objective standpoint that transcends the subjectivity of limited perspectives. In the *Persian Letters*, this expanded mind is manifest in a critique of political tyranny and sexual inequalities, and support for secular morality and religious toleration, and in Voltaire it appears as an argument to the effect that the threat to social order comes not from atheists but from the idolatry of religious zealots who worship a God in whose name they persecute others. The same is found in Hume’s cultivation of a genial scepticism as a response to the impossibility of rationally justified preferences, while in Smith, the cosmopolitan moment is enacted in the formation of a secular moral consciousness, and in sympathy as a reconciliation of differences that otherwise limit the capacity for fellow-feeling. In the *Encyclopédie*, the same is expressed as an appeal for a balance between reason and passion, and in *Rameau’s Nephew*, finally, in a full-throated celebration of emotion, an openness both to what is new and to the vulnerability that attends such an attitude.

In these moments, and by the end of the book, the reader might feel the shadows of the Enlightenment lift a little and dissipate, at least partially, to provide a glimpse of the future that, from the vantage of their eighteenth-century home, these writers saw ahead. Much potential has been squandered in the interim, but cautious as she is, Lloyd does acknowledge the presence of those other benign shadows—hope in a future and inspiration from the past—who suggest that the adventure has not yet ended: the Enlightenment remains an ongoing activity and should not be abandoned, albeit undertaken with full knowledge of the darker shadows that will always attend the journey.

Timothy M. Costelloe

*College of William & Mary*

© 2014 Timothy M. Costelloe

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.888753


In this ingenious book Philip Pettit elaborates a conception of democratic governance as part of the broad theory of political freedom that he has developed in a series of books and many articles. He resourcefully pursues several agendas here: some about the proper form of government institutions; some about the proper content of policy; and some about the philosophical structure of the justification of democracy. After a brief look at the central idea of freedom as non-domination, in this short review I limit myself to discussing that third group of agendas.

The normatively central brand of freedom, according to Pettit, is an agent’s being outside of any other agent’s power to interfere in her choices. That power, which Pettit calls ‘domination’, is a deficit of freedom even when the power to interfere goes unexercised. Rather than asking what might justify that relation, Pettit more ambitiously asks what social arrangements might avoid it altogether. His answer is that the relationship would not be troubling if that agent could no longer interfere arbitrarily or at will. A subject-controlled power of interference can be justified if (perhaps among other things) the power to interfere is (in certain ways) under the control of the person subject to the interference. This is not a justification of domination, but an absence of it. The question I want to press is how the absence of domination in this sense could be enough to justify the (even democratic) power of the collective over individuals.
The moral and political centrality of this ‘republican’ conception of freedom takes up much of Chapter 1, ‘Freedom as Non-Domination’. Chapter 2, ‘Social Justice’, distinguishes between justice and legitimacy, and considers the implications of the value of non-domination for the former question: what policies ought governments to implement? This is treated separately from the question of what procedures government may use in determining its policies, which Pettit (in the title of Chapter 3) calls the question of ‘Political Legitimacy’. He argues that a government is legitimate only if it is, in certain ways, democratic. One element of our thought about democracy involves (in the title of Chapter 4) ‘Democratic Influence’—the sensitivity of policy to citizens’ preferences, choices, and attitudes. As essential as that is, Pettit insists, in Chapter 5, ‘Democratic Control’, that the influence must be of a special sort, giving a coherent direction to government policy rather than merely being a cause of it willy-nilly. There is, finally, a useful summarizing chapter.

Why, we might ask, isn’t interference itself really where the action is? Consider an analogy: deadly diseases are a bad thing. It is derivatively a bad thing if I am not safe or secure against them. This derivative bad thing—the vulnerability—is present even if no deadly disease ever eventuates. The badness of disease is, we might say, most of the explanation for the badness of living under its threat. Why not say, in parallel fashion, that it is primarily (arbitrary) interference in my choices that is bad in a certain way, and this is what explains the disvalue in living under its threat? Why isn’t the latter disvalue penumbral, a wholly derivative kind of disvalue, resting on the disvalue of the things that might eventuate?

Vulnerability to disease is not, in itself, a kind of interpersonal relation, of course, while vulnerability to interference is. This interpersonal aspect might explain how the disvalue of domination is not as wholly derivative as the disvalue of vulnerability generally. There, in the domination relation, is a new and morally salient aspect that is not present in the interference itself: it is now an unequal social status among ostensibly morally equal individuals. Still, it is hard to see how this status consisting in a power of arbitrary interference would be troubling unless there was something troubling about arbitrary interference itself. So why isn’t that the heart of the matter?

Derivative or not, let us grant that the vulnerability of some to arbitrary interference by others is plausibly something to be concerned about—to be either justified or eradicated. Pettit proposes a range of social and political features that would reconcile the existence of state power with the ideal of non-domination (at least of a political kind). Since state interference is not, so long as it is not under an arbitrary power, a poisonous lynchpin that transmits disvalue to the vulnerability to interference, Pettit is in a position to endorse a wide range of state powers of interference. Many of the policies and institutions that are recommended, sometimes only tentatively, are roughly familiar from a social-democratic political outlook, while others are distinctive. Of course, since certain modes of state power might be impossible or undesirable to subject to such control, the non-domination approach can also advocate many outright limits on state power in that way. In principle, the non-interference and non-domination approaches could turn out to coincide in the general contours of the scope of state power that they accept. Pettit argues that this is not, in fact, the case, and the reason is (as it must be) that many areas of potential state power can be placed under the control of the subjects.

Stepping back, consider the long-standing philosophical question of what renders democratic political rule justified (or permissible, authoritative, or legitimate; my points won’t depend on those distinctions). Here are a few families into which many answers have traditionally fallen. One (instrumentalist) approach is based on the good that would be done by democratic arrangements, judged by procedure-independent
standards of value such as substantive social justice. A second (proceduralist) family of views eschews any appeal to procedure-independent standards of good outcomes or effects, but it appeals instead to the intrinsic moral value of the decision-making procedure. This would simply beg the question if the value of the procedure were simply said to be that it is democratic; the question is what is special about democracy. So some accounts locate the value in the procedural fairness (to individuals as participants) of certain democratic processes. An alternative set of proceduralist accounts (autonomist, let’s call it) says that, apart from any fairness there might be among participants, democratic procedures leave each individual free or in control after all. Since there is no loss of freedom, there is none that needs justifying. Pettit’s approach appears to be in the autonomist family (a subset of proceduralist views): in a certain kind of democracy citizens remain free because they are not dominated, and this is so because the government’s power of interference is subject to equally distributed popular control. There is no deficit of freedom that needs justifying.

It is clear how the idea of popular control of government emerges as an important possibility for the idea of freedom as non-domination, but it is less clear what it can actually deliver. Pettit argues [57, emphasis added] that

the interference that I or any others practise in a choice of yours will not impose an alien will, and not therefore invade your freedom of choice, to the extent that my discretion in exercising interference is subject to your control.

This extent is tiny in a nation-sized democracy. Clearly, most individuals in a democracy do not control the government’s power except to the most negligible extent. No person’s activism or speech or votes, considered apart from those of others, are likely ever to change a political outcome except in small collectives such as clubs. There is room for doubt, then, about how individuals escape the domination of the democratically controlled collective itself. It might be insisted that rule by the collective, as such, is not any kind of social hierarchy amongst individuals or groups (partly because collective rule under majority rule is not a subset of people with power over the rest, and in turn this is partly because rights to participate in the control are equally given to all individuals). On that basis, maybe it is not troubling in the way that paradigmatic domination is. (I borrow this point from Niko Kolodny, ‘Being Under The Power Of Others’, an unpublished draft.) In any case, Pettit does not seem to take this route, arguing instead that, since our being under state power is overdetermined in a world of states, no state is imposing this situation on us [161ff.]. That point only seems worth making if it is allowed that in principle the collective itself could be (were the case not overdetermined) in a domination relation to its subjects, and so, apparently, even though it would not be a case of social hierarchy. This overdetermination point, however, still offers no answer to the question of what permits or justifies or legitimates the power of any of the collectives over me. In a social world overrun with gangs, I will be under the power of one gang or another, and no gang is responsible for that background fact. But in merely pointing out that, for that reason, this would not be (technically) domination by any gang, the account would not address the question of what could justify any gang’s having such power over individuals. Similarly for the (even democratic) state: even if it is not a social hierarchy, and even if other ruling collectives wait in the wings, how is it that any collective’s control—but not my control—of the state’s power over me justifies, or permits, or legitimates it? So long as this question remains, it is not clear that non-domination is suited to serve as a master value in the evaluation of political relations.

We might call this the problem of the wrong controller. Unless our control is my control, the collective’s power to interfere with me is not under my control even in a
democracy. Rousseau argued that under certain conditions the collective’s will is my will, but Pettit does not make that notorious claim (see [290—1], where he explicitly disavows it). (A different tack, though one fundamentally at odds with Pettit’s aims, I think, would be to admit that the collective’s power of arbitrary interference with me cannot be significantly mitigated by my equal but miniscule share of control, but to argue that such a power can be justified partly by that equal share.) These other two points are of interest in their own right: maybe collective rule over an individual escapes one objection if it avoids being a form of social hierarchy, and avoids another if it happens to be overdetermined that the individual will be ruled by one collective or another. But other resources might be needed in order to explain why and when collective rule over individuals is justified, or legitimate, or authoritative in virtue of its being democratic.

David Estlund

Brown University

© 2014 David Estlund

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.959539


*The World-Time Parallel* is perhaps best seen as a book on the metaphysical applications of indexical semantics. Rini and Cresswell use these tools to argue that there is a ‘structural parallel’ between tense and modality, in the sense that for every argument in the metaphysics of modality (respectively: time) there is a corresponding argument in the metaphysics of time (respectively: modality), with both arguments having the same structure. To the extent that the validity of arguments is a structural matter, these parallel arguments will fare the same as far as validity is concerned. What is meant to follow from this parallel is not, in general, made clear. There are some questions, such as the ontological status of worlds and times, where such a parallel would seem to rule out some possible positions (such as being an eternalist and an actualist). We will put this issue to one side in this review, though, preferring to focus on more specific issues.

The book itself is split into four parts followed by five technical appendices. Parts I and II set up the required technical background on indexical semantics for mixed modal and temporal languages, as well as introducing the particular formal languages which are used throughout the rest of the book. These first two parts argue that there is a logical parallel between temporal and modal languages, in the sense that adequate modal and temporal languages will have equivalent expressive power. These initial chapters offer quite a gentle introduction to philosophically motivated indexical semantics (and chapter 7 proves to be a particularly pleasant discussion of linguistic motivations for enhancing the expressive power of modal and temporal languages by introducing analogues of Hans Kamp’s ‘now’ and ‘then’ operators). Parts III and IV of the book go on to make use of the logical parallel established in Parts I and II in order to deal with various issues which threaten the world time parallel. These chapters are far more heterogeneous, covering topics including various forms of primitivism concerning modal/temporal operators [chs 9—10], the argument against the world-time parallel presented in Evans [1985: ch. 12] and the connections between supervenience and causation [ch. 17]. The chapters in the second half of the