Pedro Dal Bó

Contact Information:
Department of Economics
Brown University
64 Waterman St.
Providence, RI 02912
Telephone: 401 863 2953


Recent Publications:


Working Papers:

  • In Strategy Choice In The Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Guillaume Fréchette, we use a novel experimental design to identify the strategies used by subjects in an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiment. We ask subjects to design strategies that will play in their place. The strategies chosen by the subjects include some commonly mentioned strategies, such as tit-for-tat and Grim trigger. We use the elicited strategies to validate estimates of strategy prevalence based on round by round cooperative decisions. (Online Appendix)

  • In The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation with Enrique Pujals, we study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population and that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate.

  • In The Democracy Effect: a weights-based identification strategy with Andrew Foster and Kenju Kamei, we provide a new methodology to measure the direct effect of democracy.

To participate in experiments go to BUSSEL