David Christensen's Papers

“Formulating Independence” , in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays edited by M. S. Rasmussen and A. Steglich-Petersen,  Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

“On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case,” Marc Sanders Lecture, Proceedings and Addressed of the American Philosophical Association (forthcoming)

"Disagreement, Drugs, etc: from Accuracy to Akrasia" , Episteme (2016): 397-422 (https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.20)

"Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity " , Noûs 50, 3 (2014): 584-603 (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nous.12077)

"Disagreement and Public Controversy", in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press (2014)

"Epistemic Modesty Defended", in The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press (2013)

"Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism", Philosophers’ Imprint 11, (6) (2011)

"Rational Reflection", Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), 121-140 

"Higher-Order Evidence", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2010), 185-215 

"Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy", Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), 756-67

"Epistemic Self-Respect", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2007), 319-337

"Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2 (2007), 3-31 

"Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News", Philosophical Review 116 (2007), 187-217 

"Three Questions about Leplin's Reliabilism", Philosophical Studies 134 (2007), 43-50

"Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism", Philosophy of Science 68 (2001), 356-76 

"Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality", Philosophical Review 109 (2000), 349-71

"Measuring Confirmation", Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), 437-61  

"What is Relative Confirmation?" Noûs 31 (1997), 370-84

"Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori", Philosophical Studies 86 (1997), 1-20 (with Hilary Kornblith)

"Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers", Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996), 450-79

"Critical Study of Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality", Noûs 29 (1995), 259-74 

"Conservatism in Epistemology", Noûs 28 (1994), 69-89

"Switched-Words Skepticism: a Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument", Philosophical Studies 71 (1993), 33-58 (Springer)

"Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993), 301-21

"Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology", Philosophy of Science 59 (1992), 540-57

"Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections", Analysis 52 (1992), 163-68.

"Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs", Philosophical Review 100 (1991), 229-47

"The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping", Philosophy of Science 57 (1990), 644-62

"Glymour on Evidential Relevance", Philosophy of Science 50 (1983), 471-81