BROWN

Dear Members of the Brown University Community,

The shooting at Brown on Dec. 13, 2025, resulted in tragic loss of life, injuries that continue to heal, and a campus that is still navigating its path to recovery. The shooting has shifted the way some in the Brown community think about security and what it takes to make a college campus feel safe. It also has raised questions about preventability and response that are natural following a violent attack like the one Brown experienced.

We continue to mourn the victims and to support the recovery of the injured students as we also remain resolute and steadfast in maintaining safety and security at the center of everything we do. In the eight months since Dec. 13, the University has developed important insights from a set of external reviews by firms commissioned by Brown, whose work — taken together — has offered the University a global assessment of our emergency preparedness and response.

A set of core conclusions arose from the After-Action Review of the events of Dec. 13 conducted by the global consulting firm Teneo Risk to examine the University's actions before, during and after the shooting, and a comprehensive assessment of Brown's campus safety and security program. Teneo's two reviews were launched by a special committee of the Corporation of Brown University, the institution's governing body, in the months after Dec. 13. A third review by a firm specializing in physical security involved a comprehensive assessment of all campus facilities and physical security infrastructure. All the reviews were conducted under the direction and supervision of outside legal counsel.

This report, *Safety and Security at Brown University: Overview and Action Plan*, shares lessons learned from the highly experienced experts who were charged to independently follow the facts and provide insights and recommendations about Brown's security environment, ranging from physical security infrastructure, staffing and leadership, to policies, emergency management and governance, and training and crisis response. As noted in the report, we hope this document will help our community gain a deeper understanding of the events of Dec. 13, areas where Brown was effective in managing the tragedy, and areas where our response and level of preparation can be strengthened for the future.

Alongside this report, we are publishing a webpage that responds to some frequently asked questions about the events surrounding Dec. 13. The University's FAQ on the External Reviews of Safety and Security at Brown offers more details from an extensive process of fact-finding related to a set of common questions raised on campus and by the public following the attack. The FAQ is a companion to the insights in this report.

The largest section of the report is devoted to Brown's Safety and Security Action Plan, outlining a set of detailed actions to ensure the campus is a safe place for its students, faculty and staff to fulfill our mission of education and research. The action plan outlines continued investments in safety and security spanning the months since Dec. 13, including planned actions and others that are currently underway.

As noted in the conclusion of this report, the lasting impact of this critical moment of close examination and self-reflection for the University will be a stronger model for Brown's security that persists far into the future. No campus should ever have to experience the senseless act of violence that has left a lasting mark on our community, and Brown is committed to taking all steps to ensure that our campus is a safe place to study, work, live and thrive.

Sincerely,

Brian T. Moynihan
Chancellor

Christina H. Paxson
President

BROWN

Safety and Security at Brown University: Overview and Action Plan

Brown's report and action steps for enhancing the University's security environment and emergency management, following review of the events of December 13, 2025[1]

August 28, 2026

[1] This report reflects a commitment from Brown University to share key facts and insights arising from the external reviews of the mass shooting of December 13, 2025. In sharing these details, this report contains general descriptions related to acts of violence that may be disturbing to some readers.

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INTRODUCTION

On Dec. 13, 2025, Brown University experienced a profound tragedy. A perpetrator entered a campus academic building and opened fire in and around a classroom where a coursework review session was taking place. Tragically, two students were killed, and nine were injured. Even as the first emergency calls were coming into Brown's Department of Public Safety and Emergency Management (DPSEM), the shooter had left the incident location and fled into the surrounding off-campus neighborhood. The perpetrator was later identified as Claudio Manuel Neves Valente, who had been briefly enrolled at Brown as a graduate student in 2000-01 and had not communicated with Brown since he withdrew from the University.

In the wake of this violent attack on the campus community, Brown has focused on two questions: (1) Could this attack have been prevented, and (2) What can Brown do to enhance emergency response and campus safety and security in the future? This report, *Safety and Security at Brown University: Overview and Action Plan*, presents the University's answers to those questions. While Brown will continue to review all available information and best practices that further inform Brown's approach to safety and security, this report shares our best current thinking and understanding, consistent with the University's commitment to transparency.

In January 2026, the Corporation of Brown University, Brown's governing body, established a Special Committee on Safety and Security. The committee launched two external reviews to examine the University's actions before, during and after the shooting: the first with a focus on addressing the question of preventability (the "After-Action Review"), and another to assess all aspects of Brown's campus safety and security program (the "Campus Safety and Security Assessment"). These reviews were conducted by the global consulting firm Teneo Risk via a team of highly experienced law enforcement consultants who drew upon their expertise and decades of experience. In addition, in the days following the shooting, Brown engaged COSECURE, a national firm specializing in physical security, to conduct a comprehensive physical assessment of all campus facilities. COSECURE was charged with identifying opportunities to strengthen security infrastructure, processes and standards across the Brown campus. All the reviews were conducted under the direction and supervision of outside legal counsel.

The Teneo and COSECURE teams conducted extensive on-site visits encompassing all University facilities; met with hundreds of stakeholders from every constituency on campus and many other individuals beyond; and read thousands of pages of documents, including policies, procedures, training materials, agreements with external partners and contemporaneous documentation of events surrounding the Dec. 13 shooting.

As a reflection of Brown's commitment to transparency, we are releasing Teneo's detailed Executive Summary of its After-Action Review, which summarizes Teneo's core conclusions about the Dec. 13 tragedy. We believe it is important to share this information with our community to promote an understanding of the events surrounding the shooting. Teneo's After-Action Review Executive Summary is embedded in the first section of this report. The full reports of the external reviewers contain sensitive information relating to injuries and fatalities, safety and security (including details that could undermine deterrence), and personnel matters, and are subject to the attorney-client and work product privilege.

This *Safety and Security Overview and Action Plan* synthesizes Brown's key insights from all the external reviews and our forward-looking actions in three sections:

- *Section I* provides the University's key insights from the Dec. 13 shooting that inform Brown's Safety and Security Action Plan, drawing from the core conclusions in Teneo's After-Action Review (as reflected in Teneo's Executive Summary).
- *Section II* describes Brown's investments in safety and security prior to Dec. 13, 2025, establishing the baseline for enhancements that have been made since that time.
- *Section III* outlines Brown's action plan for continuous improvement to safety and security, which draws on lessons from the external reviews; insights from another external review that had been underway at the time of the shooting; community discussions and survey results; and safety and security initiatives that pre-dated Dec. 13.

I. BROWN LESSONS LEARNED FROM TENEO'S AFTER-ACTION REVIEW

Brown's emergency protocols were tested in an unprecedented way on Dec. 13, 2025, when the University became the target for a mass shooting. More than eight months after the incident, Brown is still recovering. Many members of our community are still carrying trauma and concerns about safety. And we have continued to grapple with questions that are natural in the wake of such a tragedy: Could the shooting have been averted? Could more have been done in the moment to care for the injured students and safeguard a frightened campus? And what can be done to ensure that going forward, the Brown campus feels and is in fact safe and secure, so that all members of our community can thrive?

Teneo's After-Action Review was commissioned to provide answers to these questions. The firm's report is thorough, unbiased, informed by extensive fact-finding and reflects the best judgment of experts in the field, based on a directive to independently follow the facts. We are grateful to the many members of the Brown and Providence communities who participated in interviews with the Teneo team and provided access to the extensive body of documents that informed their work. We hope that, based on the release of the Executive Summary of Teneo's After-Action Review, our community will gain a deeper understanding of the incident, areas where Brown performed well in managing the tragedy, and areas where our response and level of preparation can be strengthened for the future.

The Teneo Executive Summary speaks for itself, and we encourage members of our community to read it closely. Here, we highlight Teneo's three high-level conclusions:

1. **It is highly unlikely that the attack by Neves Valente on Dec. 13 could have been prevented.**
   In Teneo's words: *"Accordingly, the best way forward is for Brown to improve how the organization prepares, works together, and responds to future mass casualty and/or life-safety events."*
2. **Brown's emergency response was effective at ensuring the welfare of Brown students in the aftermath of the shooting, despite significant logistical challenges.**
   In Teneo's words: *"The response actions by DPSEM and Brown personnel were unquestionably courageous and effective in ensuring the welfare of Brown students while also remaining attentive to the culture and needs of the Brown community."*
3. **There are a number of actions Brown can take to enhance its campus safety and security and respond more effectively to crises in the future.**
   In Teneo's words: *"Most recommended actions focus on strengthening the organization and making it better able to handle and recover from future major life-safety events."*

More detail underlying these conclusions can be found in Teneo's After-Action Review Executive Summary. However, we recognize that this summary will not answer all questions members of our community have about the Dec. 13 tragedy. Many of these questions are factual in nature. To provide additional information, as well as correct misunderstandings or misinformation that has appeared in news media and external online reports, we have developed a "Frequently Asked Questions" (FAQ) document that supplements Teneo's After-Action Executive Summary.

Teneo's observations based on the firm's close review of the events of Dec. 13 are, alternately, sobering, heartening and humbling.

Sobering, because they reveal the difficulty in preventing active shooter incidents, which, sadly, have increased on college campuses and elsewhere in recent years. As of the writing of this report, three colleges had experienced shootings resulting in death or injury in the eight months since Dec. 13, 2025. Like other universities and colleges, Brown is making hard and important decisions about how best to add layers of security that diminish the risk of an active shooter incident, while protecting the openness and respect for privacy that has long characterized American institutions of higher education.

Heartening, because Teneo's findings confirm that, in a moment of profound crisis, members of our community came together to protect one another. The Teneo report focuses on the efforts of Brown's DPSEM officers on the scene and in the department's communications center, as well as Campus Life staff and others who established the reunification center on Dec. 13. But we know that many others made important contributions: local law enforcement and emergency responders; the Brown Dining Services employees who supported students who had taken shelter in dining halls; the merchants along Thayer Street and Providence neighbors who protected members of our community; and alumni and parents who brought students home with them and gave them places to gather; among many more. Our campus and local community have much to be proud of in how they responded on that day.

And yet humbling, because Teneo's conclusions reveal that, even with decades of investment in and attention to safety and security (discussed in the next section of this report), Brown can — and should — do even more to protect the campus in the future. Teneo's Executive Summary provides valuable information on a number of areas related to findings in the following key areas:

- Brown's response to concerns about security expressed by community members in the Barus and Holley building (where the shooting took place) prior to the shooting.
- DPSEM executive leadership gaps, staffing levels, organization and training at the time of the shooting.
- The protocols for rapidly issuing alerts and sounding the University siren in the event of an active shooter incident.
- Brown's ability to quickly process data from security cameras. (On Dec. 13, there were three functional exterior cameras in the area of the shooting, as well as one interior camera in Barus and Holley.)
- The flow of information between Brown and the Providence Police Department (PPD) in the early stages of the investigation.
- Community members' awareness of campus safety protocols and resources.

The most important role of any after-action review is to promote learning and positive change. To that end, we have developed a detailed Safety and Security Action Plan (in *Section III* of this report) that addresses recommendations from Teneo's After-Action Review, as well as other recommendations from Teneo's comprehensive Campus Safety and Security Assessment that would more generally enhance safety on campus and elevate institutional readiness. The Action Plan also addresses COSECURE's recommendations; insights from another external review that was underway at the time of the shooting; community discussions and survey results; and safety and security initiatives that pre-dated Dec. 13, 2025. As described in the Action Plan, many of the steps outlined have already been implemented. The Action Plan also includes measures to ensure transparency, accountability and community engagement as work on implementing the plan moves forward.

Please read Teneo's Executive Summary of its After-Action Review embedded directly in this document. The section that follows the Executive Summary describes Brown's investments in safety and security prior to Dec. 13, establishing the baseline for enhancements that have been made since that time, as well as the foundation for ongoing actions for the Safety and Security Action Plan.

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Executive Summary

On December 13, 2025, an individual entered Brown's Barus and Holley Engineering building ("Barus and Holley") and opened fire on students, killing two and injuring nine others. The individual fled the scene of the shooting, which prompted a five-day search for the killer. By December 18, 2025, authorities identified the perpetrator as Cláudio Manuel Neves Valente ("Neves Valente"), a former Brown PhD candidate during the 2000-2001 school year. Law enforcement authorities tracked Neves Valente to a storage facility in Salem, New Hampshire, and proceeded to that location with an arrest warrant. The authorities found him dead inside the storage unit, having taken his life two days earlier, alongside two guns that were ultimately connected to both the shooting at Brown, as well as the separate murder of Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") Professor Nuno Loureiro in his home on December 16, 2025.

The shooting on Brown's campus triggered heroic response operations by Brown's Department of Public Safety and Emergency Management ("DPSEM"), which worked with Providence Police Department ("PPD"), Providence Fire Department ("PFD"), and Providence Emergency Management Agency ("PEMA"), as well as several other local, regional, and federal law enforcement entities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Emergency response efforts were ultimately led by PPD with support from these other agencies. Teneo's review was limited to Brown's emergency response and coordination with external law enforcement agencies but did not extend to those agencies' emergency response or criminal investigation.

The response actions by DPSEM and Brown personnel were unquestionably courageous and effective in ensuring the welfare of Brown students while also remaining attentive to the culture and needs of the Brown community. The University faced multiple logistical challenges during its response efforts, including: communicating with students who were sheltering in place; providing prompt and effective assistance to PPD's efforts to identify and find the perpetrator; organizing reunification center operations; coping with distracting swatting calls to DPSEM dispatch; canceling final exams; incorporating remote work; undertaking the difficult task of family notifications; setting up support services; accounting for unattended property; and even addressing the doxxing attempt of a student; all while balancing normal campus operations. The totality and complexity of events on December 13 and through the first 48–72 hours afterward placed remarkable stress on Brown as an institution. Teneo reviewed the incident by examining various factors, including the organization's preparedness and whether the incident could have been prevented. Teneo concludes that in the face of these challenges, the University responded with commendable resilience and effectiveness.

The past two decades—as active shooter events have occurred with increasing frequency—have shown that these tragedies of mass violence are extremely difficult to identify and prevent in advance. Based on our comprehensive review, Teneo concludes that it is highly unlikely that the attack by Neves Valente on December 13 could have been prevented. We reviewed the Neves

Valente case folder at Brown, including his student file, and there were no pre-indicators suggesting that his behavior would have led to an incident like this. There were insufficient indicators in advance for law enforcement or Brown to identify Neves Valente as a threat or to imagine that he would engage in such horrific violence directed at the University. Our review found nothing in Neves Valente's academic history or records to suggest a propensity for violence or an animus toward the University, nor is there any evidence that he had any contact with Brown personnel prior to the attack. In our exercise of due diligence, we did identify one speculative scenario in which overall increased security might have led to an opportunity to confront Neves Valente in advance of December 13. After the shooting, a Brown custodian disclosed having seen a suspicious person resembling Neves Valente in Barus and Holley in the weeks before the shooting. While confirming this person was likely Neves Valente, we found no evidence that this concern was reported to anyone at DPSEM or to a custodial supervisor, as was required for any unusual event. As noted below, nothing about pre-shooting events changes our main conclusion: nothing suggested that Brown could have prevented the shooting. In response to security concerns raised by individuals working in Barus and Holley, DPSEM increased security patrols around the building. However, the increased DPSEM patrols did not identify Neves Valente, and because of access needs during final exams, Barus and Holley was open and accessible on December 13. It remains possible that even more security patrols, stricter access control, and/or more comprehensive camera surveillance coverage might have provided DPSEM with the opportunity to identify and confront Neves Valente on one of his visits in or near Barus and Holley prior to December 13. However, given that we did not identify how Neves Valente entered Barus and Holley prior to the incident, it is not possible to do more than speculate whether any of these measures would have had an impact. Additionally, had Neves Valente not had access to Barus and Holley, he might have gone to another building on campus or targeted individuals outside. Thus, nothing about these events changes our main conclusion that nothing in our review suggests that Brown could have prevented the shooting. Accordingly, the best way forward is for Brown to improve how the organization prepares, works together, and responds to future mass casualty and/or life-safety events.

Given this conclusion, Teneo's findings and recommendations focus less on intercepting the unpredictable attack of December 13 and more on how ready the organization was to respond and recover. Most recommended actions focus on strengthening the organization and making it better able to handle and recover from future major life-safety events. Teneo's recommendations are intended to help Brown become more effective in its response and more resilient during any similar situation in the future. We note that the University chose to implement some of these recommendations as we were conducting our review, including awarding DPSEM first responders with the Medal of Valor, the highest honor DPSEM can grant.

As part of our review, Teneo conducted numerous initial and follow-up interviews with 39 individuals from Brown, including but not limited to DPSEM, as well as from PPD and PFD.[1] Teneo also has reviewed thousands of digital documents, including policies, procedures, communications, reports, logs, and audio files from the above-mentioned entities, to identify key critical findings:

- DPSEM officers responded rapidly, effectively, and heroically to the December 13 shooting and performed as well as could be expected given the information they had and the tools

[1] While we did not interview victims, the University did offer listening sessions to these individuals as part of our process. Specifically, the University offered a session to each of three groups: families of the two deceased students, students who were shot, and students in Room 166 at the time of the shooting who were not shot.

available to them. While the DPSEM officers responded in this way, better equipment and training could have enhanced their response.

- Given the limited number of on-duty dispatchers, the DPSEM Communications Center staff did not have the capacity to send out a Rave alert in a crisis of this magnitude. Likewise, no one else on duty within DPSEM would have had such capacity because they were responding to the crisis at hand. DPSEM Dispatchers answered as many phone and radio calls as they could but were unable to answer them all due to extraordinary volume. Despite this, the two DPSEM dispatchers on duty performed well and accomplished their most important life-safety tasks quickly and efficiently. In doing so, they ensured that the shooting victims received the best possible initial police and EMS response. While this delay did not result in additional harm on December 13, because the perpetrator had already fled campus, such a delay – along with DPSEM dispatchers' lack of authority to send out a Rave alert without supervisory approval – could hinder a future response to a similar event.
- The DPSEM first responders and dispatchers called PPD and PFD four minutes after the first call came to DPSEM, and PPD and PFD, which were already on their way to Barus and Holley, arrived two minutes later. Following that immediate response, some DPSEM officers' lack of familiarity with how to use their portable radios to speak directly to PPD in an emergency impeded the ability for a prompt and coordinated response. The responding PPD officers would have benefited from direct communication with DPSEM officers on PPD's main radio channel, which the DPSEM officers did not use.
- DPSEM was aware of non-threatening suspicious activity (including "John," a Brown alumnus who was a frequent trespasser) in and around Barus and Holley and the adjoining and interconnected Engineering Research Center ("ERC") before the December 13 incident. Although the frequent trespasser was not the perpetrator and was not himself a threat, earlier trespassing incidents at the building complex showed areas in which security could have been strengthened. Teneo notes that these are the only findings in this After-Action Review pertaining to preventability, but notwithstanding these findings, we also find that it is highly unlikely that the shooting on December 13 could have been prevented.
- Three Public Safety Answering Points ("PSAPs") received emergency calls during the December 13 crisis: 1) the Rhode Island E-911 Center; 2) City of Providence 911 Center (encompassing Providence police and fire emergency dispatch services); and 3) Brown DPSEM Communications Center. The Rhode Island E-911 and the Providence 911 Centers transfer callers and their emergency to the Brown DPSEM Communications Center to handle on-campus incidents. This means that a state or city call taker will listen to the caller's explanation of the emergency, discern that the emergency is in DPSEM's jurisdiction and then transfer the caller to the DPSEM Communications Center to handle, which can result in a loss of valuable response time before the call reaches Brown DPSEM. However, in the December 13 attack, it does not appear that there was any delay in the response by the first DPSEM police officers. That is because the first call into DPSEM Communications occurred nearly simultaneously with the first contact by a DPSEM officer with a wounded student and his immediate radio message describing the crisis, both of which were occurring relatively simultaneously with the initial calls to Rhode Island E-911. The additional DPSEM patrol officers were on scene at Barus and Holley almost immediately thereafter.

- The PPD investigation was slowed by delays in accessing Brown's repository of stored video images from its approximately 1,200 surveillance cameras and limited video surveillance at Barus and Holley. DPSEM faced challenges in locating personnel authorized to access the video surveillance platform and in identifying relevant footage to release to PPD in a timely manner. These delays impeded PPD's ability to conduct its immediate post-incident investigation.
- Former members of DPSEM Executive Senior Leadership, who are no longer affiliated with the University, failed to provide vital assistance to the unified command at the crime scene, especially regarding the investigative effort to find the perpetrator, as well as exhibiting other notable gaps in leadership, including not adequately preparing DPSEM for an active assailant event and inadequate responses to DPSEM employees in the aftermath. Fortunately, these shortcomings did not result in harm on campus, both because of the effective response of the DPSEM officers and dispatchers and their colleague first responders on December 13, and because the perpetrator departed campus immediately following the shooting. Stronger leadership by the individuals in question might have improved the investigative process.
- The inconsistent appearance of access-controlled doors may have caused confusion for first responders, especially since some master keys did not work on certain doors even though the lock cores met university standards. Several first responders told Teneo that their main challenge during the December 13 evacuation was that PPD and PFD could not access buildings within the secured perimeter. Although these access issues did not cause any physical harm, they did lead to property damage from forced entry and may have delayed responders in reaching some students who were sheltering in place. Because the nine wounded victims were quickly located and transported to RIH in the early minutes of the December 13 event, these challenges in identifying buildings did not delay their medical treatment. PPD officers and members from supporting agencies were not familiar with the Brown campus layout when they arrived on scene, impacting responding officers' ability to quickly identify building addresses. DPSEM officers and campus staff have a comprehensive understanding of the campus, which ultimately resulted in PPD and DPSEM officers working together while conducting building checks and evacuations.
- DPSEM should have been more responsive to the investigative needs of PPD as PPD mobilized its efforts to identify the perpetrator. DPSEM should have ensured that the Investigative Commander was assigned a formal full-time DPSEM liaison to support the investigation in the earliest moments and until the perpetrator was apprehended.
- The events of December 13 demonstrate that the University, a community of 16,000-plus students, employees and campus area residents and billions of dollars invested in complex and sensitive infrastructure, has need for more robust emergency management staffing and capability. On the day of the shooting, the University had one Director of Emergency Management, Resiliency, and Business Continuity (Director of Emergency Management), who in turn had one direct report, a full-time Fire Safety Officer, who in turn supervised one full-time and two part-time employees dedicated to fire-safety functions. Although these employees were responsible for reviewing and revising the Emergency Action Plan (EAP),[2] they were not otherwise engaged in Emergency Management-related tasks, according to the then-Director of Emergency Management.[3]

[2] The EAP provides that it is "prepared by: DPS Fire Safety Office."

[3] Teneo observed that Brown utilizes an all-hazards approach to emergency management, with responsibilities distributed across multiple roles and departments throughout the University, not centralized under the Director of Emergency Management, Resiliency, and Business Continuity. Nonetheless, the then-Director expressed that his office would benefit from additional staffing. The then-Director retired as of June 1, 2026, and a new Director has been appointed, effective August 24, 2026.

- The University's Siren was not activated during the December 13 event. The Siren should have been activated along with an accompanying audio warning to "shelter in place." DPSEM officers, dispatchers and supervisors, up to and including the Chief of Police, were well aware of the importance of sending a Rave Alert, but perhaps due to misperception or training deficit, did not similarly prioritize the use of the Siren. Additionally, the DPSEM general order on the Siren provides no guidance on what people should do when the Siren is activated, although the commonly understood action is to "shelter in place." Because the perpetrator fled the scene, and because Rave Alerts were issued to the campus community, not sounding the University's Siren did not result in an adverse impact on December 13.
- The DPSEM staffing levels on December 13 appeared to limit DPSEM's ability to respond, contain, coordinate, and maintain operations during a critical incident. Teneo will incorporate further details leveraging an evidence-based process to determine the appropriate resource allocation, including DPSEM staffing, through the separate Safety and Security Assessment report.
- With respect to body worn cameras ("BWC"), Teneo more fully explored and developed this topic during the Safety and Security Assessment process, recommending that Brown consider adopting BWC.
- DPSEM police officers are not authorized by the University to be armed while off duty, and they are required to store their duty weapons at police headquarters when they are not working. This is counter to the norm in American policing and diminishes DPSEM officers' ability to respond directly and in a timely manner to an urgent crisis, as seen during this event. While we understand arming off-duty officers is a complex decision, we recommend that the University should consider exploring the topic further. However, in the case of December 13, there is no indication that, had DPSEM officers been armed while off duty, the incident or related casualties would have been prevented or reduced.
- The Nelson Fitness Center and Olney-Margolies Athletic Center ("OMAC") were well chosen as the combined reunification center for the approximately 1,700 students who were evacuated in the event. Operations to support students at this location were conducted as well as could be expected given the extraordinary circumstances. The ad-hoc mobilization and deployment of Brown personnel and resources to accomplish this was executed extraordinarily well and is highly commendable.
- In the days, weeks, and months following December 13, the University has continued to focus on providing support and recovery resources to the community in a thoughtful, effective and highly commendable manner.

Teneo has made numerous recommendations within the body of this report focusing on strengthening Brown's resilience and capacity in the event of future major events like this. This report further elaborates on our recommendations for organizational preparedness, internal and external collaboration, and unified response training and exercises to ensure that Brown's students, staff, and community members are educated and equipped to deal with such an atrocity should it ever happen again. By following these recommendations, Brown can greatly improve its response and recovery capabilities to mitigate future active assailant incidents.

Approach & Methodology

Services at the Direction of Counsel

Teneo conducted this review in connection with Ballard Spahr LLP's ("Ballard") provision of legal advice to the University, and performed its work at Ballard's direction and within the attorney-client privilege and the parameters of attorney work product and other legal protections. Teneo's interactions with non-legal stakeholders were undertaken for purposes of supporting legal advice and strategy. The Corporation of Brown University Special Committee on Campus Safety and Security ("Special Committee") oversaw Teneo's and Ballard's work. Teneo's reporting and deliverables were made to the Special Committee solely through and/or as directed by Ballard.

Subject Matter Expert Team

The Teneo assessment team comprised a small group of highly experienced law enforcement leaders who used their knowledge, skills, and decades of experience to make the observations and recommendations contained in this report. The team drew on the vast experience of Engagement Lead Commissioner William J. Bratton, Executive Chair of Teneo Risk Advisory, for guidance and input to the overall observations and recommendations.

Review Methodology

The Teneo team, in conjunction with Ballard, conducted virtual and in-person interviews of 39 individuals, including discussions with University administrators and leadership, DPSEM leadership and patrol staff, and members of PPD and PFD. The team also reviewed and evaluated nearly 3,000 documents covering a wide variety of relevant topics, including policies, processes, and practices within DPSEM. Teneo's process included a document review and analysis of policies, procedures and operations, as well as in-depth interviews with members of the DPSEM leadership, command staff, dispatch, and patrol staff, as well as a walkthrough of relevant buildings, including the DPSEM Headquarters and the DPSEM Communications Center, OMAC, the Nelson Fitness Center, and Barus and Holley.

II. CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY AT BROWN PRE-DATING DEC. 13

Teneo's conclusions make clear that Brown can and should do more to bolster security and emergency management for the campus. Building on the lessons learned from the review of the events of Dec. 13, the University has outlined a multifaceted action plan to reinforce and strengthen key elements of Brown's security environment, emergency management infrastructure and response capabilities (*Section III* of this report). To inform an understanding of the evolution of Brown's security model, this section establishes the foundation upon which the Safety and Security Action Plan was built.

The Action Plan leverages and expands upon existing assets and progress in building a layered approach to campus safety. The University has demonstrated a clear and unwavering commitment to safety and security spanning at least the past three decades, reflected in (1) intentional decisions to build, fund, arm and proactively support a highly effective campus police force; (2) major investments in safety and security; and (3) a focus on updating the University's framework for governance and implementation of emergency and crisis management to be responsive to the shifting needs of students, faculty and staff, as well as changes in the safety environment affecting the campus and surrounding community. Understanding the state of campus safety and security at the University prior to the shooting was a foundational focus in evaluating the events of Dec. 13 and developing an action plan for the future.

Over roughly the last decade prior to Dec. 13, crime in almost every major category decreased for the campus. For instance, with steady investments in policing and security (described in *Section II.A.*), burglary dropped from a peak of 63 incidents in 2013 to approximately 6 incidents reported annually in recent years, while robberies fell from 17 incidents to zero. Aside from a rash of pellet gun incidents that hit colleges across the region in 2022 (spawned by a viral social media craze), assault incidents remain at low levels. Confirming the relative safety of Brown's campus, Teneo's safety and security assessment recognized that while crime inevitably poses a risk to Brown given its metropolitan location, the overall volume of incidents near Brown is relatively low.

Based on the recommendations from the external reviews, the Safety and Security Action Plan in *Section III* represents Brown's commitment to ramp up still further its already significant investments in security and crisis management staffing, infrastructure, tools and training.

II.A. INVESTMENTS IN POLICING AND SECURITY

The University has demonstrated a commitment to building resources and equipment to support its police force and security infrastructure. This is reflected in a record of significant investments in staffing, infrastructure and tools over more than a decade:

- Brown has increased the annual budget for safety and security by 67% since 2014, including staffing and technology.
- In addition to the 67% increase in the annual operating budget, Brown has invested more than $65 million on safety and security technology and projects over that period.
- The University increased the number of security cameras on campus by 200% over a period of 13 years, from approximately 400 in 2012 to 1,200 by early December 2025.
- Dating back to 2013, Brown made a range of other investments, including expanding an on-call shuttle service; growing security staffing through contracted security firms; hosting law enforcement and emergency responder training with multiple municipal and state agencies (including hostile intruder training exercises); and expanding safety tools for members of the Brown community, such as the GPS-enabled Rave Guardian mobile security app.

Even as other areas of Brown's operating budget have recently contracted in response to economic factors, the University has remained steadfast in its ever-increasing commitment to safety and security. This includes sustaining a campus police force that embraces best practices in crime response and prevention.

As at other universities, Brown's internal campus police force bears the primary responsibility for the safety and security of the campus. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Management (DPSEM) at Brown is a fully licensed, nationally accredited (since 1998) and armed (since 2006) force composed of highly trained and experienced police officers, many of whom came to Brown following distinguished careers in municipal police departments. This includes Vice President for Public Safety and Emergency Management and Chief of Police Hugh T. Clements Jr. (appointed in late December 2025, following the shooting), who served in the Providence Police Department for 38 years, including 12 years as chief, and is regarded as a national leader on issues of community-oriented policing.

The University previously has engaged national teams of experts led by former Boston, New York and Los Angeles Police Commissioner William J. Bratton to examine the campus safety department at Brown and make recommendations. A 2002 Bratton-led review by Kroll Advisory Solutions recommended that the licensed campus police officers in the department should be armed — a policy that was implemented by the University in January 2006 and has remained in place since that time.

In addition, before the Fall 2025 semester, the University initiated an external longitudinal review and assessment of departmental climate, culture and operations of DPSEM. The University selected Steven Healy and the Healy+ Group, nationally recognized experts on campus safety, to do this work, following a prior review of the department they conducted in 2020. Following the shooting, the University further engaged COSECURE, a national expert in physical security who was already represented on the Healy+ visit team, to undertake a review of all campus facilities to identify opportunities to strengthen security infrastructure, processes and standards. COSECURE was charged to complete this work before the start of the Spring 2026 semester. (This external assessment served as one of the foundations for immediate security enhancements reflected in the Safety and Security Action Plan detailed in *Section III*.)

Brown DPSEM maintains national accreditation through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), providing an ongoing framework for independent assessment and continuous improvement. As part of the accreditation process, CALEA conducts regular assessments to verify the department's continued compliance with applicable standards, which reflect best practices in public safety and include standards related to critical incident planning and preparedness.

II.B. CAMPUS TRAINING

DPSEM has long offered emergency preparedness training to groups across campus, distinct from and complementary to the mandatory specialized training required for Brown first responders and emergency response personnel. Among the workshops, training and tabletop exercises available to Brown departments, offices and student groups is a course that provides practical strategies for responding to a hostile intruder or active shooter situation. The training sessions emphasize the nationally recognized "Run, Hide, Fight" approach. The courses also highlight campus resources, response plans and recovery support, and participants learn how to assess rapidly changing situations, make informed decisions, and protect themselves and others.

Leaders from DPSEM routinely deliver this training in person to units and groups across campus upon request multiple times during each academic year. In addition, to accompany the University's long-established Emergency Action Plan, Brown continues to maintain web-based Emergency Action Plan Training available to community members, focusing on procedures for situations including evacuations, shelter-in-place orders, hostile intruder incidents and emergency reporting.

In the months following Dec. 13, the University expanded hostile intruder training for students, faculty and staff, building on DPSEM's existing portfolio of training for groups across campus, as further described in the Safety and Security Action Plan (*Section III*).

II.C. EMERGENCY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE

In early fall 2025, predating the shooting, the University launched a revised framework for governance and implementation of emergency and crisis management after several months of development. Brown's Emergency Management Framework is built on an all-hazards model of preparedness, characterized by a comprehensive approach to preparing for, responding to, recovering from and mitigating the full spectrum of potential emergencies and disasters. It reflects best practices in higher education emergency planning and emphasizes clear roles, coordinated decision-making and a commitment to continuous improvement.

Key elements of this framework (many operationalized by the University during the events of Dec. 13) included:

- Emergency Management and Crisis Group (EMCG): Launched in October 2025, the EMCG is a group of senior leaders at Brown with strategic leadership and decision-making authority for the University's crisis, emergency planning and response efforts. The EMCG approves safety success measures for events and incidents, and monitors business continuity planning. The group has managed diverse emergencies, ranging from storms to cybersecurity incidents, to the shooting at Barus and Holley.
- Emergency Action Plan: The Brown University Emergency Action Plan details the actions and procedures to be followed in an emergency, and assigns responsibility for certain actions to designated individuals.
- Emergency Operations Center (EOC): The EOC serves as a central physical or virtual location where campus leaders and emergency response staff coordinate information, actions, communication and resources during an emergency.
- Emergency Management Reporting Structure: A Director of Emergency Management, Resiliency, and Business Continuity position was created in 2023. Prior to that time, the Director of Environmental Health and Safety also had responsibility for emergency management. With the rollout of the new Emergency Management Framework in early fall 2025, the roles and responsibilities of the Director of Emergency Management were further clarified.

The Emergency Management Framework has propelled progress in a number of areas, including ensuring clarity around roles and responsibilities within the overall campus emergency management ecosystem; providing clear alignment between various campus groups that manage crises, oversee events, address reputational risks and manage legal compliance; and formalizing how these groups share information, coordinate and elevate issues for senior-level decision-making and response.

Following the development of this framework, recommendations from the external reviews advised that Brown should create additional structures for centralizing the governance and management of its security systems and policies. These efforts are reflected in Brown's Safety and Security Action Plan in this report (*Section III*).

III. BROWN'S SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTION PLAN

In a message to the Brown campus on Dec. 22, 2025, President Christina H. Paxson asserted an unwavering commitment to take all steps to ensure that the campus is a safe place to work, live and learn. As Brown began the new semester following the shooting, she reinforced that safety and security is at the center of everything Brown does. She wrote:

> *"Our values affirm that the University 'holds itself responsible for generating the conditions necessary for every individual member of its community to thrive.' We recognize that a secure campus is a necessary condition for fulfilling our mission of education and research, and for all members of our community to feel a sense of security and belonging as they pursue knowledge in service to society."*

These principles, together with the University's longstanding commitment to safety and security as described in previous sections of this report, are reflected in Brown's Safety and Security Action Plan. Brown can fulfill its mission only if its members can live, learn and work in a secure environment. Brown's approach to safety and security emphasizes preparedness, vigilance and — recognizing that the community is collectively responsible for safety and security — mutual care. Brown also recognizes that safety and security practices must be balanced against individuals' right to privacy and the right to be free from unfair treatment.

This Action Plan reflects this balance and outlines investments in safety and security spanning the months since Dec. 13, as well as actions that will be taken in the future. It is organized in six categories: (1) Governance and Accountability; (2) Leadership, Staffing, Organization and Training; (3) Emergency Preparedness and Protocols; (4) Tools and Technology; (5) Partnerships with External Law Enforcement and Local Organizations; and (6) Community Outreach and Engagement.

In the intervening months since the first external reviews were launched and the University launched its rapid response plans following the events of Dec. 13, the majority of recommendations have already been accepted and, in a number of cases, implemented. The University mobilized a rapid response in the days and weeks after the shooting to reinforce and bolster safety and security for the Brown community. These actions built on safety and security projects the University had launched prior to Dec. 13, and were informed by continuous feedback from the external reviewers over the course of conducting their reviews.

One of the most important steps that Brown took immediately after the shooting was to appoint Hugh T. Clements Jr. on Dec. 22, 2025, to the role of interim Vice President for Public Safety and Emergency Management, after the then-current chief of police was placed on administrative leave. In April 2026, Chief Clements was appointed to the position in a regular capacity. Nationally regarded for his expertise in community-oriented policing, Chief Clements had a distinguished 38-year career with the Providence Police Department, including 12 years as chief of police, and directed the federal Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) for the U.S. Department of Justice. Working in collaboration with other University leaders, members of DPSEM and PPD, Chief Clements will continue to play a major role in implementing Brown's Safety and Security Action Plan.

Following the shooting, Brown immediately took a number of other significant steps:

- Brown enhanced public safety staffing, active shooter training, and operating systems for rapid and effective communications during emergencies.
- Brown completed upgrades (approved prior to Dec. 13) to the University's dispatch center communications system that allow dispatchers to communicate directly with PPD more effectively.
- Brown transitioned to card access for a small number of remaining academic and administrative buildings that historically required keys for entry.

- Brown added over 700 security cameras, in addition to the 1,200 in place in December, to campus buildings and modernized its existing network of blue light phones with integrated cameras across campus.
- Brown expanded the number of panic buttons in critical locations (such as large classrooms and lecture halls) to ensure rapid access to help when it is needed most.
- Brown strengthened coordination among campus partners, state agencies and Rhode Island mental health resources.
- Brown reinforced messaging of available resources supporting crime prevention and emergency management (including apps and other resources for reporting suspicious activity or summoning police for assistance, as noted in *Section II*).

The Safety and Security Action Plan that follows draws on lessons from the external reviews as well as insights from an external review that had been underway at the time of the shooting; community discussions and results of a DPSEM campus community survey on questions of safety and security; and safety and security initiatives that pre-dated Dec. 13. Notations following each action indicate the status of each action in this plan.

A. GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

As noted in *Section II*, Brown had taken significant steps prior to Dec. 13 to strengthen its governance of emergency management and the oversight of security systems and policies. Since the shooting, and reflecting the input from the external reviews, Brown has made additional changes to streamline decision-making and strengthen accountability for all aspects of safety and security.

The following major actions aim to enhance governance and accountability on safety and security matters:

A1. **Shift oversight of safety and security to a University-level Safety and Security Steering Committee:** Oversight of safety and security, which previously resided with multiple departments, has now shifted to this senior leadership committee, which was established in July 2026 with the authority to oversee and enforce the University's approach to physical security and associated safety and security standards. The committee provides oversight to a cross-unit Safety and Security Working Group that is charged with implementing physical security measures, and works closely with a Campus Safety Advisory Committee, discussed below. The Safety and Security Steering Committee is also charged with implementing the Action Plan and reporting annually to the Risk and Audit Committee of the Corporation of Brown University. As an additional accountability measure, the University will commission periodic external safety and security reviews, starting no later than the 2028-29 academic year and then every three to four years after that.

STATUS: Implemented. The Steering Committee was established in July 2026 and began meeting in August 2026.

A2. **Ensure that every complaint of suspicious or criminal activity is reported, documented, investigated, and resolved promptly and effectively:** The Safety and Security Committee is responsible for fostering a culture of "see something, say something" at Brown, via clear expectations about the responsibility of all members of our community to report criminal or suspicious behavior; documenting and investigating such reports consistently; and marshaling the necessary resources for quickly and effectively escalating responses to suspicious or criminal activity as needed.

STATUS: Partially implemented. DPSEM has already enhanced its report intake and monitoring to ensure a unified system for documenting reports and response. The Safety and Security Committee and the related Safety and Security Working Group will develop and implement policies incorporating those improvements and articulating protocols for reporting and escalating responses.

A3. **Expand the Behavioral Assessment and Response Team (BART):** Although the Dec. 13 tragedy was perpetrated by someone who had not been involved with Brown for more than two decades, reports indicate that mass shooting events on college and university campuses may also be perpetrated by current or very recent employees and students. Brown's Behavioral Assessment and Response Team (BART) has the responsibility of identifying, assessing and responding to behavioral concerns regarding members of its community. In the fall of 2025, the University made plans to enhance its behavioral threat assessment and response model. BART's role was expanded to include concerns about employees in addition to students, and the membership of the team was expanded to create uniform standards for assessing risk and better information sharing and communication across stakeholder groups, including student support specialists in the College and Brown's schools. The enhanced BART team has been operating since January 2026.

STATUS: Implemented. The enhanced BART team has been operating since January 2026.

B. DPSEM LEADERSHIP, STAFFING, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

The external reviews confirmed that DPSEM's organizational structure generally conforms with best practices; that the department's voluntary effort to sustain accreditation is laudable; and that the department meets mandatory and in-service training requirements. At the same time, the reviews recommended important enhancements to the effectiveness of the department in various key areas. Major action items include:

B1. **Collaboratively update DPSEM goals and priorities:** Under Chief Hugh T. Clements' leadership and building on an array of strategic decisions made over the course of spring 2026, DPSEM is committed to a formal strategic planning process. That process will incorporate a system of accountability to measure and assess progress on implementing the strategic plan, including a regular cadence of internal and external assessments, and periodic renewal of the plan itself.

STATUS: Partially implemented. DPSEM is taking the necessary steps to begin the process of developing a strategic plan in September 2026, with the goal of completing that process by spring 2027.

B2. **Enhance and strategically expand staffing within DPSEM:** Although DPSEM has a staff size that is on par with institutions of higher education with similar numbers of students, the expansion of the campus into Providence's Jewelry District and the large number of campus buildings is likely to require an expansion in staffing. DPSEM will continue to focus initially on filling staff vacancies, especially in the patrol area, to ensure staffing at budgeted levels. DPSEM will also assess on an ongoing basis how much additional staffing is necessary, given the complexities of the campus noted above. In addition, DPSEM is assessing how to leverage an increase in the number of non-sworn community safety officers to cover tasks that do not need to be performed by a sworn officer, and to assume responsibilities previously fulfilled by contract security guards, who are not Brown employees, given community safety officers' greater familiarity with Brown's campus and community.

STATUS: Partially implemented. DPSEM began assessing its staffing in June 2026 and is expected to complete this process in September 2026. Implementation of any proposed staffing changes will begin immediately upon approval by the Safety and Security Steering Committee.

B3. **Enhance DPSEM training:** Given Brown's expressed commitment to excellence in all aspects of its operations, DPSEM's training requirements should surpass generally accepted professional standards. Additional training and professional development opportunities will improve the ability of DPSEM to meet safety and security objectives and to recruit and retain talented professionals.

STATUS: Partially implemented. The development of a 2026-27 DPSEM training plan is underway. It will be informed by the strategic planning process described in *Action B1*.

B4. **Promote a positive department climate:** Given recent leadership changes, and in particular the December 2025 appointment of Chief Hugh T. Clements following the shooting, DPSEM is well positioned to maintain a positive departmental climate. In addition to initiating a recurring strategic planning process (as outlined above in *Action B1*), the University will enhance policies, practices and training toward consistent and prompt resolution of complaints, as well as consistent enforcement of departmental policies and non-retaliation expectations. The University will conduct a confidential climate survey of all Brown employees, including DPSEM personnel, in September 2026. The survey will provide valuable information on the current climate in DPSEM and will also support the creation of structured mechanisms to assess DPSEM climate and morale on an ongoing basis.

STATUS: Partially implemented. In addition to department leaders working with DPSEM staff members to develop proposed actions to address recommendations from the Healy+ assessment of the department, unit staff will also be able to participate in the broader climate survey being offered to all employees in September 2026.

B5. **Conduct a comprehensive review of DPSEM internal policies and general orders:** A comprehensive review of DPSEM's policies and general orders is being conducted in coordination with Brown's Office of Risk Management, Audit and Compliance, which oversees the development and implementation of policies related to risk management. Regular assessment of policies will occur going forward.

STATUS: Partially implemented. The review of DPSEM internal policies and general orders related to emergency response was launched in August 2026, with plans to conclude in December 2026. Review of remaining policies and general orders will be completed by the end of the 2026-27 academic year.

C. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND PROTOCOLS

In addition to actions already noted above, major actions that the University will take to improve emergency preparedness include the following:

C1. **Strengthen the process for sending Rave alerts:** Brown will expedite the process for sending Rave alerts by clarifying which staff positions have authority to issue Rave alerts in different situations and scenarios, and training more non-dispatch staff to send Rave alerts. In the summer of 2026, the University established a new crisis hotline that now can be activated quickly during large-scale emergencies to provide reliable information to families and others when it becomes available, which should reduce the burden on dispatchers who are facilitating the response to an emergency.

STATUS: Partially implemented. Short-term policy revisions and expanded training on the use of the Rave system were completed prior to Brown's 2026 Commencement. Revised and finalized policies and protocols will be in place prior to the start of the Fall 2026 semester. Further training will take place later in the fall of 2026.

C2. **Enhance policies and training for sounding the University siren:** The purpose of the University siren is to warn community members about life-threatening emergencies, such as active shooter episodes, extreme weather events and chemical spills. Brown will clarify its policy on the use of the siren, will ensure the policy is periodically assessed, and will strengthen testing and training relating to the siren system. The Safety and Security Steering Committee also will consider possible changes to the use of the siren, including the use of alternative technologies (such as blue light phones, which have public address capability) that may be more effective at warning the campus of life-threatening emergencies. The University will continue to test the siren twice each year (as it did most recently in spring 2026

and which it has done since the siren system was installed in 2008), and accompany the test with communications to the University community about siren protocols. Staff training for Rave alerts (noted earlier in this action plan) will include training on use of the siren. Building on a review of the siren policy completed in August, the Safety and Security Steering Committee will regularly assess the siren policy on an ongoing basis.

STATUS: Implemented. The University has already completed a review of its siren policy to ensure it is clear regarding the circumstances for which the University siren should be used, and who has authority to sound the siren. The Safety and Security Steering Committee will periodically consider possible changes to the use of the siren, starting in the 2026-27 academic year.

C3. **Increase hostile intruder training for the campus community:** Hostile intruder training has been available to campus community members for several years as part of an existing training portfolio offered by DPSEM, while DPSEM staff currently undergo regular mandatory hostile intruder training in conjunction with local law enforcement. Online guidance regarding the "Run, Hide, Fight" model also continues to be a persisting resource on the BrownReady website. In the months following Dec. 13, the University adopted a more expansive approach to campus training as part of a layered security model, which includes community preparedness as a priority. Beginning in March 2026, Brown students, staff and faculty were given the opportunity to participate in newly designed hostile intruder preparedness training, which was grounded in nationally recognized best practices and used a trauma informed approach, in light of the events of Dec. 13. In addition to these new sessions offered to all faculty, staff and students, tailored sessions have been conducted for units with staff in high-volume, frontline areas, like dining and facilities, as well as faculty and staff working in Barus and Holley. These training offerings were expanded to be offered throughout the 2026 summer months and into the fall semester.

STATUS: Implemented. Expanded hostile intruder training began in spring 2026 and will continue through the 2026-27 academic year and into the future.

C4. **Increase evacuation site planning and training:** After the Dec. 13 shooting, Brown mobilized and delivered immediate and vitally important services to evacuated students at its reunification center, consisting of two adjacent athletic facilities that were well chosen for that purpose. Brown should have backup plans in the event that these locations are not available or appropriate during a future emergency. The University will identify alternate assistance locations for various purposes and establish updated protocols for rapid utilization of those sites for evacuation and/or reunification purposes. This work will be done in coordination with the Providence Emergency Management Agency and will align with standard practices for activation and shelter workflows.

STATUS: Partially implemented. A review of on-campus backup sites is underway (as of the publication of this report), and options will be identified by the beginning of the Fall 2026 semester. Non-Brown owned or occupied sites are also being explored but will require additional coordination to identify and generate agreements with partner organizations. Training will take place during the Fall 2026 semester.

D. TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY

Over the years, Brown has made substantial investments in the tools and technology that improve safety and security on campus, such as video cameras, blue-light phones and digital access control systems for University buildings. Additional investments include expanded shuttle bus services and campus lighting. These investments have continued since Dec. 13. As technology evolves and the campus grows, the University is committed to maintaining sound processes for deciding which tools and technologies to use, and how to address data privacy and other concerns that may be raised by newer technologies.

Brown University has largely aligned its campus infrastructure with best practices despite a challenging open urban environment. The external reviews generated recommendations on how Brown can enhance its use of tools and technologies while preserving appropriately open access to and throughout campus for students, employees, alumni and community members. Major recommendations include the following:

D1. **Optimize the number and placement of security cameras and video-enabled blue-light phones on campus:** The biannual DPSEM Community Survey conducted in spring 2026 revealed that 53% of faculty, students and staff respondents would feel safer on campus if there were more exterior security cameras. As noted earlier in this report, Brown had previously invested heavily in video cameras as a central part of its safety and security plan. The University increased the number of security cameras on campus by 200% over a period of 13 years, from approximately 400 in 2012 to 1,200 by early December 2025, prior to the shooting. Using the building-by-building assessment conducted by COSECURE in the weeks following the shooting, Brown immediately began a full review of the placement of security cameras across campus to identify areas where coverage could be strengthened. Over the course of the Spring 2026 semester, Brown installed additional security cameras in key areas, including at Barus and Holley. As of the publication of this report, the total number of cameras is now 1,942 (more than triple the number in 2012), and more installations are underway, including the recently completed installation of safety cameras at all points of ingress and egress at all undergraduate residence halls, and the installation of Tier 3 cameras discussed below.

The University's expansion of security cameras has prioritized maintaining a consistent standard across buildings with similar uses and profiles. This included expanding the placement of cameras across a category of buildings that meet criteria for hosting sensitive research, housing critical infrastructure or hosting large members of the public (categorized as "Tier 3" facilities). These spaces historically had varying levels of camera coverage based on their past use, but the work spanning spring 2026 involved bringing them into alignment with a defined standard, including coverage at key points of ingress and egress. In summer 2026, the University also established a uniform standard for cameras at student residential facilities and recently completed work to install safety cameras at all points of ingress and egress for all Brown undergraduate residence halls. The external reviews found that the Brown community occasionally faces challenges within residence halls regarding unauthorized building entry, propped doors and tailgating. This is common on campuses nationwide, and cameras may serve as a powerful visual deterrent and can provide crucial support for rapid investigative follow-up.

In addition, the implementation of plans to upgrade blue light phones to include embedded camera technology, which was approved in 2025, was accelerated following the shooting. A top priority has been to ensure a thoughtful, consistent approach to cameras that supports both safety and operational effectiveness across campus. Nevertheless, the expansion of safety technology has brought forward critical and valid questions regarding personal privacy, as reflected in community feedback during the Spring 2026 semester (see *Action D2* below). In the future, the Safety and Security Steering Committee will have responsibility for developing campus-wide standards for video coverage and a streamlined process for assessing requests for additional coverage, as well as making recommendations for replacement of cameras with improved technology over time.

> **STATUS:** Partially implemented. Between Dec. 13, 2025, and the publication of this report, Brown installed over 700 new security cameras and upgraded blue light phones. By the start of fall semester, the total number of cameras on campus will be approximately 2,000.

D2. **Develop and publish a formal policy for the use and storage of video images:** DPSEM has long operated under an internal policy establishing department practices regarding closed-circuit television (CCTV) protocols. The internal policy established the duration for which camera footage would be stored and the situations in which video footage could be used. The campus has developed a public-facing, University-level policy that governs the operation and use

of security cameras on campus. This policy addresses Brown community concerns about privacy and the need to protect the community from inappropriate uses of video footage. This will allow members of the Brown community to have an opportunity to express concerns and provide feedback.

STATUS: Implemented. On Aug. 7, Brown issued a Security Camera Oversight and Recording Retention Policy, which is available on the University policy website to all members of the campus community. This policy will be reviewed by the Campus Safety Advisory Committee (as discussed in *Action F2*) in the fall of 2026, after which the University will make any needed revisions.

D3. **Body-worn cameras:** In the coming year, Brown will conduct a formal assessment of whether to adopt body-worn cameras. This assessment will involve collecting information on the experiences of peer institutions that use body-worn cameras and getting feedback from Brown students, faculty and staff, including DPSEM employees. It will also involve a review of best practices for how officers use body-worn cameras and how video captured by body-worn cameras may be used.

STATUS: In progress. The assessment of body-worn cameras will begin in fall 2026 and will be completed by May 2027.

D4. **Access controls:** Since Dec. 13, Brown added card-swipe readers to a small number of buildings that did not previously have them. This project had been approved in 2025 prior to the shooting and was accelerated. The Safety and Security Steering Committee is charged with developing campus-wide policies for building access, with the goal of establishing an approach that balances security requirements with the need for members of the Brown community, as well as alumni and other visitors, to make use of the campus. The Steering Committee will also regularly assess technologies for access controls (beyond Brown's current card-swipe system) and make recommendations for upgrading technology for exterior and interior doors.

STATUS: Implemented. Card-swipe readers have been installed where necessary, and the Steering Committee has been charged with approving access control policies and assessing technologies.

D5. **Improve lighting on campus:** In the DPSEM Community Survey conducted in spring 2026, 52% of faculty, staff and student respondents reported that better lighting on campus would make them feel safer. (This was second only to additional cameras outside of buildings.) Based on a comprehensive lighting assessment conducted as part of the external review process, Brown will conduct a comprehensive analysis to identify potential enhancements and changes to the current lighting fixtures and technology, and develop a proposal for phasing in improvements over time. This is in addition to the regular annual lighting survey already conducted each year by DPSEM and Facilities and Campus Operations.

STATUS: In progress. The lighting analysis will begin in September 2026. The Facilities and Campus Operations team is currently reviewing firms to conduct the study. It will be completed by March 2027.

E. PARTNERSHIPS WITH EXTERNAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

Brown's campus is embedded in the city of Providence, and the Providence Police Department (PPD) maintains concurrent jurisdiction over the University campus. Due to this close relationship, strong collaboration and coordination with PPD is essential for maintaining safety and security at Brown. Addressing crime on or near campus also sometimes requires collaboration with other external law enforcement organizations, such as the FBI and state police, as well as the Rhode Island Fusion Center and the New England State Police Information Network, which provide information that is critical for assessing external threats.

While DPSEM sustains a cooperative relationship with PPD, the strategic planning process discussed in *Action B1* will seek PPD leaders' input to consider how best to leverage this relationship to enhance the development of DPSEM personnel and to address challenges that may arise in situations requiring interdepartmental coordination. With the appointment of Chief Clements, a former chief of the PPD, Brown is well positioned to build systems supporting a stronger relationship with PPD. Major actions the University will undertake include the following:

E1. **Establish a framework for joint training:** Brown will develop and implement regularly scheduled joint training sessions and professional development opportunities that involve local law enforcement. One external reviewer noted that, in the course of its review, numerous individuals commented about the value of a June 2025 training organized by DPSEM for an active shooter situation, which involved PPD and other local organizations involved in emergency response. The University will partner with PPD and other agencies to develop additional and regular joint training to support joint readiness to respond to a range of plausible emergency scenarios. Training opportunities such as this increase the professionalism and expertise of both departments, build interpersonal relationships between personnel, and enhance joint readiness to respond to a range of plausible emergency scenarios.

    STATUS: In progress. This work will be integrated with the development of the training plan discussed in *Action B3*.

E2. **Provide PPD officers with better tools to navigate the campus:** Brown's building portfolio includes approximately 300 buildings, a number of which do not front city streets. In addition, members of the Brown community frequently refer to buildings by nicknames that are not known to people outside the Brown community. While this did not delay medical treatment of the injured at the scene of the shooting on Dec. 13, it can pose challenges in the ability of local law enforcement to respond to emergencies on campus. Brown will offer annual training for PPD on the use of the existing Brown map app, which includes building addresses, as well as on building locations and common nicknames; encourage campus community members to contact DPSEM in emergencies, as Brown officers are best equipped to understand building locations and nicknames; and launch a review in fall 2026 of campus signage standards to identify any adjustments that would enhance emergency response.

    STATUS: In progress. Brown has incorporated campus navigation training into the upcoming training platform for the coming year. Implementation and strategy for the training will take place during fall 2026.

E3. **Evaluate Brown's participation in the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC):** Brown has been invited to participate in Providence's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), an integrated hub for live crime data — such as 911 calls and video footage — designed to enable real-time intelligence sharing with the PPD by police agencies that opt in. Participating would make it possible for Brown to give PPD instantaneous access to relevant Brown-stored video after a crime has occurred. This would assist in the investigation of crimes that occur on or near campus. Brown has decided to join the RTCC provided it can develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Providence that ensures an activation-based system enabling Brown to activate sharing of video information and to retain control of the video data on its own servers; there is agreement about the circumstances under which video information would be shared with PPD; Brown exclusively determines which technology and video feeds are shared; and all shared access is time-stamped, permitting auditing and community reporting on the frequency and circumstances of sharing of video images. Brown will work with PPD on an MOU that meets these conditions. The Campus Safety Advisory Committee will be asked to provide input on the governance of Brown's participation in the RTCC.

    STATUS: Partially implemented. By the end of the Fall 2026 semester, and building on the technological requirements Brown has identified, the University will determine the appropriate conditions for joining the RTCC through an agreement with PPD.

E4. **Strengthen broader emergency management and safety partnerships with Providence-area organizations:** While Brown has positive partnerships with several organizations throughout Providence, there is an opportunity to enhance communication, training and emergency preparedness with entities that are not law enforcement agencies. This includes, but is not limited to, other higher education institutions, K-12 schools, the business community, faith-based organizations and social service partners, particularly those near or adjacent to Brown buildings and facilities. Brown will develop during the academic year a formalized framework for advancing safety and emergency preparedness through streamlined communications channels, training and other opportunities for partnership.

STATUS: Partially implemented. Brown has initiated early conversations with community organizations and will develop a framework no later than the end of the 2026-27 academic year.

F. COMMUNITY OUTREACH AND ENGAGEMENT

Brown's approach to safety and security is informed by the views and perceptions of Brown's stakeholders. In addition, this Action Plan reflects a commitment to ensuring that Brown's faculty, students, staff and community partners are all supported in participating in authorized activities with appropriate safety and security measures in place to promote mutual care. The actions reflecting this commitment include the following:

F1. **Regular training and advisories related to campus safety protocols and resources:** As noted previously in this report, Brown regularly shares information with its community about available resources supporting crime prevention and emergency management (including apps like Rave Guardian and other resources for reporting suspicious activity or summoning police for assistance, as well as guidance on preparedness and response on the BrownReady website and in the Emergency Action Plan). These tools, including the Rave Guardian App and community-facing advisories outlining available resources and key preparedness policies, will continue to be shared with the Brown community regularly as part of this Safety and Security Action Plan. In the coming months, the Safety and Security Steering Committee will review, update and distribute advisories related to key preparedness protocols, including clear guidance related to when campus or community stakeholders should use 911 or 4-111 to report an emergency to Brown DPSEM. Campus leaders will continue to underscore in campus communications the resources and protocols for reporting suspicious behavior. The new Safety and Security Steering Committee, with input from the new Campus Safety Advisory Committee, will advise on the most effective ways to ensure campus community members have clarity on these protocols, and that non-affiliates, such as vendors, have clear written expectations regarding reporting of safety concerns or suspicious behavior.

STATUS: In progress.

F2. **Campus Safety Advisory Committee:** Brown will establish a Campus Safety Advisory Committee composed of faculty, staff and students. The committee will serve as a bidirectional forum for communication and engagement on all aspects of safety and security at Brown. It will provide an opportunity for the Safety and Security Steering Committee to seek community perspectives on proposed initiatives, policies, priorities and investments. It will also serve as a mechanism through which faculty, staff and student representatives may elevate emerging issues, identify concerns, highlight opportunities for improvements and share observations regarding the campus environment. The Advisory Committee will also meet annually with the Brown University Community Council (BUCC) as a mechanism to engage additional campus constituents.

STATUS: Partially implemented. A charge for this group has been developed, and in September 2026, the President will ask the governing groups within the University (e.g. the Faculty Executive Committee, the Staff Advisory Council, and student government groups) to nominate individuals to serve on this committee.

F3. **Develop strategies to improve access to facilities requiring card access for authorized visitors:** Numerous visitors, including alumni, guests, prospective students and local community members, are welcomed to campus on a daily basis. Access controls that require Brown ID cards may hamper the access of these valued visitors to Brown. Currently, departments that need to provide temporary card access for campus visitors may do so through the Sponsored ID Program. In addition, Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) faculty teaching at Brown and RISD students enrolled in courses at Brown are eligible to receive a Brown ID card. The University is exploring an expansion of the Brown Alumni Card program to extend card access and privileges beyond the library-focused access currently provided.

STATUS: In progress. Determining the expansion of the existing Alumni Card program will be complete by October 2026.

CONCLUSION

The external reviews of Brown's response to the tragic events of Dec. 13, 2025, highlighted several areas where Brown can and should enhance and fortify safety and security on campus. It is important to acknowledge the professionalism and expertise of the reviewers — Teneo Risk and COSECURE — in providing a comprehensive and extensive analysis and recommendations. The reviews answered important questions regarding Brown's response to past events, but the enduring contributions rest in the ways the findings will continue to strengthen Brown's security model for the future.

The reviews revealed how, despite decades of ever-increasing investment in safety and security, Brown can — and will — take even greater steps to improve how we prepare for and respond to future mass casualty events, including how our community works together to coordinate resources and operations. A key aspect of this work also is equipping every member of our community to play a role in preparedness and deterrence. Even as this report outlines key actions and commitments for strengthening administrative operations and procedures, as well as the security for the physical campus, it also offers areas where Brown as a community can participate in maintaining a safe environment, such as training, reporting suspicious behavior and helping to support access controls.

It is important to acknowledge the contributions the Brown community already has made to Brown's safety future by providing feedback that informed the development of this report. The report is responsive to concerns and perspectives surfaced through focus groups, listening sessions, community meetings and a community survey. These modes of collecting input will continue in the future. As noted in the action plan, Brown also is preparing to establish a Campus Safety Advisory Committee that will include representation from students, faculty and staff to help inform a model of security that continues to reflect the evolving needs of the community. Brown is committed to maintaining a sophisticated and resilient model of campus safety. Through the actions set forth in this *Safety and Security Overview and Action Plan*, we are building a model for safety and security that is grounded in best practices while also being community-centered — built through preparation, partnership and a shared commitment to continual improvement.