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Daniel Carrigg PhD Job Market Title: The Politics of Community Health Centers: Policy Feedback wit Elite and Geographic Effects |
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Nicholas Geiser PhD [email protected] CV
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William Kring PhD Job Market Title: Contesting the IMF?: Regional Battles for Global Liquidity |
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Ferris Lupino PhD [email protected] CV
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Cory Manento Job Market Title: Party Crashers: Interest Groups as a Latent Threat to Party Networks in Congressional Primaries |
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Rachel Meade PhD Job Market Title: Mobilization through Antagonism: Populist Identity Formation in Trump's American and Kirchner's Argentina |
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Sean Monahan [email protected] CV Job Market Title: The Right to Work and the American Left |
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Erik Peinert PhD [email protected] CV Job Market Title: Monopoly Politics: Price Competition and Learning in the Evolution of Policy Regimes Abstract: Many advanced industrial states have experienced a series of long-term policy alternations between favoring price competition and promoting the market power of dominant firms. Based on extensive, original archival evidence in the United States and France, I challenge existing conventional wisdom regarding "national models" of political economy and the origins of economic policy change. I draw on insights from microeconomics, psychology, sociology, and bureaucratic politics to argue that policymakers are drawn to simple mental models of competition or market power that forestall policy reconsideration and predispose leaders to see policies in simple terms of whether they promote competition or not. The endurance of, and eventual changes to, these policy regimes occur primarily because of accumulating diminishing returns to competition or market power, which are initially ignored by policymakers committed to the policy regime. As questions about the dominance of American technology giants rise in public salience, this research provides important theoretical and historical foundations to these ongoing political debates |
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Michelle Rose PhD [email protected] CV Job Market Title: The Art of Democratic Living: Recovering Alain Locke's Politics of Aesthetics Abstract: The famous debate between Alain LeRoy Locke and W.E.B. Du Bois over the proper function of art in society—art or propaganda—is typically read by students of politics as a victory for Du Bois. Against the trends in contemporary literature that adopt Du Bois's penchant for propaganda and assume a strictly instrumental relationship between aesthetics and politics, my dissertation argues for a reassessment of Locke's take on aesthetics as a "tap root" for flourishing democratic living. Locke, I contend, is not merely defending "art for art's sake" as a creative freedom owed to artists, he is arguing for a more robust conception of democratic citizenship and collective democratic life which is predicated on the intelligent deployment of aesthetic sensibilities. The dissertation employs methods of historical contextualization, uses both published and unpublished materials from archives, and engages with contemporary interpretations. For Locke, romantic democratic theory in the vain of Walt Whitman and Frederick Douglass combines with the realism and pragmatism of Williams James, Walter Lippmann, and John Dewey, as well as the avant-garde spirit of Walter Pater and Emile Verhaeren to produce an original account of individual and collective agency, and the peculiar problems of value in democracy. Locke's thought speaks to early-twentieth century grappling with "the problem of social value," to use Christopher Lebron's phrase, or the "value gap," in Eddie Glaude's terminology, that remains in need of attention, response, and discussion today. Recovery of Alain Locke's politics of aesthetics enriches our understanding of democracy's pitfalls and promises and opens new possibilities for thinking about the relationship of affect, aesthetics, and politics in our contemporary moment. |
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Jan Stockbruegger [email protected] CV Job Market Title: The Logic of Restraint Why Hegemons Build Rules-Based Orders at Sea Abstract: Do hegemons build rules-based orders to constrain their power? I argue that rules-based orders are not a liberal fantasy. Yet hegemons do not construct such orders because they are strong, but because they aren’t strong enough to dominate other actors completely. Weak hegemons have incentives to constrain their power and to build institutions that regulate international behavior. This logic explains order at sea. I argue that ‘free’ maritime orders do not emerge when a hegemon protects freedom of navigation, but when it builds institutions – such as laws of naval warfare regimes - that restrict its ability to dominate the oceans. I provide quantitative evidence for my theory from a new dataset of maritime orders that includes all maritime orders over the last 500 years. I also shed light on the causal logic of my theory through an investigation of the maritime order-building strategies of Habsburg Spain,Britain in the 19th century, and the U.S. during the Cold War. My paper shows that military-economic structures force hegemons to exercise restraint and to build cooperative international environments. Rules-based orders are rare and short-lived, but they contribute to peace and security at sea. |
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Timothy Turnbull PhD Job Market Title: Coercion and Coalitions: The Sources of US Sanctions |
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Sanne Verschuren [email protected] CV
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Gauri Wagle Job Market Title: Counterimagination and the Imperfect Politics of Freedom |
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Aaron Weinstein PhD Job Market Title: A Theology of Consensus: Occupy Wall Street's Civil Religion of hte Nones |
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Liza Williams PhD Job Market Title: Ethico-Political Practices of Immigrant Inclusion |