First, I want to say something about periodisations in the study of popular culture. Difficult problems are posed here by periodisation – I don’t offer it to you simply as a sort of gesture to the historians. Are the major breaks largely descriptive? Do they arise largely from within popular culture itself, or from factors which are outside of but impinge on it? With what other movements and periodisations is ‘popular culture’ most revealingly linked? Then I want to tell you some of the difficulties I have with the term ‘popular’. I have almost as many problems with ‘popular’ as I have with ‘culture’. When you put the two terms together the difficulties can be pretty horrendous.

Throughout the long transition into agrarian capitalism and then in the formation and development of industrial capitalism, there is a more or less continuous struggle over the culture of working people, the labouring classes and the poor. This fact must be the starting point for any study, both of the basis for, and of the transformations of, popular culture. The changing balance and relations of social forces throughout that history reveal themselves, time and again, in struggles over the forms of the culture, traditions and ways of life of the popular classes. Capital had a stake in the culture of the popular classes because the constitution of a whole new social order around capital required a more or less continuous, if intermittent, process of re-education, in the broadest sense. And one of the principal sites of resistance to the forms through which this ‘reformation’ of the people was pursued lay in popular tradition. That is why popular culture is linked, for so long, to questions of tradition, of traditional forms of life and why its ‘traditionalism’ has been so often misinterpreted as a product of a merely conservative impulse, backward-looking and anachronistic. Struggle and resistance – but also, of course, appropriation and expropriation. Time and again, what we are really looking at

is the active destruction of particular ways of life, and their transformation into something new. 'Cultural change' is a polite euphemism for the process by which some cultural forms and practices are driven out of the centre of popular life, actively marginalised. Rather than simply 'falling into disuse' through the Long March to modernisation, things are actively pushed aside, so that something else can take their place. The magistrate and the evangelical police have, or ought to have, a more 'honoured' place in the history of popular culture than they have usually been accorded. Even more important than ban and proscription is that subtle and slippery customer – 'reform' (with all the positive and unambiguous overtones it carries today). One way or another, 'the people' are frequently the object of 'reform': often, for their own good, of course – 'in their best interests'. We understand struggle and resistance, nowadays, rather better than we do reform and transformation. Yet 'transformations' are at the heart of the study of popular culture. I mean the active work on existing traditions and activities, their active reworking, so that they come out a different way: they appear to 'persist' – yet, from one period to another, they come to stand in a different relation to the ways working people live and the ways they define their relations to each other, to 'the others' and to their conditions of life. Transformation is the key to the long and protracted process of the 'moralisation' of the labouring classes, and the 'demoralisation' of the poor, and the 're-education' of the people. Popular culture is neither, in a 'pure' sense, the popular traditions of resistance to these processes; nor is it the forms which are superimposed on and over them. It is the ground on which the transformations are worked.

In the study of popular culture, we should always start here: with the double stake in popular culture, the double movement of containment and resistance, which is always inevitably inside it.

The study of popular culture has tended to oscillate wildly between the two alternative poles of that dialectic – containment/resistance. We have had some striking and marvellous reversals. Think of the really major revolution in historical understanding which has followed as the history of 'polite society' and the Whig aristocracy in eighteenth-century England has been upturned by the addition of the history of the turbulent and ungovernable people. The popular traditions of the eighteenth-century labouring poor, the popular classes and the 'loose and disorderly sort' often, now, appear as virtually independent formations: tolerated in a state of permanently unstable equilibrium in relatively peaceful and prosperous times; subject to arbitrary excursions and expeditions in times of panic and crisis. Yet though formally these were the cultures of the people 'outside the walls', beyond political society and the triangle of power, they were never, in fact, outside of the larger field of social forces and cultural relations. They not only constantly pressed on 'society'; they were linked and connected with it, by a multitude of traditions and practices. Lines of 'alliance' as well as lines of cleavage. From these cultural bases, often far removed from the dispositions of law, power and authority, 'the people' threatened constantly to erupt; and, when they did so, they broke on to the stage of patronage and power with a threatening din and clamour – with life and drum, cockade and effigy, proclamation and ritual – and, often, with a striking, popular,
ritual discipline. Yet never quite overturning the delicate strands of paternalism, deference and terror within which they were constantly if insecurely constrained. In the following century, when the 'labouring' and the 'dangerous' classes lived without benefit of that fine distinction the reformers were so anxious to draw (this was a cultural distinction as well as a moral and economic one: and a great deal of legislation and regulation was devised to operate directly on it), some areas preserved for long periods a virtually impenetrable enclave character. It took virtually the whole length of the century before the representatives of 'law and order' – the new police – could acquire anything like a regular and customary foothold within them. Yet, at the same time, the penetration of the cultures of the labouring masses and the urban poor was deeper, more continuous – and more continuously 'educative' and reformatory – in that period than at any time since.

One of the main difficulties standing in the way of a proper periodisation of popular culture is the profound transformation in the culture of the popular classes which occurs between the 1880s and the 1920s. There are whole histories yet to be written about this period. But although there are probably many things not right about its detail, I do think Gareth Stedman Jones's article on the 'Re-making of the English working class' in this period has drawn our attention to something fundamental and qualitatively different and important about it. It was a period of deep structural change. The more we look at it, the more convinced we become that somewhere in this period lies the matrix of factors and problems from which our history – and our peculiar dilemmas – arise. Everything changes – not just a shift in the relations of forces but a reconstitution of the terrain of political struggle itself. It isn't just by chance that so many of the characteristic forms of what we now think of as 'traditional' popular culture either emerge from or emerge in their distinctive modern form, in that period. What has been done for the 1790s and for the 1840s, and is being done for the eighteenth century, now radically needs to be done for the period of what we might call the 'social imperialist' crisis.

The general point made earlier is true, without qualification, for this period, so far as popular culture is concerned. There is no separate, autonomous, 'authentic' layer of working-class culture to be found. Much of the most immediate forms of popular recreation, for example, are saturated by popular imperialism. Could we expect otherwise? How could we explain, and what would we do with the idea of, the culture of a dominated class which, despite its complex interior formations and differentiations, stood in a very particular relation to a major restructuring of capital; which itself stood in a peculiar relation to the rest of the world; a people bound by the most complex ties to a changing set of material relations and conditions; who managed somehow to construct 'a culture' which remained untouched by the most powerful dominant ideology – popular imperialism? Especially when that ideology – belying its name – was directed as much at them as it was at Britain's changing position in a world capitalist expansion?

Think, in relation to the question of popular imperialism, of the history and relations between the people and one of the major means of cultural expression: the press. To go back to displacement and superimposition – we can see clearly how
the liberal middle-class press of the mid-nineteenth century was constructed on the back of the active destruction and marginalisation of the indigenous radical and working-class press. But, on top of that process, something qualitatively new occurs towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century in this area: the active, mass insertion of a developed and mature working-class audience into a new kind of popular, commercial press. This has had profound cultural consequences: though it isn’t in any narrow sense exclusively a ‘cultural’ question at all. It required the whole reorganisation of the capital basis and structure of the cultural industry; a harnessing of new forms of technology and of labour processes; the establishment of new types of distribution operating through the new cultural mass markets. But one of its effects was indeed a reconstituting of the cultural and political relations between the dominant and the dominated classes: a change intimately connected with that containment of popular democracy on which ‘our democratic way of life’ today appears to be so securely based. Its results are all too palpably with us still, today: a popular press, the more strident and virulent as it gradually shrinks; organised by capital ‘for’ the working classes; with, nevertheless, deep and influential roots in the culture and language of the ‘underdog’, of ‘Us’: with the power to represent the class to itself in its most traditionalist form. This is a slice of the history of ‘popular culture’ well worth unravelling.

Of course, one could not begin to do so without talking about many things which don’t usually figure in the discussion of ‘culture’ at all. They have to do with the reconstruction of capital and the rise of the collectivism and the formation of a new kind of ‘educative’ state as much as with recreation, dance and popular song. As an area of serious historical work, the study of popular culture is like the study of labour history and its institutions. To declare an interest in it is to correct a major imbalance, to mark a significant oversight. But, in the end, it yields most when it is seen in relation to a more general, a wider history.

I select this period – the 1880s–1920s – because it is one of the real test cases for the revived interest in popular culture. Without in any way casting aspersions on the important historical work which has been done and remains to do on earlier periods, I do believe that many of the real difficulties (theoretical as well as empirical) will only be confronted when we begin to examine closely popular culture in a period which begins to resemble our own, which poses the same kind of interpretive problems as our own, and which is informed by our own sense of contemporary questions. I am dubious about that kind of interest in ‘popular culture’ which comes to a sudden and unexpected halt at roughly the same point as the decline of Chartism. It isn’t by chance that very few of us are working in popular culture in the 1930s. I suspect there is something peculiarly awkward, especially for socialists, in the non-appearance of a militant radical mature culture of the working class in the 1930s when – to tell you the truth – most of us would have expected it to appear. From the viewpoint of a purely ‘heroic’ or ‘autonomous’ popular culture, the 1930s is a pretty barren period. This ‘barrenness’ – like the earlier unexpected richness and diversity – cannot be explained from within popular culture alone.
We have now to begin to speak not just about discontinuities and qualitative change, but about a very severe fracture, a deep rupture – especially in popular culture in the postwar period. Here it is a matter not only of a change in cultural relations between the classes, but of the changed relationship between the people and the concentration and expansion of the new cultural apparatuses. But could one seriously now set out to write the history of popular culture without taking into account the monopolisation of the cultural industries, on the back of a profound technological revolution (it goes without saying that no ‘profound technological revolution’ is ever in any sense ‘purely’ technical)? To write a history of the culture of the popular classes exclusively from inside those classes, without understanding the ways in which they are constantly held in relation with the institutions of dominant cultural production, is not to live in the twentieth century. The point is clear about the twentieth century. I believe it holds good for the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries as well.

So much for ‘some problems of periodisation’.

Next, I want to say something about ‘popular’. The term can have a number of different meanings: not all of them useful. Take the most common-sense meaning: the things which are said to be ‘popular’ because masses of people listen to them, buy them, read them. consume them, and seem to enjoy them to the full. This is the ‘market’ or commercial definition of the term: the one which brings socialists out in spots. It is quite rightly associated with the manipulation and debasement of the culture of the people. In one sense, it is the direct opposite of the way I have been using the word earlier. I have, though, two reservations about entirely dispensing with this meaning, unsatisfactory as it is.

First, if it is true that, in the twentieth century, vast numbers of people do consume and even indeed enjoy the cultural products of our modern cultural industry, then it follows that very substantial numbers of working people must be included within the audiences for such products. Now, if the forms and relationships on which participation in this sort of commercially provided ‘culture’ depend are purely manipulative and debased, then the people who consume and enjoy them must either be themselves debased by these activities or else living in a permanent state of ‘false consciousness’. They must be ‘cultural dopes’ who can’t tell that what they are being fed is an updated form of the opium of the people. That judgment may make us feel right, decent and self-satisfied about our denunciations of the agents of mass manipulation and deception – the capitalist cultural industries: but I don’t know that it is a view which can survive for long as an adequate account of cultural relationships; and even less as a socialist perspective on the culture and nature of the working class. Ultimately, the notion of the people as a purely passive, outline force is a deeply unsocialist perspective.

Second, then: can we get around this problem without dropping the inevitable and necessary attention to the manipulative aspect of a great deal of commercial popular culture? There are a number of strategies for doing so, adopted by radical critics
and theorists of popular culture, which, I think, are highly dubious. One is to
counterpose to it another, whole, ‘alternative’ culture – the authentic ‘popular
culture’; and to suggest that the ‘real’ working class (whatever that is) isn’t taken in
by the commercial substitutes. This is a heroic alternative; but not a very convincing
one. Basically what is wrong with it is that it neglects the absolutely essential
relations of cultural power – of domination and subordination – which is an
intrinsic feature of cultural relation. I want to assert on the contrary that there is
no whole, authentic, autonomous ‘popular culture’ which lies outside the field of
force of the relations of cultural power and domination. Second, it greatly
underestimates the power of cultural implantation. This is a tricky point to make,
for as soon as it is made, one opens oneself to the charge that one is subscribing to
the thesis of cultural incorporation. The study of popular culture keeps shifting
between these two, quite unacceptable, poles: pure ‘autonomy’ or total
encapsulation.

Actually, I don’t think it is necessary or right to subscribe to either. Since ordinary
people are not cultural dopes, they are perfectly capable of recognising the way the
realities of working-class life are reorganised, reconstructed and reshaped by the
way they are represented (i.e. re-presented) in, say, Coronation Street. The cultural
industries do have the power constantly to rework and reshape what they represent;
and, by repetition and selection, to impose and implant such definitions of ourselves
as fit more easily the descriptions of the dominant or preferred culture. That is what
the concentration of cultural power – the means of culture-making in the heads of
the few – actually means. These definitions don’t have the power to occupy our
minds; they don’t function on us as if we are blank screens. But they do occupy and
rework the interior contradictions of feeling and perception in the dominated
classes; they do find or clear a space of recognition in those who respond to them.
Cultural domination has real effects – even if these are neither all-powerful nor all-
inclusive. If we were to argue that these imposed forms have no influence, it would
be tantamount to arguing that the culture of the people can exist as a separate
enclave, outside the distribution of cultural power and the relations of cultural force.
I do not believe that. Rather, I think there is a continuous and necessarily uneven
and unequal struggle, by the dominant culture, constantly to disorganise and
reorganise popular culture; to enclose and confine its definitions and forms within
a more inclusive range of dominant forms. There are points of resistance; there are
also moments of supersession. This is the dialectic of cultural struggle. In our times,
it goes on continuously, in the complex lines of resistance and acceptance, refusal
and capitulation, which make the field of culture a sort of constant battlefield. A
battlefield where no once-for-all victories are obtained but where there are always
strategic positions to be won and lost.

This first definition, then, is not a useful one for our purposes; but it might force
us to think more deeply about the complexity of cultural relations, about the reality
of cultural power and about the nature of cultural implantation. If the forms of
provided commercial popular culture are not purely manipulative, then it is because,
alongside the false appeals, the foreshortenings, the trivialisation and short circuits,
there are also elements of recognition and identification, something approaching a
re-creation of recognisable experiences and attitudes, to which people are
responding. The danger arises because we tend to think of cultural forms as whole
and coherent: either wholly corrupt or wholly authentic. Whereas they are deeply
contradictory; they play on contradictions, especially when they function in the
domain of the 'popular'. The language of the Daily Mirror is neither a pure
construction of Fleet Street 'newspeak' nor is it the language which its working class
readers actually speak. It is a highly complex species of linguistic ventriloquism in
which the debased brutalism of popular journalism is skillfully combined and
intricate with some elements of the directness and vivid particularity of working-
class language. It cannot get by without preserving some element of its roots in a
real vernacular - in 'the popular'. It wouldn't get very far unless it were capable of
reshaping popular elements into a species of canned and neutralised demotic
populism.

The second definition of 'popular' is easier to live with. This is the descriptive one.
Popular culture is all those things that 'the people' do or have done. This is close
to an 'anthropological' definition of the term: the culture, mores, customs and
folkways of 'the people'. What defines their 'distinctive way of life'. I have two
difficulties with this definition, too.

First, I am suspicious of it precisely because it is too descriptive. This is putting
it mildly. Actually, it is based on an infinitely expanding inventory. Virtually
anything which 'the people' have ever done can fall into the list. Pigeon-fancying and
stamp-collecting, flying ducks on the wall and garden gnomes. The problem is how
to distinguish this infinite list, in any but a descriptive way, from what popular
culture is not.

But the second difficulty is more important - and relates to a point made earlier.
We can't simply collect into one category all the things which 'the people' do,
without observing that the real analytic distinction arises, not from the list itself -
an inert category of things and activities - but from the key opposition: the
people/not of the people. That is to say, the structuring principle of 'the popular'
in this sense is the tensions and oppositions between what belongs to the central
domain of elite or dominant culture, and the culture of the 'periphery'. It is this
opposition which constantly structures the domain of culture into the 'popular' and
the 'non-popular'. But you cannot construct these oppositions in a purely descriptive
way. For, from period to period, the contents of each category change. Popular
forms become enhanced in cultural value, go up the cultural escalator - and find
themselves on the opposite side. Others things cease to have high cultural value, and
are appropriated into the popular, becoming transformed in the process. The
structuring principle does not consist of the contents of each category - which, I
insist, will alter from one period to another. Rather, it consists of the forces and
relations which sustain the distinction, the difference: roughly, between what, at any
time, counts as an elite cultural activity or form, and what does not. These
categories remain, though the inventories change. What is more, a whole set of
institutions and institutional processes are required to sustain each - and to
continually mark the difference between them. The school and the education system is one such institution – distinguishing the valued part of the culture, the cultural heritage, the history to be transmitted, from the ‘valueless’ part. The literary and scholarly apparatus is another – marking off certain kinds of valued knowledge from others. The important fact, then, is not a mere descriptive inventory – which may have the negative effect of freezing popular culture into some timeless descriptive mould – but the relations of power which are constantly punctuating and dividing the domain of culture into its preferred and its residual categories.

So I settle for a third definition of ‘popular’, though it is a rather uneasy one. This looks, in any particular period, at those forms and activities which have their roots in the social and material conditions of particular classes; which have been embodied in popular traditions and practices. In this sense, it retains what is valuable in the descriptive definition. But it goes on to insist that what is essential to the definition of popular culture is the relations which define ‘popular culture’ in a continuing tension (relationship, influence and antagonism) to the dominant culture. It is a conception of culture which is polarised around this cultural dialectic. It treats the domain of cultural forms and activities as a constantly changing field. Then it looks at the relations which constantly structure this field into dominant and subordinate formations. It looks at the process by which these relations of dominance and subordination are articulated. It treats them as a process: the process by means of which some things are actively preferred so that others can be dethroned. It has at its centre the changing and uneven relations of force which define the field of culture – that is, the question of cultural struggle and its many forms. Its main focus of attention is the relation between culture and questions of hegemony.

What we have to be concerned with, in this definition, is not the question of the ‘authenticity’ or organic wholeness of popular culture. Actually, it recognises that almost all cultural forms will be contradictory in this sense, composed of antagonistic and unstable elements. The meaning of a cultural form and its place or position in the cultural field is not inscribed inside its form. Nor is its position fixed once and for ever. This year’s radical symbol or slogan will be neutralised into next year’s fashion; the year after, it will be the object of a profound cultural nostalgia. Today’s rebel folksinger ends up, tomorrow, on the cover of the Observer colour magazine. The meaning of a cultural symbol is given in part by the social field into which it is incorporated, the practices with which it articulates and is made to resonate. What matters is not the intrinsic or historically fixed objects of culture, but the state of play in cultural relations: to put it bluntly and in an oversimplified form – what counts is the class struggle in and over culture.

Almost every fixed inventory will betray us. Is the novel a ‘bourgeois’ form? The answer can only be historically provisional: When? Which novels? For whom? Under what conditions?

What that very great Marxist theoretician of language who used the name Volosinov once said about the sign – the key element of all signifying practices –
is true of cultural forms:

Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e. with ... the totality of users of the same sets of signs for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of class struggle. ... By and large it is thanks to this intersecting of accents that a sign maintains its vitality and dynamism and the capacity for further development. A sign that has been withdrawn from the pressure of the social struggle – which so to speak crosses beyond the pale of the social struggle – inevitably loses force, degenerating into an allegory and becoming the object not of live social intelligibility but of philosophical comprehension. ... The ruling class strives to impart a supra-class, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgements which occurs in it, to make the sign unaccentual. In actual fact, each living ideological sign has two faces, like Janus. Any current curse word can become a word of praise, any current truth must inevitably sound to many people as the greatest lie. This inner dialectic quality of the sign comes out fully in the open only in times of social crisis or revolutionary change.¹

Cultural struggle, of course, takes many forms: incorporation, distortion, resistance, negotation, recuperation. Raymond Williams has done us a great deal of service by outlining some of these processes, with his distinction between emergent, residual and incorporated moments. We need to expand and develop this rudimentary schema. The important thing is to look at it dynamically: as an historical process. Emergent forces reappear in ancient historical disguise; emergent forces, pointing to the future, lose their anticipatory power, and become merely backward-looking; today's cultural breaks can be recuperated as a support to tomorrow's dominant system of values and meanings. The struggle continues: but it is almost never in the same place, over the same meaning or value. It seems to me that the cultural process – cultural power – in our society depends, in the first instance, on this drawing of the line, always in each period in a different place, as to what is to be incorporated into 'the great tradition' and what is not. Educational and cultural institutions, along with the many positive things they do, also help to discipline and police this boundary.

This should make us think again about that tricky term in popular culture, 'tradition'. Tradition is a vital element in culture; but it has little to do with the mere persistence of old forms. It has much more to do with the way elements have been linked together or articulated. These arrangements in a national-popular culture have no fixed or inscribed position, and certainly no meaning which is carried along, so to speak, in the stream of historical tradition, unchanged. Not only can the elements of 'tradition' be rearranged, so that they articulate with different practices and positions, and take on a new meaning and relevance. It is also often the case that cultural struggle arises in its sharpest form just at the point where different, opposed traditions meet, intersect. They seek to detach a cultural form from its implantation in one tradition, and to give it a new cultural resonance or accent.
Traditions are not fixed for ever: certainly not in any universal position in relation to a single class. Cultures, conceived not as separate ‘ways of life’, but as ‘ways of struggle’, constantly intersect: the pertinent cultural struggles arise at the points of intersection. Think of the ways in the eighteenth century in which a certain language of legality, of constitutionalism and of ‘rights’ becomes a battleground, at the point of intersection between two divergent traditions: between the ‘tradition’ of gentry ‘majesty and terror’ and the traditions of popular justice. Gramsci, providing a tentative answer to his own question as to how a new ‘collective will’ arises, and a national-popular culture is transformed, observed that

What matters is the criticism to which such an ideological complex is subjected by the first representatives of the new historical phase. This criticism makes possible a process of differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate, even incidental, is now taken to be primary – becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex. The old collective will dissolves into its contradictory elements since the subordinate ones develop socially.

This is the terrain of national-popular culture and tradition as a battlefield.

This provides us with a warning against those self-enclosed approaches to popular culture which, valuing ‘tradition’ for its own sake, and treating it in an ahistorical manner, analyse popular cultural forms as if they contained within themselves, from their moment of origin, some fixed and unchanging meaning or value. The relationship between historical position and aesthetic value is an important and difficult question in popular culture. But the attempt to develop some universal popular aesthetic, founded on the moment of origin of cultural forms and practices, is almost certainly profoundly mistaken. What could be more eclectic and random than that assemblage of dead symbols and bric-à-brac, ransacked from yesterday’s dressing-up box, in which, just now, many young people have chosen to adorn themselves? These symbols and bits and pieces are profoundly ambiguous. A thousand lost cultural symbols could be summoned up through them. Every now and then, amongst the other trinkets, we find that sign which, above all other signs, ought to be fixed – solidified – in its cultural meaning and connotation for ever: the swastika. And yet there it dangles, partly – but not entirely – cut loose from its profound cultural reference in twentieth-century history. What does it mean? What is it signifying? Its signification is rich, and richly ambiguous: certainly unstable. This terrifying sign may delimit a range of meanings, but it carries no guarantee of a single meaning within itself. The streets are full of kids who are not ‘fascist’ because they may wear a swastika on a chain. On the other hand, perhaps they could be. . . . What this sign means will ultimately, depend, in the politics of youth culture, less on the intrinsic cultural symbolism of the thing in itself, and more on the balance of forces between, say, the National Front and the Anti-Nazi League, between White Rock and the Two ToneSound.

Not only is there no intrinsic guarantee within the cultural sign or form itself.
There is no guarantee that, because at one time it was linked with a pertinent struggle, it will always be the living expression of a class: so that every time you give it an airing it will 'speak the language of socialism'. If cultural expressions register for socialism, it is because they have been linked as the practices, the forms and organisation of a living struggle, which has succeeded in appropriating those symbols and giving them a socialist connotation. Culture is not already permanently inscribed with the conditions of a class before that struggle begins. The struggle consists in the success or failure to give 'the cultural' a socialist accent.

The term 'popular' has very complex relations to the term 'class'. We know this, but are often at pains to forget it. We speak of particular forms of working-class culture; but we use the more inclusive term 'popular culture' to refer to the general field of enquiry. It's perfectly clear that what I've been saying would make little sense without reference to a class perspective and to class struggle. But it is also clear that there is no one-to-one relationship between a class and a particular cultural form or practice. The terms 'class' and 'popular' are deeply related, but they are not absolutely interchangeable. The reason for that is obvious. There are not wholly separate 'cultures' paradigmatically attached, in a relation of historical fixity, to specific 'whole' classes — although there are clearly distinct and variable class-cultural formations. Class cultures tend to intersect and overlap in the same field of struggle. The term 'popular' indicates this somewhat displaced relationship of culture to classes. More accurately, it refers to that alliance of classes and forces which constitute the 'popular classes'. The culture of the oppressed, the excluded classes: this is the area to which the term 'popular' refers us. And the opposite side to that — the side with the cultural power to decide what belongs and what does not — is, by definition, not another 'whole' class, but that other alliance of classes, strata and social forces which constitute what is not 'the people' and not the 'popular classes': the culture of the power bloc.

The people versus the power bloc: this, rather than 'class-against-class', is the central line of contradiction around which the terrain of culture is polarised. Popular culture, especially, is organised around the contradiction: the popular forces versus the power bloc. This gives to the terrain of cultural struggle its own kind of specificity. But the term 'popular', and even more, the collective subject to which it must refer — 'the people' — is highly problematic. It is made problematic by, say, the ability of Mrs Thatcher to pronounce a sentence like 'We have to limit the power of the trade unions because that is what the people want.' That suggests to me that, just as there is no fixed content to the category of 'popular culture', so there is no fixed subject to attach to it — 'the people'. 'The people' are not always back there, where they have always been, their culture untouched, their liberties and their instincts intact, still struggling on against the Norman yoke or whatever: as if, if only we can 'discover' them and bring them back on stage, they will always stand up in the right, appointed place and be counted. The capacity to constitute classes and individuals as a popular force — that is the nature of political and cultural struggle: to make the divided classes and the separated peoples — divided and
separated by culture as much as by other factors – into a popular-democratic cultural force.

We can be certain that other forces also have a stake in defining 'the people' as something else: 'the people' who need to be disciplined more, ruled better, more effectively policed, whose way of life needs to be protected from 'alien cultures', and so on. There is some part of both those alternatives inside each of us. Sometimes we can be constituted as a force against the power bloc: that is the historical opening in which it is possible to construct a culture which is genuinely popular. But, in our society, if we are not constituted like that, we will be constituted into its opposite: an effective populist force, saying 'Yes' to power. Popular culture is one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also the stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured. It is not a sphere where socialism, a socialist culture – already fully formed – might be simply 'expressed'. But it is one of the places where socialism might be constituted. That is why 'popular culture' matters. Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don't give a damn about it.

Note