

# Authoritarianism and Development in the Third World

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ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING debates in comparative political economy pertains to the impact of political regime types on development. More concretely, there is a view that authoritarian regimes are more capable of launching and advancing ambitious developmental projects. This view, often referred to as developmental authoritarianism, contrasts with the apparent weaknesses of democracies in a similar developmental context.<sup>1</sup> It is argued by advocates of developmental authoritarianism that democracies impede the timing and speed of development as a result of the inherent argumentative nature of democracies, which prevents the insulation of the state from particularistic demands. This argument has frequently been made about some Latin American, East Asian, and African countries since independence in the 1960s, when democracy was thought to be destabilizing and too focused on short term results to foster development.<sup>2</sup> The argument was revised during the phase of the adoption of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s—whereby debtor countries would agree to make internal changes in governance and policy in return for loan conditions—when democracy was perceived to make governments vulnerable to resistance to economic reform.<sup>3</sup> It was only after the relative development failures of one-party states—and in the eyes of many, of SAPs—in many African countries that international donors began once again to consider that democracy might be a necessary condition of development.<sup>4</sup>

Examples of the purported effectiveness of authoritarian regimes in advancing development can be traced to the success of Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s (during the Getúlio Vargas regime), South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, and Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s. At present, China is portrayed as a notable example

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of the success of authoritarian regimes at development. Some would argue that China's impressive gains in completing the Three Gorges Dam project and serving as the host of the 2008 Olympic Games is a result of the ability of the state to undertake ambitious developmental projects by stifling dissent and avoiding time-consuming public scrutiny. In this comparative context, even high-growth democratic countries in the Third World, like India, appear to be hampered by democracy.

The basic argument of this article is that specific political regime types (such as authoritarianism or democracy) do not necessarily guarantee specific types of developmental outcomes. In other words, some authoritarian regimes have developmental success, but just being authoritarian does not guarantee this success. We will argue that authoritarian regimes offer some advantages vis-à-vis democracies but that democracies also have some advantages regarding development. We will conclude that a mixture of variables are sometimes more important than political regime (be it democracy or authoritarianism), in terms of providing positive developmental outcomes, by arguing that state strength is more important than whether the regime is democratic or not.

#### EVALUATING AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT

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Even though democracy and authoritarianism are two of the most important concepts in the study of politics, it is only recently that political scientists have begun identifying precisely which political regimes are democratic and which ones authoritarian. In general, political scientists make determinations about political regime types based on fairly crude indices. For instance, Freedom House releases an annual index of political regimes. The Freedom House index is a composite of a country's performance on accountability and public voice, protection of civil liberties, rule of law, and anticorruption and transparency.<sup>5</sup>

Although useful as a broad measure of democracy or authoritarianism, the Freedom House index is not a particularly compelling tool to determine a country's political regime type over time. For that reason, most political scientists use the Polity IV index of democracy and autocracy. The Polity IV code for components of democracy and autocracy includes measures relating to the institutionalization of procedures regarding the transfer of executive power and the competitiveness of executive recruitment; the level of executive constraints and operational independence of chief executive; and levels of political competition and competitiveness of participation.<sup>6</sup> The advantage of Polity IV over other efforts to measure democracy or authoritarianism is the degree of nuance for each country over time. Thus, a researcher may be able to determine the level of authoritarianism or democracy in a given country from 1945 onwards.

Neither the Freedom House index nor the Polity IV index provides evidence that

authoritarian regimes are more capable of development than democracies. Countries that score low on the Freedom House index of democracy also tend to be poorly developed. For instance, the countries with the lowest ranking in terms of democracy (that is with a Freedom House score of 7) were Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.<sup>7</sup> With the possible exception of Cuba, few would argue that the other countries with low Freedom House scores would be considered developmental models.

Likewise, evidence from the Polity IV index suggests that, if viewed regionally and across time, the continent with the highest proportion of autocracies would be Africa. From 1965 until 1991, the majority of African states are classified as autocracies using the Polity IV codes. At its peak, in 1988, 33 out of 35 countries were considered to be autocracies.<sup>8</sup> If authoritarianism is a key contributor to development, then logically Africa should be rife with developmental successes. Evidence for the link between authoritarianism and development in South America, the Middle East, and Asia are also mixed. Although some countries in these regions have experienced periods of developmental growth during periods of authoritarian rule (such as South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s), there are also plenty of examples of durable authoritarian regimes that have been developmental failures (including Bolivia, Cambodia, Laos, Paraguay, and Yemen).

The aggregate measures of political regime types (such as Freedom House and Polity IV), though useful as a starting point about political regime types, often overlook more nuanced and complex examples of evaluating what constitutes democracy at the regional level. For Persson and Tabellini, the difficulty of linking political regime types to economic development is that the term democracy “is too blunt a concept.” Thus, they conclude that the “evidence that democratizations yield subsequent economic growth is quite weak. Political regimes may still influence economic development, but the effects appear difficult to identify from the within-country variation.”<sup>9</sup> Likewise, aggregate measures of political regime types do not provide a useful guide as to the depth of democratic institutions nor about regime consolidation. For instance, the 1990s were a period of democratization in much of sub-Saharan Africa: more than half the countries in the region held multi-party elections during the first half of the decade, many of them for the first time.<sup>10</sup> However, the depth and extent of democracy has remained fragile.

A crude way to assess the depth of democracy is whether elections can deliver a peaceful change of party. This might indicate whether the ruling party allows the opposition sufficient space to campaign and whether structures are stable and robust enough to process a change of regime peacefully.<sup>11</sup> For instance, Zimbabwe in 2008 provides an extreme example of an election in which the opposition party was inhibited during

campaigning, electors were intimidated, and the state institutions were systematically exploited to ensure a victory by the ruling party. Likewise, the 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria and Kenya, both judged by election monitors as significantly flawed, saw the re-election of the respective ruling party's candidates. In Nigeria, the fact that the former President Olusegun Obasanjo did not attempt to amend the constitution to allow himself a third term was seen by some as a sign of democratic strengthening; however, the election of his chosen successor, Umaru Yar'Adua, in elections that were seen as heavily skewed in favor of the ruling party—and attended by widespread accusations of ballot-rigging—was less encouraging. In Kenya, the re-election of President Mwai Kibaki sparked inter-party violence, underlining the fact that political competition remains potentially destabilizing in parts of the continent. However, other recent elections, such as those in Sierra Leone in 2007 and Ghana in 2008, saw relatively peaceful elections and changes of regime, suggesting that there are a few examples of gradual democratic consolidation.

Both the increase in elections and superficiality of democracy in Africa can be partially accounted for by the fact that much democratic reform in Africa has been donor-driven.<sup>12</sup> While donors make regular electoral contests a condition for aid and debt relief, many African regimes have paid little more than lip-service to reforms, aided by the relative weakness of state institutions which enable the subversion of free elections. Donors attempt to deepen democracy by setting benchmarks, such as requiring that public accounts are published and that anti-corruption authorities are appointed and given sufficient clout. However, there is a long way to go, according to the Freedom House index of political and civil liberties: only ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa are termed *free*, while 14 are *not free* and the rest are only *partially free*.<sup>13</sup>

In order to assess the link between authoritarianism and development, the concept of development itself requires some clarification. Development can be measured at a disaggregated level, such as child welfare, female literacy rates, mortality rates, nutritional indices. Other measures of development include aggregate indices, such as the Human

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Development Index (HDI). HDI is an aggregate measure of a country's performance over an extensive range of developmental variables, such as child and adult literacy rates, life expectancy at birth, and child and adult mortality rates.<sup>14</sup>

The UNDP Human Development Report in 2007/2008 confirmed sub-Saharan Africa as the world region with the highest concentration of deprivation. Out of the 26

countries judged to have low human development, 25 were in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>15</sup> Sub-Saharan Africa's economic power-house, South Africa, ranks 125 in the world.<sup>16</sup> On the other side of the HDI scale are countries with high human development rankings; democratic OECD countries predominate. Among the top 50 countries in the 2008 HDI ranking, the highest ranked authoritarian regime is Brunei Darussalam (with a composite 2008 HDI rank of 27). Other authoritarian regimes—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar—also appear among the top 50 countries in terms of human development, though it is also worth noting that all of these authoritarian regimes are also rich in crude oil and natural gas. In terms of its performance in the HDI, China has a global ranking of 94, trailing behind Suriname, Jordan, and the Dominican Republic. Thus, the claim that authoritarian regimes have a stronger performance in terms of development is severely weakened.

Given the disagreements relating to the most accurate nomenclature, many confuse high levels of economic growth with development. However, although fast growing economies sometimes have developmental gains, the relationship between GDP growth and socio-economic development is not uniform. As argued by William Easterly, in direct reference to Pakistan, countries can have high levels of growth with no accompanying improvements in development.<sup>17</sup>

Inequality is also important to address. In some of the fastest growing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, high levels of entrenched inequality mean that the poorest in the population see virtually no resulting improvement in their standard of living from high growth. Increasingly, donors have attempted to measure development in ways that reflect the life chances and quality of countries' populations. This can be done in a variety of ways. For example, the World Bank provides a basic distinction of development based on social and physical infrastructure. The Bank now argues that "without an effective state, sustainable development, both economic and social, is impossible."<sup>18</sup> This approach has involved the Bank in attempts to reform the political and social rules and customs that underlie states' institutions.

Donors in recent years have assumed that "good governance"—which is predicated on the ideas of government accountability and transparency—will ensure that development projects are geared towards the needs of the wider population. Thus, the World Bank, alongside other donors, has focused its efforts on strengthening state institutions and in particular the relationship between states and societies—trying to build state capacity via democratic deepening. From this perspective, democracy becomes a measure, rather than a driver, of development.<sup>19</sup>

## THE EMPIRICAL LINK BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT

Although isolated cases appear to suggest that authoritarianism best enables development, the empirical record is certainly mixed.<sup>20</sup> As argued by Jagdish Bhagwati, democracy is often consonant with development, provided that the right institutional incentives are present.<sup>21</sup> Other economists, such as Abbas Pourgerami, have shown that democracy and development are linked directly through investment and education and indirectly through labor and welfare.<sup>22</sup> Overall, though, the political science literature also finds weak evidence for political regime types and development. For instance, in a comprehensive empirical analysis of 18 leading studies of the relationship between political regime types and economic growth came to the startling conclusion that “we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. All we can offer are some educated guesses.”<sup>23</sup>

Even if examples of successful cases of developmental states are taken in isolation, it is unclear that authoritarianism *per se* is the sole factor for a country’s developmental success. If we compare two authoritarian countries (North and South Korea from the 1950s until the mid-1980s), we find that similar levels of authoritarianism lead to opposite developmental outcomes. If we evaluate the developmental success of one country over time, we also find that the developmental impact of authoritarian regimes is not particularly compelling. While many marvel at the apparent success of China, it is also the case that China has had a very mixed record of developmental success over time. From 1949 until 1978, China’s developmental record is quite poor, largely defined by the catastrophic failures of the Great Leap Forward. Other examples of failures of authoritarian development projects abound, but they receive little attention compared to the occasional successes.<sup>24</sup>

There are few examples of developmental success under authoritarian regimes in Africa. One-party states prevailed between the 1960s and 1990s, and, despite some growth in the 1960s, the picture since then has been one of economic decline. Some one-party states achieved a measure of political stability, but even of those that did, few managed to translate stability into economic success. One line of thought for this neglect is focused on political logics in Africa, which rest on the need to service patron-client relations, leading to “economies of affection.”<sup>25</sup> This logic, as argued by Galenson and later by Huntington and Dominguez, privileges short-term consumption over investment and development.<sup>26</sup> Despite hopes in the 1970s that military regimes might prove more ascetic and development-focused, most were as corrupt and bad at development as the civilian ones they overthrew. Many were merely predatory—Uganda (Idi Amin), Zaire (Mobutu Sese Seko), and Nigeria (Sani Abacha). A small number pursued economic reforms with a measure of success: Jerry Rawlings in Ghana and

Yoweri Museveni in Uganda both managed to translate the relative stability and control they brought into development-focused economic programs.

In contrast, others turn the features of patron-client relationships on their head. For instance, Mushtaq Khan has argued that political contestation in developing countries is organized through the mobilization of patron-client relationships.<sup>27</sup> Based on this assumption, Khan admits that factional conflicts and contests over existing resources could be damaging to economic growth or to democratic stability. However, Khan suggests that, based on the premise that patron-client relationships can act as a conduit for redistributive coalitions, democracy can assist development. Framed in this way, Khan argues that democracy “can be a viable mechanism for managing these conflicts, and factional conflicts can drive economic growth in some contexts.”<sup>28</sup>

Clearly, the inherent complexity of markets, civil society, and the internal political structure of developing countries suggests that factors other than the level of authoritarianism account for differences in the relative success of different countries, such as South Korea compared to North Korea or the differences in developmental outcomes in China after 1978. Similarly, in examples from Africa, these might include personality of the leadership, levels of external support, and a very low starting point which engenders popular resignation and subdues dissent.

#### FACTORS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL SUCCESS AND FAILURE

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Recent advances in endogenous economic growth theory suggest that a number of factors account for rapid economic growth. These perspectives typically tend to examine the impact of technology, a constant return to scale production function, human capital, and productivity on economic growth.<sup>29</sup> However, non-economic analyses of development tend to focus on a wider range to variables. Accordingly, developmental success is attributed to a number of factors, including the adoption of specific economic policies, availability of specific natural resources, colonial heritage, geographic advantage, and state strength.

#### *ADOPTION OF SPECIFIC ECONOMIC POLICIES*

Ongoing debates in comparative political economy stress the relative success of specific forms of outward oriented economic policies. In this context, authoritarian regimes appear adept at enforcing rapid changes to the economy. These include the adoption of neoliberal economic policies during Pinochet's Chile or in Argentina during its recent period of military rule. Likewise, the rapid implementation of export-oriented policies during Lee Kuan Yew's governance of Singapore has also strengthened the view that authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian regimes are more capable at inducing radical

economic change. Based on the success of the transformation from import-substitution industrialization (ISI) to export-led industrialization in South Korea and Taiwan, some authors have stressed the importance of capitalist developmental states in prompting rapid development under authoritarian conditions, primarily through institutional mechanisms that enable cooperation between the state, industrialists, and labor, often prompted by systemic vulnerabilities.<sup>30</sup>

Although persuasive arguments can be developed to explain that authoritarianism is not inimical to development, it is not apparent that only efficient economic policies can be implemented during periods of authoritarianism. In fact, different variants of economic policy have also been tried under contexts of authoritarian rule with very mixed results. The absence of optimal institutional arrangements to enable capitalist developmental states points to the importance of *ex ante* factors, such as initial conditions, the impact of colonial heritage, or the availability of natural resources.

#### *INITIAL CONDITIONS*

Some of the political economy literature attempts to suggest that differences in initial conditions could account for differences in developmental outcomes. Some authors, with special reference to South East Asia, have emphasized that the success of South Korea and Taiwan, together with the intermediate cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (relative to north-east Asian countries) could be attributed to differences in terms of land and natural resources, abundant export economies, or as a result of education and the distribution of income.<sup>31</sup>

However, we also find that there is a similar starting point for many African and Asian countries. UNDP data show the dramatic divergence between countries which once had similar income levels and natural resources. For example, Nigeria and Indonesia had similar income levels in the 1970s, and both possessed significant oil reserves. However, while Indonesia tripled its GDP per capita between 1975 and 1997, Nigeria's actually fell. In Cote d'Ivoire and South Korea, both relatively poor and without mineral resources in 1975, incomes diverged dramatically so that by 1997, South Korea's GDP per capita was more than six times higher than Cote d'Ivoire's. HDIs in these

**Different variants of economic policy have been tried under the contexts of authoritarian rule with very mixed results.** countries have diverged alongside incomes.<sup>32</sup> So a set of advantageous initial conditions do not guarantee developmental success. For instance,

Argentina in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was one of the world's richest economies and appeared to become an advanced industrial economy. However, years of adverse world commodity prices and economic mismanagement have stifled the economic prowess of Argentina, particularly if compared to Brazil and Chile. In this case, it appears that



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advantageous initial conditions that are not coupled with strong institutions and a high proportion of GDP devoted to investment result in weak developmental and macroeconomic outcomes.

### *COLONIAL HERITAGE*

Some authors have argued that differences in colonial heritage could affect levels of development. In their study of the colonial origins of development, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson argue that settler mortality, rather than colonial heritage per se, enables the development of institutions that enable development to occur.<sup>33</sup>

In West Africa, where settlers were few, the colonial authorities relied heavily on local manpower and built up local military and civil government personnel to a far greater degree than in east and southern Africa. It was generally expected, therefore, that West Africa would be ready for independence earlier (and indeed Ghana in West Africa was the first in 1957). However, roughly 50 years later, it is difficult to find enduring trends that suggest that West African countries have fared better developmentally than elsewhere in the continent.

However, the effects of predatory colonial rule and policy continue to inhibit African development. The ways in which Africa was carved up and governed meant that most states at independence were imbued both with the logic of repression and weak social penetration. Most colonial regimes in Africa were poorly resourced, and they confined direct control to a few urban and coastal areas. Thus, at independence, many African states largely continued to be either irrelevant to people's lives because of their lack of geographical reach and control or objects of resentment and distrust even after independence. Inheriting fragmented and ethnically diverse territories, with relatively few resources and weak institutions, many African states have struggled to create coherence, and to build legitimacy and the ability to represent national ideas of progress and development.

### *GEOGRAPHY*

Some have argued that geographic advantages have enabled developmental success in some countries. Some economists have shown that the prevalence of specific diseases, the proportion of land area in tropical locations, climate, and crop quality appear to affect levels of economic development.<sup>34</sup> Although stressing the importance of geography, some have argued that favorable geographic conditions work, but only in mediation through institutions.<sup>35</sup> Using Bayesian model averaging (BMA) techniques, Masanjala and Papageorgiou argue that "it is unequivocally apparent that more than any other reason, geographical and ecological variables are more important in explaining Africa's

postindependence economic result.”<sup>36</sup> Others have highlighted the importance of geography in terms of the ability of the state to sustain industry and to promote growth through export.<sup>37</sup> However, there is little evidence of such correlations in Africa, perhaps underlining the significance of the very low levels of institutional strength in much of the continent. Likewise, although intriguing, none of these geographic hypotheses show how differences in political regime type account for divergence in developmental outcomes.

#### *NATURAL RESOURCES AND FACTOR ENDOWMENTS*

Many African countries rely on agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, tobacco, and cotton, which they have tended to export in raw forms. Attempts to add value to agricultural products via processing, or to use agricultural surplus to feed wider industrial growth, have been patchy at best. Failures have been explained in terms of the sensitivity of raw agricultural products to international prices; to Africa’s infrastructural weaknesses; or to government policies, such as price controls, which have repressed production.<sup>38</sup> Several African countries have substantial mineral resources, but these have not always brought economic advantages. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone are illustrations of the potential problems of mineral resources which became an object of excessive levels of corruption, political instability, and eventual state collapse. Oil, found for example in Nigeria and Angola, appears to benefit tiny minorities but has failed to bring significant development advantages. The extreme corruption and political instability seen in many resource-rich countries in Africa have led some to develop the idea of a “resources curse.”<sup>39</sup>

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#### *STATE STRENGTH*

Finally, some have argued that state strength is an important factor in developmental success. Normatively, the argument about state strength is an institutionalist one, namely, that functioning institutions generate optimal developmental outcomes.<sup>40</sup> It is in this limited context that some authoritarian regimes are presumed to have an advantage over their democratic counterparts. However, one can define state strength in many different ways: it can also be understood in terms of the ability of the state to withstand the self-interest of political elites. Alternatively, state strength can be equated to the perceived legitimacy of the state. Rarely do any of these alternative forms of state strength appear in authoritarian regimes, hence it cannot be claimed that state strength (under authoritarianism) can contribute to development.

Empirical examples suggest that most Third World countries have relatively weak states, especially those that have authoritarian regimes. In Weberian terms, African states are very weak: many do not control the means of violence and cannot secure their

borders. They struggle to implement taxation regimes or adequately provide services and resources. Indeed, many find it difficult to extend their authority and presence beyond the capital city. States' low insulation from predatory political elites and weak sources of legitimacy undermine potential sources of strengthening and further erode opportunities for creating and realizing ambitious development programs.

## CONCLUSION

We conclude that the linkage between authoritarianism and development in developing countries is not strong. At first glance, some evidence drawn from isolated cases in Asia and Latin America appears to be most compelling. However, upon closer scrutiny, we suggest that authoritarian regimes are also equally likely not to be developmentally inclined. Evidence from Africa, in particular, suggests that there is no clear relationship between political regime types and development. Africa provides examples of low development under both authoritarian and democratic regimes, supporting the argument that there is no golden regime type that delivers development. Ghana is a rare example of an authoritarian regime initiating a moderately successful development program, but it illustrates the problems of making simplistic assumptions about the relationship. Ghana began its growth period in the early 1980s from a very low starting point. Jerry Rawlings' military regime implemented stringent structural adjustment programs that might have been less easy to effect if the government had been open to democratic pressures. However, from 1990, Ghana has become increasingly democratic.<sup>41</sup> Growth has been reasonably steady since 1994 (GDP growth has increased from around 4 percent between 1995 and 2002, to over 6 percent in 2008).<sup>42</sup> Ghana's HDI trend was also up over the same period.<sup>43</sup>

In our view, it is more credible to argue that the weakness of states—their low capacity, reach, and social and cultural resonance—is a key factor in Africa's relative economic failure. Weakness makes development programs, even with the most committed or well-insulated of regimes, difficult to realize. It also has meant in many African countries that the state is not robust enough to contain the prebendalism of a succession of ruling elites. Conversely, such weakness can allow for high levels of donor direction and aid impact, which, in a few cases, has translated into sustained development. However, external attempts to build the structures and processes of good governance are expensive and thus impractical for long-term, as well as potentially self-defeating in terms of state strengthening.

**By stifling dissent, authoritarian developmental projects (or shock therapy approaches to economic reform) can overlook long term deficiencies in implementation.**

In general, authoritarianism offers some specific advantages, relative to democratic regimes, in terms of initiating ambitious development projects. As argued by Dani Rodrik, reform in transition economies can be derailed by the expectation that a move away from authoritarianism can bring about weaker protection of worker rights.<sup>44</sup> As such, opposition to developmental agendas can be stifled more efficiently in an authoritarian system, or as some have argued, by enacting shock therapy-style reforms. However, by stifling dissent, authoritarian developmental projects (or shock therapy approaches to economic reform) can overlook long term deficiencies in implementation. For instance, China's environmental degradation is a notable example of the damage that stifled dissent can cause.


Finally, it is worth highlighting that democracy does offer some advantages in terms of the implementation and sustainability of development. As argued by Bardhan, "large-scale technocratic development projects directed from above by an insulated modernizing elite are often far removed from or insensitive to local community needs and concerns. Rather than involving the local people, these projects often treat them simply as objects of the development process."<sup>45</sup> By providing development suited to local conditions, the example of Costa Rica suggests that stable state institutions can flourish under a democratic regime type and that such a regime can have developmental aspirations. Democracy also fosters the entrepreneurship of ideas and innovation. Thus, India, despite its spotty developmental record, is another example where there is no incompatibility between democracy and development. In India's case, commitment to democratic principles has enabled the development of a leading information technology sector.

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Botswana, a rare developmentally successful African country, has also been one of the most democratic since its independence.<sup>46</sup> Here, democracy has helped to strengthen state institutions, and, aided by considerable mineral wealth, the country has managed to develop peacefully and with high and sustained levels of economic growth on a par with Korea and Thailand. Its HDI indicators (apart from life expectancy which has been severely affected by AIDS) are impressive.

In Africa, where states began from a point of severe weakness, authoritarian regimes bring no guarantee of development success. Democracy, as argued by Donal Cruise O'Brien, can serve as a way to strengthen states. Even an activity as simple as casting a vote in an election can enable voters to deepen their sense of connection to the state, although in practice such state strengthening can only be viewed as a long-term prospect.<sup>47</sup>

Our article has attempted to provide a nuanced perspective on the relationship between authoritarianism and development. We have argued that both authoritarianism and democracy have institutional features that enable development, both at the

start-up phase of policy recommendation and at the implementation phase. Based on our illustration of democratic cases where development is able to take place, this tentative conclusion could be interpreted as an inherent endorsement of democracy as a preferable vehicle towards a developmental regime. Our preference, however, is to look beyond the “democracy versus authoritarianism” debate and to instead focus on the strengthening of state institutions that best enables economic development in the Third World. 

## NOTES

1. The concept of developmental dictatorship was developed in reference to various authoritarian regimes, including fascist Italy by A.J. Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), South Korea in Lee Byeyong-cheon, ed. *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee Era* (Paramus, NJ: Homa & Sekey Books, 2006).

2. See, Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

3. Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). See chapter 12 for an excellent overview.

4. The World Bank's shifting focus towards “Good Governance,” driven by the relative inadequacies of SAPs, coincided with an international resurgence in democratization which also took hold in sub-Saharan African in the early 1990s. From that time, reforms in governance and democratization became part of the conditions donors put on aid. See Adrian Leftwich, Evelyne Huber, Mushtaq Khan, Jean Grugel and Boagang He, for a discussion of the links between democracy and development: Debate, *New Political Economy* 7, no. 2 (July 2002): 269-281.

5. Freedom House website, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

6. Polity IV's codes for democracy and autocracy can be found at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/report.htm>.

7. See Freedom House, *Index of Freedom, 2008*, available at [www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=415&year=2008](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=415&year=2008). Other low ranking countries with a Freedom House score of 6.5 included Belarus, Chad, China, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Zimbabwe.

8. See Polity IV rankings for Africa, available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ssafrica2.htm>.

9. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details.” *American Economic Review* 96, no. 2 (May 2006): 319-324.

10. Polity IV regional graphs in Latin America, Asia, and Africa show gradual increase in democratization over the last 10 years.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

12. Donor conditionalities attached to aid include holding regular multi-party elections, establishing mechanisms to end corruption, enable transparency, and direct funding of the “institutions of democracy:” civil society, free media and judiciary, political parties (via bilateral “democracy foundations”).

13. The ten sub-Saharan countries listed as being free in the 2008 Freedom House index include Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Africa.

14. The Human Development Report and full range of statistics used in computing the HDI are available from the website of UN Development Programme (UNDP). Data available from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>.

15. The only non-sub-Saharan African country in the 2008 HDI was Leste-Timor.

16. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> for UNDP *Human Development Index 2007/8*. AIDS has

dramatically affected many sub-Saharan African countries rating by the effect it has had on life-expectancy. This has been most noted in the relatively affluent countries like Botswana and South Africa, which have seen very high infection rates.

17. William Easterly, "The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan," in ed. Dani Rodrik, *In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives of Growth* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

18. World Bank, *World Bank Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), <http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr>.

19. Ibid.

20. Dani Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg, "Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?" *American Economic Review* 95, no. 2 (2005): 50-55.

21. Jagdish Bhagwati, "The New Thinking on Development," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 4 (1995): 50-64. Also see, Jagdish Bhagwati, "Democracy and Development: Cruel Dilemma or Symbiotic Relationship?," *Review of Development Economics* 6, no. 2 (2002): 151-162. For a more policy-oriented evaluation of the benefits for democracy to government performance, see Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant Pritchett, "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects," *World Bank Economic Review* 11, no. 2 (1997): 219-242.

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