most notable element of this translation is the way it translates the names and types of creatures when it talks about the demons. The Greek translates the Sanskrit compound daityarājya with its own version of this compound Τιτανομέδοντι. Additionally, text translates daitya with Τιτάν. The choice makes a lot of sense considering the mythological context of the Daityas as opponents of the gods towards the beginning of the mythological cycle. Although this does not match up exactly with the Titans of Greek mythology, the choice to use the Greek Τιτάν does convey the sort of conflict between these two categories of divine beings.

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2. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
The Greek translation comes across another set of Sanskrit names in the fourth verse, which reads:

\[
\text{तत्पिरत्राणदः कश्चिद्यदि योगिन्द्रेऽपरः} \
\text{स हंस्योमरो वापि यक्षो गंधर्वो एव वा} \quad ||4||
\](Devīmāhātmya, 6.4)

If another stands up, giving her protection, he should be slain, even a god, or one of the semidivine beings—a yakṣa or a gaṇḍharva.

In this case, the Greek text translates this sentence containing the names of two kinds of demons in the Devīmāhātmya as such:

\[
\text{Ἄν δὲ τις τῶν Θεῶν, ἢ τῶν Ιαξῶν, ἢ τῶν Γανδαरβῶν,} \quad \text{ἀντιστῇ σοι εἰς ὑσεράσσιν καὶ σωτηρίαν αὐτῆς,} \quad \text{ἀναιρετέος οὗτος.}
\]

(Δουργα, Μεταφρασθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ Βραχ6άνικου, 6.4)

But if some one of the Gods, either of the Iaxos or of the Gaddarvos, let whoever desires her preservation be set in opposition to you and your soldiers.

This translator’s choice to use Ἰαξόν and Γανδαρβόν—Greek transliterations of yakṣa and gaṇḍharva—diverges from the precedent he seemed to set in the first two verses when he translates the names of divine and semidivine characters in the Devīmāhātmya. Here, the Greek translator does not translate the names of these beings using other figures from Greek mythology the way he did when he translated the Daityas and Asuras with the Greek Τίτων. This decision could be a reflection of the limits of the Greek language, which does not have the vocabulary to express semidivine beings or other immortal beings that would fight beside the gods in a battle, since Greek myths do not have any beings like Yakṣas and Gaṇḍharvas. Although these Greek verses translate the Sanskrit amaraḥ with the Greek θεὸν,\(^4\) the closest Greek word that could translate the same level of divinity marked by the terms yakṣaḥ and gaṇḍharvā may be νύμφη, but the nymphs were more connected with nature in the Greek tradition, and they do not act in the same manner as the Yakṣas and Gaṇḍharvas, at least as the demon-king describes them in these two verses.

Unlike the Greek translation of these three verses, the Latin translation does not use any Latin names from Latin literature to translate these Sanskrit names. The Latin translation of these two verses reads:

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3. tatparitṛṇaḍaḥ kaścidyadī vottīṣṭate’paraḥ || sa haṃṭavyo’maro vāpi yakṣo gaṇḍharva eva vā ||4||

4. Both words mean “god” or “deity.”

(Devimahatmyam: Markandeyi Purani sectio edidit Latinam interpretationem, 6.1-2)

The wise man said: Thus having heard the speech of the goddess, the messenger, having been filled up with anger, coming to the king of the Daityas, told these things broadly.

When he had heard the messenger’s speech, the king of the Asuras then, having been angered, spoke to Dhumralocanus, the leader of the Daityas.

Unlike the Greek text, the Latin retains all the names of characters like Devī and Dhumralocana as well as categories of divine beings like Daityas and Asuras as Latin in the text, and it does not transliterate them the way the Greek does. The consonant combination of ai in Daitya does not occur in Latin, nor does the aspirated dh in Dhumralocana, and so Daitya should be transliterated into Latin as daetya, and Dhumralocana as Dumralocanus. Beyond this, the Greek text introduces the foreign name Dhumralocana into the text with the phrase ὅνομα,5 which integrates the foreign word into the Greek text using Greek vocabulary and grammar. This choice allows the character of Dhumralocana to seem more natural in the midst of the narrative in Greek than does the Latin version of these verses. Unlike the Latin text, the Greek text translates most of the other Sanskrit names into Greek equivalents (or near-equivalents): Devī translates to Θέα and Daitya and Asura translate to Τιτάν.6 The Latin text could do the same by translating Devī with Dea and Daitya and Asura with daemon to obtain the same effect.7 However, the Latin text does preserve the nature and word order of the Sanskrit compounds by using the hyphenated phrases “Daityorum-regi,” and “Asurorum-rex”.

In the fourth verse, the Latin translation follows this same precedent:

Huius-servator quod si quis exsurgat alius, is occidendus est immortalis vel Yaschus vel Gandharvus etiam sit.

(Devimahatmyam: Markandeyi Purani sectio edidit Latinam interpretationem, 6.4)

5. This phrase means, “whose name was.”
6. The Greek Θέα means “goddess,” and does not refer to one specific goddess in Greek. However, it is capitalized in the Greek text and is used exclusively as Devī’s name. The Greek Τιτάν refers to the specific group of divine beings known as the Titans in Greek mythology.
7. Dea is the Latin word for “goddess,” and daemon means “demon,” “daimon,” or “semidivine being.”
Thus, if any savior, or anyone else from the immortals, either a Yaschus or a Gandharvus rises up, let him still be striken down.

Like the first two verses, this translation of the fourth verse transliterates yakṣa and gandharva instead of using a Latin word that fits the role of these demons. Like its transliteration of dāitya, this translation uses the Roman letters that correspond to the Devanagari characters, regardless of whether the consonant combinations actually occur in Latin, like the ch in Yaschus and the dh in Gandharvus. However, the translator does add the ending –us to denote these nouns as masculine, instead of leaving the –a ending from the Sanskrit.8

Sanskrit Grammar and Structure in Translation

Because of the grammar and sentence structure of Greek and Latin, these two translations are able to mimic the unique grammatical structure in the Devīmāhātmya in ways that an English translation may be unable to do. The first two verses of each of these translations set the tone for the ways that these translations use Greek and Latin to convey the grammatical complexities of the Sanskrit text.9 In the Greek text, the Greek participle ἀκούσας fulfills the same grammatical function as the Sanskrit ākarṇya,10 as well as ἐθελῶν and samāgamya and ἔγκοτος γενόμενος and sakrodhaḥ. However, the translation of samāgamya with ἐθελῶν is more complex—both come from verb roots and serve the same grammatical function, but samāgamya has a sense of motion, while ἐθελῶν means “wish” or “desire.” Beyond this, the Greek translation mimics the compounds in the Sanskrit text; the Greek translates the Sanskrit compound dāityarājya with its own version of this compound Τίτανομέδοντι.11

The Latin text translates the Sanskrit compounds differently. In some cases, it preserves the structure of the Sanskrit compounds with hyphenated phrases like “daityorum-regi” and “asurorum-rex.”12 Additionally, when

8. Nouns like deva that end in –a are usually masculine in Sanskrit, just as nouns in –us are often masculine in Latin.
9. For the Greek text, see Δούργα, Μεταφρασθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ Βραχύλακου, 6.1-2, and for the Latin text, see Devimahatmyam: Markandeyi Purani sectio edidit Latinam interpretationem, 6.1-2.
10. Although the Sanskrit ākarnya is indeclinable, the use of Greek participles to translate Sanskrit gerunds is the closest Greek equivalent, since Greek participles are built from Greek verbs, and they serve the same grammatical function as the Sanskrit gerund in this case.
11. See note 6 for the parallel of dāitya and Tīrāṇ.
12. These phrases correspond to the Sanskrit dāityarājya.
translating ṛṣirvāca compound from the Sanskrit by adding the sentence “Sapiens dixit” at the beginning of the sixth chapter, it translates the narrative structure of the Devīmāhātmya with the sporadic interjections of ṛṣirvāca throughout the text. Yet while it retains these aspects of the Sanskrit grammar, it misses some opportunities to preserve all aspects of the Sanskrit grammar. For example, the Latin text translates vistarāt with the adverbial participle fuse. This translation misses an opportunity to mimic the Sanskrit text exactly, since Latin has an ablative case, which is often used adverbially. The Latin translation could have used a noun like subtilitate instead of the more obscure adverbial use of the participle fuse. Another odd deviation from the original text of the Devīmāhātmya is the use of the clause, “Huius nuntii illum sermonem cum audisset,” in place of an ablative absolute phrase like the one that this translator used in the first verse. Although the two grammatical structures can accomplish the same meaning in Latin, the ablative absolute mimics the way this Sanskrit text uses participles within its sequence of tenses, and the participle in an ablative absolute phrase more explicitly modifies a single noun, which works closer grammatically with Sanskrit participles.

Like the participles and compounds, both the Greek and Latin text translate the conditional in the fourth verse with an exact parallel in the two languages. The overall structure of this Greek conditional mimics the structure and ordering of the Sanskrit text, using the particle ān in the same way that these verses are using the indeclinable yadi. The Latin mimics the indeclinable yadi with its own indeclinable particle si. However, both the Greek and Latin translations use subjunctive verbs in these conditionals—āvṛtṛē and exsurgat, respectively—while the Sanskrit text does not use the subjunctive in this conditional. This difference is likely the result of varying ways of forming conditionals in these three languages, as well as differing usages of the subjunctive in the three languages.

13. ṛṣirvāca means “the sage said,” and sapiens dixit means “the wise man said.”
14. The word subtilitate is the ablative from the noun subtilitas, meaning “fineness,” or “acuteness,” or “exactness.” I suggest it here in place of fuse both because it matches the grammar of the Sanskrit text, but also because the use of a vocative participle adverbially is not very common in Latin grammar, while the use of vistarāt to mean “in detail” is idiomatic in Sanskrit, and it makes more sense to use a common function of the Latin ablative to translate a common use of this Sanskrit ablative.
15. This grammatical structure, known in Latin grammar textbooks as the “Cum clause” (the preposition cum combined with a subjunctive verb) conveys a sense of temporality or causation.
16. “Ita audio sermone Deviae.”
17. For verse 4, see Devīmāhātmya, 6.4, Δούργα, Μεταφρασθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ Βραχµάνικου, 6.4, and Devimahatmyam: Markandeyi Purani sectio edidit Latinam interpretationem, 6.4, for Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, respectively.
18. While Greek and Latin conditionals do not always use the subjunctive, this instance requires it in order to convey Śuṃbha and Niśūṃbha’s orders. Sanskrit conditionals, however, do not require the subjunctive.
Sanskrit Narrative in Translation

These two translations also show the different ways that the narrative of the Devīmāhātmya comes across in Greek and Latin. The third verse describes Śuṃbha and Niśuṃbha’s commands to Dhūmralocana to kidnap Devī. The Sanskrit text reads:

हे धूम्रलोचनाशु त्वं स्वसैन्यपरिवरितः ||
तामानय बलाद्दुष्टां केषाक्षर्णविह्रलाम् ||3||

(Devīmāhātmya, 6.3)

Oh Dhūmralocana, surrounded by your army, bring the villain by force while she is confused by the pulling of her hair.

These two verses relate the details of Dhūmralocana’s plans to kidnap Devī, and this sort of kidnapping scene occurs in both Greek and Latin literature, and so the two translations possess a large body of vocabulary from which to draw for this description. The Greek translation describes the demon-king’s plan:

Ὦ Δουραλοσάνα, περιεπόμενος τῷ οἰκείῳ στρατῷ, κόμισον ταχέως ἑκείνην τὴν κακὴν, ἐλκομένην βίᾳ ἐκ τῆς κόμης.

(Δούργα, Μεταφρασθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ Βραχ6άνικου, 6.3)

Oh Doumralosana, being followed by a friendly army, swiftly carry off the evil one, dragging her by force in her hair.

This translation is a bit surprising, especially in its choice of verbs. The choice of κόμισον instead of ἁρπάζω or αἱρέω 20 indicates a departure from the conventional language of kidnapping in Greek. 21 Even though the verbs in this translation do not match the tone of the Sanskrit text, the Greek translation does

19. he dhūmralocanāśu tvam svasainyaparivāritah || tāmānaya balāduṣṭāṃ keśākarṣanavivhīlam ||3||
20. The verb αἱρέω means “seize” and ἁρπάζω “snatch away,” or “carry off.” These two verbs occur often in scenes of abduction in ancient Greek literature.
include the noun βία, which does occur often in battle sequences and abduction scenes. Similarly, the Latin text of this verse reads:

Heus Dhumralotschane! Celeriter tu proprio-exercitu-circumdatus illam ducas vi improbam capillorum-tractu-agitatam.

(Devimahatmyam: Markandeyi Purani sectio edidit Latinam interpretationem, 6.3)

Alas, Dhumralotschanus! Swiftly, having been followed by your own army lead to that nasty woman by force, once she has been stirred by the dragging of her hair.

Like the Greek text, this translation is a bit surprising because it uses the verb forms ducas and tractu but does not employ a form of rapio in this context, but the presence of occidendus does add the level of power behind the demon-king’s words. The addition of vi to this text further reinforces the militant tone of these verses. Even without the emphatic verb rapio, the Latin text conveys the aggressive tone of these lines with evocative verbs of motion like exsurgat and the poignant phrase “illam…vi improbam.” These word choices ensure that this Latin translation retains the tone present in these two Sanskrit verses in a way that the Greek text does not.

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22. The Greek noun βία means “force,” “strength,” or “power.”
24. Rapio is a Latin verb that means “seize” or “take by force,” and it appears in several narratives of abduction.
26. Occidendus comes from the verb occido which means “strike down.”
27. Vi is from the noun vis, meaning “force,” and it is acting as a dative of agent here.
28. Exsurgat comes from the proposition ex (“out,” or “out of”) and the verb surgo (“rise” “rise up”); these sorts of verbs that combine a preposition in front of a verb form are grammatically identical to the upasarga-verb root form in Sanskrit.
Another important scene in the Devīmāhātmya is Devī’s confrontation with Dhūmralocana. The Sanskrit verses read:

ऋिषरुवाच || इत्युक्तः सोऽभ्यधावत्तामसुरो धूम्रलोचनः ||
हुंकारेणैव तं भस्म सा चकाराविका ततः ||९||
अथ क्रु ध् द ं महासैन्यमसुराणां तथानिवाकम ||
वर्ष सायकस्तक्रिक्षणसत्त्वा शल्यपरस्यथैः ||१०||

(Devīmāhātmya, 6.9-10)

The sage spoke. Having been addressed, the demon Dhūmralocana ran at her. But with a sound “Humm” Ambikā turned him to ashes. Then Ambikā showered the angry army of demons with firey arrows and powerful axes.

This battle sequence is unique because Devī fights with materials generally associated with battle; the text mentions sāyakastikṣṇaiḥ and śaktiparāśvadhāiḥ. But she also uses her own voice against Dhūmralocana, the leader of this demon army. This additional information about the sheer power of Devī’s voice creates two interesting interpretations of this scene into Greek and Latin. The Greek text reads:

ἀκούσας ὁ Δουμραλοσάνας, ἔδραεν ἐς’ αὐτήν· ἢ δὲ ἀπετέφρωσεν αὐτὸν διὰ μόνης τῆς ἐκφωνήσεως, Ἡ. Ὀργισθεῖσα δ’ ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Τιτάνων, βέλη ἔβαλλεν ὀξέα ἐς’ αὐτὴν βροχηθὸν, καὶ ἀχόντα, καὶ αξινίδια.
(Δουργα, Μεταφρασθείσα ἐκ τοῦ Βραχμάνικου, 6.9-10)

Having heard this, Dourmalosana ran to her; and she made a fearsome sound, and through her he became ashen when she called out “Ahh.” And she was angered with the general of the Titans, and threw a spear and sharp arrows and axes and swords.

This translation stands in contrast with the Latin one which reads:

Sapiens dixit. Ita compellatus hic irruit in illam Asurus Dhumralotschanus; incantatione cum in cinerem vertit Ambica deinde. Tunc iratus magnus-exercitus Asurorum etiam Ambicam operuit telis acutis atque lanceis-et securibus.
(Devimahatmyam: Markandeyi Purani sectio edidit Latinam interpretationem, 6.9-10)

29. र्षिरुवः || इत्युक्तः सो’भयदवतासुरो धुम्रलोचनः || हुम्कारेणाव त सायकस्तक्रिक्षणसत्त्वा शल्यपरस्यथैः ||
30. सायकस्तिक्षणाः are the firey arrows and śaktiparāśvadhāiḥ are the powerful axes.
The wise man spoke. Having been addressed thus, the Asura Dhumrolotschanus made an attack on her; therefore Ambika spoke an incantation for ashes. Then the great army of Asuras became angry and covered Ambika with a web of sharp lances and axes.

Both translations had to make significant interpretive choices with this battle scene, since Greek and Latin do not have the vocabulary to describe precisely the nature of Devī’s attack. These two translations make different choices when it comes to Devī’s dramatic utterance. The Greek text translates the Sanskrit hum with the onomatopoeic word ā. On the other hand, the Latin translation uses the word incantatione to describe the sound. These two translations give vastly different interpretations of what Devī is actually doing here. The Greek translation gives an equivalent of the hum sound in the Greek language, which portrays Devī’s frightful sound as some sort of battle cry. In this reading of verse nine, Devī’s voice carries so much strength that she can turn a powerful demon to ashes with a single sound. But the Latin translation gives a different sort of power to Devī in its interpretation. By describing her sounds with incantatione, this translator interprets Devī’s hum as a special ability, unique to Devī. In other words, Devī has a special ability to turn demons into ashes. According to this reading, it is not Devī’s sheer power but some unique quality of Devī’s voice which turns Dhumralocana to ash. Since the Devīmāhātmya goes on to relate other equally magnificent feats that this goddess performs in battle, it seems to be Devī’s sheer power that brings about Dhumralocana’s demise. However, Devī’s voice and authority also become important in the Devīmāhātmya’s narrative when she and Kāli are able to call on the śaktis of the other gods to come to their aid in the battle against the demon Raktabīja (Devīmāhātmya, 8.12-62).

Another interpretive choice in these two verses results from the weapons used in battle and the way the text narrates the fight itself. The Greek translation uses a few common words for Greek weapons such as βέλη for “spear” and ὀξέα meaning “sharp,” which often describe Apollo and Artemis’ arrows. However, the subsequent words that clearly refer to weapons are much more obscure, which demonstrates Greek’s lack of vocabulary to talk about these kinds of divine conflicts. The Latin translation encounters a similar issue, but it takes an opposite approach. Instead of trying to find Latin vocabulary that accurately describes what is happening in this scene, this translation uses simple words that convey the narrative without the nuance. Yet even though this Latin translation strips this scene of some of its more nuanced elements, it does ensure that the narrative comes through without any confusion. These complications concerning translating the divine warfare and weaponry

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31. For one example, see Homer, Iliad, 1.51.
uncover the lack of specific vocabulary in Latin and Greek for these weapons, as well as the differences in the ways that these three languages tell divine stories.

Concluding Thoughts

This chapter of the Devīmāhātmya deals closely with the consequences of Dhūrmralocana’s attempt to kidnap a goddess. Both Greek and Latin literature encounter narrative themes that are quite similar to those in these verses in the Devīmāhātmya. As a result, Greek and Latin have quite a bit of vocabulary to relate themes like abduction, and so these two languages have a range of choices when translating the Sanskrit verses. Because of such decisions, the Greek and Latin renditions of the Devīmāhātmya are able to expose key themes and provide a variety of interpretations of these verses, while still mimicking the grammar and syntax of the Sanskrit itself.

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