Distributional Disputes and Civil Conflict
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Abstract
Some polities are able to use constitutionally prescribed political processes to settle
distributional disputes, whereas in other polities distributional disputes result in civil
conflict. Theoretical analysis reveals that the following properties help to make it
possible to design a self-enforcing constitution that can settle recurring distributional
disputes between social classes without civil conflict:
* Neither social class has a big advantage in civil conflict.
* The expected incremental costs of civil conflict are large relative to aggregate
  appropriable economic rents.
* Both social classes are greatly concerned about the future consequences of their
current actions.

Theoretical analysis also reveals that a self-enforcing constitution can require limitations
on the prerogatives of winners of constitutional contests such that on average the
distribution of appropriable economic rents under the constitution is not too favorable to
one social class or the other and such that the outcome of a constitutional contest does
not matter too much for the current distribution of economic rents.