Killing of Ayatollah Is Start of Iraqi
Civil War
Commentary, William O. Beeman,
Pacific News
Service, Aug 29, 2003
The bombing of one of Islam's holiest shrines not only killed an important
Shi'a leader, it also signals the first shot in an Iraqi civil war that Middle
East experts warned would ensue if Saddam were removed without careful
planning.
The assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir
al-Hakim in Najaf on August 28 is the opening volley
in the coming Iraqi Civil War. The United States will reap the whirlwind.
One of the most consistent and ominous prewar warnings to the Bush
administration by Middle East experts was that removal of Saddam Hussein
without the most careful political and social engineering would result in the
breaking apart of Iraq into warring factions that would battle each other for
decades.
The hawks in the White House would not listen. They were so wedded to the
fantasy scenario that the removal of Saddam in an act of "creative
destruction" would result in the automatic emergence of democracy. They
brushed aside all warnings.
Present-day Iraq was three provinces of the Ottoman Empire before World War I. It was cobbled together by the British for their own
convenience after that conflict. The British installed a king, the son of the
chief religious official of Mecca (Faisal, of Lawrence of Arabia Fame) and glued the whole mess together
with the resident British Army.
The three regions were incompatible in ethnicity, religious confession and
interests. The Sunni Muslim Kurds occupied the north. The Sunni Arab Bedouins
occupied the center and Southwest. The Shi'a Arab and Persian population
occupied the South and Southeast. Of the three groups, the Shi'a were largest, with 60 percent of the population. With oil,
an outlet to the Persian Gulf and good agricultural land, they would be the natural dominant force in
the state the British created. The Kurds would be important, too, because they
lived in the region of the country with the largest oil reserves.
However, the British wanted the Sunni Arabs, the smallest faction of the
population, to be dominant. They wanted this both to
reward the Arabians for helping them fight the Ottomans, and because they had
existing clients in the sheikhs who ruled the Arab states of the Gulf.
When the British were finally expelled, and their Saudi ruling family deposed
in Iraq in a 1958 nationalist coup, the new Ba'athist
Iraqi nationalist rulers had a supremely unruly nation on their hand. The only
way to keep power in Sunni Arab hands, and away from
the Shi'ites was through ruthless dictatorship and oppression. Saddam Hussein
was the supreme master of this political strategy.
Ayatollah al-Hakim's family was victimized by this oppression. Virtually every
one of the Ayatollah's male relatives was executed by Saddam's regime. He fled
to Iran for years of exile, returning only after Saddam was deposed by the United States. He became one of the principal leaders of the Shi'a community, and a
symbol of rising Shi'a power in post-War Iraq. His triumphant
return to Iraq and the holy city of Najaf was one of the most
celebrated events in recent Iraqi history.
It is still not known who set off the explosion that killed him at the shrine
of Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad. It could have been Sunni
Arab factions who fear the rise of Shi'a dominance in Iraq, or it could have
been his own Shi'a supporters, disappointed with him for cooperating with
American policies in Iraq. Or it could have
been someone else. What is clear is that his death will now forever be a
rallying cry for the Shi'ite community against its
enemies.
It is notable that in Shi'ism virtually all
significant leaders have been "martyred." Of the 12 historical Imams
of the Ithna 'ashara branch
of Shi'ism dominant in Iraq and Iran (Ithna
'ashara means "twelve" in Arabic), ten are
buried in shrines in Iraq. Their tombs are
ever-present reminders of the oppression and struggle of the Shi'a. Now
Ayatollah al-Hakim will join them, and with the power of a saint, will inspire
generations of grimly dedicated young warriors, determined to wreak vengeance
and assert the power of their community. They will be led by his
own paramilitary group, the Badr brigade.
Shi'a fury will be directed at the Sunnis to the north. It will also be
directed toward United States as the occupying force who both did nothing to prevent this tragedy, and
further continued the British doctrine of Sunni favoritism by insisting that
the Shi'a religious leaders would never be allowed to come to power. In any
case, the forces of retribution are about to be unleashed in a manner hitherto
unseen in the region.
Could the United States have done anything to have prevented this tragedy? Of course it could
have. As the occupying power U.S. officials knew
acutely about the danger to Ayatollah al-Hakim. Since Washington opposed the rise of
Shi'a power in Iraq, charges of American indifference or even complicity in his death will
soon be flying.
The final question Washington must now face is how to stop this inevitable civil war? When the factional
shooting starts, where does the U.S. army, caught in the
crossfire, aim its own guns?
William O. Beeman, Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. He is author of the forthcoming book, Iraq: State in Search of a Nation.
©2003 William O. Beeman and Pacific News Service. All
rights reserved. This article may be freely distributed or broadcast for any
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