Discussion points
- We will dedicate the first half of the class discussing questions of agency in archaeology, particularly with the help of Dobres and Dornan. I am particularly interested in the impact of agency paradigm on archaeological thought, particularly deriving from Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, habitus, structures, and complexities of human action; and Giddens's theory of structuration. How did the intoduction of agency as a research conception bring about a critique of systemic, ecological approaches to ancient societies for instance, and their behaviourist explanations? Why has there been a move from "behaviour" to "performance"? What is the difference between them in thinking about cultural practices?
- One of the interesting ways that agency issue has been useful in archaeological practice is thinking about "technology". Technique, or technology is a dull, mechanical process amongst processual archaeologists, where the craftsmen are imprisoned in the technical knowledge passed down to them from their masters and ancestors, the tradition. Agency theory opens up a new vision where processes of making things are also impacted by the very specific decisions made by the craftsmen themselves as social actors, agents, and thus innovation becomes possible. Serendipidity and accident is very much of part of this process (the so-called chain of operations- after Leroi Gourhan). Talking about bodies of technological knowledge, and the processes of making things is an excellent way of rethinking Bourdieu's habitus in relation to the intenstionality of individual actors.
- How does Alfred Gell's enchanted technologies operate, and what is its contribution to the agency paradigm? I am hoping that Keffie and Marguerite will pose us interesting questions relating to Winter and Nakamura's work in the light of Gell's anthropological theory of art(ifact).
- Just wondering, is it possible for a material object to have agency without having it ascribed to it by human means or does the fact that an object is made by human hands automatically result in the human ascription/marking of agency to the material world?
- If I (Omur) may add something to this question, which I think is critical... When speaking about the relationship between people and material culture, Dobres and Robb point to two different academic positions (p. 12). One position prioritizes the agency of the individual and her/his intentionality, such that "the material world is created and manipulated by more or less freely acting individuals" and suggests that material artifacts are essentially "inactive traces, residues or correlates of particular kinds of human activity and agency". On the other front are the material culturists who suggest that "meanings and values, histories and biographies, even personhood and agency can be attributed to material things". Therefore material artifacts in this perspective are not passive, secondary beings but active agents in the making of the world. I think the question above raises the dichotomy between these two positions: are artifacts residual indexes of human agency or do they have agency on their own independent of human attribution? See also Dornan 319-322. Where do we place Gell, Winter, Nakamura in this spectrum?
- Following from this last question, both Gell and Nakamura discuss (at length) the processes by which agentic objects are produced by humans. However, I found both of their dicussions lacking in the attention to performances surrounding and involving these objects after their conception. Both of the examples--Trobriand prow boards for Gell, and Neo-Assyrian figurines for Nakamura--are objects that are continuoulsy involved in relationships with humans, other objects, the ocean, the dirt, and I wonder how those changing relations change their agentic qualities. Thoughts?
- Nakamura touches on the point briefly, but I think we can further draw out the interconnection between the efficacy of objects and human memory (individual and collective). How does this work with the example of the interred Neo-Assyrian figurines?
- There is a question posted in the discussion page from the Material Worlds class in which a quote from Gell's book, Art and Agency, is presented: Gell views "art as a system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it." Irene J. Winter largely draws upon Gell's 'anthropological' theories of art in her analysis of Mesopotamian artifacts relating/recounting/narrating Gudea's rebuilding of the temple Eninnu. She explores the affective power of such objects vis-a-vis their imagery as well as their text. Do you feel that Winter's approach to agency in terms of viewing them through images and words falls into Gell's perception of art as standing as a system of action, or does she also fall into the trap of interpreting the agency of objects as symbolic representations of human and/or divine agency?
- Winter: "...material objects were conceived as animate, hence as having the same agency as living entities. This was achieved largely through ritual consecration, in a system of belief that allowed for the transfer of personhood and/or divinity into physical matter." How does this fall into Gell's interpretation of agency? Is this too a symbolic interpretation for the object does not have, but is given?
- Not necessarily. Gell believes consecration rites are a means to understanding the combination of internal and externa agency that art/objects have. External agency is given to the object from human manipulation while internal agency is inherent in the object through its own physical appearance and form. What are the Mesopotamian artifacts' internal and external agencies and how do they function?
- Winter defines the ascription of agency to works of art as: "artworks may be considered the equivalent of persons, capable of acting on and for their social universes, both psychologically and physically." In my opinion, by the defining agency in terms of action, we cannot think of agency without considering performance. The two go hand and hand, no? Winter herself states that the "stele itself performs politically, exterting its agency upon the viewing public..." In what ways does an object such as the stele perform? Is performance the means by which the material world communicates and interacts with the social one?
- Does the juxtaposition of text with images give the Mesopatamian stele and cylinders more potent agency? Can there be varying degrees of agency?
Bibliography for the ambitious